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Summary 
Since 2009, regulators worldwide have conducted large-scale stress tests to reveal 
systemically important banks’ soundness to financial markets. Regulators aim to enforce 
market discipline that penalises excessive risk-taking and requires banks to operate more 
responsibly leading to financial stability. In this thesis, I contribute to this current debate 
by empirically analysing the implications of bank stress tests on three important aspects, 
namely accounting discretion, transparency and market discipline.  
First, based on a unique accounting dataset of stress-tested and untested European 
banks, I reveal that the accounting information of stress-tested banks is affected by stress 
tests. In particular, stress tests incentivise bank managers to exercise accounting 
discretion over loan loss provisions to manage both capital and earnings. The results 
suggest that stress tests exacerbate discretionary behaviour with the purpose of passing 
stress tests and conveying a sound picture of the bank’s financial condition to regulators 
and market participants. 
Second, examining a unique textual dataset of stress-tested European banks, I find that 
stress tests incentivise banks to enrich their textual narratives utilising certain stress test 
terms that I call ‘stress test sentiment’. This effect may specifically apply to newly than 
regularly stress-tested banks. Importantly, banks seem to compensate an increased stress 
test sentiment using a more positive disclosure tone; this may obfuscate market players, 
as market measures indicate lower information asymmetry and more analyst coverage. 
Third, based on a dataset of European and U.S. stress-tested banks, I show that stress 
tests do promote market discipline in both positive and negative directions as well as in 
short- and long-term event windows. In Europe, bank fundamentals are improved in terms 
of reduced bank risk-taking and funding structure, whilst the U.S. results are inconclusive. 
However, stress tests also tend to exacerbate negative performance of weaker institutions, 
due to market discipline, which could unintentionally compromise financial stability. 
In summary, this thesis provides novel results on stress tests that might be of interest 
to policymakers and regulators. I conclude that stress tests are an important addition that 
increases regulatory awareness and can enhance financial stability. However, I also show 
that stress tests may lead to unintended drawbacks on bank accounting practice and 
market discipline. Therefore, stress tests must be paired with a carefully executed 
disclosure policy to be a more effective regulatory tool. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
1.1. Background and main objectives of regulatory stress tests 
The 2008 financial crisis has unravelled severe problems. Most issues are connected 
to inadequate bank liquidity and capital; this has led to bank instabilities, failures, bailouts 
and forced mergers and, in turn, created uncertainty within financial markets. This 
uncertainty has affected the entire economy, as banks play an important role of 
intermediation that stimulates economic growth and wellbeing. Consequently, policy 
makers and regulators have been forced to take drastic measures to mitigate this 
uncertainty and regain the investor’s trust to stabilise the economic system (Wheeler, 
2019; Acharya and Steffen, 2015; Papanikolaou and Wolff, 2014; Flannery et al., 2013). 
The authorities learnt that financial instability is mainly linked to large financial 
institutions because a failure of such institutions causes major shocks in the economy and 
leads to severe meltdowns. For example, large European banks, such as Dexia, Hypo Real 
Estate, Allied Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland and Anglo Irish Bank, to name a few, needed 
emergency financial support to withstand the crisis; this was even though they were 
complying with regulatory requirements (see, Braouezec and Wagalath, 2018 for a 
detailed case study). Before the financial crisis, the general belief was that the economic 
system would be sound if individual banks retained adequate liquidity and capital. 
However, in turmoil, the situation is different from normal economic times. Banks could 
infect one another and hit the markets when they are most vulnerable; this is called 
systemic risk that plays a major role in shaping current financial regulation. For instance, 
the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS) defines a systemically important 
financial institution (SIFI) as an institution that has a specific size, complexity, is highly 
interconnected, hard to substitute and globally active (BCBS, 2018). Financial institutions 
that fulfil these criteria are seen to be too-big-to-fail because a failure would lead to a 
chain reaction that could lead to bankruptcy of other, related institutions, and ultimately 
to the failure of the economic system (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2013; Allen and 
Gale, 2000). 
During the financial crisis, regulators and policy makers were most concerned about 
systemic risk. The dogma that a bank is safe if it fulfils adequate regulatory requirements 
no longer held. Consequently, regulators needed a tool to regain the trust of market 
players. Amongst other amendments to regulatory requirements and policies, regulators 
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in the United States of America (U.S.) and Europe have resorted to large-scale stress tests 
as a standard tool to provide new valuable information and to win back the market’s trust. 
Stress tests were first applied before the financial crisis as an internal self-exercise for the 
bank. In 2009, financial regulators adopted this method to provide market participants 
with additional information that separates sound from unsound banks (Borio et al., 2014; 
Schuermann, 2014). 
In the U.S., stress tests were implemented as a regulatory device with the 2009 
Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP). It tested the 19 largest U.S. financial 
institutions on capital adequacy criteria. The assessment found that half the banks did not 
fulfil the capital requirements, and that banks needed to raise more capital over the 
succeeding six months. This regulatory intervention successfully restored trust of the 
markets and helped to stabilise the economy. As stress tests were a success, in the Dodd-
Frank act that was finalised in July 2010, politicians implemented stress tests as a yearly 
exercise. Therefore, the Federal Reserve conducts Dodd-Frank Stress Tests (DFAST) and 
Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Reviews (CCAR) to test resilience against adverse 
financial shocks during tranquil times, which should maintain the market’s trust.1 
In Europe, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) and the 
succeeding European Banking Authority (EBA) conducted stress tests in 2009, 2010 and 
2011 with similar intention. However, stress tests could not contribute as much to gain 
back control of the financial sector because banks were not obliged to raise capital ratios 
questioning the regulator’s reliability and authority (Schuermann, 2014). In 2014 and 
2015, the European Central Bank (ECB) assessed European SIFIs within the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) member states as part of the induction of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM). Recently, stress tests have become a supporting part of Pillar 2 
(supervisory review) of the Basel Accord.2 In 2016 and 2018, the EBA has used the stress 
test results for the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP). This enables 
regulators and supervisors to understand particular needs of banks and to detect problems 
early. Thus, Pillar 2 complements Pillar 1 (capital requirements) and Pillar 3 (market 
 
1  Detailed information on U.S. stress tests may be accessed on the Federal Reserve website: https:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/dfa-stress-tests.htm. 
2 The Basel Accord, that constitutes regulatory requirements for financial institutions, is currently based on 
the recently finalised Basel III framework. Basel III comprises of three pillars (capital requirements, 
supervisory review and market discipline). The European Parliament has adopted Basel III within the 
Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) and the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR). Details 
about the Basel III framework may be accessed on the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) website: 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm. 
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discipline) that aim to increase bank soundness with more quality and quantity of bank 
capital, as well as well-informed markets that penalise extensive bank risk-taking.3 
Analysing the stress test exercises in Europe and the U.S., Borio et al. (2014) and 
Schuermann (2014) conclude that stress tests may be an effective crisis management tool, 
but cannot be used as an early warning device. Conceptually, both studies claim that the 
success of stress tests in enhancing financial stability depends on the level of credibility 
and the coherence in the implementation of the stress tests. In fact, both are essentially 
easier to achieve during a crisis than in normal economic times. Specifically, regulators 
usually apply a one-size-fits-all approach, although some banks might be more affected 
by the chosen scenario than others. However, selecting a scenario that accommodates all 
banks is more difficult in normal times than during financial distress; this is because 
regulators are required to rely on information about past crises. Therefore, they propose 
that these challenges might be resolved through regulators’ individual judgement or by 
exercising a dual approach that combines top-down with bottom-up criteria. Although 
this dual approach helped in the U.S. to learn about idiosyncratic risks of participating 
banks, it is very difficult to implement in a balanced way. 
On the other hand, owing to these technical weaknesses, regulators might not be able 
to implement credible scenarios and signal the soundness of the financial system during 
normal economic times, which seems to be more a part of the problem than the solution. 
Borio et al. (2014) argue that no stress test conducted prior to the financial crisis of 2008 
was able to detect the risks that banks held in their exposures. Even if regulators were 
able to predict this risk correctly, markets might not have taken them seriously, owing to 
the sentiment and experiences prior to the crisis. Consequently, this signal of soundness 
encouraged all stakeholders with an incorrect perception of safety to continue with their 
high risk-taking practices. 
In support of the above analysis, there is a growing theoretical literature that develops 
a stress test disclosure theory, debating issues around disclosing detailed (i.e., bank-
specific) or aggregated (i.e., summarised) stress test information. The main argument is 
that the positive impact of detailed stress test disclosures appears to be vital during times 
of financial distress, whereas researchers cast doubt on their benefits during normal 
 
3  Detailed information on European stress tests may be accessed on the EBA and ECB websites: 
https://eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/eu-wide-stress-testing; https://www.bankingsupervision.euro 
pa.eu/banking/tasks/comprehensive_assessment/html/index.en.html. 
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economic times. Bouvard et al. (2015) illustrate that during financial crises more 
transparency reduces bank-specific uncertainty among market participants, which 
contributes to financial stability. However, during relatively calm economic periods, 
detailed regulatory information might not fully convince market players, therefore 
backfire by increasing uncertainty and harming the market’s trust. Similarly, Goldstein 
and Leitner (2018) and Goldstein and Sapra (2013) conclude that stress test disclosures 
may increase market discipline, in particular, when regulators provide both the underlying 
methodology and the results. However, detailed stress test disclosures might come at a 
cost of reduced risk sharing by investors, and a decline in analyst information production. 
Further, investors might follow the regulators information instead of their own analyst’s 
resources, and bank managers might undertake unfavourable short-term decisions that 
assist in passing stress tests. Moreover, Prescott (2008) argues that banks might not be 
willing to share as much information with regulators if they knew that this information is 
going to be disclosed. 
Some empirical studies have shed light on bank and market behaviour around stress 
test announcements. On the one hand, European and U.S. event studies indicate that 
markets react on stress test disclosures as these reports add new and valuable information 
(Carboni et al., 2017; Morgan et al., 2014; Petrella and Resti, 2013). However, not all 
studies find significant market responses as stress test results might correspond with 
market expectation (Sahin and de Haan, 2016). Also, the impact of regular stress test 
information appears to decrease over time (Flannery et al., 2017). On the other hand, in 
European studies on bank behaviour, Bischof and Daske (2013) report that stress test 
participants voluntarily disclose information to mitigate bad stress test signals, while 
Gropp et al. (2019) show that stress tests incentivise banks to manage capital. In the U.S., 
researchers document that stress tests influence bank behaviour with respect to lending 
activities (Acharya et al., 2018) and increase lobbying expenses to pass stress tests 
(Cornett et al., 2019). In contrast, Flannery et al. (2017) cannot confirm strong empirical 
evidence for Goldstein and Sapra’s (2013) proposition that that stress tests affect analyst 
information production and short-term investment decisions. 
Motivated by the growing regulatory importance of bank stress tests, I examine the 
following key research question. Do stress tests fulfil the goal of mitigating information 
asymmetry that stimulate market discipline or do stress tests have unintended (potential 
negative) consequences for financial stability? The main objective of this thesis is to 
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contribute to knowledge by shedding ample light on the cost and benefits of stress tests 
that might be useful for regulators and policymakers (Bouvard et al., 2015; Goldstein and 
Sapra, 2013). In particular, I am interested in the implications of stress tests on bank 
behaviour, and whether bank managers adjust their accounting practices to mitigate any 
‘bad’ regulatory market signals (Gropp et al., 2019; Flannery et al., 2017; Bischof and 
Daske, 2013). This thesis, therefore, provides a novel link from stress tests to three 
particular aspects that are widely established in the accounting and finance literature. I 
analyse the implications of bank stress tests on accounting discretion (Chapter 2), 
transparency and opacity (Chapter 3), and market discipline (Chapter 4). 
In the following Sections 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4, I present for each underlying empirical 
chapter (i.e., study) the key research questions, methodologies, main findings and 
individual contributions to the relevant literature. 
1.2. Bank stress tests: An active treatment or a placebo? 
Banks and their accounting practices are seen as highly opaque (Flannery et al., 2013; 
Morgan, 2002). There is an extant literature on bank accounting discretion and 
manipulation that highlights that banks exercise discretion over loan loss provisioning to 
manage their capital and earnings. Banks usually aim to report consistent earnings growth 
because investors prefer such a development. Further, banks manage capital because it is 
a costly funding resource (Bushman and Williams, 2012; Huizinga and Laeven, 2012; 
Laeven and Majnoni, 2003). 
Consequently, the first empirical chapter of this thesis (Chapter 2) is a study that links 
bank stress tests and accounting discretion. I view stress tests as a regulatory treatment 
that might incentivise banks to exercise accounting discretion to pass stress tests and to 
signal financial strength to regulators and markets. In this context, I examine the 
subsequent research questions. What is the effect of stress tests on the participating bank’s 
accounting quality? In particular, do stress tests incentivise participating banks to exercise 
discretion over loan loss provisioning? Do banks with lower capital levels exercise more 
accounting discretion? 
To evaluate the research questions, I gather a unique dataset of stress-tested and 
untested banks from 27 European countries. The accounting data comprises various 
variables such as asset quality and capital adequacy over a period 2005-2015, which is 
supplemented by hand-collected figures. I resort to propensity score matching (PSM), 
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combined with a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach to estimate participation 
indicators and treatment effects on stress-tested banks. Further, relying on fixed effects 
regressions, I assess stress-tested bank’s earnings and capital management behaviour, 
including institutional variables and individual capital levels. 
I find a significant treatment effect of stress tests on the quality of the relevant 
accounting data. In particular, this study shows that banks subject to stress tests report 
different accounting figures in terms of asset quality and capital adequacy, compared to 
untested banks. While tested banks report more pro-cyclical loan loss provisions in 2010 
and 2011, the overall capital adequacy of stress-tested banks was lower and increased 
after the 2014 stress tests. Second, stress-tested banks have stronger incentives to delay 
loan loss provisions to strengthen their capital adequacy ratios, which signal resilience 
and soundness to regulators and market players. In 2010 and 2011, stress tests motivate 
banks to manage capital and earnings, whilst in 2014 stress tests mitigate discretionary 
behaviour. Further, low-capitalised stress test participants delay loan loss provisions to 
boost capital, whereas medium- and high-capitalised banks increase loan loss provisions 
to smooth income and optimise capital, respectively. Third, I document that a more 
reliable institutional environment may mitigate the degree of earnings management 
during stress test periods. Overall, the results suggest that stress tests convey, on certain 
occasions, a ‘placebo’ image to regulators and markets, but can also be an ‘active’ 
treatment. 
The contribution to the literature is threefold. First, this study is one of the first to 
empirically link stress tests and accounting discretion. I shed light on an implicit stress 
test mechanism that incentivises bank managers to exercise discretionary accounting 
(Wheeler, 2019; Bushman and Williams, 2012; Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011; 
Beatty and Liao, 2011). Second, I contribute to the debate on the cost and benefits of 
stress test disclosures. The results illustrate discretion over loan loss provisions to manage 
earnings and capital; this is rather a cost and unintended consequence from stress tests 
when the results are disclosed in detail (Flannery et al., 2017; Bouvard et al., 2015; 
Bischof and Daske, 2013; Goldstein and Sapra, 2013). Third, my analysis relies on a 
unique stress test and propensity-score-matched control sample. To increase data quality, 
I hand-collect missing figures from annual and interim bank reports to supplement the 
dataset. 
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1.3. Transparency versus opacity: Are bank stress tests worthwhile? 
Transparency reduces the informational gaps amongst economic agents and is 
generally accepted to promote bank performance and decreases the cost of capital. The 
more transparent the operation of a bank is, the more accurately outsiders can assess its 
value; this leads to better-informed investment decisions (Bushman et al., 2004). BCBS 
(1998, p. 15) defines transparency as “public disclosure of reliable and timely information 
that enables users of that information to make an accurate assessment of a bank’s financial 
condition and performance, its business activities, and the risks related to those activities.” 
Further, BCBS (1998) emphasises that more transparent disclosure is high-quality 
disclosure. 
In the second empirical chapter of this thesis (Chapter 3), I scrutinise a bank’s textual 
disclosures and accounting figures to assess if bank managers influence the transparency 
mechanism by amending their bank reports following stress test disclosures. 
Transparency from stress test results can provide useful information that enables markets 
to assess the soundness of banks. In turn, however, this may come at a cost that could 
lead to certain market inefficiencies (Goldstein and Leitner, 2018; Bouvard et al., 2015; 
Goldstein and Sapra, 2013). Further, because the outcome of the stress tests is made 
public, the incentives of banks to cooperate with authorities and disclose high-quality 
information may be lowered (Prescott, 2008). Consequently, to be subject to stress testing 
can incentivise bank managers to adjust their information disclosure strategies to offset 
the effect of negative stress test results or to enhance that of positive results (Cornett et 
al., 2019; Gropp et al., 2019; Acharya et al., 2018; Flannery et al., 2017; Bischof and 
Daske, 2013). In this context, I propose the following research questions. What is the 
impact of stress tests on participating banks’ transparency? Does stress test language 
affect the sentiment and tone of participating banks’ textual disclosures? Are the 
sentiment and tone measured in participating banks’ share prices? 
To address the research questions, I compose a unique dataset of stress-tested banks 
from 25 European countries that comprises quarterly accounting, textual and market data 
over the period 2005-2017. The empirical analysis is divided into a quantitative and 
qualitative approach. On the one hand, I establish a transparency index that measures the 
quantity of accounting figures within bank reports and, therefore, the level of 
transparency of these reports. On the other hand, I hand-collect stress test disclosures and 
bank reports to analyse the stress test language within the narratives of these bank reports. 
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In particular, I establish a word list from these stress test disclosures that, first, measures 
the sentiment that comes from specific words within those regulatory disclosures and, 
second, shows how bank reports are influenced by stress test words. I also measure the 
tone in bank reports to estimate if bank managers apply a more positive tone during stress 
test periods to mitigate negative stress test outcomes.  
The study shows that stress-tested banks adjust their bank reports during stress test 
periods. First, I find terms and language within bank reports that is related to stress test 
sentiment. It is evident that the relative number of stress test words increases considerably 
over time, while new participants apply more stress test words compared to their regularly 
tested peers. Second, the stress test disclosure sentiment appears to incentivise stress test 
participants to change their disclosure tone towards more positive (or less negative) 
language. Third, I report that market measures show less information asymmetry when 
banks use a more positive disclosure tone. In particular, the results suggest that a more 
positive disclosure tone is related to a lower bid-ask spread and more analyst coverage, 
indicating a strengthened level of transparency. This is an indication that market 
participants might be obfuscated when banks use a more positive tone in their textual 
disclosures. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, I link the stress test with 
the growing textual analysis literature (Henry and Leone, 2016; Loughran and McDonald, 
2016). On the one hand, I establish a unique stress test word list based on frequently used 
words in stress test disclosures, and search for those words in the hand-collected interim 
and annual reports of European financial institutions. On the other hand, I connect widely 
established corporate word lists by Loughran and McDonald (2011a) to measure 
disclosure tone. Second, I provide a novel perspective on bank textual reporting behaviour 
with regards to stress test disclosures (Flannery et al., 2017; Bischof and Daske, 2013). 
Third, I expand the literature on bank transparency and opacity by examining the 
implications of stress test disclosures (Jones et al., 2012; Morgan, 2002). 
1.4. Market discipline and financial stability: Are bank stress tests meeting 
expectations? 
Disclosure of stress test results can provide markets with useful information about the 
soundness of banks and can, in turn, enhance market discipline in financial industries. 
The concept of market discipline relies on market monitoring and its influence on bank 
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management (Danisewicz et al., 2018; Flannery, 2001). In principle, stress test 
information mitigates information asymmetry between bank managers and investors. 
Once investors are better-informed, they will identify risky activities and then penalise 
bank manager’s excessive risk-taking. This may, in turn, incentivise bank managers to 
take more prudent decisions that can boost the level of trust in the banking system and 
ensure its stability (Cornett et al., 2019; Acharya et al., 2018; Flannery et al., 2017; 
Bischof and Daske, 2013). 
In the third empirical chapter of my thesis (Chapter 4), I explore specifically the key 
purpose of stress tests, which is enabling markets to discipline bank risk-taking. The stress 
test literature provides some results on its benefits but has not yet concluded on the impact 
of stress tests on market discipline (Acharya et al., 2018). Since market discipline is the 
third pillar of the recently finalised Basel III Accord, I examine the following research 
questions that shed ample light on this crucial regulatory effect. Do stress tests contribute 
to market discipline and safeguard financial stability? What is the disciplining effect of 
new stress test information? What is the impact of stress test information on banks’ risk-
taking and funding structure? 
To address the research questions, I analyse a European and U.S. sample of banks and 
stress test observations. My empirical analysis is twofold. First, I implement an event 
study approach that measures the market reactions from stress test information on bank 
shares. I employ various estimates that illustrate the short- and long-term effect of stress 
tests. In particular, I resort to the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the Fama and 
French (1993) three-factors model (FF3F), and the Carhart (1997) four-factors model 
(C4F) to estimate the short-term cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and buy and hold 
abnormal return (BHAR). Further, I follow a calendar-time portfolio (CTIME) approach 
that shows the long-term bank performance following stress test exercises and whether 
stress-tested banks over-or under-perform the markets. Second, I measure the time-series 
effect of stress tests by applying various bank fundamentals on information asymmetry, 
bank risk-taking and funding structure. The purpose of this analysis is to estimate if the 
impact from stress tests is transferred into the investor’s influence. 
In this study, I document that the disciplining effect is mixed across both the European 
and U.S. markets as the assessments are intrinsically different from each other. In Europe, 
the results indicate some significant and positive market responses (e.g., the exercise in 
2011), while, in the U.S., I recognise disciplining market reactions that are mainly 
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negative (e.g., the assessments in 2013, 2016, 2017 and 2018). Further, for the majority 
of stress tests in both jurisdictions, I find, on average no significant abnormal return 
around the days of the result announcement; this implies that stress test results correspond 
with market expectations. However, the results also show that stress test events may push 
abnormal returns towards negative and positive directions. For instance, when a bank 
reports an overall downward trend, additional negative stress test information further 
exacerbates this downward trend, and vice versa. This holds true specifically for the U.S. 
2009 SCAP (positive) and the 2011 (positive), and 2014 (negative) European assessments, 
whilst the negative market reactions are more persistent than the positive responses. This 
consequence may harm financial stability as weaker institutions are punished more. On 
certain occasions, the positive or negative momentum even transfers into long-term 
‘alphas’, indicating that bank stocks over- or under-perform compared to the market 
portfolio.  
Furthermore, I report that, supporting prior event study results, information asymmetry 
reduces significantly during earlier stress test periods in Europe (in 2010-11) and in the 
U.S. (in 2009-13). However, this finding deteriorates during more recent stress test 
periods. Further, the results show that analyst coverage rises for European first-time 
participants in 2010-11, while analyst estimates dispersion increases. Therefore, lower 
information asymmetry contributes to market liquidity, while some uncertainty remains 
among analysts. In contrast, similar to prior U.S. studies, stress tests do not substantially 
change U.S. analyst behaviour as the analysis provides inconclusive evidence on analyst 
coverage or earnings forecasts (Flannery et al., 2017). On the other hand, in both 
jurisdictions, stress-tested banks significantly reduce risk-taking during stress test periods 
as capital adequacy, insolvency risk and credit risk improves. Further, the markets reward 
European banks, indicated by a favourable cost and structure of funding. In particular, 
first-time participants in 2010-11 are affected, which implies the growing confidence of 
the markets and a potential learning curve of those banks. In contrast, the results are more 
profound in Europe than in the U.S. as I cannot find influence on U.S. banks leverage, 
credit risk and credit portfolio quality, nor on the funding structure. 
This chapter contributes to the literature by linking stress tests and market discipline, 
which has not yet been fully investigated (Acharya et al., 2018). Importantly, I shed light 
on the influence mechanism of stress tests on market discipline and extend the related 
literature (Danisewicz et al., 2018; Nier and Baumann, 2006). In particular, I implement 
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the analysis from two perspectives. First, I examine the direct impact of stress tests on 
market discipline as reflected in the market’s sentiment (Flannery et al., 2017; Morgan et 
al., 2014; Petrella and Resti, 2013). I contribute to this literature by adding a complete 
picture of the short- and long-term disciplining effect of stress tests on participating banks’ 
abnormal returns. Second, I expand empirical research that explores bank behaviour by 
showing the implications of stress tests on bank fundamentals that are connected to 
market discipline (Cornett et al., 2019; Gropp et al., 2019; Bischof and Daske, 2013).  
The remainder of my thesis is structured as follows. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 constitute the 
three studies that I conduct as discussed above. In particular, Chapter 2 examines the 
impact of bank stress tests on discretionary behaviour. Chapter 3 scrutinises the 
implications of bank stress tests on quantitative and qualitative transparency. Chapter 4 
explores the contribution of bank stress tests to market discipline. Ultimately, Chapter 5 
concludes the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 – Bank stress tests: An active treatment or a placebo? 
2.1. Introduction 
It is widely accepted that banks play a special role in the economy. The healthy and 
unwavering operation of the banking sector greatly contributes to the stability of the 
financial system and to that of the overall economy. After the outbreak of the global 
financial crisis in mid-to-late 2007, supervisors and regulators had to regain the trust of 
market participants, the public and all the other economic players in the financial services 
industry. Towards this, authorities in Europe, the U.S., and elsewhere decided, amongst 
other actions, to conduct regular stress tests to assess the resilience of Systemically 
Important Financial Institutions (SIFI) to adverse macroeconomic conditions (Flannery 
et al., 2017; Bouvard et al., 2015; Bischof and Daske, 2013). 
Stress tests simulate an adverse exogenous shock to measure the exposure of banks to 
common risk factors. Authorities evaluate the relevant outcome with respect to the capital 
adequacy and the liquidity level of banks (Borio et al., 2014). Prior to the crisis, banks 
conducted stress tests mainly as internal self-assessment exercises. In 2009, regulators 
launched large-scale stress tests of SIFIs to supply markets with specialised information 
on the resilience of those institutions as stand-alone accounting figures were not deemed 
as being sufficient to mirror banks’ solvency (Schuermann, 2014). For instance, several 
large European banks, such as Dexia, Hypo Real Estate, Allied Irish Bank, Bank of 
Ireland and Anglo Irish Bank, to name a few, needed urgent financial support to withstand 
the consequences of the crisis, although they were complying with the regulatory 
requirements (Braouezec and Wagalath, 2018).  
Stress tests have nowadays turned to be one of the most important tools at the hands 
of regulatory and supervisory authorities. Such a tool can produce several benefits to the 
financial system and to the economy as a whole. Carboni et al. (2017), Candelon and Sy 
(2015), Morgan, et al. (2014), Quijano (2014), and Petrella and Resti (2013) show that 
stress tests significantly reduce the informational asymmetries amongst the economic 
agents thereby contributing to the transparency and the stability of financial system. 
However, transparency is costly (e.g., Di Maggio and Pagano, 2017) and the accounting 
information that is utilised by regulators in carrying out stress tests can be opaque (e.g., 
Flannery et al., 2017; Jones et al., 2012; Morgan, 2002). Along these lines,  Bouvard et 
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al. (2015) and Goldstein and Sapra (2013) have lately developed the stress test disclosure 
theory, which argues that mandatory stress test disclosures may incentivise discretion to 
bank managers to curb the signalling effect of ‘bad news’ on market participants 
(Bouvard et al., 2015; Goldstein and Sapra, 2013). This theory can be linked to the well-
established literature on accounting discretion (e.g., Beatty and Liao, 2014; Bushman and 
Williams, 2012; Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011), according to which bank 
managers resort to loan loss provisions to smooth income and manage capital. 
 In practice, the outcome of stress tests in Europe suggests that the bank participants 
can be successful in both signalling soundness to authorities and also in mitigating the 
impact of stress test disclosures. Comparing the U.S. with the European stress test 
exercises conducted in the midst of the crisis, Schuermann (2014) concludes that the latter 
ones were lacking credibility because authorities claimed additional capital of only 
€3.5bn (for 7 out of the 91 banks) in 2010 and €2.5bn (for 8 out of the 90 banks) in 2011, 
even though the actual needs of banks later proved to be much larger. In this context, two 
independent assessments that were carried out by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
revealed large capital gaps in the accounts of some Irish and Spanish banks, which yet 
had passed all prior assessments undertaken by national authorities. On the other hand, 
the U.S. regulators required the amount of $75bn as additional capital requirements for 
more than half the participating banks. Acharya and Steffen (2014) focus on the banks 
that participated in the European Central Bank (ECB)’s 2014 assessment predicting larger 
capital shortfalls than those officially reported. Finally, in the stress test conducted by the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) in July 2016, almost all the assessed banks except 
two, i.e., Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena and Allied Irish Bank, were found to be 
sufficiently sound. 
 Motivated by the regular and extensive stress tests conducted lately and also by their 
growing impact on the economy, this study empirically examines the quality of 
accounting information that authorities utilise in carrying out stress tests and how this 
affects the outcome of the tests as perceived by market participants and other economic 
agents. I view stress tests as a regulatory treatment and assume that tested banks have 
incentives to signal financial strength to regulators and markets. In this context, I address 
the following research questions. What is the effect of stress tests on the quality of the 
accounting figures that banks report? Further, do stress tests provide banks with 
incentives to exercise accounting discretion? If yes, what is the profile of banks, which 
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are engaged in discretion? Do the tested banks exercise more accounting discretion 
compared to their untested peers? And, lastly, does a stronger institutional environment 
decreases the incentives of banks to resort to discretion in the context of stress tests? 
 I construct a unique dataset of tested and untested banks from 27 European countries, 
which relies upon hand-collected accounting data on asset quality, capital adequacy and 
earnings. Data are of a half-yearly frequency and cover the period 2005-2015. I conduct 
a Propensity Score Matching (PSM) analysis, which is paired with a Difference-in-
Difference (DiD) approach to estimate the average treatment effect of bank stress test 
participation. I also resort to a fixed effects regression model to link stress tests with 
possible accounting discretion controlling for the impact of the institutional environment. 
 The contribution of this study to the literature is threefold. While the disclosure of 
stress test outcomes has been found to be useful for market participants, the implications 
of the information quality of the accounting data used in bank stress tests have not yet 
been explored. Therefore, I contribute to the strand of literature that analyses the costs 
and benefits of stress tests (Flannery et al., 2017; Bouvard et al., 2015; Bischof and Daske, 
2013; Goldstein and Sapra, 2013). Second, I examine stress tests through the lenses of an 
implicit, underlying incentives mechanism for bank managers and executives to exercise 
accounting discretion. In that sense, I enhance the current literature (e.g., Beatty and Liao, 
2011; Bushman and Williams, 2012; Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011) by 
considering stress tests as a novel motivation for banks to apply discretion in the relevant 
figures they report on their books. Third, the empirical analysis relies on a unique dataset, 
which consists of all the available banks that participated in the European stress tests both 
prior to and after the onset of the global financial crisis. Secondary accounting data are 
widely complemented by hand-collected raw data, therefore creating an all-inclusive 
dataset that allows me to shed ample light on the research questions. 
 I document a vigorous treatment effect of stress tests on the quality of the relevant 
accounting figures of the participating banks. In particular, the results show that stress 
tests reveal both the weaknesses and the strengths of tested banks in terms of asset quality 
and capital adequacy. The potency of this treatment effect is found to vary significantly 
between different stress test exercises. More concretely, the 2010 and 2011 assessments 
highlight a pro-cyclical loan loss provisioning behaviour of tested banks and illustrate an 
increase in backward-looking non-performing loans. The strength of these findings is 
largely enhanced when the 2014 stress test is considered. Furthermore, tested banks are 
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found to disclose lower regulatory capital ratios compared to untested banks, which 
demonstrates the difficulty of the former banks to be recapitalised. In contrast, the 
assessments that occurred in 2010 and 2011 show no significant difference in the capital 
adequacy between the tested and the untested banks, but significantly higher capital in 
2014. Stress tests were moderate in terms of additional capital requirements for banks, 
compared to the relatively stricter 2014 exercises. In summary, the results suggest that 
bank accounting figures are indeed influenced by stress tests, revealing managers’ 
incentives to mitigate regulatory interventions. 
 Focusing on accounting discretion practices, I find that tested banks are more likely to 
manage capital and earnings compared to untested banks. During stress test periods, the 
former banks delay discretionary loan loss provisions to boost capital adequacy. In this 
context, low-capitalised institutions are more motivated to do so, while high- and 
medium-capitalised institutions increase loan loss provisions to either optimise capital or 
to smooth income. I provide evidence of excess capital management and income 
smoothing for the banks that were stress-tested for the first time in 2010 and 2011, while 
the discretionary behaviour of the first-time participants in the 2014 exercise is found to 
be milder. I, further, report that a more resilient institutional environment constraints 
banks’ incentive to resort to earnings management during stress test periods but has no 
effect on their incentives to manage their capital. Overall, the results suggest that stress 
tests may exacerbate banks’ discretionary behaviour in order to convey a sounder picture 
of their operations to regulators and market participants. On certain occasions, the 
outcome of stress tests is considered as being a ‘placebo’ treatment rather that an ‘active’ 
treatment. In earlier stress tests (i.e., those conducted in 2010 and 2011) a placebo 
treatment prevails, while the 2014 test is closer to an active treatment mainly due to the 
enhancement of the authorities’ learning curve, which can discipline banks more 
effectively. 
 I run various robustness checks to ensure the validity of my findings. First, I apply 
different probit model specifications and matching algorithms in the context of the PSM 
analysis to eliminate any inconsistencies due to the possible bias emerging either from 
covariates imbalance or matching inequality. Further, I test the robustness of the DiD 
approach by accounting for alternative covariates as well as for a set of additional control 
and environmental variables. I also incorporate banks outside the common support area 
in the sample to address potential hidden bias, in the context of the DiD and the fixed 
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effects regression analyses. Moreover, I safeguard the robustness of the latter analysis by 
removing banks from non-EU countries as well as those with multiple stress test 
participation from the sample that may spoil the results. In addition, I account for banks 
that use local (and not international) accounting standards and for those banks which are 
involved in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) or have gone bankrupt. Overall, the 
robustness checks provide strong support to the findings of the baseline analysis. 
 The remainder of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the relevant studies 
and presents the main arguments and limitations of the extant literature. Section 2.3 
develops the hypotheses I test in the empirical analysis based on the relevant research 
questions. Section 2.4 presents the data collection process and describes the econometric 
models and techniques I employ in the analysis. Section 2.5 reports and discusses the 
empirical results and sheds the spotlight on the relevant policy and business implications. 
Section 2.6 is devoted to robustness checks and Section 2.7 concludes the chapter. 
2.2. Theoretical framework and related literature 
 This study lies upon two pillars, which are rather controversial in the banking literature. 
First, the literature has increasingly evaluated stress tests from different angles and 
concludes that the effect of stress tests on financial stability may be positive or negative. 
During the 2008 financial crisis, stress tests have become a very important tool for 
enhancing financial stability by playing a fundamental role in informing market 
participants about banks’ solvency and rebuilding market trust. However, during normal 
economic conditions, stress tests and the disclosure of their outcomes can produce 
negative market reactions. Second, it is well-documented that bank managers exercise 
discretion over their loan loss provisions (LLP), which have been highlighted as being 
the key discretionary tool to manage both earnings and capital. While accounting 
discretion that reduces information asymmetry is positive, short-sighted accounting 
practice is on the negative side of LLP.4 In this study, I argue that stress tests may not 
convey reliable information to markets and may be utilised by bank managers to signal 
soundness as bank accounting information can be influenced by discretionary behaviour. 
 
4 The literature consists of other streams that evaluate stress test methodologies (e.g., Gross and Población, 
2015; Acharya et al., 2014; Buncic and Melecky, 2013) and misreporting (i.e., accounting fraud, cooking 
the books, etc.) combined with enforcement actions (e.g., Silvers, 2016; Peterson, 2012; Erickson et al., 
2006), which I do not present here as they are not closely linked to my study. 
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2.2.1. Stress tests, transparency, and financial stability 
 Several event studies illustrate that the disclosure of stress test results leads to a 
reduction in bank opacity. Focusing on the reaction of the U.S. (Candelon and Sy, 2015; 
Morgan et al., 2014; Quijano, 2014) and European (Carboni et al., 2017; Petrella and 
Resti, 2013) markets to stress tests, the literature rejects the irrelevance hypothesis that 
markets ignore stress test results. Evidence is indeed provided for significant market 
reactions shown through abnormal share or bond price variations of tested banks before 
and after the disclosure of the stress test results. These studies conclude that the observed 
outcome of stress tests cannot be predicted and, hence, can provide novel and valuable 
information that mitigates informational asymmetries in the market. In contrast, Flannery 
et al. (2017) argue that the positive influence of regularly conducting stress tests on the 
U.S. market has decreased over time. Similarly, Sahin and de Haan (2016) display that 
the European markets did not react to EBA’s 2014 stress test because market players were 
expecting those results. According to their view, the benefits of stress tests are linked to 
the authority’s increased learning curve through the in-depth investigation of the 
participating institutions. 
 Borio et al. (2014) and Schuermann (2014) conclude that stress tests are an effective 
crisis management tool, but cannot be used as an early warning mechanism. Both studies 
find that the success of stress tests in enhancing financial stability depends on the level 
of credibility of scenario analysis and the coherence in the implementation of the tests. In 
fact, these two aims are essentially easier to be achieved during a crisis than in normal 
times because selecting a single scenario for all banks is less difficult in the case of a 
financially distressed environment compared to normal economic conditions where 
multiple scenarios need to be shaped and examined. This is to say; regulators may not be 
able to develop credible scenarios to signal the level of soundness of the financial system 
when the economy grows. 
 The increase in transparency through the disclosure of stress test results can be 
beneficial during times of distress, but harmful during normal economic and financial 
conditions. Based on a theoretical model, Bouvard et al. (2015) illustrate that the 
enhancement of transparency in a crisis period can reduce uncertainty among banks and 
contribute to financial stability. In contrast, increased transparency in normal times 
undermines market trust and is likely to lead to a run on weak banks. Furthermore, the 
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authorities might waive negative information concerning individual banks to avoid 
adverse market reactions. 
 Along these lines, Goldstein and Sapra (2013) propose that during crises detailed 
information should be published to give markets the opportunity to determine with the 
additional information which banks are sound or unsound. For instance, detailed results 
were provided after EBA’s 2011 stress test and the Irish exercise, which increased 
credibility in the markets during times of uncertainty (Schuermann, 2014). However, 
Goldstein and Sapra (2013) further suggest that during normal times the regulators 
should provide no disclosure or only aggregated results and should be mindful with the 
type of disclosure to avoid over-reactions from the markets and participating banks. In 
particular, stress test disclosures might motivate banks to make inefficient short-term 
decisions to pass stress tests, while failing to accommodate the potential adverse long-
term effects of those decisions. Although Flannery et al. (2017) cannot find evidence in 
the U.S., this conceptual view is partly confirmed in the European context. 
Bischof and Daske (2013) analyse the effects of CEBS’s 2010 and EBA’s 2011 stress 
tests and the following capital exercise in 2012 on participating banks’ disclosure 
behaviour. Their empirical results indicate that tested banks increased their voluntary 
disclosure of sovereign risk exposure in response to the mandatory stress test results. 
Consequently, banks do not underestimate the signalling effect that stress test disclosures 
can convey to the markets. 
2.2.2. Quality of accounting information and loan loss provisioning 
 Banks typically use provisions to build reserves against loan losses to cover expected 
losses, whereas capital should absorb unexpected losses. However, owing to discretionary 
accounting choices, banks may understate or delay current LLP in the presence of low 
profitability, and vice versa. This behaviour might overshadow future bank performance 
because it hides the actual level of the loan portfolio risk and, hence, the required capital 
buffers. In case of a delayed loan loss recognition, capital needs to cover both the 
expected and unexpected losses (Bushman and Williams, 2015; Beatty and Liao, 2011; 
Laeven and Majnoni, 2003). In the following subsections, I focus on income smoothing 
and capital management as the main motives for discretion. As regulators evaluate bank 
soundness using earnings and capital adequacy measures within stress test exercises, both 
incentives to resort to discretionary LLP might be exacerbated by stress test participation. 
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2.2.2.1. Income smoothing 
 First, income smoothing, also known as earnings management, indicates that investors 
prefer and reward steady earnings increases (Barth et al., 1999; DeAngelo et al., 1996). 
Many studies document that managers influence bank performance by making specific 
accounting choices, such as discretion over LLP, to become more attractive to investors. 
For instance, the extent of income smoothing through LLP depends on banks’ profitability 
and loan portfolio structure (Liu and Ryan, 2006), economic cycles (Laeven and Majnoni, 
2003) and dispersed ownership (Beatty et al., 2002; Beatty and Harris, 1999). The latter 
studies argue that private banks have less motivation to smooth income as their investors 
suffer less under information asymmetry and are more long-term orientated. Thus, private 
bank owners do not penalise unstable earnings as much as public banks’ shareholders. In 
another study, Nichols et al. (2009) show that public banks recognise timelier loan losses 
to manage earnings to decrease information asymmetry. 
 From a regulatory accounting perspective, Fonseca and González (2008) compare a 
global sample and argue that stricter rules on accounting disclosures, bank activities and 
regulation can reduce income smoothing incentives. This view is partly supported by 
Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011), who find European evidence for income 
smoothing through discretionary LLP and further illustrate that mandatory International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption and stronger rules in International 
Reporting Standards (IAS) 39 decrease banks’ ability to exercise discretion over LLP to 
manage earnings. In contrast, they argue that stricter accounting regimes cannot 
completely eliminate discretionary behaviour. For instance, part of their findings suggests 
that, after IFRS adoption, LLP were less timely. This result is consistent with Pérez et al. 
(2008), who analyse Spanish banks and display that stricter LLP rules do not discourage 
managers from income smoothing practices. 
 Furthermore, specific accounting practices can be observed from the risk-taking and 
discipline perspective, which enables investors and supervisors to monitor banks. For 
instance, Bushman and Williams (2012) conclude that banks’ discretion over LLP may 
have a positive or negative impact on discipline of bank risk-taking. When bank managers 
exercise discretion to decrease perceived risk, it curbs market discipline, but discretion 
that reduces information asymmetry through forward-looking disclosures should 
strengthen market discipline. Considering the financial crisis, other research shows that 
LLP can be triggered by bank competition (Bushman et al., 2016) and can negatively 
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influence the financial strength of individual banks and exacerbate systemic risk 
(Bushman and Williams, 2015). Overall, managing earnings propose more soundness to 
markets and regulators. Hence, I posit that banks participating in stress tests might be 
particularly interested in applying income smoothing. 
2.2.2.2. Capital management 
 Second, capital management refers to banks’ motivation to optimise their capital 
efficiently to meet regulatory capital requirements and buffers. Analysing distinct capital 
regimes, many studies consistently find evidence for capital management using the 
discretionary portion of LLP (Ahmed et al., 1999; Beatty et al., 1995; Collins et al., 1995; 
Moyer, 1990). In particular, low-capitalised banks during the post-Basel I period delayed 
their LLP in response to the regulatory change to avoid non-compliance with capital 
requirements (Kim and Kross, 1998). 
 Examining the 2008 financial crisis, Allen et al. (2011) and Thakor (2012) document 
the positive impact of capital on survival likelihood. Their models predict that capital 
attenuates banks’ motivation to invest in risky and innovative products and decreases 
moral hazard. Focused on financial distress, Berger and Bouwman (2013) conclude that 
the likelihood of bankruptcy before and during a crisis is lower for small banks that hold 
more capital. However, the impact of capital on medium and large banks depends on the 
banks’ situation and is only ensured during crises. Consequently, the recent banking 
regulation amendments in Basel III (Pillar 1) require that banks raise capital standards 
supplemented by leverage and liquidity ratios. This implies that banks hold more common 
equity (Tier 1 capital) and additional capital buffers to cover distinct risks of 
counterparties, securities and trading books. Further, under Basel III, LLP decrease Tier 1 
capital by reducing retained earnings. However, loan loss reserves (LLR), up to a 
maximum of 1.25% of credit risk-weighted assets, may be added back to Tier 2 capital 
and boost total regulatory capital (Ng and Roychowdhury, 2014; BCBS, 2011).5 
 Due to the continuously increasing focus on regulatory capital requirements, banks 
seem to have a higher need to optimise their capital adequacy ratios. Towards this, 
empirical evidence on the financial crisis shows that banks managed capital requirements 
intensively towards their goals. Huizinga and Laeven (2012) argue that banks with 
 
5  Details on Basel III may be accessed on the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)’s website: 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm. 
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relatively high amounts of mortgage-backed securities contracts had significantly lower 
LLP in their accounts in 2008 to manage their capital ratios. In another study, Beatty and 
Liao (2011) illustrate that delayed recognition of expected loan losses were widely used 
in the financial crisis to optimise capital which led to increased pro-cyclicality and 
exacerbated the credit crunch. Further, Bierey and Schmidt (2017) argue that in the 
sovereign debt crisis banks delayed write-offs on Greek government bonds to strengthen 
capital and to receive higher governmental support. Hence, those studies support my view 
that stress tests might enhance capital management activities as those exercises focus on 
capital adequacy to signal soundness. 
2.3. Hypotheses 
2.3.1. Stress test signal and accounting quality 
 The results of stress tests, provided by the banking regulators, are supposed to 
supplement the available information in the market to sketch out banks’ strengths and 
weaknesses (Schuermann, 2014). With this additional information the authorities aim to 
enhance transparency that enables market participants to discipline bank risk-taking 
towards financial stability. Despite banking regulators and investors have not necessarily 
the same interests, both groups share the common goal of avoiding severe financial 
distress and business disruptions (Schaeck, et al., 2012). On certain occasions, regulators 
would not mind banks being less transparent and having lower accounting quality for 
investors if this opacity assists banks to build larger reserves or to utilise more equity 
finance than shareholders might permit under better transparency. For instance, bank 
opacity may benefit liquidity and risk sharing purposes (Dang et al., 2017; Bushman, 
2014). However, the importance and the purpose of stress test information, produced and 
published by the authorities may be justified for two main reasons. First, stress test reports 
disclose bank-specific regulatory information to restore and maintain the market’s trust 
during crises and normal economic times, respectively (Bouvard et al., 2015; Borio et al., 
2014). For this higher public interest of financial stability, regulators make an exception 
and publish regulatory information that would be kept confidential under normal 
circumstances (Feldberg and Metrick, 2019; Bushman, 2014). 
 Along these lines, the disclosure theory (see, e.g., Bagnoli and Watts, 2007; Einhorn, 
2005; Dye, 1990) distinguishes between two types of disclosure. First, the mandatory 
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disclosure that refers to the information that is required to be disclosed in line with the 
regulatory framework; and, second, the voluntary disclosure that is reflected in the 
additional piece of information that banks optionally disclose. The disclosure of stress 
test results is mandatory and is likely to be costly for banks in case it conveys a ‘bad’ 
signal to the market. In such a case, banks would prefer the relevant information not to 
be disclosed. This is, however, not feasible due to the mandatory character of stress tests 
and, hence, banks have incentives to shape a disclosure strategy that aims to offset the 
‘bad’ stress test signal through a responsive voluntary disclosure. 
 Analysing European stress tests, Bischof and Daske (2013) find that the tested banks 
increased their voluntary disclosure of sovereign risk exposures in response to the stress 
test results. In addition to this, it is rational for bank managers to attempt to mitigate a 
possibly bad signal in anticipation of stress tests. Goldstein and Sapra (2013) conclude 
that stress tests can provide banks with incentives to take short-term investment decisions 
that may contribute to a positive outcome, notwithstanding the potentially negative long-
term consequences of these decisions. Such a signalling game cultivates an environment 
in which market players can be misguided like in the years preceding the 2008 financial 
crisis (Bouvard et al., 2015). In my analysis, I focus on both tested and untested banks 
and use a set of key regulatory variables to examine if the accounting information that 
regulators utilise in the conduct of stress tests is influenced by banks’ incentives to hedge 
the stress test signals. I therefore formulate the following two hypotheses: 
H1. The quality of accounting figures is enhanced for the stress-tested banks. 
H2. Stress tests provide banks with incentives to exercise accounting discretion. 
2.3.2. Stress test participation and discretionary behaviour 
 The literature documents that banks widely use loan loss provisions as the principal 
discretion channel to manage their earnings and capital (Bushman and Williams, 2012; 
Huizinga and Laeven, 2012; Beatty and Liao, 2011). Further, Bierey and Schmidt (2017) 
suggest that banks may overstate capital to avoid regulatory enforcements. On the other 
hand, according to Basel III, there is a regulatory demand for increased quality of capital 
buffers. Moreover, stress test disclosures, such as the EBA’s 2016 results, recognise that 
the amount (and change) of credit losses from non-performing loans (the so-called Credit 
Risk driver) is the main contributor in scenarios reducing capital adequacy ratios and 
earnings figures (EBA, 2016). Hence, the stress test participants are likely to exercise 
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more discretion over loan loss provisions than non-participants to mitigate the Credit Risk 
driver and to smooth the impact on their capital adequacy and earnings, which could 
produce a poor signal through regulatory stress test disclosures. It is thus important to 
shed the spotlight on the stress test participation and examine whether the tested banks 
exercise more discretion over loan loss provisions compared to their untested peers. 
H3. Tested banks exercise more accounting discretion compared to their untested peers. 
 In addition, the literature accounts for the impact of the institutional environment on 
the level of accounting discretion. A robust environment is considered to impose 
limitations on banks’ discretionary practices (Bierey and Schmidt, 2017; Bushman and 
Williams, 2012; Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011). Moreover, the theory suggests 
that corruption can have severe consequences on the operation and the growth of a 
business (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Beck et al. (2006) link the regulatory framework 
with the level of corruption in banking. Therefore, I test the influence of the institutional 
environment on banks’ discretionary behaviour in terms of supervisory power, capital 
regulation requirements, and corruption. 
H4. A stronger institutional environment leads to a decrease in accounting discretion. 
2.3.3. Low capital levels and discretionary behaviour 
 As earlier indicated, a key determinant of the individual performance of banks in the 
light of stress tests is the level of capital adequacy. Kim and Kross (1998) argue that the 
relatively low-capitalised banks are more prone to regulatory intervention and, hence, 
they have stronger incentives to exercise accounting discretion to manage their capital 
upwards. In this vein, Bierey and Schmidt (2017) show that financially distressed banks 
are those that manage their level of capital in order to avoid an intervention from 
regulatory authorities. Candelon and Sy (2015) and Goldstein and Sapra (2013) document 
that banks with relatively low capital are anxious about the outcome of stress tests and 
therefore aim to strengthen their capital adequacy ratios. Consequently, my last 
hypothesis tests whether the treatment banks resort to accounting discretion to a higher 
degree compared to the untested institutions with the purpose to demonstrate an enhanced 
performance in stress tests. 
H5. Treatment banks with lower capital buffers exercise more accounting discretion. 
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2.4. Empirical analysis 
In this section, I illustrate the construction of the stress test samples and data as well 
as the empirical models that I employ in my analysis. The description of variables and 
the relevant data sources are provided in Table 2.1. 
[Please refer to Table 2.1 here] 
2.4.1. Sample selection 
 The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) undertook the first stress 
tests in Europe in 2009 and 2010. A year later, its responsibilities were handed over to 
EBA, which conducted a series of stress tests in 2011, 2014 and 2016. In a similar vein, 
the ECB comprehensively assessed all the SIFIs in the Eurozone in 2014 and 2015. I 
construct the sample of treatment banks based on the stress test exercises that were 
conducted by CEBS, EBA, and ECB over the period 2010-2016. The names of the banks 
that participated in the CEBS’s 2009 exercise were not specified and this justifies why it 
is not included in my dataset.6 
 As shown in Table 2.2, Panel A, the initial sample of the entire population of treatment 
banks (TREATALL) consists of 187 institutions from 25 European economies. I identify 
the treatment banks based on the regulatory stress test reports (EBA, 2011, 2014, 2016; 
ECB, 2014, 2015; CEBS, 2010) and I select those banks on Bureau van Dijk (BvD) 
Bankscope.7 Following Bischof and Daske (2013) and Carboni et al. (2017), I take a 
broad perspective considering the European Union (EU) and the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) economies. I begin with the 28 EU member states which are, 
however, reduced to 24 states, as there were no stress-tested banks in Bulgaria, Romania, 
Croatia and the Czech Republic. I then proceed to include Norway in my sample, which 
is the only EFTA member state that contributes to the stress test observations. 
[Please refer to Table 2.2 here] 
 A total of 98 banks were assessed for the first time in the 2010-11 stress tests, while 
77 banks were first assessed in the 2014 test. Only a small number of sample banks (12 
 
6  The relevant press release of the CEBS does not provide the names of the stress-tested banks; it simply 
states that “22 major European cross-border banking groups” were tested. For further details on this, see: 
http://www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/eu-wide-stress-testing/2009.  
7 Apart from Deutsche Bank Malta, I identify all banks on BvD Bankscope by name, as shown in stress test 
disclosures. 
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banks) were first assessed in a subsequent stress test exercise, meaning that the most 
systemically important banks were those assessed in the first three stress test exercises. I 
therefore use two dummy variables, i.e., TREAT1011 and TREAT14 to capture the first-
time participants. I group the first-time participants in the 2010-11 stress tests together 
because the two tests were carried out one after the other within a very short period of 
time. In addition, the banks that were stress-tested in 2010 were (almost) the same with 
those tested in 2011 as shown in Table 2.2 (Panel A). 
 As regards the geographical structure and density of participation in stress tests (as 
shown in Table 2.2, Panel A), the majority of the stress-tested banks are from France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain, which are the four largest European (and Eurozone) economies 
with the biggest banking sectors. It is worth to note that the EBA and ECB select their 
samples based on their supervisory responsibilities. The EBA examines SIFIs from the 
entire EU and the ECB reviews banks from EMU economies. Consequently, ECB’s 
comprehensive assessments in 2014 and 2015 consider large subsidiaries from non-EMU 
countries (e.g., HSBC France). Owing to the disparity of selection approaches, the 
treatment sample consists of 171 parent banks and 16 subsidiaries. The treatment sample 
comprises a variety of commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative banks and bank 
holding companies (according to BvD Bankscope classification). I exclude 36 banks due 
to a lack of data availability and/or inconsistency (e.g., from M&As and bankruptcies) 
that could not be manually corrected; see Table 2.2, Panel B for more information.8 This 
sample construction process leads me to a total treatment sample (TREATALL) of 151 
banks, including subsamples of 86 and 60 first-time participants in 2010-11 (TREAT1011) 
and 2014 (TREAT14), respectively. The remaining 5 banks, not included in the sub-
samples (i.e., 151-86-60=5), participated in a later stress test exercise for the first time. 
 As I describe in Section 2.4.5.1, the PSM approach requires to construct a suitable 
benchmark portfolio of untested banks. Following the European authorities’ geographic 
sample structure, the sample of treatment banks covers the 69.5% of the entire European 
market size (EU and EFTA) based on total (year-end 2015) consolidated assets. Thus, the 
benchmark portfolio is congregated from the pool of the remaining 30.5% of total assets. 
I further adjust the benchmark portfolio and include only banks that have the same 
business classification as the treatment sample (i.e., mainly commercial banks, savings 
 
8 As I aim to analyse a complete treatment sample, I do not generally exclude banks due to bankruptcies, 
consolidations or M&As. Thus, banks with sufficient data quality remain in the sample. I run a robustness 
check including an additional covariate for banks’ activity status (ACTIVE) and receive similar results. 
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banks and cooperative banks). As data availability for most inactive banks is inconsistent, 
I select only banks that are classified as ‘active’ on BvD Bankscope. Further, I carefully 
analyse banking groups and their subsidiaries and remove banks that are clearly not 
independent to avoid having an inflated benchmark portfolio.9 Overall, the control group 
consists of 367 banks from 27 countries as described in Table 2.2, Panel A. The groups 
of control banks for TREAT1011 (432 banks) and TREAT14 (372 banks) are augmented 
by 65 and 5 banks, respectively. These banks participated in a stress test conducted at 
some later point in time. I follow the PSM literature that suggests to adjust control groups 
as appropriate (Flannery et al., 2017; Casu et al., 2013; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). 
2.4.2. Data construction 
 I first refer to the BvD Bankscope to collect the accounting data that I need to construct 
the variables. The data period covers the years from 2005 to 2015. To confirm the validity 
and consistency of my data, I utilise three additional mainstream databases: Bloomberg, 
Thomson Reuters Worldscope and SNL Financial. Due to some gaps and inconsistencies 
I identify in some data series, I follow Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011) and Hamadi 
et al. (2016) to supplement the available data by hand-collecting any missing or erratic 
figures. Towards this, I resort to the individual banks’ financial statements that I obtain 
from their official websites, or from Bloomberg’s corporate filings archive. Hand-
collection enables me to construct a much more complete dataset by enriching the number 
of observations and enhancing the reliability of my data series.  
 Due to the different reporting policies in some sample economies, the reporting 
frequency varies. To ensure consistency, I require a bank to provide accounting data at 
least on a half-year basis. Since most of the banks are systemically important both at the 
European level (Global-SIFIs) and also at their home countries (Domestic-SIFIs) as 
dictated by the EBA Guidelines and the Basel Committee recommendations for SIFIs 
(Castro and Ferrari, 2014), they all meet this reporting requirement.  
 
9 I follow BvD Bankscope definitions by using the criteria ‘Status’ (‘active’) and ‘BvD Independence 
Indicator’ (A, U, -) to identify inactive and subsidiaries, respectively. I manually cross-check the extracted 
data to eliminate errors. Moreover, as Lichtenstein has no significant banking sector, no bank could hold 
those criteria and, hence, where automatically excluded. 
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2.4.3. Key variables 
 I rely on the regulatory stress test reports (EBA, 2011, 2014, 2016; ECB, 2014, 2015; 
CEBS, 2010) in combination with the stress test literature (Acharya et al., 2018; Carboni 
et al., 2017; Flannery et al., 2017; Bischof and Daske, 2013) to identify all the accounting 
variables on bank performance and risk-taking, which are linked to stress tests. In the 
PSM analysis, I measure asset quality using loan loss provisions (LLP) as a forward-
looking measure, and non-performing loans (NPL) as a backward-looking measure; 
capital adequacy is captured by the Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio (T1R); the credit risk 
profile of banks is reflected in the risk-weighted assets (RWA). 
 Further, I refer to the accounting discretion literature (Hamadi et al., 2016; Beatty and 
Liao, 2014; Bushman and Williams, 2012; Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011) and 
utilise LLP as the dependent variable in my fixed-effects regression model, controlling 
for NPL, the growth in outstanding loans (ΔLOAN) and the change in non-performing 
loans (ΔNPL) to isolate the discretionary component of LLP. In addition, I capture capital 
management by referring to T1R, while I measure income smoothing using the earnings 
before provisions and taxes (EBPT). To mitigate estimation problems arising from 
possible outliers, I follow the banking literature (Gropp et al., 2014; Beatty and Liao, 
2011) and winsorise all variables at the 1 and 99 percentiles. 
2.4.4. Descriptive statistics and correlation tests 
 Table 2.3 reports the descriptive statistics of the bank-specific variables for the groups 
of treated and untreated (control) banks (Panel A and Panel B, respectively). On average 
there are some differences and similarities between treatment and benchmark banks that 
I need to address in my PSM analysis to find adequate matches. I test the statistical 
significance of those variables by t-statistics (see also, Table 2.5, Panel B). First, based 
on the natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE), treatment banks report 11.1, whilst 
benchmark banks account 6.4. Thus, treatment banks are on average larger than their 
untreated counterparts. However, the minimum, maximum and standard deviation 
indicate similar distributions among both samples. As EBA and ECB overview banks 
from distinct economies, where relatively small banks count as SIFIs, the treatment 
samples also account for smaller banks. 
[Please refer to Table 2.3 here] 
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 Second, the average portion of traditional assets, such as outstanding loans (LOAN), 
yields on average 58.8% for treated banks, which is lower compared to untested banks 
(78.4%). In contrast, treatment banks’ asset composition has a higher average portion of 
non-traditional earning assets (OEA) than benchmark banks. The relevant means are 
equal to 36.20% and 20.00%, respectively. This implies that treatment banks’ business 
models appear to be riskier compared to untested banks’ business models. Further, the 
general loan quality, measured by a higher portion of loan loss reserves (LLR), appears to 
be lower for treatment (2.4%) compared to their counterparts (1.2%). Third, benchmark 
banks have higher bank capital (CAP), regulatory capital adequacy (T1R) and deposits 
and short-term funding (DSFR), indicating stricter compliance with capital and liquidity 
requirements. Fourth, from an income statement perspective, return on assets (ROA) 
indicate that both samples have on average similar profitability. 
[Please refer to Table 2.4 here] 
 Table 2.4 provides the Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients for the variables I use 
in the PSM analysis (Panel A), and for those used in the fixed-effects regression analysis 
(Panel B). Panel A shows that it is only outstanding loans (LOAN) and other earnings 
assets (OEA) which are strongly correlated (-85.80%) at the 1% level of significance. For 
this reason, I discard LOAN from the PSM baseline analysis. Panel B reveals a moderate 
positive correlation between loan loss provisions (LLP) and loan loss reserves (LLR) as 
well as non-performing loans (NPL), which accounts for the non-discretionary portion of 
loan loss provisions and is confirmed by the literature (Bushman and Williams, 2012, 
2015). I also report a highly significant positive correlation between LLR and NPL 
(87.80%), which is consistent with the accounting discretion literature (Beatty and Liao, 
2014; Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011). To avoid possible multicollinearity, I 
exclude LLR from the fixed effects regression analysis. Further, a statistically significant 
positive correlation of 41.50% is observed between LLP and earnings (EBPT), which is 
also in line with the accounting discretion literature (Hamadi et al., 2016; Kim and Kross, 
1998). 
2.4.5. Empirical models 
To test the hypotheses, I conduct a PSM analysis paired with a DiD and a fixed effects 
regression analysis. 
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2.4.5.1. The PSM analysis 
 PSM, which can be traced back to the Roy-Rubin model (Rubin, 1973; Roy, 1951), 
has been widely employed in social sciences (e.g., Lechner, 1999; Taylor et al., 1999; 
Heckman and Robb, 1985), but also in the accounting and finance literature (see, Shipman 
et al., 2017). In banking, PSM has been utilised to measure the treatment effect of public 
guarantees on bank risk-taking (Gropp et al., 2014), to account for securitised and non-
securitised bank activities (Casu et al., 2013), and to control for corrupted and non-
corrupted environments (Smith, 2016). Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) argue that PSM 
can be applied in any empirical framework that aims to observe a treatment by identifying 
two entity groups: one that receives the treatment, and a second one which does not. In 
this analysis, stress test participation specifies the groups of banks: treated versus 
untreated (control) banks. The treatment sample is selected by resorting to stress test 
disclosures, which represents about 70% of the population of stress-tested banks, while 
the control sample is matched by using control variables based on regulatory criteria and 
the related literature. In what follows, I show how I apply PSM in this study.10 
 PSM is implemented in three steps: first, I estimate the propensity scores; I then match 
the treated with the untreated banks; and, finally, I measure the average treatment effect 
of stress tests on treated banks. I repeat this process three times to receive matched control 
banks for the three distinct stress test participation samples (i.e., TREATALL, TREAT1011, 
and TREAT14) as discussed in Section 2.4.1. To calculate propensity scores, I run a probit 
model based on the common support option: 
!"#$%&'( = !*	(-./0- = 1|#$%&')                          (2.1) 
where, !"#$%&'(	is the propensity score for sample bank i at country j that is estimated 
over the pre-treatment period T0. This equals to the probability of a bank to be a member 
of the treatment group (TREAT = 1, which stands for one of the three stress test 
participation samples (i.e., TREATALL, TREAT1011, and TREAT14) that is conditional 
on the covariates vector #$%&'. Covariates must be estimated prior to the treatment so that 
they are not influenced by the treatment itself (independence condition). Thus, covariates 
are measured for each sample bank over the pre-treatment period T0 that varies for each 
of the three samples. Following Gropp et al. (2019), I employ extended periods (including 
 
10 A detailed theoretical framework of the PSM approach is provided on pages 222-225 of the APPENDIX. 
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three semesters or more) prior to the treatment event to average out confounding events 
such as contemporaneous changes in fiscal and monetary policy, or market overreactions 
during the twin (financial and fiscal) European crises. For the total stress test participation 
(TREATALL), T0 extends from the second semester of 2005 (2005S2) to the second 
semester of 2008 (2008S2); T0 covers the period 2008S2-2009S2 for the first-time 
participation in 2010-11 (TREAT1011); and, finally, T0 spans from 2012S2-2013S2, for 
the first-time participation in 2014 (TREAT14). 
As described in the PSM framework (see, APPENDIX), the selection of the model 
covariates hinges upon certain stress test criteria (i.e., relevant bank characteristics) that 
regulators use to decide which bank should participate in stress tests or be left out. Banks 
are selected by the authorities to participate in stress tests based on their size in relation 
to national economic strength, which is a crucial determinant of systemic importance 
(Carboni et al., 2017; Bischof and Daske, 2013). Thus, I control for bank size by referring 
to the natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE) and economic strength measured by the 
nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Further, I account for the non-traditional 
banking activities captured by other earning assets (OEA); credit portfolio quality 
measured by loan loss reserves (LLR); liquidity risk captured by the deposits and short-
term funding ratio (DSFR); the equity-to-assets ratio reflected by bank capital (CAP); and 
profitability measured by returns on assets (ROA).11  
After the estimation of the propensity scores for the treatment and control samples, I 
proceed to select the matching algorithm from the group of widely used algorithms (e.g., 
‘Kernel’, ‘Nearest-neighbour’, ‘Radius’, etc.). According to Caliendo and Kopeinig 
(2008), the choice of the matching estimator depends on the data structure, which is 
characterised by a trade-off between bias and efficiency. Gaussian Kernel Matching 
(GKM) 12 is a non-parametric matching estimator that performs matching on estimated 
Kernel weights of all sample banks within the common support area. It depends on the 
 
11 Following the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer that regulators may select banks to participate in 
stress tests based on the level of their loan loss provisions, I also incorporate LLP in Equation 2.1. However, 
I find that LLP is non-significant, indicating that provisions are not a crucial factor in the decision of 
regulators to select the stress test banks. Moreover, excluding Swiss banks from my control samples does 
not significantly affect the baseline results. All results are available upon request.  
12 Another popular matching method is that of Nearest-neighbour, which considers the closest control 
matches of each treatment bank based on the estimated propensity scores. While the Nearest-neighbour 
estimator may reduce bias, it uses significantly fewer control observations which comes at the cost of 
decreased precision (Smith and Todd, 2005; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). After testing several matching 
estimators, I find that GKM is the most appropriate one for my dataset (see also the robustness section). 
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distances between the propensity scores of treatment and control banks. Suitable control 
matches receive a higher weight than non-suitable ones. It further allows to employ 
Kernel weights in the fixed effects regression analysis that I describe in the following 
Section 2.4.5.2. To reduce possible matching bias, I employ the so-called ‘trimming’ that 
enables to smooth the high densities of propensity scores, while the bandwidth parameter 
allows a tolerance level of Kernel weights (Smith and Todd, 2005). Ultimately, this 
process yields, respectively, matched treatment and control groups of 132 versus 122 
(TREATALL), 71 versus 108 (TREAT1011), and 55 versus 87 (TREAT14) European banks 
(see, Section 2.5.1 and Tables 2.5 and 2.6 on the PSM and DiD results). 
 Then, conditional on the estimated propensity scores 	!"#$%&'(  obtained by 
Equation 2.1, the treatment effect of stress tests on tested banks (5$) that I estimate in the 
context of H1 may be written as follows: 
5$ = / 678$(%9%:)'(1);-./0- = 1, !"#$%&'(= − / 678$(%9%:)'(0);-./0- = 0, !"#$%&'(=	(2.2) 
where / 678$(%9%:)'(1);-./0- = 1, !"#$%&'(=  stands for the mean difference in the 
outcome of treated banks and / 678$(%9%:)'(0);-./0- = 0, !"#$%&'(=	 is the mean 
difference in the outcome of untreated banks within the common support area and 
accounting for Kernel-weighted propensity scores. TREAT is the parameter that stands 
for total stress test participation (TREATALL), first-time participation in 2010-11 
(TREAT1011) and 2014 (TREAT14) as defined in Equation 2.1. 78$(%9%:)'  denotes the 
weighted average change in the outcome variables (y) of each bank i over the post-
treatment period T2 that follows stress tests, minus the pre-treatment period T1 that 
precedes the exercise. These outcome periods (T1, T2) vary for each of the three stress test 
samples. For the total stress test participation sample (TREATALL) the pre-treatment 
period T1 exceeds from 2005S2-2008S2 and the post-treatment period T2 covers 2009S2-
2015S2 (BAST). For the first-time participants in 2010-11 (TREAT1011) and 2014 
(TREAT14) the outcome periods (T1, T2) comprise four half-year periods before and after 
the particular exercise; i.e. the pre-treatment periods T1 span respectively from 2008S1-
2009S2 and 2012S1-2013S2, while the post-treatment periods T2 extends respectively 
from 2010S1-2011S2 and 2014S1-2015S2 (BAST1011, BAST14). 
 Eventually, (5$) yields the average difference, or DiD, of the two individual differences 
in the outcome variables of the treatment over the control group. In other words, the 
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average stress test effect on participating banks is predicted as the difference between the 
stress-tested banks after stress test participation and that of the banks that had ex ante the 
probability of stress test participation but were not selected. The outcome variables (y) 
measure this average treatment effect of regulatory stress tests that are asset quality (LLP 
and NPL), capital adequacy (T1R), and credit risk exposure (RWA). 
2.4.5.2. Fixed effects models 
In the second part of my analysis, I test H2 and introduce stress tests as a particular 
incentive for banks to resort to accounting discretion practices. Further, I suspect stress-
tested banks to exercise more accounting discretion than their untested counterparts (H3). 
Accordingly, I follow the extant accounting discretion literature (i.e., Bushman and 
Williams, 2012; Fonseca and González, 2008; Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011) and 
build the subsequent fixed effects models that I pair with prior PSM and DiD analysis to 
capture the effects of stress test participation on banks’ discretionary behaviour. 
Based on the literature and the stress test reports, the main measures of discretionary 
accounting practices on LLP are capital management (T1R) and income smoothing 
(EBPT). To analyse the impact of stress test exercises (i.e., stress test participation and 
periods), I allow for interactions between the main independent variables, i.e. capital 
management (T1R) and income smoothing (EBPT), and two dummy variables that 
constitute stress test participation as well as pre- and post-treatment periods. Stress test 
participation is measured using the three distinct treatment samples that I develop in 
Section 2.4.5.1 (i.e., TREATALL, TREAT1011, and TREAT14). These time-invariant 
dummy variables take the value one for receiving the stress test treatment and zero 
otherwise. It should be noted that I use Kernel weights that I receive from the PSM 
analysis to enhance comparability of the treatment and control groups. Suitable control 
matches receive a higher weight than non-suitable ones. 
Similar to Section 2.4.5.1, the pre-and post-treatment periods, that isolate the stress 
test effect, are estimated differently for total stress test participation (TREATALL) and the 
first-time participation in 2010-11 (TREAT1011) and 2014 (TREAT14). For total stress 
test participation (TREATALL), I create a dummy variable that measures ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ 
stress test periods (STHC), taking the value of one for ‘hot’ stress test periods (i.e., 
2009S1-2011S2 and 2014S1-2015S2) and zero for ‘cold’ (i.e., 2005S2-2008S2 and 
2012S1-2013S2). For first-time participation in 2010-11 (TREAT1011) and 2014 
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(TREAT14), I employ dummy variables that estimate the exact outcome period that is 
four half-year periods before and after stress tests (BAST1011 and BAST14). The variables 
take the value of one for the post-treatment periods after the 2010-11 and 2014 stress tests 
(i.e., 2010S1-2011S2 and 2014S1-2015S2, respectively) and zero for the pre-treatment 
periods before the 2010-11 and 2014 stress tests (i.e., 2008S1-2009S2 or 2012S1-2013S2, 
respectively). The outcome periods are consistent with the periods T1 and T2 in 
Section 2.4.5.1 as well as the ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ stress test periods, and vice versa. The cut-
off point that separates between the periods before and after the treatment is the first half-
year bank report (semester S1), as the stress test results are released during the time when 
banks typically produce and release these reports (Bischof and Daske, 2013). I expect the 
stress test impact to be particularly strong during the post-treatment periods T2 that happen 
‘after’ the stress test exercises. 
Accordingly, I run the following model that is based on the total treatment 
participation (TREATALL), the Kernel-weighted control sample and ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ 
stress test periods (STHC): @@!$A' = 	 BC + BEF!@$AGE' + BH7F!@$A' + BI7@J0F$A' + BK-1.$AGE' + BL/M!-$A' +																														BNO-PQ + BR-./0-0@@ ∗ O-PQ + BT-./0-0@@ ∗ -1.$AGE' + BUO-PQ ∗																														-1.$AGE' + BEC-./0-0@@ ∗ O-PQ ∗ -1.$AGE' + BEE-./0-0@@ ∗ /M!-$A' +																														BEHO-PQ ∗ /M!-$A' + BEI-./0-0@@ ∗ O-PQ ∗ /M!-$A' + BEKOVW/$AGE' +																														BEL7XY!A' + BEN7ZF/[A' + BERP!VA' + BETV.0-/A' + \$ + ]A +																														^$A'	         (2.3A) 
To analyse the distinctive implications of the particular stress tests in 2010-11, I amend 
Equation 2.3A and run the subsequent modification based on the sample of first-time 
participants in 2010-11 (TREAT1011), the Kernel-weighted control sample and the 
equivalent outcome periods (BAST1011): @@!$A' = 	 BC + BEF!@$AGE' + BH7F!@$A' + BI7@J0F$A' + BK-1.$AGE' + BL/M!-$A' +																													BNM0O-1011 + BR-./0-1011 ∗ M0O-1011 + BT-./0-1011 ∗ -1.$AGE' +																													BUM0O-1011 ∗ -1.$AGE' + BEC-./0-1011 ∗ M0O-1011 ∗ -1.$AGE' +																													BEE-./0-1011 ∗ /M!-$A' + BEHM0O-1011 ∗ /M!-$A' + BEI-./0-1011 ∗																													M0O-1011 ∗ /M!-$A' + BEKOVW/$AGE' + BEL7XY!A' + BEN7ZF/[A' +																													BERP!VA' + BETV.0-/A' + \$ + ]A + ^$A'       (2.3B) 
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Similarly, to estimate the stress test in 2014, I amend Equation 2.3A and run the 
following modification based on the sample of first-time participants in 2014 (TREAT14), 
the Kernel-weighted control sample and the equivalent outcome periods (BAST14): @@!$A' = 	 BC + BEF!@$AGE' + BH7F!@$A' + BI7@J0F$A' + BK-1.$AGE' + BL/M!-$A' +																													BNM0O-14 + BR-./0-14 ∗ M0O-14 + BT-./0-14 ∗ -1.$AGE' + BUM0O-14 ∗																													-1.$AGE' + BEC-./0-14 ∗ M0O-14 ∗ -1.$AGE' + BEE-./0-14 ∗ /M!-$A' +																													BEHM0O-14 ∗ /M!-$A' + BEI-./0-14 ∗ M0O-14 ∗ /M!-$A' + BEKOVW/$AGE' +																													BEL7XY!A' + BEN7ZF/[A' + BERP!VA' + BETV.0-/A' + \$ + ]A +																													^$A'         (2.3C) 
where, in all Equations 2.3A, 2.3B and 2.3C, for bank i, time t and country j, LLP is current 
loan loss provisions scaled by lagged total assets, NPL and ΔNPL stand for the lagged 
level and current change in non-performing loans divided by lagged total assets, 
respectively, and ΔLOAN is the contemporary change in outstanding loans scaled by 
lagged total assets. These variables are included to adjust for the non-discretionary 
component of LLP as they measure the beginning degree and current shift of banks’ asset 
quality and credit risk (NPL, ΔNPL) as well as the current response of banks to reduce 
risk exposures (ΔLOAN). Thus, I control for the mechanism that current LLP are mainly 
determined by the lagged level and current change in banks’ asset quality and depend to 
some extent on the quality of the performing loan portfolio. I do not include LLR in the 
model as this variable is mechanically related to LLP and highly correlated with NPL (see, 
Table 2.4) and causes multicollinearity (Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011).13 
Further, I include, respectively, the lagged Tier 1 capital ratio (T1R) and current 
earnings before provisions and taxes scaled by lagged total assets (EBPT) to measure 
income smoothing and capital management. Based on the extant literature on accounting 
discretion, I observe capital management and/or income smoothing when one or both 
main independent variables (i.e., T1R, EBPT) explain the variation of the dependent 
variable, i.e. the current loan loss provisions. I lag the independent accounting variables 
to the necessary extent to reduce the risk that the independent and dependent variables 
might be jointly determined and cause bias (Beatty and Liao, 2014; Bushman and 
Williams, 2012). 
 
13 For more LLP model analyses, I refer to Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011) and Beatty and Liao 
(2014). 
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 In the outcome of the interaction variables of capital management (T1R) and income 
smoothing (EBPT) with stress test participation (i.e., TREATALL, TREAT1011, and 
TREAT14) and stress test periods (i.e., STHC, BAST1011, BAST14), I expect to see the 
impact of stress tests on banks’ capital management and income smoothing behaviour. 
Thus, the interaction terms are the variables of interest that show if stress-tested banks, 
compared to their Kernel-weighted counterparts, are incentivised to increase (positive 
coefficients) or decrease (negative coefficients) the current portion of discretionary LLP 
to manage capital and/or to smooth income. Moreover, to disentangle the consequences 
of stress test participation on discretionary practices over LLP, the setting creates various 
challenges due to potentially confounding bank-specific and macro-prudential responses 
to the financial and sovereign debt crisis. Therefore, I use bank size assessed by the lagged 
natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE) to control for differences within, and most 
importantly, across treatment and control groups. 
 I consider contemporaneous fiscal and monetary policy changes as well as market 
instabilities such as illiquidity, constrained capital and higher volatility (Bonner and 
Eijffinger, 2016). In particular, I utilise the country’s macroeconomic fundamentals using 
economic growth (ΔGDP), unemployment growth (ΔUNEM), price level in the housing 
market (HPI), and sovereign debt risk (IRATE). These variables control for the economic 
cycles of the stress test periods that might affect bank’s discretionary behaviour (Hamadi 
et al., 2016; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013; Bushman and Williams, 2012). Further, 
after statistical testing (i.e., the Hausman test), I employ bank-specific fixed effects (a) 
and half-year fixed effects (d) to account respectively for time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity and time-variant common shocks that may not be covered by the PSM-
obtained Kernel weights and/or the various bank- and country-specific control variables 
employed in my analysis (e.g., Hagendorff et al., 2018; Hamadi et al., 2016). It may be 
noted that the applied statistical software Stata omits overlapping time and fixed effects 
dummies to avoid multicollinearity. In addition, I cluster the standard errors at the bank 
level to shield my analysis from being biased by heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
(Acharya et al., 2018). Finally, I include the residual (e). 
 Next, in the context of H4, I account for contemporaneous responses of banking 
regulation and supervision along with the level of corruption to test if a stronger 
institutional environment leads to a decrease in discretionary behaviour over LLP. 
Inspired by Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011) and Bushman and Williams (2012), I 
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subsequently expand the baseline model in Equation 2.3A that is based on the total 
treatment participation (TREATALL), the Kernel-weighted control sample and ‘hot’ and 
‘cold’ stress test periods (STHC): @@!$A' = 	 BC + BEF!@$AGE' + BH7F!@$A' + BI7@J0F$A' + BK-1.$AGE' + BL/M!-$A' +																							BNO-PQ + BR-./0-0@@ ∗ O-PQ + BT-./0-0@@ ∗ -1.$AGE' + BUO-PQ ∗																							-1.$AGE' + BEC-./0-0@@ ∗ O-PQ ∗ -1.$AGE' + BEE-./0-0@@ ∗ /M!-$A' +																							BEHO-PQ ∗ /M!-$A' + BEI-./0-0@@ ∗ O-PQ ∗ /M!-$A' + BEKVFO-`0. +																							BEL-./0-0@@ ∗ VFO-`0. + BENO-PQ ∗ VFO-`0. + BER-./0-0@@ ∗ O-PQ ∗																							VFO-`0. + BETVFO-`0. ∗ -1.$AGE' + BEU-./0-0@@ ∗ VFO-`0. ∗ -1.$AGE' +																							BHCO-PQ ∗ VFO-`0. ∗ -1.$AGE' + BHE-./0-0@@ ∗ O-PQ ∗ VFO-`0. ∗																							-1.$AGE' + BHHVFO-`0. ∗ /M!-$AGE' + BHI-./0-0@@ ∗ VFO-`0. ∗ /M!-$AGE' +																						BHKO-PQ ∗ VFO-`0. ∗ /M!-$AGE' + BHL-./0-0@@ ∗ O-PQ ∗ VFO-`0. ∗																						/M!-$AGE' + BHNOVW/$AGE' + BHR7XY!A' + BHT7ZF/[A' + BHUP!VA' +																						BICV.0-/A' + \$ + ]A + ^$A'         (2.4) 
where, all other variables equally defined as in Equation 2.3A, the parameter INSTVAR 
stands for one of the three institutional variables SUPERV, CAPREG and CORRUPT. I 
apply two indices capturing, respectively, the country’s bank supervisory strength 
(SUPERV) and regulatory capital stringency (CAPREG) obtained from a 2012 World 
Bank survey (Cihák et al., 2012; Barth et al., 2001), and the country’s corruption level 
(CORRUPT) assessed by Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. I 
separately add the three institutional variables to the interaction term of the main 
independent variables, i.e. capital management (T1R) and income smoothing (EBPT), the 
total treatment participation sample (TREATALL), and ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ stress test periods 
(STHC) that I employ in Equation 2.3A. Thus, the extended interaction term constitutes 
the variable of interest that shows if a robust regulatory environment imposes limitations 
on stress-tested banks’ discretionary behaviour. As Table 2.3, Panel C illustrates the 
strength of bank supervisors (SUPERV) and the regulatory capital stringency (CAPREG) 
differs across European countries that might aid country-specific discretion and 
forbearance (Wheeler, 2019). Furthermore, I expect new insights by implementing the 
country’s corruption level (CORRUPT). For instance, banks operating in countries with 
more corruption might be more prone in exercising accounting discretion. 
 Further, following Kim and Kross (1998) and Bushman and Williams (2012), I 
consider differences in bank capital levels to test if stress-tested banks with lower capital 
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buffers are more inclined in discretionary behaviour (H5). Thus, I divide the total stress 
test participation sample (TREATALL) and the Kernel-weighted control banks into three 
subsamples that I use to separately run the baseline model on discretionary LLP displayed 
by Equation 2.3A. I distinguish between banks with high (CAPH: CAP > 10%), medium 
(CAPM: 7% ≤ CAP ≤ 10%) and low (CAPL: CAP < 7%) bank capital, as in Bushman and 
Williams (2012). According to the extant literature, low-capitalised banks might have 
more incentives to optimise capital to meet regulatory requirements and to avoid 
regulatory intervention. In this context, stress tests might provide additional motivation 
for banks with low capital buffers to exercise accounting discretion. 
2.5. Results 
This section provides empirical evidence on the treatment effect of stress tests and 
discusses the accounting discretion behaviour of treatment banks compared to control 
banks in the different settings established in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. 
2.5.1. The treatment effect of stress tests 
 First, I provide the results of the PSM probit models, which estimate the determinants 
of banks’ probability of being stress-tested and produce propensity scores for subsequent 
matching procedures (Equation 2.1).14 Table 2.5, Panel A, illustrates, with a pseudo-R2 
of 0.692 (Model 1), 0.625 (Model 2) and 0.462 (Model 3) indicating a high goodness of 
fit, that bank size (SIZE) is the sole consistent statistically significant predictor for stress 
test participation. There is mixed significance of the other covariates namely country’s 
economic strength (GDP), non-traditional banking activities (OEA), asset quality (NPL), 
liquidity risk (DSFR), bank capital (CAP) and profitability (ROA). 
[Please refer to Table 2.5 and Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 here] 
 According to EBA’s methodology notes for distinct stress tests, regulators focus on 
banks’ size relative to the home country and the European market to select stress test 
participants as this is an important measure for systemic relevance. Interestingly, the 
results suggest that regulators further appear to consider a wider range of bank-specific 
characteristics. For instance, in Model 1, the overall selection case, profitability (ROA), 
 
14 I use widely established Stata modules such as ‘psmatch2’ (Sianesi and Leuven, 2003) in my analysis. 
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asset quality (LLR) and bank capital (CAP) are significantly associated with stress test 
participation. These measures might be used by regulators as they play a fundamental 
role in banks’ performance, risk aversion and ability to meet long-term commitments 
(Schuermann, 2014). In contrast, the selection process for the assessments in 2010-11 
(Model 2) integrates the country’s economic strength (GDP) and non-traditional activities 
(OEA), whilst in 2014 (Model 3) liquidity and bank capital are of great importance for 
the regulators’ selection process. The latter result suggests that banks with a higher bank 
capital and liquidity base are more likely to be stress-tested, which is an indicator for 
regulators learning curve as they might be able to partly see through banks’ capital and 
liquidity management (Bierey and Schmidt, 2017). 
 Second, Table 2.5, Panels B, C and D report the matching equality by comparing the 
means of the covariates before and after running the GKM algorithm. Accordingly, the 
bias has been minimised for all covariates. Before matching, the means of almost all 
variables are significantly diverse, while the difference in means of all variables after 
matching is insignificant. Moreover, the pseudo-R2 is reduced to a minimum of 0.009 
(Panel B), 0.027 (Panel C) and 0.012 (Panel D) for the matched samples. Figures 2.1, 2.2 
and 2.3 show that the density of the Kernel weighted propensity scores between the 
matched treatment and control samples is very similar compared to the unmatched cases. 
Therefore, the GKM method works well in eliminating significant differences between 
the treatment and control groups. Importantly, the Kernel matching procedure has 
removed any meaningful differences along observables from the two groups of banks 
during the pre-treatment periods, which ensures that the parallel trend assumption has 
been satisfied. Consequently, this explained PSM process leads to the final samples that 
I use in the subsequent DiD and fixed effects analyses. As I adopt the common support 
option, treatment and control banks with particularly high or low propensity scores are 
automatically removed. This yields a total European matched sample of 132 treatment 
and 122 control banks (TREATALL), including matched samples of first-time participants 
of 71 treated to 108 controls in 2010-11 (TREAT1011), and 55 treated to 87 controls in 
2014 (TREAT14).  
[Please refer to Table 2.6 and Figures 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 here] 
 Third, Table 2.6 and Figures 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 provide the PSM and DiD analysis and 
empirical evidence on the average treatment effect of stress tests (Equation 2.2). To test 
H1, I compare the GKM-matched samples of European treatment and control banks 
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before and after treatment. I conduct my analysis on the following outcome variables, 
which measure forward- and backward-looking asset quality (LLP, NPL), capital 
adequacy (T1R) and credit risk (RWA). The examination is divided into three parts, where 
Panel A presents the total stress test participation effect of all treatment banks over the 
entire sample period 2005-2015. Panels B and C examine the stress test effect separately 
four half-year periods before and after the 2010-11 and the 2014 treatments, respectively 
(as defined in Section 2.4.5.1). 
 In terms of asset quality (LLP, NPL), I do not observe a statistically significant average 
treatment effect (DiD) for total stress test participation (Panel A). However, the single 
differences for asset quality (LLP, NPL) indicate that treatment and control banks report 
more NPL (increase of 0.71% and 0.45%) for the treatment over the pre-treatment period 
that are statistically significant, while only the control banks show more LLP (increase of 
0.17%) for the same periods. This may also be explained by Figure 2.4 illustrating that 
treatment banks had made exhaustive LLP during the financial crisis suggesting pro-
cyclicality of such activities (Wheeler, 2019; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013; Bushman 
and Williams, 2012; Beatty and Liao, 2011; Laeven and Majnoni, 2003). Regarding the 
individual assessment of first-time participants in 2010-11, I document a statistically 
significant average treatment effect (DiD) showing that treatment banks report lower LLP 
(-0.13%) and increased NPL (0.35%). This average treatment effect partly continues for 
the first-time participants of the 2014 exercise, as I find a significant increase in NPL 
(0.55%), but not in LLP. As regulators comprehensively assess the asset quality of tested 
banks, this result shows that stress tests reveal weaknesses in the loan portfolio quality of 
treated banks in terms of backward-looking classification of NPL. 
 Interestingly, the results for capital adequacy vary intensely between the three 
examination periods. While I measure an average treatment effect (DiD) on capital 
adequacy (T1R) for total stress test participation that is negative and significant (-1.15%), 
the average treatment effect (DiD) in 2010-11 is insignificant and in 2014 positive and 
significant (2.00%). On average, treatment banks seem not to re-capitalise as stringent 
compared to untreated banks after the financial crisis. Only recently, as suggested by the 
positive and significant treatment effect in 2014 (2.00%), stress-tested banks show a 
learning curve and increase their capital levels. This development is supported by the 
negative single differences for the treatment over the control groups which are significant 
for all treatment and pre-treatment periods except for the treatment period in 2014. On 
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the other hand, with regards to credit risk (RWA), I document a statistically significant 
average treatment effect (DiD) for the 2010-11 assessments (-3.53%) but not for total 
stress test participation and the 2014 exercise. Further, all single differences of the 
treatment and control groups that compare the treatment over the pre-treatment periods 
are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This indicates that stress-tested 
banks and their counterparts decreased their risk exposures substantially. 
 Thus, stress test exercises do not appear to improve capital adequacy of treatment 
banks on all occasions, while banks might shrink risk exposure than increase their capital 
base (Gropp et al., 2019). In particular, the 2010-11 stress tests appeared to be rather mild 
regarding additional capital requirements (Schuermann, 2014), which seem to be 
benefited by the reduction in credit risk (Braouezec and Wagalath, 2018; Beltratti and 
Paladino, 2016). In contrast, the 2014 stress test focused more on capital adequacy and 
banks were required to increase capital when a capital shortfall was disclosed (Sahin and 
de Haan, 2016). In addition, the ongoing process of implementing Basel III considerably 
raises the capital base, which is captured in the PSM and DiD approach, as it affects both 
treated and untreated banks similarly. Stress tests might further motivate both treatment 
and control banks to capitalise positively as markets might penalise weak banks owing to 
the fear of future regulatory enforcement actions (Carboni et al., 2017). Overall, I can 
constitute that, in support of H1, the 2014 stress test enhanced treatment banks’ 
accounting figures and, thus, contributed to safety and soundness of the banking system, 
whilst the 2010-11 exercises did not trigger those positive bank reactions. 
2.5.2. The effect of stress test participation on discretionary behaviour 
 Table 2.7 illustrates the results of the fixed effects baseline model, which estimates 
stress test effects on banks’ capital and income smoothing through LLP and therefore 
introduces stress tests as a novel accounting discretion motive (as hypothesised in H2 and 
H3). In Model 1, I run Equation 2.3A on the entire matched treatment and control sample 
of 265 European banks, whereas, based on Equation 2.3B and Equation 2.3C, in Models 2 
and 3, I estimate stress test effects on first-time participants’ discretionary behaviour 
before and after the 2010-11 and 2014 treatments, respectively. Most importantly, my 
findings provide support for H2 and H3 and indicate capital management of stress test 
participants compared to the control banks. In particular, I report capital management 
related to the total stress test participation and CEBS/EBA’s 2010-11 exercises, as the 
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interaction terms TREATALL*STHC*T1R in Model 1 and TREAT1011*BAST1011*T1R 
in Model 2 are statistically significant. Further, I find increased and reduced income 
smoothing activities of first-time participants in 2010-11 and 2014, respectively, as the 
interaction terms TREAT1011*BAST1011*EBPT and TREAT14*BAST14*EBPT are 
statistically significant. The latter result indicates the impact of stress tests on banks’ 
discretionary behaviour that may be positive or negative depending on the individual 
exercise. 
[Please refer to Table 2.7 here] 
 Consistent with H2 and H3, the results show that current LLP decreases with T1R, 
suggesting that treatment banks, in contrast to untreated banks, delay more loan losses to 
manage their capital adequacy. In economic terms, if T1R increases by 1%, current LLP 
of treated banks decrease by -3.10% compared to untreated banks, on average and ceteris 
paribus (see interaction term TREATALL*STHC*T1R in Model 1). According to Basel III, 
higher LLP increases LLR, which reduce retained earnings and Tier 1 capital. As stress-
tested banks are exposed to regulatory intervention to raise capital adequacy in t–1, this 
appears to have an impact on future banks’ discretionary behaviour. Banks delay current 
loan losses to reduce pressure on earnings figures, to recover from regulatory re-
capitalisation and to prepare for potential forthcoming interventions. Further, in Model 2, 
the interaction term TREAT1011*BAST1011*T1R is significant at the 1% confidence 
level, while the equivalent term in Model 3 (TREAT14*BAST14*T1R) is insignificant. 
Therefore, in support of H2 and H3, the stress test effect in 2010-11 appears to incentivise 
first-time participants to boost capital by delaying LLP, unlike during the 2014 stress test 
period. Regarding the CEBS/EBAs’ treatments in 2010-11, if T1R increases by 1%, 
current LLP of first-time participants decrease after the stress test by -7.19% compared to 
untreated banks, on average and ceteris paribus. 
 On the other hand, in Models 2 and 3, the interaction terms TREAT1011*BAST1011* 
EBPT and TREAT14*BAST14*EBPT illustrate respectively that stress tests significantly 
exacerbate or mitigate income smoothing by first-time participants. In particular, conform 
to H2 and H3, after the 2010-11 stress tests, first-time participants seem to influence their 
earnings by applying discretionary LLP, while, in opposition of H2 and H3, the effect on 
2014 first-time participants is negative. If EBPT increase by 1%, current LLP of treatment 
banks increase by 20.07% after the 2010-11 stress tests in contrast to untreated banks, on 
average and ceteris paribus. This effect on LLP after the EBA/ECB’s 2014 assessments 
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yields -29.84%. Both results, on capital and earnings management, support my PSM and 
DiD analysis as regulatory intervention focused on capital adequacy and asset quality in 
2014, which mitigated discretion, implying that stress tests in 2010-11 might be 
influenced by such accounting practices. Moreover, the outcome supports Schuermann 
(2014), who conclude that the 2010-11 stress test experiences lacked sufficient reliability. 
In contrast, ECB’s assessment in 2014 was much more credible, indicating a regulatory 
learning curve (Sahin and de Haan, 2016). 
 In addition, my results support earlier findings of the existing literature such as 
Bushman and Williams (2012), Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011) and Fonseca and 
González (2008), who report evidence of income smoothing in different settings. For 
instance, Table 2.7 reports that LLP increase with NPL and the change in NPL, which is 
the non-discretionary component of LLP (Hamadi et al., 2016). Moreover, the change in 
loans (ΔLOAN) is negatively related with LLP, which supports Laeven and Majnoni 
(2003), who argue that less timely LLP in combination with an economic downturn affect 
credit quality negatively. 
[Please refer to Table 2.8 here] 
 Fifth, Table 2.8 presents the results for the first modification of the baseline model 
(Equation 2.4, H4) by separately including institutional variables as suggested by 
Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011). Model 1 reports the results of including the local 
supervisory power (SUPERV), Model 2 considers the stringency of capital requirements 
(CAPREG) and Model 3 incorporates the country’s corruption level (CORRUPT). As 
hypothesised by H4, the results illustrate that the institutional environment is significantly 
related to the manager’s choice to exercise discretionary LLP. My findings indicate that 
stress tests in combination with more bank supervisory strength significantly relates to 
both capital and earnings management, while stricter capital regulation and corruption 
influences capital or earnings, respectively. 
 In particular, in Models 1 and 3, the interaction variables that connect stress test 
participation and earnings with the supervisor’s strength (TREATALL*STHC* 
SUPERV*EBPT) and the corruption level (TREATALL*STHC*CORRUPT*EBPT) are 
negative and significant at the 1% confidence level. In support of H4, this implies that in 
countries where supervisors have more strength and corruption is lower, if earnings 
increase by 1%, LLP decrease respectively by -19.14% and -0.74% compared to the 
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control banks, on average and ceteris paribus. Therefore, I conclude that stronger 
supervisors may mitigate income smoothing of stress-tested banks, whilst a lower 
corruption level may be a contributing factor, but the absolute impact is minimal and 
therefore statistically but not economically significant. Surprisingly, in Models 1 and 2, 
the interaction terms that combine stress test participation and capital management with 
supervisor’s strength (TREATALL*STHC*SUPERV*T1R) and capital stringency 
(TREATALL*STHC*CAPREG*T1R) are negative and significant at the 1% and 10% 
confidence levels, respectively. If T1R increase by 1%, LLP decrease respectively by          
-3.75% and -3.56%. Thus, in opposition to H4, unlike income smoothing, stricter banking 
supervisory and capital regulation regimes do not necessarily mitigate the bank manager’s 
incentives to delay LLP and to boost earnings during stress test periods. This indicates 
that the total effect of stress tests on the capital management of treated banks remains 
strong, even within stricter regimes. 
[Please refer to Table 2.9 here] 
 Sixth, I examine whether high-, medium- or low-capitalised treatment banks are more 
driven to exercise discretionary behaviour (H5). I follow Bushman and William’s (2012) 
definition and run Equation 2.3A separately for treatment banks reporting high (Model 1: 
CAP > 10%), medium (Model 2: 7% ≤ CAP ≤ 10%) and low (Model 3: CAP < 7%) capital 
levels. In Table 2.9, Model 3, as the interaction term TREATALL*STHC*T1R is 
significant at the 10% confidence level, I find consistent with H5 that that low-capitalised 
treatment banks apply more discretionary practices. In economic terms, if T1R increases 
by 1%, current LLP decrease by -5.31%, on average and ceteris paribus. There is also an 
overall tendency of low-capitalised banks to exercise capital management (T1R). This 
result suggests that especially weakly capitalised banks boost their capital adequacy 
figures by delaying LLP in particular during stress test periods owing to the fear of 
additional bad market reactions and regulatory interventions (Bierey and Schmidt, 2017; 
Kim and Kross, 1998). 
 On the other hand, in Model 1, the same interaction term turns positive at the 10% 
confidence level, indicating that highly capitalised banks increase LLP to optimise capital 
adequacy (4.07%). In Table 2.9, Model 2, the relationship between LLP and the 
interaction terms TREATALL*EBPT (i.e., 30.85%) and TREATALL*STHC*EBPT (i.e., 
32.77%) is positive and significant at the 1% and 5% confidence levels, which indicates 
that medium-capitalised treatment banks apply accounting discretion to smooth income 
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compared to untreated peers. In comparison with earlier findings in Table 2.7, Model 1, 
this suggests that high- and low-capitalised treatment banks may drive capital 
management practices in both directions, while medium-capitalised treatment banks 
rather smooth income. 
2.6. Robustness analysis 
In this section, I test the robustness of my findings and the validity of the econometric 
analysis. Main results are displayed in Tables 2.10 and 2.11 and additional robustness is 
reflected in the APPENDIX (Tables A.1 to A.8). 
2.6.1. Unconfoundedness and common support control 
 As earlier mentioned, it is essential that the PSM and DiD analyses meet the 
unconfoundedness and common support assumptions. The model covariates are required 
to have an important influence on the participation choice and the treatment outcome to 
be in the right balance (i.e., neither over-, nor under-parameterised) and independent of 
the outcome. To ensure that these conditions hold true and, hence, minimise any 
confoundedness emerging from covariate imbalance, I run an alternative probit model 
using the leave-one-out strategy. In Table 2.10, Panel A, I display the alternative 
robustness model that is based on the full set of covariates including the Loan-to-Deposit 
ratio (LTDR) as an additional covariate that measures liquidity risk. As banks were highly 
exposed to liquidity risk during the 2008 financial crisis, regulators might focus on 
selecting banks that report weak liquidity reserves. However, the results do not show that 
liquidity risk is a significant selection criterion. Further, I find that my results with respect 
to the probability of banks participating in stress tests, shown in Table 2.10, Panel A, are 
overall unaffected. 
[Please refer to Table 2.10 here] 
 Next, to ensure that the PSM and DiD approach (Equation 2.2) is resilient against 
remaining differences of the treatment and control banks after matching and hidden bias 
from the PSM probit model, I control for additional confounding covariates in the model. 
In Table 2.10, Panel B, I include a set of dummy variables to isolate different sample 
banks as I test if those banks are inherently different and alter my conclusions. In 
particular, although I believe that Swiss and Norwegian banks operate under comparable 
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regulatory environments, I separate banks from countries outside the EU (EU) because 
the different regulatory regimes might cause inherently different accounting behaviour 
compared to EU banks. Further, as mandatory IFRS was introduced in 2005, most of the 
sample bank observations are based on IFRS. To address sensitivities from distinct 
accounting standards, I consider those banks that still use local GAAP (GAAP). Similarly, 
I acknowledge listed banks (PUBLIC), which might be more affected by market 
responses than their private counterparts. Moreover, I control for some banks which are 
under stricter supervision than other treatment banks, as the parent and subsidiaries are 
considered in stress tests (MULTIPLE) as well as stress test reports revealed a capital 
shortage (SHORT). As multiple stress test participation and capital inadequacy of banks 
might intensify pressure, those banks might have more incentives to exercise discretion. 
In addition, I control for inactive banks (ACTIVE) and follow related studies (e.g., Beatty 
and Liao, 2011) that separately analyse banks involved in M&As and bankruptcies as 
those banks might be influenced by special survival circumstances. The results displayed 
in Table 2.10, Panel B, appear to be similar in all distinct settings. 
[Please refer to Table 2.11 here] 
 In Table 2.11, I ensure the robustness of the fixed effects baseline models in 
Equations 2.3A, 2.3B and 2.3C. In particular, Lechner (2008) argues that the information 
excluded due to the common support option might result in biased treatment effects. 
Therefore, I run the fixed effects regressions including all treatment banks outside the 
common support area. I incorporate 11 and 15 treatment banks that were not within 
common support for the samples of total stress test participation (TREATALL) and first-
time participants in 2010-11 (TREAT1011), respectively. As the ‘trimming’ function does 
not exclude any treatment bank from the sample of first-time participants in 2014 
(TREAT14), I test my results discarding the four largest treatment banks. From this 
analysis, I retrieve consistent results, compared to my baseline analysis, as the 
coefficients vary slightly but conform regarding the operator and the statistical 
significance of the main capital and earnings management variables. 
2.6.2. Additional robustness checks 
 In addition to the main robustness checks in Section 2.6.1, I run several testings, 
displayed in the APPENDIX (Tables A.1 to A.8), to further support my baseline results. 
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First, in Table A.1, Panel A, I repeat the leave-one-out strategy and run another alternative 
probit model to test covariance imbalance. In particular, I exchange asset composition 
measures (OEA with LOAN). Further, in Panel B, I rerun the baseline probit model based 
on the matched sample within common support (i.e., double PSM) to detect any 
significant remaining differences after matching. 15 
 Second, based on the baseline samples, I employ various matching algorithms, where 
the choice is a trade-off between reducing bias and variance (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2008). Those tests are crucial as I aim to optimise matching equality that reduces the 
difference between treatment and control banks by retaining as many sample banks as 
possible. In particular, I examine results from Nearest-neighbour matching with and 
without ‘Caliper’, replacement or oversampling, ‘Radius’, ‘Kernel’ (i.e., ‘Epanechnikov’ 
‘Biweight’, etc.) and ‘Mahalanobis’. The results appear to be different depending on the 
exact combination of covariate and algorithm variations. Nevertheless, in Table A.1, 
Panels C, D and E, I present Radius and Nearest-neighbour matching, which are similar 
in achieving equality of means of treatment and control banks after matching. 
 Third, in Table A.2, I repeat the common support robustness check and include 
treatment banks that were automatically excluded by the PSM algorithm as the estimated 
propensity scores were not in the common support area. This test ensures that leaving out 
the information outside this common support area does not significantly screw the results 
(Lechner, 2008). Moreover, the DiD results are insensitive to the addition of NPL in the 
PSM probit model. I conclude that the significant difference of LLP between treatment 
and control banks seems to be truly attributed to the treatment effect. On the other hand, 
I do not explicitly consider exogenous macroeconomic changes, such as the financial or 
sovereign debt crisis, as PSM addresses individual differences between treatment and 
control groups. Hence, PSM assumes that both groups similarly suffer from those external 
influences.16 
 Fourth, in Tables A.3, A.4 and A.5 I exclude a different set of sample banks as those 
banks are inherently different and might alter my conclusions. In particular, similar to the 
robustness check in Section 2.6.1, I rerun the baseline models of Equations 2.3A, 2.3B and 
 
15 I also attempted to introduce the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, listing status, bank specialisation, non-
performing loans, relative size (Total assets/GDP). However, I discard those variables, as they do not 
achieve a balanced property of the propensity score or produce too biased matching results. The relevant 
results are all available upon request. 
16 I gratefully thank an anonymous reviewer for valuable comments on the treatment effect results. 
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2.3C removing banks from non-EU countries (EU), banks with multiple stress test 
participation (MULTIPLE), banks using local GAAP (GAAP) and inactive banks 
(ACTIVE). Further, to fully rule out the influence of macroeconomic fluctuations that may 
confound the findings of the fixed effects regressions, I include an interaction term 
between the treatment groups and the unemployment rate. In Table A.6, the results of all 
models illustrate that the coefficients of the interaction terms are positive, indicating pro-
cyclicality of LLPs, that are, however, statistically insignificant. Lastly, in Table A.7 and 
Figure A.1, I provide the marginal effects of the interaction terms of the baseline 
regressions, while Table A.8 shows additional testings on multicollinearity by excluding 
time fixed effects. From all those distinct settings, the results are consistent as the 
coefficients are marginally different but match my baseline analysis regarding the 
operator and the statistical significance of the main variables and interaction terms of 
interest that reflect capital and income smoothing. 
2.7. Concluding remarks 
 The benefits of stress tests in Europe and the U.S. have been determined through event 
and conceptional studies that report markets’ reaction to stress test disclosures. Owing to 
the complexity of regulatory exercises, recent studies such as those by Carboni et al. 
(2017) and Flannery et al. (2017) have expanded the literature by using different 
information measures and event study designs. Instead, my work advances prior research 
by empirically connecting treatment banks’ accounting information quality and stress test 
disclosures. In particular, using a unique sample and dataset from 27 European countries, 
I employ PSM and various fixed effects models to measure the treatment effect of stress 
tests and the implications of these exercises on tested banks’ discretionary behaviour. I 
document that tested banks are highly influenced by stress tests, which provides 
incentives for these banks to apply discretionary loan loss provisions to manage capital 
and earnings. 
 First, this study shows that banks subject to stress tests report different accounting 
figures in terms of asset quality and capital adequacy, compared to untested banks. While 
tested banks report more pro-cyclical loan loss provisions in 2010-11, overall capital 
adequacy of tested banks was lower and increased after the 2014 stress tests. Second, 
tested banks have stronger incentives to delay loan loss provisions to strengthen and boost 
their capital adequacy ratios; this signals resilience and soundness to regulators and 
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market players. In particular, in 2010-11, stress tests motivate banks to manage capital 
and earnings, whilst in 2014 stress tests mitigate discretionary behaviour. Further, 
specifically low-capitalised stress test participants delay loan loss provisions to boost 
capital, whereas medium- and high-capitalised banks increase loan loss provisions to 
smooth income and optimise capital, respectively. Third, I document that a more reliable 
institutional environment mitigates the degree of earnings management, whilst capital 
management remains the same during stress test periods. Overall, my results suggest that 
stress tests convey, on several occasions, a ‘placebo’ image to regulators and markets, but 
can also be an ‘active’ treatment. 
 This study is the first that links the quality of accounting information with stress test 
disclosures in such a comprehensive manner and has distinct political and business 
implications. Undoubtedly besides their intrinsic limitations, stress tests are a useful 
regulatory tool during crises to distinguish banks by their quality (Borio et al., 2014; 
Schuermann, 2014). Furthermore, comprehensive assessments provide unique 
opportunities for regulators to gain in-depth insights to improve the supervision of SIFIs 
(Carboni et al., 2017; Sahin and de Haan, 2016). However, my findings indicate that 
stress-tested banks use LLP to manage capital and earnings to signal soundness. I 
conclude that stress tests might exacerbate market pressure particularly on weaker 
institutions as they expose bank-specific information in calm economic times; this might 
lead to financial instability. Therefore, this study empirically advances previous research 
on stress tests that suggested to amend mandatory stress test disclosures towards 
aggregated information, particularly in normal economic times, as this policy would 
reduce pressure and banks’ signalling incentives (Bouvard et al., 2015; Goldstein and 
Sapra, 2013). 
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Table 2.1 Variable definitions and data sources 
Abbreviations Variables Description Data sources 
SIZE Bank size Natural logarithm of total assets BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports 
CAP Bank capital Total equity capital divided by total assets BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports 
LOAN Traditional banking 
activities 
Outstanding loans scaled by lagged total assets BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports 
ΔLOAN Loan growth Change in outstanding loans scaled by lagged 
total assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports 
NPL (Backward-looking) 
asset quality 
Non-performing or impaired loans scaled by 
lagged total assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports 
ΔNPL Change in 
(backward-looking) 
asset quality 
Change in non-performing or impaired loans 
scaled by lagged total assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports 
LLP (Forward-looking) 
asset quality 
Loan loss provisions for non-performing or 
impaired loans scaled by lagged total assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports 
LLR Credit portfolio 
quality 
Loan loss reserves for non-performing or 
impaired loans scaled by lagged total assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports 
DSFR Liquidity risk Deposit ratio: deposits and short-term funding 
divided by total assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports 
LTDR Liquidity risk Loan-To-Deposit ratio: outstanding loans divided 
by deposits and short-term funding 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports 
OEA Non-traditional 
banking activities 
Other earning assets scaled by lagged total assets BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports 
EBPT Income smoothing Earnings before provisions and taxes scaled by 
lagged total assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports 
ROA Profitability Return on assets: earnings before taxes scaled by 
total assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports 
T1R Capital adequacy 
and capital 
management 
Regulatory Tier 1 capital divided by risk-
weighted assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports 
RWA Credit risk Risk-weighted assets scaled by lagged total 
assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports 
TREATALL Stress test 
participation 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for 
stress-tested banks and 0 otherwise 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports 
TREAT1011 First-time 
participation in the 
2010-11 stress tests 
Dummy variable that captures the first-time 
participants in the 2010-11 stress tests 
EBA and ECB stress 
test disclosures 
TREAT14 First-time 
participation in the 
2014 stress test 
Dummy variable that captures the first-time 
participants in the 2014 stress test  
EBA and ECB stress 
test disclosures 
STHC ‘Hot’ vs. ‘cold’ 
stress test periods 
Dummy variable with a value of 1 for 'hot' 
(2009S1-2011S2 and 2014S1-2015S2) and 0 for 
'cold' (2005S2-2008S2 and 2012S1-2013S2) 
stress test periods 
EBA and ECB stress 
test disclosures 
BAST Treatment vs non-
treatment overall 
stress test periods 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the 
overall treatment period (2009S1-2015S2) and 0 
for the overall pre-treatment period (2005S2-
2008S2) 
EBA and ECB stress 
test disclosures 
BAST1011 Treatment vs non-
treatment 2010-11 
stress test periods 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the 
2010-11 treatment period (2010S1-2011S2) and 
0 for the 2010-11 pre-treatment period (2008S2-
2009S2) 
EBA and ECB stress 
test disclosures 
BAST14 Treatment vs non-
treatment 2014 
stress test periods 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the 
2014 treatment period (2014S1-2015S2) and 0 
for the 2014 pre-treatment period (2012S2-
2013S2) 
EBA and ECB stress 
test disclosures 
GDP Economic strength Nominal Gross Domestic Product in Trillion 
Euros 
OECD, Bloomberg 
ΔGDP Economic growth Change in Gross Domestic Product in Euros OECD, Bloomberg 
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Table 2.1 continued 
ΔUNEM Unemployment 
growth 
Change in unemployment rate OECD, Bloomberg 
HPI Price level in the 
housing market 
House price index (available at: 
http://www.bis.org/statistics/pp.htm) 
BIS Residential 
Property Price database 
IRATE Sovereign debt risk The difference between short- and long-term 
interest rates in government bond markets 
OECD 
SUPERV Bank supervisory 
strength 
A composite index indicating the power of 
national supervisors following Bushman and 
Williams (2012) 
World Bank 
CAPREG Regulatory capital 
stringency 
A composite index indicating the stringency of 
capital regulation following Bushman and 
Williams (2012) 
World Bank 
CORRUPT Corruption level The Corruption Perceptions Index (available at: 
https://www.transparency.org) 
Transparency 
International 
EU EU membership Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the 
banks which are headquartered in an EU member 
state and 0 otherwise 
BvD Bankscope 
GAAP Accounting 
standards 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a 
bank follows GAAP and 0 if a bank follows 
IFRS 
BvD Bankscope 
ACTIVE Bank status Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for a 
bank is active as a going concern entity, and 0 
otherwise 
BvD Bankscope 
PUBLIC Listed banks Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a 
bank is listed on the exchange market, and 0 
otherwise 
BvD Bankscope 
SHORT Capital shortage Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a 
bank does not meet the regulatory capital 
requirements, and 0 otherwise 
EBA and ECB stress 
test disclosures 
MULTIPLE Multiple stress test 
participation 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if both 
the parent bank and its subsidiaries have 
participated in a stress test exercise and 0 if only 
the parent bank has participated in a stress test 
EBA and ECB stress 
test disclosures 
 
  
51 
Table 2.2 European stress tests and sample construction 
Panel A: Geographical structure of sample banks 
 Stress test participation  
CEBS/EBAa 
 Stress test participation 
ECB 
Total treatment 
sample 
First-time 
participants 
First-time 
participants 
Benchmark 
portfolio  
 2010 2011 2014 2016  2014 2015 (TREATALL) 2010-11 (TREAT1011) 
2014  
(TREAT14) 
 
Austria 2 3 6 2  6 2 10 4 3 2 
Belgium 2 2 5 2  6 1 7 2 4 0 
Cyprus 2 2 3 0  4 0 5 2 3 0 
Denmark 3 4 4 3  0 0 4 4 0 41 
Estonia 0 0 0 0  3 0 3 0 3 0 
Finland 1 1 1 1  3 1 4 1 2 3 
France 4 4 11 6  13 1 15 4 9 7 
Germany 14 12 24 9  25 0 27 14 13 3 
Greece 6 6 4 0  4 4 6 6 0 1 
Hungary 2 1 1 1  0 0 2 2 0 2 
Iceland 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 2 
Ireland 2 3 3 2  5 0 5 3 2 0 
Italy 5 5 15 5  15 0 15 5 10 18 
Latvia 0 0 1 0  3 0 3 0 3 1 
Lithuania 0 0 0 0  3 0 3 0 3 1 
Luxembourg 2 1 2 0  6 1 8 2 5 0 
Malta 1 1 1 0  3 1 4 1 2 0 
Netherlands 4 4 6 4  7 0 7 4 3 2 
Norway 0 1 1 1  0 0 1 1 0 92 
Poland 1 1 6 1  0 0 6 1 5 1 
Portugal 4 4 3 0  3 1 5 4 0 3 
Slovakia 0 0 0 0  3 0 3 0 3 0 
Slovenia 1 2 3 0  3 1 4 2 1 1 
Spain 27 25 15 6  15 0 32 28 3 2 
Sweden 4 4 4 4  0 0 4 4 0 36 
Switzerland 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 128 
United Kingdom 4 4 4 4  0 0 4 4 0 21 
Total sample 91 90 123 51  130 13 187 98 77 367 
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Table 2.2 continued 
Panel B: PSM samples of banks 
            TREATALL Control TREAT1011 Control TREAT14 Control 
Initial sample of banks 
   187 
 
98 
 
77 
 
Excluded banks due to financial reporting inconsistencies     27 
 
3 
 
17 
 
Excluded banks due to lack of data caused by M&As   8 
 
8 
 
0 
 
Excluded banks due to lack of data caused by bankruptcies   1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
Sample of banks used in the PSM estimation   151 367 86 432b 60 372b 
Excluded banks as no propensity score estimated due to data constraints  8 27 0 42 5 27 
Samples of banks with estimated propensity scores  143 340 86 390 55 345 
Excluded banks that are not in the common support area 
   11 218 15 282 0 258 
Final PSM samples    132 122 71 108 55 87 
This table presents the European stress test participation and sample construction. Panel A reports the number of treated and untreated (control) banks for each sample European (i.e., 
EU and EFTA) country. For the former group of banks, participation in either the CEBS/EBA, or the ECB stress tests over the period 2010-2016 is considered. TREATALL reflects the 
entire population of treatment banks; it covers the 69.5% of the entire European banking market based on total year-end 2015 consolidated assets. The benchmark portfolio as described 
in the last column is congregated from the pool of banks with the remaining 30.5% of total assets. I use two dummy variables (TREAT1011 and TREAT14) to capture the first-time 
participants in the 2010-11 and the 2014 stress tests, respectively. Panel B describes the filtering criteria I apply to my samples of banks in the conduct of the PSM analysis. I exclude 
banks due to financial reporting inconsistencies, and also due to the lack of data caused either by M&As, or bankruptcies. To obtain the final PSM samples, I exclude banks for which 
no propensity scores are produced due to data constraints as well as banks that do not fall into the common support area.  
aThe stress tests in 2009 and 2010 were conducted by CEBS. The names of the participating banks of the CEBS stress test in 2009 were not published. 
bThe untreated (control) groups for TREAT1011 and TREAT14 are augmented by 65 (i.e., 367 + 65 = 432) banks and 5 (i.e., 367 + 5 = 372) banks, respectively. These banks participated 
in a stress test exercise at some later point in time. 
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Table 2.3 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Treated banks 
 Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. Median 
SIZE 2827 11.102 1.641 4.860 14.254 11.058 
CAP 2552 0.073 0.065 0.006 0.480 0.062 
LOAN 2527 0.588 0.188 0.057 1.084 0.610 
ΔLOAN 2526 0.012 0.052 -0.135 0.241 0.006 
NPL 2034 0.044 0.049 0.000 0.244 0.027 
ΔNPL 1740 0.003 0.010 -0.025 0.046 0.001 
LLP 2494 0.004 0.007 -0.002 0.042 0.002 
LLR 2259 0.024 0.026 0.000 0.132 0.016 
DSFR 2534 0.637 0.236 0.027 1.427 0.624 
LTDR 2522 1.187 1.375 0.045 14.251 0.930 
OEA 2544 0.362 0.191 0.016 0.936 0.324 
EBPT 2539 0.008 0.007 -0.006 0.051 0.007 
ROA 2551 0.004 0.009 -0.026 0.043 0.003 
T1R 2512 0.119 0.053 0.059 0.394 0.109 
RWA 2237 0.503 0.209 0.079 1.026 0.502 
Panel B: Control banks 
 Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. Median 
SIZE 6747 6.429 1.623 3.682 13.706 6.062 
CAP 5684 0.090 0.076 0.006 0.480 0.078 
LOAN 5660 0.784 0.211 0.057 1.084 0.842 
ΔLOAN 5655 0.028 0.057 -0.135 0.241 0.022 
NPL 3291 0.020 0.034 0.000 0.244 0.010 
ΔNPL 1841 0.001 0.007 -0.025 0.046 0.000 
LLP 5341 0.003 0.006 -0.002 0.042 0.001 
LLR 3436 0.012 0.019 0.000 0.132 0.006 
DSFR 5608 0.785 0.204 0.027 1.427 0.824 
LTDR 5599 1.305 1.691 0.045 14.251 1.056 
OEA 5679 0.200 0.171 0.016 0.936 0.143 
EBPT 5693 0.008 0.008 -0.006 0.051 0.006 
ROA 5694 0.005 0.008 -0.026 0.043 0.004 
T1R 1974 0.168 0.054 0.059 0.394 0.162 
RWA 2042 0.581 0.166 0.079 1.026 0.574 
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Table 2.3 continued 
Panel C: Means of country-specific variables 
Country ΔGDP ΔUNEM HPI IRATE SUPERV CAPREG CORRUPT 
Austria 0.012 0.004 134.371 1.285 15 7 32.261 
Belgium 0.012 0.003 100.283 1.530 18 6 33.342 
Cyprus 0.009 0.057 88.776 N/A 20 7 27.840 
Denmark 0.008 0.026 105.086 0.758 17 7 40.471 
Estonia 0.013 0.020 131.205 N/A 17 6 29.853 
Finland 0.009 0.009 102.319 1.143 13 8 39.838 
France 0.011 0.008 100.529 1.305 19 9 31.148 
Germany 0.014 -0.043 104.981 0.867 15 8 35.119 
Greece -0.005 0.051 84.985 7.324 15 9 18.242 
Hungary 0.010 -0.005 99.733 0.601 20 7 23.472 
Iceland 0.016 0.032 247.133 -1.287 20 8 35.812 
Ireland 0.027 0.048 93.219 2.996 17 8 32.365 
Italy 0.004 0.024 96.070 2.438 17 9 19.191 
Latvia 0.012 0.026 129.046 1.406 18 7 23.009 
Lithuania 0.020 0.034 342.657 2.369 18 7 24.881 
Luxembourg 0.021 0.019 104.290 1.120 19 8 35.977 
Malta 0.038 -0.015 176.490 N/A 19 10 24.923 
Netherlands 0.011 0.012 96.348 1.146 20 9 37.571 
Norway 0.013 0.007 146.129 0.381 15 7 38.099 
Poland 0.026 -0.038 97.476 0.927 15 9 25.808 
Portugal 0.006 0.018 95.954 3.785 17 7 25.057 
Slovakia 0.024 -0.014 98.790 2.011 14 9 21.288 
Slovenia 0.011 0.015 97.200 2.440 19 8 26.440 
Spain 0.009 0.050 83.467 2.386 16 9 27.041 
Sweden 0.016 -0.001 101.429 1.214 15 7 39.343 
Switzerland 0.015 0.012 388.255 0.948 14 8 38.205 
United Kingdom 0.012 0.003 92.200 1.119 16 8 34.388         
Country mean 0.014 0.013 131.053 1.676 16.963 7.852 30.407 
Country median 0.012 0.012 100.529 1.250 17 8 31.148 
This table reports the descriptive statistics (i.e., observation, mean, standard deviation, minimum maximum 
and median) of the bank-specific accounting variables for the group of treated (Panel A) and that of 
untreated (Panel B) banks, winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentiles. These variables are: Bank size measured 
by natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE), bank capital captured by total equity capital (CAP), traditional 
banking activities and its growth shown by (change in) outstanding loans (LOAN, ΔLOAN), (backward-
looking) asset quality assessed by (change in) non-performing loans (NPL, ΔNPL), (forward-looking) asset 
quality captured by loan loss provisions (LLP), credit portfolio quality shown by loan loss reserves (LLR), 
liquidity risk measured by deposit ratio and Loan-To-Deposit ratio (DSFR, LTDR), non-traditional banking 
activities shown by other earning assets (OEA), income smoothing captured by earnings before provisions 
and taxes (EBPT), profitability estimated by and return on assets (ROA), capital adequacy/capital 
management measured by regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio (T1R), and credit risk assessed by risk-weighted 
assets (RWA). The means of the country-specific control variables are reported in Panel C. These variables 
are: Economic growth (ΔGDP), unemployment growth (ΔUNEM), price level in the housing market (HPI), 
sovereign debt risk (IRATE), bank supervisory strength (SUPERV), regulatory capital stringency 
(CAPREG), and corruption level (CORRUPT). The description of variables and the relevant data sources 
are provided in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.4 Correlation coefficients 
Panel A: PSM analysis 
Variables SIZE GDP OEA LOAN LLR DSFR CAP ROA 
SIZE 1.000        
         
GDP 0.519*** 1.000       
 (0.000)        
OEA 0.450*** 0.336*** 1.000      
 (0.000) (0.000)       
LOAN -0.492*** -0.333*** -0.858*** 1.000     
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)      
LLR 0.099*** -0.049*** 0.013 -0.132*** 1.000    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.314) (0.000)     
DSFR -0.492*** -0.316*** -0.258*** 0.392*** 0.084*** 1.000   
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
CAP -0.187*** -0.003 0.185*** -0.196*** 0.120*** 0.020* 1.000  
 (0.000) (0.799) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.077)   
ROA -0.104*** -0.041*** 0.054*** 0.007 -0.260*** -0.025** 0.459*** 1.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.550) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000)  
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Table 2.4 continued 
Panel B: Fixed effects model 
Variables LLP LLR NPLt–1 ΔNPL ΔLOAN T1Rt–1 EBPT SIZEt–1 ΔGDP ΔUNEM HPI IRATE 
LLP 1.000            
             
LLR 0.658*** 1.000           
 (0.000)            
NPLt–1 0.530*** 0.878*** 1.000          
 (0.000) (0.000)           
ΔNPL 0.376*** 0.273*** 0.093*** 1.000         
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)          
ΔLOAN -0.162*** -0.138*** -0.206*** 0.105*** 1.000        
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
T1Rt–1 -0.175*** -0.125*** -0.120*** -0.153*** 0.004 1.000       
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.791)        
EBPT 0.415*** 0.221*** 0.197*** 0.065*** 0.008 0.069*** 1.000      
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.451) (0.000)       
SIZEt–1 0.062*** 0.099*** 0.161*** 0.047*** -0.171*** -0.472*** -0.064*** 1.000     
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)      
ΔGDP -0.039*** 0.012 0.032** -0.069*** 0.020* 0.159*** -0.039*** 0.001 1.000    
 (0.001) (0.367) (0.027) (0.000) (0.067) (0.000) (0.000) (0.959)     
ΔUNEM 0.145*** -0.069*** -0.056*** 0.181*** -0.157*** -0.053*** 0.008 -0.015 0.115*** 1.000   
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.452) (0.159) (0.000)    
HPI -0.184*** -0.290*** -0.270*** -0.066*** 0.219*** 0.237*** -0.251*** -0.392*** 0.058*** 0.029*** 1.000  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)   
IRATE 0.326*** 0.398*** 0.372*** 0.230*** -0.112*** -0.134*** -0.030*** 0.215*** -0.023** 0.115*** -0.148*** 1.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000)  
This Table reports the Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients and p-values for the variables I use in the PSM analysis (Panel A), and for those used in the fixed-effects regression analysis 
(Panel B). Panel A relies on the following variables: Bank size measured by natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE), economic strength estimated by nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
(non-)traditional banking activities assessed by other earning assets and outstanding loans (OEA, LOAN), asset quality predicted by loan loss reserves (LLR), liquidity risk captured by deposit ratio 
(DSFR) bank capital measured by total equity capital (CAP) and profitability predicted by return on assets (ROA). Panel B relies on the following variables, winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentiles: 
(Forward-looking) asset quality captured by loan loss provisions (LLP), credit portfolio quality shown by loan loss reserves (LLR), (backward-looking) asset quality assessed by (change in) non-
performing loans (NPLt–1, ΔNPL), loan growth shown by change in outstanding loans (ΔLOAN), income smoothing captured by earnings before provisions and taxes (EBPT), capital 
adequacy/capital management measured by lagged regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio (T1Rt–1), bank size measured by lagged natural logarithm of total assets (SIZEt–1), and country-specific 
macroeconomic fundamentals captured by economic growth (ΔGDP), unemployment growth (ΔUNEM), price level in the housing market (HPI), and sovereign debt risk (IRATE). *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The description of variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.5 PSM analysis of stress test participation predictors and matching equality 
Panel A: Determinants of banks’ probability to participate in stress tests 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Covariates TREATALL TREAT1011 TREAT14 
SIZEitj 0.6764*** 0.7875*** 0.5994*** 
 (0.0759) (0.0955) (0.0877) 
GDPtj -0.2487 -0.4662*** -0.0260 
 (0.1568) (0.1644) (0.1661) 
OEAitj 0.0673 -1.1845* 0.6998 
 (0.5494) (0.6526) (0.5578) 
LLRitj 52.5814*** -3.0506 1.4683 
 (16.5449) (4.8819) (2.0216) 
DSFRitj 0.6308 0.9969 1.5434*** 
 (0.5722) (0.6984) (0.5938) 
CAPitj -9.5260** 0.9899 6.0888*** 
 (4.3287) (4.0417) (2.0246) 
ROAitj 43.3069*** 10.1317 -1.3432 
 (15.6988) (9.1826) (4.5948) 
Constant -6.7455*** -8.4602*** -7.8283*** 
 (0.9141) (1.3941) (1.0311) 
    
Observations 483 476 400 
Pseudo R2 0.692 0.625 0.462 
Log likelihood -90.28 -84.27 -86.10 
Panel B: t-Test before and after matching for equality of means of covariates including all treatment banks 
  Unmatched samples   Matched samples 
Covariates TREATALL Control banks 
Difference 
in means 
 TREATALL Control banks 
Difference 
in means 
SIZEitj 10.9440 6.0875 4.8565***  10.7470 10.7230 0.0240 
GDPij 0.9741 0.4431 0.5310***  0.9464 0.9032 0.0432 
OEAitj 0.3692 0.1829 0.1863***  0.3505 0.3811 -0.0306 
LLRitj 0.0133 0.0076 0.0057***  0.0133 0.0122 0.0011 
DSFRitj 0.5889 0.7314 -0.1425***  0.5974 0.5997 -0.0023 
CAPitj 0.0609 0.0943 -0.0334***  0.0636 0.0636 0.0000 
ROAitj 0.0067 0.0079 -0.0012  0.0069 0.0079 -0.0010 
        
Observations 143 340 483  132 122 254 
Pseudo-R2 0.692  0.009 
Panel C: t-Test before and after matching for equality of means of covariates for first-time participants in 
2010-11 
  Unmatched samples   Matched samples 
Covariates TREAT1011 Control banks 
Difference 
in means 
 TREAT1011 Control banks 
Difference 
in means 
SIZEitj 11.8420 6.7965 5.0455***  11.7870 11.7910 -0.0040 
GDPij 0.9177 0.4960 0.4217***  0.9177 0.8479 0.0698 
OEAitj 0.3477 0.2101 0.1376***  0.3477 0.4035 -0.0558 
LLRitj 0.0145 0.0119 0.0026  0.0145 0.0087 0.0058 
DSFRitj 0.5916 0.7199 -0.1283***  0.5916 0.5587 0.0329 
CAPitj 0.0546 0.0855 -0.0309***  0.0546 0.0472 0.0074 
ROAitj 0.0029 0.0039 -0.0010  0.0029 0.0030 -0.0001 
        
Observations 86 390 476  71 108 179 
Pseudo-R2 0.625 
 
0.027 
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Table 2.5 continued 
Panel D: t-Test before and after matching for equality of means of covariates for first-time participants in 2014 
  Unmatched samples   Matched samples 
Covariates TREAT14 Control banks 
Difference 
in means 
 TREAT14 Control banks 
Difference in 
means 
SIZEitj 10.1250 6.5702 3.5548***  10.0510 10.0030 0.0480 
GDPij 1.0157 0.4724 0.5433***  0.9849 1.0272 -0.0423 
OEAitj 0.3515 0.2064 0.1451***  0.3453 0.3495 -0.0042 
LLRitj 0.0273 0.0156 0.0117*  0.0273 0.0441 -0.0168 
DSFRitj 0.6331 0.7358 -0.1027***  0.6444 0.6270 0.0174 
CAPitj 0.0772 0.0899 -0.0127  0.0819 0.0868 -0.0049 
ROAitj 0.0015 0.0042 -0.0027  0.0015 0.0015 0.0000         
Observations 55 345 400  55 87 142 
Pseudo-R2 0.462 
 
0.012 
This table reports the PSM results based on Equation 2.1. Panel A shows the estimates of the bank's propensity 
of being stress-tested for the samples of total stress test participation (TREATALL), first-time participation in 
2010-11 (TREAT1011) and 2014 (TREAT14). Panels B, C and D illustrate the mean comparison of bank-specific 
covariates for treated and untreated (control) banks, before and after Gaussian Kernel Matching (GKM). The 
difference in means is calculated as the difference between treated and untreated banks' means. The two rows 
below the covariates illustrate the number of observations and Pseudo-R2 before and after matching. I include 
the following covariates in my analysis: Bank size measured by natural logarithm of total assets (SIZEitj), 
countries' economic strength estimated by nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDPtj), non-traditional banking 
activities assessed by other earning assets (OEAitj), asset quality predicted by loan loss reserves (LLRitj), liquidity 
risk captured by deposit ratio (DSFRitj), bank capital measured by equity divided by total assets (CAPitj), and 
profitability predicted by return on assets (ROAitj). The covariates are obtained as an average value from 2005S2-
2008S2 (TREATALL), from 2008S2-2009S2 (TREAT1011) and from 2012S2-2013S2 (TREAT14). *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors of the coefficients in Panel A are 
clustered at bank level. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 2.1. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Matching equality of TREATALL 
This figure plots the density of estimated propensity scores for the sample of total stress test participation 
(TREATALL) compared to control banks before and after matching. 
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Figure 2.2 Matching equality of TREAT1011 
This figure plots the density of estimated propensity scores for the sample of first-time participants in 2010-11 
(TREAT1011) compared to control banks before and after matching. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Matching equality of TREAT14 
The figure plots the density of estimated propensity scores for the sample of first-time participants in 2014 (TREAT14) 
compared to control banks before and after matching. 
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Table 2.6 PSM/DiD analysis of the average treatment effect of stress tests 
Panel A: Total stress test participation effect 
 Asset quality (LLP)  Asset quality (NPL) 
 TREATALL Control Diff (T–C)  TREATALL Control Diff (T–C) 
Treatment period (T2) 0.0040 0.0050 -0.0010*  0.0366 0.0374 -0.0008 
Pre-treatment period (T1) 0.0037 0.0033 0.0004  0.0295 0.0329 -0.0034 
Diff (!"#(%&%'))) 0.0003 0.0017**   0.0071*** 0.0045*  
DiD (*#(%&,%')))   -0.0014    0.0026 
Observations 3,223  2,749 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7648  0.9002 
        
 Capital adequacy (T1R)  Credit Risk (RWA) 
 TREATALL Control Diff (T–C)  TREATALL Control Diff (T–C) 
Treatment period (T2) 0.1290 0.1519 -0.0229***  0.4525 0.4132 0.0394 
Pre-treatment period (T1) 0.0612 0.0726 -0.0114***  0.6490 0.6120 0.0370 
Diff (!"#(%&%'))) 0.0678*** 0.0793***   -0.1965*** -0.1988***  
DiD (*#(%&,%')))   -0.0115**    0.0023 
Observations 2,440  2,650 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4414  0.6023 
Panel B: 2010-11 EBA first-time stress test participation effect 
 Asset quality (LLP)  Asset quality (NPL) 
 TREAT1011 Control Diff (T–C)  TREAT1011 Control Diff (T–C) 
Treatment period (T2) 0.0039 0.0043 -0.0004  0.0284 0.0270 0.0014 
Pre-treatment period (T1) 0.0035 0.0026 0.0009  0.0215 0.0236 -0.0021 
Diff (!"#(%&%'))) 0.0004 0.0017***   0.0069*** 0.0034***  
DiD (*#(%&,%')))   -0.0013**    0.0035** 
Observations 1,051  897 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6747  0.8693 
        
 Capital adequacy (T1R)  Credit Risk (RWA) 
 TREAT1011 Control Diff (T–C)  TREAT1011 Control Diff (T–C) 
Treatment period (T2) 0.1247 0.1389 -0.0142**  0.3794 0.3910 -0.0116 
Pre-treatment period (T1) 0.0811 0.0966 -0.0155***  0.5279 0.5042 0.0237 
Diff (!"#(%&%'))) 0.0436*** 0.0424***   -0.1485*** -0.1132***  
DiD (*#(%&,%')))   0.0013    -0.0353* 
Observations 871  915 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4549  0.6800 
Panel C: 2014 EBA/ECB first-time stress test participation effect 
 Asset quality (LLP)  Asset quality (NPL) 
 TREAT14 Control Diff (T–C)  TREAT14 Control Diff (T–C) 
Treatment period (T2) 0.0043 0.0037 0.0006  0.0412 0.0418 -0.0005 
Pre-treatment period (T1) 0.0028 0.0027 0.0001  0.0397 0.0458 -0.0061 
Diff (!"#(%&%'))) 0.0015*** 0.0010   0.0015 -0.0040  
DiD (*#(%&,%')))   0.0005    0.0055* 
Observations 880  751 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5811  0.8921 
        
 Capital adequacy (T1R)  Credit Risk (RWA) 
 TREAT14 Control Diff (T–C)  TREAT14 Control Diff (T–C) 
Treatment period (T2) 0.1580 0.1653 -0.0073  0.4559 0.4085 0.0474 
Pre-treatment period (T1) 0.1145 0.1418 -0.0273**  0.5733 0.5095 0.0638* 
Diff (!"#(%&%'))) 0.0434*** 0.0235**   -0.1174*** -0.1010***  
DiD (*#(%&,%')))   0.0200**    -0.0164 
Observations 626  720 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3697  0.5757 
This table reports the average treatment effect of stress tests based on Equation 2.2. Panel A illustrates the total stress test participation 
effect (TREATALL). Panel B estimates the effect of the 2010-11 treatments (TREAT1011). Panel C analyses the effect of the 2014 
EBA/ECB treatments (TREAT14). I apply a DiD design using Gaussian Kernel probability weights, covariates obtained from my prior 
PSM analysis and control for half-year time effects. I include the following outcome variables in my analysis: Forward- and backward-
looking asset quality measured by loan loss provisions (LLP) and non-performing loans (NPL), capital adequacy captured by lagged 
regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio (T1Rt–1), and credit risk assessed by risk-weighted assets (RWA). *#(%&,%')) yields the average double 
difference, or DiD, between the difference of the outcome variables before and after the treatment (!"#,%&,%'-)) and the difference of 
the treatment (TREAT, TREAT1011, and TREAT14) over the control group. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 2.1. 
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Figure 2.4 Total stress test participation 
The graphs plot Gaussian Kernel weighted means of outcome variables for the sample of total stress test participation 
(TREATALL) and matched control banks. Dashed lines indicate the observed period, while the solid line marks the 
treatment separating pre- and post-treatment periods. I include the following variables in my analysis: Forward-looking 
and backward-looking asset quality measured by loan loss provisions (LLP) and non-performing loans (NPL), capital 
adequacy captured by regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio (T1R), and credit risk assessed by risk-weighted assets (RWA). 
 
Figure 2.5 2010-11 EBA first-time participation 
The graphs plot Gaussian Kernel weighted means of outcome variables for the sample of 2010-11 first-time participants 
(TREAT1011) and matched control banks. Dashed lines indicate the observed period, while the solid line marks the 
treatment separating pre- and post-treatment periods. I include the following variables in my analysis: Forward-looking 
and backward-looking asset quality measured by loan loss provisions (LLP) and non-performing loans (NPL), capital 
adequacy captured by regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio (T1R), and credit risk assessed by risk-weighted assets (RWA). 
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Figure 2.6 2014 EBA/ECB first-time stress test participation 
The graphs plot Gaussian Kernel weighted means of outcome variables for the sample of 2014 first-time participants 
(TREAT14) and matched control banks. Dashed lines indicate the observed period, while the solid line marks the 
treatment separating pre- and post-treatment periods. I include the following variables in my analysis: Forward-looking 
and backward-looking asset quality measured by loan loss provisions (LLP) and non-performing loans (NPL), capital 
adequacy captured by regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio (T1R), and credit risk assessed by risk-weighted assets (RWA). 
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Table 2.7 Bank discretionary behaviour 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables TREATALL TREAT1011 TREAT14 
NPLit–1j 0.0441*** 0.0731** 0.1291** 
 (0.0103) (0.0335) (0.0536) 
ΔNPLitj 0.1469*** 0.1102*** 0.1283** 
 (0.0302) (0.0240) (0.0535) 
ΔLOANitj -0.0170*** 0.0020 -0.0111 
 (0.0037) (0.0054) (0.0084) 
T1Rit–1j -0.0401** -0.0242* -0.0367 
 (0.0169) (0.0139) (0.0247) 
EBPTitj -0.0615 0.0383 -0.2275 
 (0.0691) (0.0417) (0.1577) 
STHC -0.0039   
 (0.0032)   
TREATALL*STHC 0.0046   
 (0.0029)   
TREATALL*T1Rit–1j 0.0090   
 (0.0167)   
STHC*T1Rit–1j 0.0420***   
 (0.0161)   
TREATALL*STHC*T1Rit–1j -0.0310*   
 (0.0157)   
TREATALL*EBPTitj 0.1522**   
 (0.0649)   
STHC*EBPTitj 0.1372   
 (0.1173)   
TREATALL*STHC*EBPTitj -0.0217   
 (0.1206)   
BAST1011  -0.0034***  
  (0.0013)  
TREAT1011*BAST1011  0.0058**  
  (0.0023)  
TREAT1011*T1Rit–1j  0.0119  
  (0.0237)  
BAST1011*T1Rit–1j  0.0573***  
  (0.0142)  
TREAT1011*BAST1011*T1Rit–1j  -0.0719***  
  (0.0217)  
TREAT1011*EBPTitj  0.2069**  
  (0.0937)  
BAST1011*EBPTitj  -0.1461**  
  (0.0621)  
TREAT1011*BAST1011*EBPTitj  0.2007**  
  (0.0859)  
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Table 2.7 continued 
BAST14   -0.0112*** 
   (0.0021) 
TREAT14*BAST14   0.0081** 
   (0.0036) 
TREAT14*T1Rit–1j   -0.0303 
   (0.0346) 
BAST14*T1Rit–1j   0.0587*** 
   (0.0144) 
TREAT14*BAST14*T1Rit–1j   -0.0263 
   (0.0239) 
TREAT14*EBPTitj   0.3565* 
   (0.1946) 
BAST14*EBPTitj   0.2045* 
   (0.1035) 
TREAT14*BAST14*EBPTitj   -0.2984** 
   (0.1131) 
SIZEit–1j 0.0000 -0.0024 0.0030 
 (0.0005) (0.0018) (0.0033) 
ΔGDPtj -0.0346*** -0.0130 -0.0703 
 (0.0086) (0.0095) (0.0488) 
ΔUNEMtj -0.0029 -0.0007 0.0056 
 (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0044) 
HPItj 0.0000 -0.0001*** 0.0001 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
IRATEtj 0.0006*** 0.0003 0.0001 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0006) 
Constant 0.0030 0.0421* -0.0342 
 (0.0071) (0.0242) (0.0376) 
    
Observations 1,698 649 410 
Number of banks 152 119 72 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3941 0.5524 0.4922 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Half-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports the effect of stress test participation on banks' capital management and income smoothing 
behaviour through LLP in 27 European countries. Model 1 presents the total stress test effect on banks' capital 
management and income smoothing behaviour based on Equation 2.3A. Model 2 illustrates the stress test effect 
on the discretionary behaviour of first-time participants in 2010-11 based on Equation 2.3B. Model 3 examines 
the stress test effect on the discretionary behaviour of first-time participants in 2014 based on Equation 2.3C. I 
include the following variables in my analysis: Forward- and (shift of) backward looking asset quality captured 
by loan loss provisions (LLPitj) and lagged (change in) non-performing loans (NPLit–1j, ΔNPLitj), loan growth 
shown by change in outstanding loans (ΔLOANitj), capital management measured by lagged regulatory Tier 1 
capital ratio (T1Rit–1j), income smoothing captured by earnings before provisions and taxes (EBPTitj); a dummy 
for stress test participation (TREATALL), first-time participation in 2010-11 (TREAT1011) and 2014 (TREAT14); 
a dummy for 'hot' and 'cold' stress test periods (STHC), a dummy for four half-year periods before and after the 
2010-11 (BAST1011) and 2014 treatments (BAST14); bank size captured by lagged natural logarithm of total 
assets (SIZEit–1j) and macroeconomic fundamentals to control for contemporaneous fiscal and monetary policy 
changes and market instabilities such as illiquidity, constrained capital and higher volatility shown by economic 
growth (ΔGDPtj), unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj), price level in the housing market (HPItj) and sovereign debt 
risk (IRATEtj). Data range 2005-2015. Standard errors (parentheses) are clustered at bank level. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant 
data sources are provided in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.8 Bank discretionary behaviour considering the institutional environment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables SUPERV CAPREG CORRUPT 
NPLit–1j 0.0421*** 0.0454*** 0.0389*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0110) 
ΔNPLitj 0.1432*** 0.1478*** 0.1454*** 
 (0.0301) (0.0308) (0.0295) 
ΔLOANitj -0.0169*** -0.0162*** -0.0164*** 
 (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0037) 
T1Rit–1j 0.3251** 0.3309** -0.0321 
 (0.1535) (0.1317) (0.0270) 
EBPTitj 0.5927 -1.5221** 0.1069** 
 (0.6261) (0.7121) (0.0453) 
TREATALL*STHC -0.0993*** -0.0277 0.0005 
 (0.0309) (0.0226) (0.0038) 
TREATALL*T1Rit–1j -0.3054* -0.2885** 0.0059 
 (0.1682) (0.1399) (0.0306) 
STHC*T1Rit–1j -0.5110*** -0.3303** 0.0278 
 (0.1715) (0.1371) (0.0260) 
TREATALL*STHC*T1Rit–1j 0.5463*** 0.2511* -0.0146 
 (0.1818) (0.1414) (0.0312) 
TREATALL*EBPTitj -0.0044 1.1599 -0.0267 
 (0.7410) (0.7084) (0.0632) 
STHC*EBPTitj -3.3378*** 0.3432 -0.1731 
 (1.0565) (0.8214) (0.1079) 
TREATALL*STHC*EBPTitj 2.8918*** 0.4794 0.2823** 
 (1.0918) (0.8441) (0.1112) 
STHC*SUPERV -0.0068***   
 (0.0019)   
TREATALL*STHC*SUPERV 0.0068***   
 (0.0020)   
SUPERV*T1Rit–1j -0.0237**   
 (0.0101)   
TREATALL*SUPERV*T1Rit–1j 0.0205*   
 (0.0111)   
STHC*SUPERV*T1Rit–1j 0.0361***   
 (0.0111)   
TREATALL*STHC*SUPERV*T1Rit–1j -0.0375***   
 (0.0119)   
SUPERV*EBPTitj -0.0455   
 (0.0417)   
TREATALL*SUPERV*EBPTitj 0.0156   
 (0.0484)   
STHC*SUPERV*EBPTitj 0.2248***   
 (0.0695)   
TREATALL*STHC*SUPERV*EBPTitj -0.1914***   
 (0.0715)   
STHC*CAPREG  -0.0055*  
  (0.0030)  
TREATALL*STHC*CAPREG  0.0041  
  (0.0031)  
CAPREG*T1Rit–1j  -0.0461**  
  (0.0181)  
TREATALL*CAPREG*T1Rit–1j  0.0371*  
  (0.0192)  
STHC*CAPREG*T1Rit–1j  0.0463**  
  (0.0185)  
TREATALL*STHC*CAPREG*T1Rit–1j  -0.0356*  
  (0.0190)  
CAPREG*EBPTitj  0.1833**  
  (0.0926)  
TREATALL*CAPREG*EBPTitj  -0.1301  
  (0.0918)  
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Table 2.8 continued 
STHC*CAPREG*EBPTitj  -0.0256  
  (0.1154)  
TREATALL*STHC*CAPREG*EBPTitj  -0.0589  
  (0.1173)  
STHC   -0.0003 
   (0.0036) 
CORRUPT   0.0001* 
   (0.0000) 
TREATALL*CORRUPT   -0.0000 
   (0.0000) 
STHC*CORRUPT   -0.0001** 
   (0.0001) 
TREATALL*STHC*CORRUPT   0.0001 
   (0.0001) 
CORRUPT*T1Rit–1j   -0.0000 
   (0.0003) 
TREATALL*CORRUPT*T1Rit–1j   -0.0002 
   (0.0004) 
STHC*CORRUPT*T1Rit–1j   0.0003 
   (0.0003) 
TREATALL*STHC*CORRUPT*T1Rit–1j   -0.0001 
   (0.0004) 
CORRUPT*EBPTitj   -0.0049*** 
   (0.0013) 
TREATALL*CORRUPT*EBPTitj   0.0056*** 
   (0.0019) 
STHC*CORRUPT*EBPTitj   0.0070*** 
   (0.0022) 
TREATALL*STHC*CORRUPT*EBPTitj   -0.0074*** 
   (0.0022) 
SIZEit–1j 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0001 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) 
ΔGDPtj -0.0339*** -0.0354*** -0.0295*** 
 (0.0082) (0.0084) (0.0083) 
ΔUNEMtj -0.0024 -0.0026 -0.0027 
 (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
HPItj -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
IRATEtj 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Constant 0.0036 0.0018 0.0042 
 (0.0071) (0.0069) (0.0088) 
    
Observations 1,698 1,698 1,698 
Number of banks 152 152 152 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4044 0.4020 0.4027 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Half-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports the effect of stress test participation on banks' capital management and income smoothing behaviour 
considering the institutional environment in 27 European countries based on Equation 2.4. Model 1 assesses differences in 
stress test effect on banks' discretionary behaviour across countries with low versus high supervisory power regimes. Model 2 
illustrates differences in stress test effect on discretionary behaviour across countries with low versus high capital regulation 
regimes. Model 3 evaluates differences in stress test effect on banks' discretionary behaviour across countries with low versus 
high corruption level. I include the following variables in my analysis: Forward- and (shift of) backward looking asset quality 
captured by loan loss provisions (LLPitj) and lagged (change in) non-performing loans (NPLit–1j, ΔNPLitj), loan growth shown 
by change in outstanding loans (ΔLOANitj), capital management measured by lagged regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio (T1Rit–1j), 
income smoothing captured by earnings before provisions and taxes (EBPTitj); a dummy for stress test participation 
(TREATALL); a dummy for 'hot' and 'cold' stress test periods (STHC); bank size captured by lagged natural logarithm of total 
assets (SIZEit–1j), countries' institutional environment assessed by local supervisory power (SUPERV), capital regulation 
stringency (CAPREG), and corruption level (CORRUPT), and macroeconomic fundamentals to control for contemporaneous 
fiscal and monetary policy changes and market instabilities such as illiquidity, constrained capital and higher volatility shown 
by economic growth (ΔGDPtj), unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj), price level in the housing market (HPItj) and sovereign 
debt risk (IRATEtj). Data range 2005-2015. Standard errors (parentheses) are clustered at bank level. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are 
provided in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.9 Discretionary behaviour of high-, medium- and low-capitalised banks 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables CAPH CAPM CAPL 
NPLit–1j 0.0371** 0.0496*** 0.0413 
 (0.0171) (0.0080) (0.0316) 
ΔNPLitj 0.1829*** 0.1002*** 0.0650 
 (0.0588) (0.0276) (0.0545) 
ΔLOANitj -0.0197*** -0.0125*** -0.0105* 
 (0.0071) (0.0037) (0.0057) 
T1Rit–1j 0.0235 -0.0020 -0.0615** 
 (0.0305) (0.0227) (0.0234) 
EBPTitj -0.0073 -0.2108* 0.1085 
 (0.0689) (0.1122) (0.0872) 
STHC 0.0087** 0.0116*** -0.0109*** 
 (0.0039) (0.0036) (0.0036) 
TREATALL*STHC -0.0071* -0.0061** 0.0079 
 (0.0038) (0.0027) (0.0051) 
TREATALL*T1Rit–1j -0.0282 -0.0023 -0.0171 
 (0.0315) (0.0274) (0.0436) 
STHC*T1Rit–1j -0.0371 -0.0006 0.0490** 
 (0.0224) (0.0083) (0.0208) 
TREATALL*STHC*T1Rit–1j 0.0407* 0.0104 -0.0531* 
 (0.0231) (0.0145) (0.0296) 
TREATALL*EBPTitj -0.0158 0.3085*** -0.0289 
 (0.0951) (0.0941) (0.0952) 
STHC*EBPTitj -0.0332 -0.2888* 0.1725 
 (0.0597) (0.1474) (0.1272) 
TREATALL*STHC*EBPTitj 0.1206 0.3277** -0.0013 
 (0.1079) (0.1637) (0.1641) 
SIZEit–1j -0.0002 0.0011 -0.0021 
 (0.0009) (0.0022) (0.0015) 
ΔGDPtj -0.0152 -0.0275* -0.0348** 
 (0.0106) (0.0148) (0.0131) 
ΔUNEMtj -0.0031 -0.0021 -0.0018 
 (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0016) 
HPItj -0.0000 -0.0000** 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
IRATEtj 0.0005** 0.0002 0.0017* 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0009) 
Constant 0.0082 -0.0077 0.0285 
 (0.0110) (0.0243) (0.0181) 
    
Observations 884 486 328 
Number of banks 100 75 55 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3781 0.6650 0.4012 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Half-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports the effect of stress test participation on high-, medium- and low-capitalised banks and their capital 
management and income smoothing behaviour in 27 European countries based on Equation 2.3A. Model 1 assesses the 
discretionary behaviour of high-capitalised banks (CAPH: CAP > 10%). Model 2 estimates the discretionary behaviour of 
medium-capitalised banks (CAPM: 7% ≤ CAP ≤ 10%). Model 3 examines the discretionary behaviour of low-capitalised 
banks (CAPL: CAP < 7%). I include the following variables in my analysis: Forward- and (shift of) backward looking asset 
quality captured by loan loss provisions (LLPitj) and lagged (change in) non-performing loans (NPLit–1j, ΔNPLitj), loan growth 
shown by change in outstanding loans (ΔLOANitj), capital management measured by lagged regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio 
(T1Rit–1j), income smoothing captured by earnings before provisions and taxes (EBPTitj); a dummy for stress test participation 
(TREATALL); a dummy for 'hot' and 'cold' stress test periods (STHC); bank size captured by lagged natural logarithm of total 
assets (SIZEit–1j) and macroeconomic fundamentals to control for contemporaneous fiscal and monetary policy changes and 
market instabilities such as illiquidity, constrained capital and higher volatility shown by economic growth (ΔGDPtj), 
unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj), price level in the housing market (HPItj) and sovereign debt risk (IRATEtj). Data range 
2005-2015. Standard errors (parentheses) are clustered at bank level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.10 PSM robustness on covariate imbalance and hidden bias 
Panel A: Determinants of banks' probability to participate in stress tests using an alternative robustness model 
 (1) TREATALL (2) TREAT1011 (3) TREAT14 
Covariates Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
SIZEitj 0.6743*** (0.0757) 0.7709*** (0.0903) 0.5937*** (0.0874) 
GDPtj -0.2613* (0.1582) -0.4982*** (0.1719) -0.0309 (0.1682) 
OEAitj 0.0048 (0.5539) -1.3509** (0.6352) 0.5424 (0.5790) 
LLRitj 52.6526*** (16.5193) -3.5711 (4.8120) 1.3822 (2.0275) 
DSFRitj 0.4485 (0.6016) 0.4447 (0.7804) 1.1844 (0.7212) 
LTDRitj -0.0107 (0.0071) -0.0717 (0.0618) -0.0600 (0.0895) 
CAPitj -9.6389** (4.3401) 0.5144 (4.1328) 5.9751*** (1.9900) 
ROAitj 42.9867*** (15.7546) 10.6378 (8.9867) -1.5936 (4.6251) 
Constant -6.5493*** (0.9170) -7.7272*** (1.3137) -7.3987*** (1.0847) 
       
Observations 483  476  400  
Pseudo R2 0.693  0.628  0.465  
Log likelihood -89.99  -83.67  -85.71  
Panel B: PSM/DiD treatment effect including additional confounding covariates 
(1) Total stress test participation effect     
 Asset quality (LLP) Asset quality (NPL) Capital adequacy (T1R) Credit risk (RWA) 
  Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
TREATALL 0.0004 (0.0011) -0.0054** (0.0025) -0.0106* (0.0063) 0.0332 (0.0555) 
BAST 0.0017** (0.0007) 0.0042* (0.0024) 0.0781*** (0.0076) -0.1930*** (0.0632) *#(%&,%')) -0.0014 (0.0011) 0.0030 (0.0023) -0.0119** (0.0057) 0.0055 (0.0483) 
Observations 3,223 2,749 2,440 2,650 
Adjusted R2 0.7687 0.9044 0.4515 0.6070 
(2) 2010-11 EBA first-time stress test participation effect     
 Asset quality (LLP) Asset quality (NPL) Capital adequacy (T1R) Credit risk (RWA) 
  Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
TREAT1011 0.0005 (0.0005) -0.0002 (0.0016) -0.0115 (0.0076) 0.0155 (0.0340) 
BAST1011 0.0017*** (0.0004) 0.0043*** (0.0013) 0.0424*** (0.0080) -0.1103*** (0.0220) *#(%&,%')) -0.0013** (0.0006) 0.0030** (0.0014) 0.0006 (0.0067) -0.0343* (0.0190) 
Observations 1,051 897 871 915 
Adjusted R2 0.6855 0.8792 0.4695 0.6867 
(3) 2014 EBA/ECB first-time stress test participation effect     
 Asset quality (LLP) Asset quality (NPL) Capital adequacy (T1R) Credit risk (RWA) 
  Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
TREAT14 0.0004 (0.0009) -0.0115*** (0.0041) -0.0328*** (0.0115) 0.1026** (0.0408) 
BAST14 0.0011 (0.0011) -0.0037 (0.0050) 0.0222** (0.0097) -0.0948*** (0.0218) *#(%&,%')) 0.0006 (0.0011) 0.0054* (0.0031) 0.0163* (0.0087) -0.0074 (0.0186) 
Observations 880 751 626 720 
Adjusted R2 0.6111 0.9033 0.4193 0.6039 
This table reports PSM robustness checks. Panel A tests covariate imbalance using an alternative covariate combination and 
Panel B analyses hidden bias including additional confounding covariates. I illustrate results for the samples of total stress test 
participation (TREATALL), first-time participation in 2010-11 (TREAT1011) and 2014 (TREAT14). In Panel A, I include the 
following covariates in my analysis: Bank size measured by natural logarithm of total assets (SIZEitj), countries’ economic 
strength estimated by nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDPtj), non-traditional banking activities assessed by other earning 
assets (OEAitj), credit portfolio quality predicted by loan loss reserves (LLRitj), liquidity risk captured by deposit ratio and 
Loan-To-Deposit ratio (DSFRitj, LTDRitj), bank capital measured by equity divided by total assets (CAPitj), and profitability 
predicted by return on assets (ROAitj). The variables are obtained as an average value from 2005S2-2008S2 (TREATALL), 
from 2008S2-2009S2 (TREAT1011) and from 2012S2-2013S2 (TREAT14). In Panel B, I apply PSM/DiD using Gaussian 
Kernel weights, covariates obtained from my prior PSM analysis and control for half-year time effects. I include the following 
variables in my analysis: Forward- and backward-looking asset quality measured by loan loss provisions (LLPitj) and non-
performing loans (NPLitj), capital adequacy captured by lagged regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio (T1Rit–1j), and credit risk assessed 
by risk-weighted assets (RWAitj). I add the following covariates: Accounting standards (GAAP), listed banks (PUBLIC), bank 
status (ACTIVE), multiple stress test participation (MULTIPLE), capital shortage (SHORT), and EU membership (EU). *#(%&,%')) yields the average double difference, or DiD, between the difference of the outcome variables before and after the 
treatment (!"#,%&,%'-)) and the difference of the treatment (TREAT, TREAT1011, and TREAT14) over the control group. *, **, 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors (parentheses) are clustered at bank 
level. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.11 Fixed effects robustness on common support bias with adjusted samples 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables TREATALL TREAT1011 TREAT14 
NPLit–1j 0.0450*** 0.0738** 0.1282** 
 (0.0101) (0.0315) (0.0532) 
ΔNPLitj 0.1454*** 0.1334*** 0.1389** 
 (0.0298) (0.0379) (0.0528) 
ΔLOANitj -0.0157*** -0.0019 -0.0151* 
 (0.0035) (0.0052) (0.0089) 
T1Rit–1j -0.0391** -0.0146 -0.0387 
 (0.0165) (0.0131) (0.0264) 
EBPTitj -0.0625 0.0507 -0.2534 
 (0.0699) (0.0390) (0.1583) 
STHC -0.0049   
 (0.0030)   
TREATALL*STHC 0.0045   
 (0.0029)   
TREATALL*T1Rit–1j 0.0085   
 (0.0164)   
STHC*T1Rit–1j 0.0424***   
 (0.0159)   
TREATALL*STHC*T1Rit–1j -0.0301*   
 (0.0154)   
TREATALL*EBPTitj 0.1604**   
 (0.0637)   
STHC*EBPTitj 0.1287   
 (0.1162)   
TREATALL*STHC*EBPTitj -0.0160   
 (0.1188)   
BAST1011  -0.0022  
  (0.0024)  
TREAT1011*BAST1011  0.0040**  
  (0.0017)  
TREAT1011*T1Rit–1j  0.0146  
  (0.0187)  
BAST1011*T1Rit–1j  0.0471***  
  (0.0137)  
TREAT1011*BAST1011*T1Rit–1j  -0.0582***  
  (0.0174)  
TREAT1011*EBPTitj  0.1719*  
  (0.0875)  
BAST1011*EBPTitj  -0.1557***  
  (0.0562)  
TREAT1011*BAST1011*EBPTitj  0.2074***  
  (0.0748)  
BAST14   -0.0077*** 
   (0.0025) 
TREAT14*BAST14   0.0078** 
   (0.0036) 
TREAT14*T1Rit–1j   -0.0359 
   (0.0374) 
BAST14*T1Rit–1j   0.0594*** 
   (0.0142) 
TREAT14*BAST14*T1Rit–1j   -0.0224 
   (0.0238) 
TREAT14*EBPTitj   0.3756* 
   (0.2024) 
BAST14*EBPTitj   0.2066* 
   (0.1044) 
TREAT14*BAST14*EBPTitj   -0.3158** 
   (0.1202) 
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Table 2.11 continued 
SIZEit–1j 0.0002 -0.0020 0.0031 
 (0.0005) (0.0017) (0.0034) 
ΔGDPtj -0.0343*** -0.0089 -0.0829 
 (0.0084) (0.0088) (0.0506) 
ΔUNEMtj -0.0023 -0.0017 0.0063 
 (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0049) 
HPItj 0.0000 -0.0001** 0.0001 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
IRATEtj 0.0005*** 0.0004** -0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0006) 
Constant 0.0010 0.0338 -0.0338 
 (0.0070) (0.0227) (0.0390) 
    
Observations 1,860 742 382 
Number of banks 163 132 68 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3972 0.5364 0.5099 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Half-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports fixed effects robustness checks on common support bias using adjusted samples. Model 1 presents 
the total stress test effect on banks' capital management and income smoothing behaviour. Model 2 illustrates the stress 
test effect on the discretionary behaviour of first-time participants in 2010-11. Model 3 examines the stress test effect 
on the discretionary behaviour of first-time participants in 2014. I include the following variables in my analysis: 
Forward- and (shift of) backward looking asset quality captured by loan loss provisions (LLPitj) and lagged (change in) 
non-performing loans (NPLit–1j, ΔNPLitj), loan growth shown by change in outstanding loans (ΔLOANitj), capital 
management measured by lagged regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio (T1Rit–1j), income smoothing captured by earnings 
before provisions and taxes (EBPTitj); a dummy for stress test participation (TREATALL), first-time participation in 
2010-11 (TREAT1011) and 2014 (TREAT14); a dummy for 'hot' and 'cold' stress test periods (STHC), a dummy for       
2010-11 (BAST1011) and 2014 stress test periods (BAST14); bank size captured by lagged natural logarithm of total 
assets (SIZEit–1j) and macroeconomic fundamentals to control for contemporaneous fiscal and monetary policy changes 
and market instabilities such as illiquidity, constrained capital and higher volatility shown by economic growth 
(ΔGDPtj), unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj), price level in the housing market (HPItj), and sovereign debt risk 
(IRATEtj). Data range 2005-2015. Standard errors (parentheses) are clustered at bank level. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources 
are provided in Table 2.1. 
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Chapter 3 – Transparency versus opacity: Are bank stress tests 
worthwhile? 
3.1. Introduction 
 Transparency is an important instrument that maintains the smooth operation of an 
economy. Reducing information asymmetry between bank insiders and outsiders is a 
crucial element; it promotes bank performance and decreases the cost of capital through 
the following mechanism. First, transparency improves project identification, enabling 
investors to estimate a more realistic picture of the value of a bank and make better-
informed investment decisions. Second, transparency encourages corporate governance 
and monitoring that empower different stakeholders, such as shareholders and 
supervisory bodies, to assess the top executive’s performance (Bushman et al., 2004; 
Levine, 1997). Third, the markets become capable of detecting excessive risk-taking and 
enable managers to be disciplined in their work ethic; this mitigates moral hazards 
(Freixas and Laux, 2012; Nier and Baumann, 2006). 
 However, a recent study by Dang et al. (2017) has the opposing view, that, in regard 
to the funding side of a bank’s balance sheet, opacity might be desirable. The authors 
argue that bank liquidity that arises from money creation by issuing debts may be more 
efficiently maintained when investors are uninformed. Nonetheless, bank transparency 
has been at the centre of recent controversy debates. For instance, the reviews by Acharya 
and Ryan (2016), Beatty and Liao (2014), and Bushman (2014) highlight the importance 
of this trade-off, suggesting that transparency may have both positive and negative effects 
on financial stability, while the advantages appear to outweigh the disadvantages. 
 In theory, transparency is promoted through mandatorily and voluntarily disclosed 
information of different sources and nature, such as financial accounting, credit ratings 
and supervisory disclosures. Market participants convert this information into market 
transactions and security prices, known as market microstructure (Madhavan, 2000). 
However, in practice, this transformation process is complicated and does not operate 
perfectly (Bloomfield, 2002; Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). Furthermore, disclosures on 
their own do not seem to be sufficient in advancing transparency (Freixas and Laux, 2012). 
 This concern may be viewed from both a quantitative and a qualitative perspective. 
On the one hand, financial accounting figures do not perfectly illustrate a banks’ financial 
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situation as the quantitative disclosures might be inaccurate, incorrectly understood and 
intrinsically complex (Jones et al., 2012, 2013). Due to the character and composition of 
the bank’s balance sheet (i.e., loans and trading assets), as well as the bank’s size and 
complexity, some studies even argue that specifically banks, compared to firms of other 
sectors, seem to be inherently opaque to outsiders. Therefore, the traditional view on 
transparency identifies opacity as a threat to financial stability and an important reason 
why banking regulation and supervision is needed and not entirely undertaken by 
financial markets (e.g., Flannery et al., 2013; Iannotta, 2006; Morgan, 2002). On the other 
hand, and by analysing corporate narratives, research finds that information complexity 
and the tone of textual disclosures potentially influence firm performance (Bonsall and 
Miller, 2017; Loughran and McDonald, 2011b, 2011a; Li, 2008). This relationship may 
incentivise managers to provide more complex and abnormally positive narratives with 
the objective of obfuscating investors about the true value of a firm (Bushee et al., 2018; 
Asay et al., 2017; Ertugrul et al., 2017; Allee and Deangelis, 2015). 
 Consequently, according to the latest regulatory evolvements, regulators, 
policymakers and the public demand more and improved transparency from banks. For 
example, the 2008 global financial crisis showed how the absence of reliable information 
produced a lack of confidence about the resilience of Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions (SIFI) and of the entire economic system (Flannery et al., 2013). Therefore, 
as part of Basel III, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) highlights the 
importance of quantitative and qualitative disclosure quality that should be clear, 
comprehensive, meaningful, consistent and comparable; this is to improve and 
supplement the effectiveness of the capital regime (BCBS, 2013, 2017). In addition, 
authorities attempt to improve the quality of information available to market participants 
through regular bank stress tests. This specific information aims to reveal bank solvency 
and soundness against adverse market developments to respectively rebuild and maintain 
the trust of market participants during both crises and normal economic times (Flannery 
et al., 2017; Bouvard et al., 2015; Borio et al., 2014; Schuermann, 2014). 
 Various event studies show that U.S. and European markets react to stress test 
announcements and results as they provide novel information to market participants 
(Carboni et al., 2017; Morgan et al., 2014; Petrella and Resti, 2013). In conceptual studies, 
Borio et al. (2014) and Schuermann (2014) argue that during crises, when uncertainty is 
high and credible information is rare, bank stress tests work well as a crisis management 
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tool to provide markets with the additional information that they need to distinguish 
between sound and unsound banks. In normal times, however, stress tests should work as 
an early warning device, which is increasingly difficult to implement in a credible way. 
Bouvard et al. (2015) and Goldstein and Sapra (2013) support this view and suggest that 
more bank transparency during crises may lead to more financial stability, although it 
might cause distinct inefficiencies during relatively calm times. In particular, disclosing 
bank-specific information during normal times might mislead investors about the 
financial situation, causing incorrect conclusions, and, in a worst scenario, resulting in 
bank runs. 
 However, how do banks react to stress test participation and disclosures? The literature 
provides rather little insight on the impact of regulatory stress tests on bank reports. On 
the one hand, as stress tests provide mainly quantitative mandatory disclosures, they may 
encourage voluntary disclosures of such kind. Analysing European stress tests in 2010 
and 2011 and the following capital exercise in 2012, Bischof and Daske (2013) find an 
increase in voluntarily disclosed information on sovereign risk exposures as a response 
to the mandatory stress test results. On the other hand, turning to the U.S. market, the 
literature suggests that bank managers know about the implications of ‘bad’ news on the 
markets and may attempt to mitigate potential negative consequences (Cornett et al., 2019; 
Acharya et al., 2018; Goldstein and Leitner, 2018; Flannery et al., 2017; Goldstein and 
Sapra, 2013). Therefore, stress tests may influence qualitative, textual, disclosure 
sentiment depending on banks’ stress test participation and the individual stress test 
performance. For instance, banks that performed well may specifically mention stress test 
results to account for their soundness and resilience approved by regulatory evidence. 
Banks that failed stress tests might use positive language in an attempt to disperse stress 
test results and their reported shortcomings. 
 Motivated by the conflicting view on transparency and opacity and the growing 
regulatory influence of stress tests on the financial sector, I explore the impact of stress 
tests on participating banks’ quantitative and textual disclosure profiles and the effect on 
bank transparency. Based on the obfuscation theory of textual disclosures, I believe that 
stress test participation and disclosures can create a stress test sentiment that may 
influence disclosure tone and quantitative disclosure behaviour, it might even affect bank 
opacity measures. In this context, I scrutinise the following research questions. Do stress 
test participants adjust disclosure profiles in response to stress tests? Does stress test 
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sentiment influence the tone and language of banks’ textual disclosures? Do the stress 
test sentiment and disclosure tone during stress test periods convert into bank opacity? 
 To address these research questions, I construct a unique and comprehensive dataset 
of stress-tested banks from 25 European countries; the dataset consists of accounting, 
textual analysis and market microstructure components. My data are of quarterly 
frequency and cover the period 2005-2017. In particular, I largely resort to hand-collected 
annual and interim reports for my quantitative and qualitative accounting analysis, which 
I combine with bank opacity measures from the market microstructure literature. 
Accordingly, my empirical approach is divided into three steps. First, I produce a 
transparency index that captures the quantity of accounting figures within bank reports 
and, thus, the level of transparency of these reports. Second, I apply textual analysis to 
measure the qualitative level of transparency. In particular, I establish a word list that 
comprises of specific stress test words found in stress test disclosures (i.e., stress test 
reports and announcements published by the European authorities). Utilising the word 
counts of these stress test words within bank reports, I show how these bank reports are 
influenced by specific stress test language. This measure of influence is defined as ‘stress 
test sentiment’. I further measure the tone in bank reports to estimate if bank managers 
apply a more positive tone during stress test periods. Third, I then link these qualitative 
transparency attributes to evaluate how the stress test sentiment and disclosure tone affect 
bank opacity. 
 This study advances previous research by documenting that stress test participants 
adjust disclosure profiles during stress test periods in several ways. In particular, as I 
identify increased stress test terms and language within banks’ textual disclosures, I 
conclude that narratives are evidently influenced by stress test sentiment. The number of 
stress test terms, in relation to the report length, has increased considerably from one 
exercise to another. In addition, newly involved participants utilise more stress test 
language within their textual disclosures than regular participants. Further, my results 
indicate that the variation of disclosure tone and the quantitative disclosure behaviour can 
influence the evolvement of the transparency process during stress test periods. This 
effect may differ for banks that are newly or regularly involved in stress test exercises, 
while I can see a slight learning curve from serial stress test participation. 
 Importantly, stress tests might incentivise stress test participants to change their 
disclosure tone towards more positive language during stress test periods, which, as traced 
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in bank opacity measures, seems to obfuscate investors. For instance, I find that an 
increased stress test sentiment may lead to higher bid-ask spreads and lower analyst 
coverage and, therefore, more bank opacity. In turn, the results suggest that a more 
positive disclosure tone is related to lower bid-ask spreads and more analyst coverage, 
thus, less bank opacity. I conclude, therefore, that bank managers might not be able to 
condition the amount of stress test words precisely to the market’s expectations but may 
attempt to compensate for stress test sentiment by amending the disclosure tone towards 
more positivity. Both results are consistent over distinct periods around and after 
individual bank report release dates. However, I am hesitant to link the results towards 
causal inference, as textual narratives per se might be at least partly responsible for the 
transparency effect. Nevertheless, I conclude that stress tests influence banks’ disclosure 
strategies, which may affect bank opacity measures and influence market participants. 
 I combine accounting, textual and market microstructure characteristics and 
empirically examine how stress test participants influence disclosure profiles and whether 
this affects bank transparency. Therefore, my study contributes to distinct streams of the 
literature. First, I expand the growing literature of textual analysis (Henry and Leone, 
2016; Loughran and McDonald, 2016; Li, 2010). My study is the first that measures stress 
test sentiment by establishing a unique word list from stress test disclosures and applying 
this list on hand-collected European stress-tested banks’ annual and interim reports. 
Further, I connect the concept of stress tests with textual disclosure tone based on word 
lists by Loughran and McDonald (2011a). Second, Bischof and Daske (2013) study the 
impact of mandatory stress test disclosures on European banks’ voluntarily disclosure 
behaviour. Based on a U.S. sample, Flannery et al. (2017) empirically explore Goldstein 
and Sapra’s (2013) theoretical drawbacks of stress test disclosures. By analysing the 
impact of stress tests on banks’ quantitative and textual disclosure profiles, I contribute 
to this literature and shed light on a rather opaque area of stress test research. 
 Third, I extend the literature on bank transparency and opacity (Flannery et al., 2013; 
Iannotta, 2006; Morgan, 2002) by exploring the implications of regulatory stress test 
participation and disclosures on bank opacity measures. Fourth, I expand the growing 
literature that applies event study designs to examine the short-term ex post effects of 
stress test disclosures on financial markets (Carboni et al., 2017; Sahin and de Haan, 2016; 
Morgan et al., 2014; Petrella and Resti, 2013). Further, I generally contribute to the 
conceptual debate on the costs and benefits of transparency through stress test disclosures 
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that provides suggestions for regulators and policymakers on how to establish a solid 
disclosure strategy (Bouvard et al., 2015; Borio et al., 2014; Schuermann, 2014; Goldstein 
and Sapra, 2013). 
 The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the 
theoretical framework and related literature; it also discusses the main arguments and the 
limitations of relevant studies. Section 3.3 develops the empirical hypotheses to be tested 
in Section 3.4. The latter section illustrates the data collection and the econometric 
techniques applied in my analysis. Section 3.5 reports and discusses the empirical results, 
whereas Section 3.6 is devoted to robustness checks. Section 3.7 concludes the chapter 
and presents relevant policy and business implications. 
3.2. Theoretical framework and related literature 
My study bases on the controversial debate on conceptional frictions between 
transparency and opacity and the role of stress tests within those concepts, in terms of 
potential consequences for financial stability. In theory, transparency is the flip-side of 
opacity meaning that more transparency leads to less opacity, and vice versa. However, 
the relationship between both concepts is complex. For instance, how quantitative and 
qualitative accounting information influences financial markets and is transferred into 
transactions and share prices is an ongoing area of research. The literature argues that 
disclosed information through stress test results may affect financial stability positively 
or negatively depending on the detail of disclosed information and the state of the 
economy (Bouvard et al., 2015; Goldstein and Sapra, 2013). 
3.2.1. Bank transparency and opacity 
The demand for transparency can be traced back to the principle that information 
efficiency ensures that financial markets and the entire economic system to operate 
smoothly. For example, the efficient market hypothesis assumes perfect information 
movement between all market participants (Allen and Santomero, 1998; Fama, 1970). 
Following Bushman (2014) and BCBS (1998), I define transparency as the amount of 
public information available to outside stakeholders. Therefore, the level of transparency 
depends on the precision, reliability and frequency of various components of publicly 
available financial accounting information such as bank reports, credit ratings and 
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supervisory disclosures. All this credible information about a bank’s solvency and 
soundness is a necessary condition to attract outsiders, such as depositors and creditors, 
and establish a trustworthy business relationship (Danisewicz et al., 2018; BCBS, 2000). 
Along these lines, transparency provides outsiders with opportunities to produce 
private investors’ information and to make better-informed investment decisions that 
convert information into transactions and share prices on financial markets; the so-called 
market microstructure (Madhavan, 2000). However, banks operate in an environment 
with informational frictions and uncertainty (i.e., at best the semi-strong form of Fama’s 
(1970) efficient market hypothesis) where insiders and outsiders have asymmetric 
information (Goldstein and Sapra, 2013). Moreover, Bloomfield (2002) introduces the 
‘incomplete revelation hypothesis’ (IRH); this states that market prices do not fully reflect 
public information due to the costs of analysing and assessing this information. This 
circumstance exacerbates the costs of raising external equity or regulatory capital, and 
gives birth to fundamental concerns such as the agency problem and adverse selection 
(e.g., Beatty and Liao, 2014; Bushman et al., 2004; Diamond, 1984; Diamond and Dybvig, 
1983). Following Acharya and Ryan (2016), I define bank opacity as the level of 
uncertainty; this is based on certain market inefficiencies that make effective decision-
making more difficult or even impossible for outside market players. For instance, 
uncertainty appears when investors face incomplete, incorrectly interpreted or too 
complicated public information (Jones et al., 2012, 2013). 
In addition, studies argue that banks are even inherently opaque. Morgan (2002) and 
Iannotta (2006) examine whether bond issue ratings are differently rated by rating 
agencies. They conclude that banks, compared to other industries, are opaquer as they 
find that banks’ bond ratings differ more often between agencies than bond ratings of 
firms in other industries. The literature identifies banks’ specific asset composition from 
loans and trading assets, which are usually the largest items on the balance sheet, as 
determinants for bank opacity. On the one hand, the value of bank loans is difficult to 
assess from outside as banks hold confidential information about the nature of the contract 
and the creditworthiness of the borrower (Berlin and Loeys, 1988; Campbell and Kracaw, 
1980). On the other hand, trading assets are seen to be opaque because they are inherently 
complex (e.g., CDOs) and therefore difficult to measure. Moreover, trading assets are 
very liquid and move fast on and off the trading books, sometimes within days or hours 
(Jones et al., 2013; Morgan, 2002). 
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3.2.2. Transparency related to textual disclosures 
Transparency is also linked to the quality of qualitative, textual, disclosures. The 
literature argues that information complexity 17  and tone of textual components of 
corporate disclosures are related to firms’ future performance. In particular, using the fog 
index, Li (2008) examines Bloomfield’s (2002) IRH in the sense that complex textual 
disclosures in 10-K filings can lead to confusion, obfuscation, about the true performance 
of a firm.18 He finds that firms with low earnings are more likely to publish disclosures 
that are more complicated. Consistent with Li (2008), recent studies conclude that firms 
with more complex reports tend to manage their earnings (Lo et al., 2017), while easier 
10-K filings increase credit rating quality and reduce the cost of debt (Bonsall and Miller, 
2017). 
Moreover, Bloomfield (2008) discusses Li’s (2008) results, providing an alternative 
explanation that low performing firms might need to disclose more complex information 
in response to their poor performance. Analysing conference calls, Bushee et al. (2018) 
disentangle disclosed information into complex but informative and deliberately 
obfuscating information, which respectively decreases or increases information 
asymmetry. They observe that low performing firms convey more of both components. 
Furthermore, Asay et al. (2017) suggest that the potential of the obfuscation effect of 
more complex disclosures to cover poor performance is limited to the extent that investors 
will base their investment decision on other information sources. 
On the other hand, many studies analyse the tone and sentiment of corporate 
disclosures by resorting to dictionaries, word lists or phrases and document a relationship 
between tone and firms’ stock performance.19 In particular, Loughran and McDonald 
(2011a) create dictionaries to analyse the tone and sentiment of financial disclosures and 
find that specific language (e.g., ‘negative’, ‘uncertainty’, ‘modal’, ‘litigious’ words) can 
 
17 Information complexity refers to the term ‘readability’. Both terms are used interchangeably in the 
literature (see, e.g., Bushee et al., 2017; Li, 2008). Loughran and McDonald (2016) posit that the term 
‘readability’ is problematic, as it refers only to the analysed document, which is inherently interrelated with 
the business’ complexity that it attempts to describe. As I examine document complexity in a broader sense, 
I follow Loughran and McDonald (2016) and use the term ‘information complexity’. 
18 There is an ongoing debate on the measurement of information complexity and tone of disclosure. 
Researchers have introduced various information complexity measures, dictionaries, word lists and 
machine learning approaches that I do not comprehensively discuss in my study (see, Henry and Leone, 
2016; Loughran and McDonald, 2016 for a review). 
19 In some research areas, it might be important to distinguish between a dictionary and a word list. In my 
study, I do not make this distinction and, hence, use the terms interchangeably. 
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influence stock returns and trading volumes on the filing date and future stock return 
volatility. Further, Loughran and McDonald (2011b) examine negative tone and phrases 
connected to fraud, which indicates a warning to investors as they find lower stock prices 
for firms using this language. Related to the obfuscation theory, Allee and Deangelis 
(2015) link textual disclosures and managers’ reporting incentives. They observe that 
managers structure the dispersion of the tone of their narratives according to their 
advantages in order to influence investors’ perceptions of firm performance. Similarly, 
Ertugrul et al. (2017) document that annual reports with more ambiguous tone and 
complexity lead to higher future crash risk. Analysing earnings press releases, studies by 
Arslan-Ayaydin et al. (2016) and Huang et al. (2014) show that an abnormal positive tone 
can boost stock prices in the short-run, while the effect results in a negative market 
reaction in subsequent quarters. 
3.2.3. Costs and benefits of stress test disclosures 
Some conceptual studies examine the impact of stress test disclosures on financial 
stability and identify costs and benefits in terms of transparency. For instance, Goldstein 
and Sapra (2013) summarise distinct empirical studies and illustrate the consequences of 
reported stress test results. On the positive side, stress test disclosures provide specific 
information about the risk profile of banks; this enables outside stakeholders to make 
informed investment decisions and enforces market discipline. Further, regulators can 
enhance the market’s trust in the system through a disclosure commitment prior to the 
stress test, as regulators will not deliberately hold back negative private information. 
On the negative side, stress test disclosures might lead to the effect modelled by 
Hirshleifer (1971) and reduce risk sharing among economic agents; this is because 
realised losses cannot be insured. Furthermore, managers might rather choose short-term 
investments to pass stress tests at the cost of their long-term value. Moreover, contagion 
could arise, if many market players do not react on bank fundamentals but follow other 
market participants. In addition, regulators’ information might dominate investors’ 
privately produced information, preventing regulators from learning from market 
reactions. In a similar vein, Bouvard et al. (2015) support this theoretical framework; 
however, they posit that it is essentially connected to the state of the economy and the 
quantity and quality of stress test disclosures (i.e., aggregated or bank-specific 
information). In particular, detailed stress test disclosures during financial crises mitigate 
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opacity, whilst those disclosures rather produce adverse market reactions. The latter 
incident might incentivise regulators to waive negative information, even in situations 
when this information should be disclosed. 
Many empirical studies have illustrated that markets respond to stress test disclosures 
and therefore do not ignore such information. Exercising an event study design on 
different U.S. and European stress tests, most studies conclude that stress test disclosures 
provide, on certain occasions, novel and valuable information for investors; they therefore 
reduce the informational gap between inside and outside market participants (Carboni et 
al., 2017; Sahin and de Haan, 2016; Morgan et al., 2014; Petrella and Resti, 2013). 
Consequently, the signalling effect of stress test disclosures might incentivise bank 
managers to mitigate potential negative consequences. 
Analysing bank holding companies that participated in U.S. stress tests from 2009 to 
2015, Flannery et al. (2017) expand those studies by specifically investigating three of 
Goldstein and Sapra’s (2013) propositions. First, they explore analysts’ earnings forecasts 
and find no evidence for a reduction in private information production by market 
participants. Second, examining the growth of assets and loans three quarters after the 
stress test result release, they report only weak evidence that managers alter their 
portfolios in response to stress test participation. Third, Flannery et al. (2017) analyse 
interbank borrowing behaviour of participating and non-participating banks, and cannot 
confirm the view that stress test disclosures reduce risk-sharing activities. 
Although evidence in the U.S. appears to be limited, Bischof and Daske (2013) partly 
support this conceptual view in Europe. Analysing the CEBS’s 2010 and EBA’s 2011 
stress tests as well as the subsequent capital exercise in 2012, they find that stress-tested 
banks tend to increase their voluntary disclosure of sovereign risk exposure in response 
to the mandatory stress test disclosures. Consequently, banks seem to aim to mitigate any 
negative signalling from stress test disclosures. 
3.3. Hypotheses 
 My hypotheses establish the theory that stress tests incentivise banks to adjust 
disclosure profiles, which indirectly affects bank transparency. 
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3.3.1. Stress tests and bank disclosure profiles 
Based on the related literature, I assume that stress test disclosures operate as a 
transparency mechanism for soundness and solvency of stress test participants. In 
addition to public information through financial accounting, stress test results should 
increase transparency and reduce information asymmetry (Schuermann, 2014). However, 
the literature also suggests that bank managers are well aware of the effect of stress test 
disclosures on market participants as they might lead to adverse market reactions and 
bank runs (Bouvard et al., 2015). Consequently, stress test participation and disclosures 
might incentivise bank managers to influence their information strategies towards 
mitigation of the effects of stress tests (Flannery et al., 2017; Bischof and Daske, 2013; 
Goldstein and Sapra, 2013). 
I hypothesise this effect on banks’ disclosure profiles from both a qualitative and 
quantitative viewpoint. On the one hand, I capture this effect by measuring the number 
of stress test words used in bank filings and name it ‘stress test sentiment’. The stress test 
sentiment refers to the prevailing attitude of managers towards stress tests as expressed 
by the volume and the selection of the stress test words in the bank reports. That is, the 
stress test sentiment captures how and to what extent the content of bank reports is related 
to stress tests, e.g., a larger number of stress test words in a bank report show that the 
report is more influenced by stress tests. Along these lines, the literature suggests that 
banks can manage their disclosure tone. In particular, disclosure tone and stronger 
language within narratives (i.e., ‘negative’, ‘uncertainty’, ‘modal’ and ‘litigious’ words) 
may obfuscate investors (Ertugrul et al., 2017; Arslan-Ayaydin et al., 2016; Huang et al., 
2014; Loughran and McDonald, 2011a). Further, the disclosure profiles of banks relate 
to the actual figures and numbers within financial statements and notes, which I measure 
using a transparency index  (Nier and Baumann, 2006). Consequently, bank managers are 
expected to provide an increased number of stress test terms, a more positive disclosure 
tone, less negative language and more quantitative figures during stress test periods, 
compared to the period preceding stress tests. Accordingly, I formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
H1. Stress test participants adjust disclosure profiles in response to stress tests. 
Moreover, an increased stress test sentiment should be compensated by a change 
towards more positive disclosure tone and less negative language, with the purpose of 
dispersing regulatory stress test information. For example, a bank produces a realistic 
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picture of the stress test event by using increased stress test sentiment; this should lead to 
a slightly negative disclosure tone within their reports due to the negative nature of stress 
test words. However, if there is disparity within a banks’ narratives (e.g., a bank increases 
stress test sentiment and uses a more positive (less negative) disclosure tone to hide 
negativity from stress tests, then, this might indicate that bank managers aim to obfuscate 
investors on the outcome of stress tests (Ertugrul et al., 2017; Henry and Leone, 2016; 
Huang et al., 2014). Hence, I provide the subsequent hypothesis: 
H2. Increased stress test sentiment during stress test periods is related to changes 
towards a more positive disclosure tone and less negative language. 
3.3.2. Stress tests and bank opacity 
Next, based on the theoretical framework of banks’ disclosure profiles displayed in 
Section 3.3.1, I expect that the stress test sentiment and the disclosure tone may even lead 
to bank opacity with the purpose of obfuscating investors. A widely used measure for 
information asymmetry is the bid-ask spread. In principal, the bid-ask spread shows 
market liquidity from both the supply (ask price) and the demand (bid price) side of a 
share, which may be also applied to estimate information asymmetry. A high spread 
indicates that there is a greater likelihood of information asymmetry (or uncertainty) 
among traders about the true value of a share. Uninformed investors are likely to price 
uncertainty into their investment to buffer potential costs from adverse selection or might 
even be reluctant to invest. Therefore, a high spread leads to reduced market liquidity and 
increases cost of capital, as banks need to discount their shares to attract investors. 
Accordingly, the theory states that more transparent banks should trade with a lower bid-
ask spread (Flannery et al., 2013; Bushman et al., 2004; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Kyle, 
1985). Further, many studies show that investors and financial analysts tend to prefer 
firms that are more transparent, mainly because it reduces cost of information gathering 
and production (McNichols and O’Brien, 1997). Therefore, analyst coverage, estimated 
by the number of analyst recommendations, is an indicator for an individual bank’s level 
of transparency. In other words, the higher the number of analysts that file a 
recommendation, the more transparent is the bank (Flannery et al., 2017; Marquardt and 
Wiedman, 1998). 
In terms of textual disclosures, the effect on transparency may be twofold. On the one 
hand, if the stress test sentiment and disclosure tone of bank reports is informative, this 
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should add to investor’s and analyst’s knowledge and the relevant information should 
transfer into market prices and analyst coverage. Importantly, this hypothesis should be 
true if both textual measures are meaningful and align with market expectations. In this 
case, stress test sentiment and disclosure tone should lead to lower bid-ask spreads and 
higher analyst coverage. On the other hand, if market participants perceive that banks 
might face more risk than is transferred by the stress test sentiment and disclosure tone, 
then bid-ask spreads should increase and analyst coverage should decrease, indicating a 
lower level of opacity (Campbell et al., 2014). As banks aim to mitigate the effect of 
stress test information, I hypothesise the first scenario that is stated as follows: 
H3a. Increased stress test sentiment during stress test periods is negatively related to 
information asymmetry and positively associated with analyst coverage. 
H3b. More positive disclosure tone during stress test periods is negatively related to 
information asymmetry and positively associated with analyst coverage. 
3.4. Empirical analysis 
In this section, I show the sample selection process, data construction, key variables 
and empirical models that I apply in my analysis. Detailed descriptions of the variables 
and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 3.1. 
[Please refer to Table 3.1 here] 
3.4.1. Sample selection 
I select my sample based on the following steps. First, as I am interested in European 
stress-tested banks, I resort to the regulatory stress test disclosures published by 
CEBS/EBA and ECB to identify public and private banks that participated in European 
stress tests between 2009 and 2016 (EBA, 2011, 2014, 2016; ECB, 2014, 2015; CEBS, 
2010). Table 3.2, Panel A, illustrates the stress test participation by country and 
assessment and reports 187 European stress-tested banks.20  
[Please refer to Table 3.2 here] 
 
20 The relevant press release of the 2009 CEBS exercise does not provide the names of the stress-tested 
banks; it simply states that “22 major European cross-border banking groups” were tested (for further 
details, see: http://www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/eu-wide-stress-testing/2009). 
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Second, I obtain each bank’s activity status from BvD Bankscope and verify the 
availability of various data sources for my sample. I remove banks with general data 
unavailability and poor data quality due to M&As and bankruptcies. Further, as my 
textual analysis software, DICTION 7.0, requires reports in English and in a machine-
readable quality (i.e., pdf), I remove banks that published only non-English disclosures 
or reports in an incompatible format. This sample construction process, shown in 
Table 3.2, Panel B, leads me to an initial stress test participation sample of 142 banks 
from 25 European countries, of which, respectively, 69 and 65 banks were tested for the 
first time in 2010-11 (FTST1011) and in 2014 (FTST14). Moreover, the sample comprises 
61 banks that are listed on a stock exchange.21 However, as my regression analysis of 
stress test periods is most accurate with quarterly frequency, the sample size reduces as 
about one-third of my sample does not publish quarterly reports. The combination of 
some variables and lags may lead to a further reduction in observations and sample size. 
3.4.2. Data construction and key variables 
The bank transparency and opacity dataset comprise various accounting, textual and 
market microstructure variables from distinct data sources. To construct my extensive 
dataset, I rely on stress test reports and the recent stress test and bank transparency and 
opacity literature (Acharya et al., 2018; Carboni et al., 2017; Flannery et al., 2017; 
Bischof and Daske, 2013). As discussed in the following sub-sections, I capture bank 
transparency from a quantitative and qualitative viewpoint by utilising, receptively, a 
transparency index based on accounting figures and textual measures (i.e., stress test 
sentiment and disclosure tone). Further, I measure bank opacity from a market perspective 
by resorting to information asymmetry and analyst coverage. 
I thoroughly analyse my data to accommodate outliers that might screw the results. 
For instance, I discard observations of particularly low/high share prices, total words 
analysed or low number of trades. Further, I normalise and winsorise the data at the 1 and 
99 percentiles, accounting and textual measures on a quarterly and market data on a daily 
basis. The data period of this quarterly obtained accounting and market data spans from 
2005-2017, which reflects the most recent and accurate provision of this data. I follow 
recent standards of the accounting, textual analysis and market microstructure literature 
 
21 I remove delisted banks from my sample of listed banks to ensure consistent data quality. 
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that applies those techniques to validate observations and to mitigate estimation problems 
due to parsing textual documents or market inefficiencies (Flannery et al., 2013; Bushman 
and Williams, 2012; Loughran and McDonald, 2011a). 
3.4.2.1. Bank accounting 
I gather accounting-based variables from BvD Bankscope and FitchConnect22 and use 
this data to compose the transparency index (TRANX) according to Nier and Baumann 
(2006) that I apply to measure quantitative disclosure behaviour of stress-tested banks. 
The purpose is to assess the detail of figures provided in the bank reports. I resort to the 
FitchConnect database and collect quarterly data of various balance sheet and income 
statement categories connected to bank risk-taking. The categories are divided into 19 
sub-indices that are linked to credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk and capital risk. I count 
the disclosed figures within the sub-indices available on FitchConnect and aggregate the 
sub-indices to a ratio that is the transparency index (TRANX). The ratio ranges from 0 
to 1. The higher the TRANX ratio, the more figures are disclosed and thus the more 
transparent is the bank. The definition and the categories of the sub-indices are fully 
described in Table 3.1 and the additional Note 1 (page 109). 
At the same time, I use the accounting-based variables to establish my comprehensive 
accounting dataset of bank risk measures and characteristics (see, e.g., Jones et al., 2012, 
2013). In particular, I utilise bank size reflected in the natural logarithm of total assets 
(SIZE); traditional- and non-traditional banking activities measured by outstanding loans 
(LOAN) and trading securities (TRADE); credit portfolio quality captured by loan loss 
reserves (LLR), asset quality estimated by loan loss provisions (LLP); capital adequacy 
shown by the Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio (T1R); liquidity risk reflected in deposits and 
short-term funding (DSTF); and profitability captured by earnings before provision and 
taxes (EBPT). Similar to Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011), I face some degree of 
inconsistency and incompleteness of raw European accounting data from public 
databases, for example, for challenging accounting variables such as capital adequacy 
 
22 In January 2017, BvD Bankscope was replaced by Orbis Bank Focus, which has significantly reduced 
the data quality. I resort to other sources such as FitchConnect, Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters Worldscope 
and SNL Financial. I validate the completeness of the extracted data and find that FitchConnect is the 
database with the richest and most accurate provision of accounting variables. 
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figures and loan loss provisions. Therefore, I enrich the data by hand-collecting missing 
figures. 
3.4.2.2. Textual analysis 
Next, I resort to the textual analysis methodology to test my hypotheses. I hand-collect 
all available annual and interim reports published on the bank’s website or stored on 
Bloomberg’s corporate filings database. I use DICTION 7.0, which is a state-of-the-art 
programming tool widely used in the literature, to determine the tone and the variation of 
a verbal message found in bank reports. As I describe below, I create my own word list 
based on words related to stress tests, regulation and risk management, which is a unique 
innovation in the context of textual analysis that is tailored to banking. In addition, I adopt 
the word list of Loughran and McDonald (2011a) to measure the disclosure tone (i.e., 
positive versus negative terms).23 I then apply these word lists to the bank reports to 
retrieve the word count that estimates stress test sentiment and disclosure tone. 
First, to measure the stress test sentiment (STS) of bank narratives, I establish a 
procedure that enables me to comprehensively assess the recognition of stress test, 
regulation and risk management language. I create a word list that is composed of six 
categories and based on the most frequently used words in the stress test regulatory 
reports, in financial accounting reports, as well as in the stress test literature. Relying on 
all three sources of reporting ensures the maximum degree of objectivity. In particular, I 
upload the relevant reports and methodology notes of the stress test assessments in 2010 
(CEBS), 2011 (EBA), 2014 (EBA, ECB), 2015 (ECB) and 2016 (EBA) to DICTION to 
extract the full list of so-called “insistence” words.24 Following the DICTION-manual 
definition, an insistence word is a noun, a verb or a noun-derived adjective that appears 
three times or more within a passage of 500 words. It is important to indicate here that 
not all the insistence words are eligible for retention. For example, some of the most 
frequently used words in the studied documents are ‘bank/s’, ‘asset/s’ and ‘result/s’, 
which are generic words and do not necessarily pertain to preceding stress tests. Therefore, 
I do not include those words in my list. Further, I resort to the stress test and accounting 
literature (e.g., Borio et al., 2014; Schuermann, 2014; Bischof and Daske, 2013; Bushman 
 
23 I follow the relevant guidelines found on McDonald’s website: https://sraf.nd.edu/. 
24 The documents may be accessed on the EBA and ECB websites (see: http://www.eba. europa.eu/ risk-
analysis-and-data/eu-wide-stress-testing, https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/tasks/compr 
ehensive_assessment/html/index.en.html). 
87 
 
and Williams, 2012) and screen stress test sections of selected financial reports to identify 
specific language and to spot the terms that are related to stress tests. I also expand the 
word list by adding inflections, plurals, and alternative English or American spellings 
(Athanasakou et al., 2019). 
After structuring the output and cleaning it from bogus words, I analyse and evaluate 
all the extracted words according to their relevance to stress tests, bank regulation and 
risk management. From this I obtain a word list that consists of a total 349 keywords that 
measure stress test sentiment (STS). The word list is displayed in the additional Note 2 of 
Table 3.1 (pages 110-111). Each insistence word is classified and allocated into the 
following six categories: 
(1) ‘Stress test identity’ (STS_ID): Words that are directly linked to the stress test 
assessments, e.g., exercise, stress, test; 
(2) ‘Stress test performance’ (STS_PERF): Words that reflect the performance of banks 
in stress tests, e.g., finding, pass, significant; 
(3) ‘Stress test procedure’ (STS_PRO): Words that are related to the particular 
methodological stress test procedures, e.g., baseline, scenario, shortfall; 
(4) ‘Regulatory institutions’ (STS_REGIN): Words that identify the various stress test 
regulatory bodies and institutions, e.g., EBA, ECB, SSM; 
(5) ‘Regulatory requirements’ (STS_REQ): Words that are connected to particular 
regulatory requirements, e.g., Basel, floor, Tier; 
(6) ‘Risk management’ (STS_RM): Words that are related to bank risk management 
procedures, e.g., collateral, credit, provisioning. 
Second, I measure distinct forms of disclosure tone by applying widely accepted word 
lists of ‘positive’ (POSITIVE), ‘negative’ (NEGATIVE), ‘uncertain’ (UNCERTAIN), 
‘modal’ (MODAL) words (Loughran and McDonald, 2011a), including an aggregated 
word list that consists of ‘negative’, uncertain’ and ‘modal’ words (AGGNUM). As 
suggested by Henry and Leone (2016)25, I combine the word count of the ‘negative’ and 
‘positive’ word lists to construct disclosure tone estimates using the following formula: 
./01#2) = 4567%789:;<=>9?@%789:;<4567%789:;<A>9?@%789:;<                    (3.1) 
 
25 An alternative formula for disclosure tone is TONE_ALT = (POSITIVE – NEGATIVE) / TWA as in Huang 
et al. (2014). I apply this measure in my robustness checks and receive similar results. 
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where i shows the bank, t stands for time measured in quarters, and j reflects the relevant 
country. The disclosure tone (TONE) yields the equally weighted word count26 of the 
‘positive’ word list (POSITIVE) subtracted from the word count of the ‘negative’ word 
list (NEGATIVE) and divided by the sum of the two word lists. According to Henry and 
Leone (2016), TONE yields a score of 1 for an entirely positive narrative, a score of -1 
for a purely negative disclosure and 0 for a perfectly neutral narrative. Further, I calculate 
the variation of the disclosure tone (ΔTONE), defined as TONEt – TONEt–1. 
Third, to find the relevant bank reports, I apply Bloomberg’s CFS <GO> function and 
search for the name of the bank and select the criteria ‘annual report’, ‘interim report’ and 
‘quarterly report’. I download all filings for each bank in pdf-format, which I save in a 
folder named by the bank. As the downloaded files have no particular name to identify 
the bank or the specific report, I rename all files according to my textual observation 
identifier that I give each bank and observation (“Nr_ID_Shortname_Period”). In case 
Bloomberg does not store all filings, I also visit the bank’s website to download, if 
available, the relevant missing filings. As the Bloomberg downloading and renaming 
process is very resource intensive, I sometimes reverse the process, directly resorting to 
the bank’s website, and search on Bloomberg for extensions. 
I do various verification checks to ensure that I downloaded the correct reports for 
each bank and period. I hand-check the reports twice to ensure the bank’s name and period 
are correctly specified.27 When I upload the filings into DICTION, in rare cases, the file 
is not machine readable and automatically omitted by the software. After I run DICTION 
for the first time, I thoroughly check, remove and/or replace such obvious faulty filings. 
This test also includes duplicate filings. Further, I sort the outcome observations by the 
number of total words analysed (TWA) and by the variation of TWA of the filing compared 
to the equivalent period (ΔTWAt-4). I check filings with fewer than 3,000 words (Bonsall 
and Miller, 2017; Li, 2008) and filings with a word count increase of greater than one. 
Ultimately, I delete 86 filings with fewer than 3,000 words and replace 83 reports with 
an inconsistent word count increase. After all these verification checks, I then proceed to 
 
26 Alternatively, Loughran and McDonald (2016) apply inverse document frequency weighting to reduce 
word misclassification. However, I follow Henry and Leone (2016) who favour equal weighting as it 
increases transparency and replicability. 
27  One bank, Banco Comercial Português, published from 2005 to 2011 two annual report versions 
(Volumes I and II), which I merge by using an online pdf-converter (https://online2pdf.com). 
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run DICTION to retrieve the word count of the above-mentioned word lists that estimate 
stress test sentiment and disclosure tone. 
Although I apply DICTION as the textual analysis tool, I reject using the software-
included dictionaries or other word lists such as Harvard General Inquirer or Henry 
(2008). Early textual analysis literature has widely employed those dictionaries, but 
recent research indicates that those word lists are inappropriate for analysing financial 
narratives (see, Loughran and McDonald, 2015, 2016 for a review). Moreover, I utilise 
annual and interim reports in my analysis, which creates a distinct trade-off. On the 
negative side, the literature argues that interim reports are, in some cases, condensed, 
unaudited and less regulated, leading to less informative disclosures (Loughran and 
McDonald, 2014). On the positive side, some studies resort to interim reports arguing that 
specifically less regulation enables research to measure changes of positive disclosure 
tone as managers might use regulatory freedom to improve the firm’s picture (Huang et 
al., 2014). As I am interested in the variation of disclosure tone, I follow the latter stream 
in combination with the stress test literature, which primarily resorts to quarterly data 
(Flannery et al., 2017; Bischof and Daske, 2013). In particular, interim reports enable me 
to measure stress test periods more accurately. Further, although there are fewer 
requirements on interim reports, as my sample consists of the largest European SIFIs, 
those banks usually write their reports in close cooperation with auditors and regulators. 
3.4.2.3. Market microstructure 
Moreover, for the 61 listed banks in my portfolio, I collect market microstructure 
variables from Thomson Reuters (Datastream/IBES). In particular, I estimate bank 
opacity utilising information asymmetry covered by the bid-ask spread (BIDASK) and 
analyst coverage measured by the number of analyst recommendations (RECNO). As 
described in Section 3.3.2, both variables are widely acknowledged to measure bank 
opacity that is recognised in the level and variation of market liquidity and analyst 
information production (Flannery et al., 2017; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). Further, I 
gather additional market microstructure variables to control for confounding factors. I 
include share turnover (TOVER), inverse share price (INVPRICE), return volatility 
(RETVOL), market value (MVALUE), market-to-book value and analyst recommendation 
consensus (RECCON). Following Bischof and Daske (2013) and Flannery et al. (2013), 
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I produce the market measures by obtaining transactions data on a daily basis and average 
those daily values to compute quarterly microstructure measures. 
3.4.3. Descriptive statistics and correlation tests 
I focus on variables that are relevant for regulators and investors in terms of bank risk-
taking, performance and transparency (see, e.g., Flannery et al., 2013, 2017; Bischof and 
Daske, 2013). In particular, the accounting variables and ratios cover asset quality, capital 
adequacy, traditional and non-traditional banking activities as well as profitability to 
measure bank risk-taking. Further, I collect bank opacity measures and microstructure 
characteristics to estimate potential influence and obfuscation on market participants. On 
the other hand, my dataset consists of textual disclosure characteristics that capture the 
qualitative side of transparency based on stress test sentiment and disclosure tone. In 
addition, I incorporate macroeconomic fundamentals to control for country differences 
and economic inefficiencies. 
[Please refer to Table 3.3 here] 
Table 3.3 reports descriptive statistics of the main regression variables, whereas 
Panels A, B and C show respectively the accounting, textual analysis and market 
microstructure characteristics of my stress test participation sample. In addition, Panel D 
illustrates country-specific macroeconomic fundamentals. Even though stress-tested 
banks are relatively large, the data indicate some dispersion of bank size (SIZE, 
MVALUE). In Europe, banks may operate within unequal economies, where relatively 
small banks count as SIFIs. In this way, the authorities assess a range of small- and 
medium-sized banks. Further, I can see that stress test terms and language appear to be a 
central part of textual narratives (STS). On average, I find that 5.4% of the total words in 
textual disclosures is a term from my stress test disclosure dictionary, which is more than 
double than the word count of 2.1% of the aggregated ‘negative’, ‘uncertain’ and ‘modal’ 
word list (AGGNUM). In addition, TONE yields a score of -0.275 indicating an average 
negative disclosure tone. According to the literature, negative disclosure tone is generally 
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a sign of stronger regulation and accounting rules as banks are less optimistic due to 
litigation concerns (Huang et al., 2014; Li, 2010).28 
[Please refer to Figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 here] 
Figures 3.1 to 3.5 graphically illustrate mean development of important bank-specific 
accounting, textual and market microstructure characteristics for my stress test sample. 
Figure 3.1 shows banking activities (LOAN, TRADE), credit portfolio quality (LLR), asset 
quality (LLP), liquidity risk (DSTF), bank capital (CAP), and capital adequacy (CET1R, 
T1R, TRR). Figures 3.2 and 3.3 display the development of the stress test sentiment (STS, 
STS_ID, STS_PERF, STS_PRO, STS_REGIN, STS_REQ, and STS_RM) and textual 
disclosure tone (TONE, ΔTONE, AGGNUM, NEGATIVE, UNCERTAIN), while 
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 highlight the evolvement of information asymmetry (BIDASK), 
analyst coverage (RECNO, RECSBUY to RECSSELL) and market microstructure 
characteristics (TOVER, INVPRICE, RETVOL, MVALUE, MTBV, RECCON). I indicate 
the European stress test exercises in the second quarter of 2010, 2011, 2014 and 2016 
with dashed lines. 
As expected, the graphs illustrate that stress test sentiment has grown within bank 
disclosures, as regulatory stress tests have been undertaken after the financial crisis. 
Further, the bid-ask spread (BIDASK) indicates an increase in information asymmetry in 
2008 and sharply peaks from 2008Q4 to 2009Q1 as well as from 2010Q2 to 2013Q4. The 
first movement reflects the burst of the U.S. housing bubble and the aftermath of the 
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy (which led to the 2008 global financial crisis) while the 
second evolvement implies the uncertainty from the European sovereign debt crisis. The 
time series of analyst coverage (RECNO) does not show such a clear pattern and appears 
to be slightly behind the bid-ask spreads. This indicates that analyst information 
production is particularly valuable when overall information asymmetry is high. In recent 
years, low uncertainty even seems to discourage analysts from providing information, as 
reflected in the decrease in analyst recommendations from 2015Q4 onwards (supporting, 
e.g., Bouvard et al., 2015; Goldstein and Sapra, 2013). This development in alliance with 
a relatively negative disclosure tone for the same period supports my expectation of the 
 
28 Huang et al. (2014) posit that disclosure tone could be driven by Loughran and McDonald’s (2011a) 
‘negative’ word list as it consists of seven times more words than the ‘positive’ word list. I consider this 
finding by applying alternative tone measures in my robustness checks. 
92 
 
increased importance of stress tests, which might influence banks’ textual disclosures 
leading to opacity and is the basis of my following empirical analysis. 
[Please refer to Table 3.4 here] 
Table 3.4 provides Pearson correlation coefficients and p-values for the variables 
explained in the following analysis in Section 3.4.4. Panel A displays the variables of the 
disclosure profile and tone models (Equations 3.2 and 3.3), while Panel B shows the 
measures of the bank opacity models (Equations 3.4A and 3.4B). In general, the table 
reports statistically significant correlation among some related accounting variables. For 
instance, there is a significant correlation (respectively, -60.90% and 62.50%) between 
trading securities (TRADE) and outstanding loans (LOAN) as well as bank size (SIZE). 
These relationships align with the literature and illustrate the business models of stress-
tested banks (Jones et al., 2012; Nier and Baumann, 2006). Nevertheless, the diagnostic 
techniques reject problematic correlations, except for a strong positive correlation 
(93.40%) between NPL and LLR that is significant at the 1% confidence level. The 
accounting discretion literature defines both variables as reflecting loan quality (Beatty 
and Liao, 2014; Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011). Due to this conceptional 
relationship and to avoid potential multicollinearity, I follow Flannery et al. (2013) and 
include LLR while discarding NPL in my analysis. 
3.4.4. Empirical models 
This study examines whether stress test participants adjust disclosure profiles, which 
ultimately leads to improved bank transparency. I test my hypotheses from Section 3.3 
utilising panel data analysis with bank and quarterly time fixed effects, as a result of the 
Hausman test, to control for potential time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity avoiding 
omitted variable bias. Related to sample selection procedures, and in alliance with the 
stress test literature, I reject self-selection issues for two reasons. First, as it covers about 
76% of the entire stress test population, my sample is much more than a sub-sample. 
Second, the authorities select stress test participants in a political decision-making 
process that bank managers are unlikely to fully control (see, e.g., Carboni et al., 2017). 
Moreover, I lag all subsequent accounting and market microstructure characteristics by 
two quarters to address endogeneity between contemporary asset choice and stress test 
exercises according to recent literature standards (Acharya et al., 2018; Flannery et al., 
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2017). For parsimony, I reject one- to four-quarter lags, as the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) yields no substantial improvement in model strength. I also cluster the 
standard errors at the bank level to mitigate bias from heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation. I believe that these methods and techniques shield my analyses from most 
severe estimation issues. 
I begin with the analysis of banks’ disclosure profiles, which contains the identification 
of stress test sentiment, together with the impact of stress test participation on textual 
disclosure tone and quantitative disclosure behaviour (H1). Inspired by the approach of 
recent stress test models by Flannery et al. (2017) and Bischof and Daske (2013) that 
measure the exact timing of stress test participation, I estimate the first model: BC/DEF1#2) = GH + GJK.1011 + GNK.1415 + GQK.16 + GSD.K.1011 +																																				GUK.1011 ∗ D.K.1011 + GWK.1415 ∗ D.K.1011 +																																				GXK.16 ∗ D.K.1011 + ∑GZ([\]^	_ℎ\a\_bcadebd_e)#2=N) +																																				∑ Gf(ghi]ba"	_ℎ\a\_bcadebd_e)2) + j# + k2 + l#2)     (3.2) 
where, for bank i, quarter t and country j, the dependent variable PROFILE represents 
distinct disclosure profiles of stress-tested banks and stands for one of the subsequent 
measures. First, PROFILE is the following textual components for stress test sentiment; 
where STS is the accumulated word count of the entire stress test, regulation and risk 
management word list based on stress test disclosures, STS_ID is the word count of the 
‘stress test identity’ word list, STS_PERF is the word count of the ‘stress test performance’ 
word list, STS_PRO is the word count of the ‘stress test procedure’ word list, STS_REGIN 
is the word count of the ‘regulatory institutions’ word list, STS_REQ is the word count of 
the ‘regulatory requirements’ word list, and STS_RM is the word count of the ‘risk 
management’ word list. These novel variables measure the recognition of stress test terms 
and language within banks’ filings and ultimately the stress test sentiment. 
Second, the dependent variable PROFILE stands for distinct forms of disclosure tone, 
based on Loughran and McDonald’s (2011a) word lists and Henry and Leone’s (2016) 
formula. Disclosure tone is captured by TONE that is based on the word count of ‘negative’ 
and ‘positive’ word lists (see, Section 3.4.2.2), AGGNUM that is the word count of an 
aggregated word list of ‘negative’, ‘uncertainty’ and ‘modal’ words, NEGATIVE that is 
the word count of the ‘negative’ word list, UNCERTAIN that is the word count of the 
‘uncertainty’ word list, and MODAL that is the word count of the ‘modal’ word list. Third, 
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the dependent variable PROFILE represents quantitative disclosure behaviour, which I 
capture using the transparency index (TRANX) built on the method by Nier and Baumann 
(2006). 
The independent time-dummy variables stand for the stress test periods of 2010-11 
(ST1011), 2014-15 (ST1415) and 2016 (ST16). The participation dummy variable 
FTST1011 captures banks that participated for the first time in 2010-11. Importantly, the 
interaction terms of these time and participation dummies estimate the effect of stress test 
sentiment and disclosure tone. They compare first-time stress-tested banks of 2010-11 
with 2014 first-time participants. A positive (negative) sign of the coefficients indicates 
that earlier first-time participants use more (less) stress test language, ‘positive’, 
‘negative’, ‘uncertain’, ‘modal’ tone or quantitative disclosures than later ones. 
Moreover, to disentangle the consequences of stress test participation, I include 
various control variables that capture potentially confounding bank-specific and macro-
prudential responses to the financial and sovereign debt crisis based on extensive 
accounting and transparency literature (see, e.g., Beatty and Liao, 2014; Flannery et al., 
2013; Jones et al., 2012, 2013). In particular, (Bank characteristics) control for 
differences of stress-tested banks using bank size assessed by the natural logarithm of 
total assets (SIZE), traditional- and non-traditional banking activities (LOAN, TRADE), 
credit portfolio quality (LLR), asset quality (LLP), capital adequacy (T1R), liquidity risk 
(DSTF) and profitability (EBPT). Further, (Country characteristics) considers 
contemporaneous fiscal and monetary policy changes by utilising countries’ 
macroeconomic fundamentals such as economic (ΔGDP), and unemployment growth 
(ΔUNEM). Finally, I incorporate bank-specific fixed effects (a), quarterly fixed effects (d) 
and the residual (e). 
Next, to measure the effect of stress tests on textual disclosures, I combine stress test 
sentiment with stress test participants’ disclosure tone (H2). Hence, I estimate the 
following model: mEKg./01#2) = GH + GJK.ng_E + GNK.K#2) + GQK.ng_E ∗ K.K#2) +																																								∑ GS([\]^	_ℎ\a\_bcadebd_e)#2=N) +																																								∑ GU(ghi]ba"	_ℎ\a\_bcadebd_e)2) + j# + k2 + l#2)     (3.3) 
where, for bank i, quarter t and country j, the dependent variable DISCTONE represents 
the estimates for the variation and distinct forms of disclosure tone (ΔTONE, AGGNUM, 
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LITIGIOUS), employing Loughran and McDonald’s (2011a) word lists and Henry and 
Leone’s (2016) formula. The independent time-dummy variable estimates individual 
stress test participation of each bank in my sample (STHC_I). A binary variable equal to 
one for the period that each sample bank participated in stress tests and zero otherwise. 
STS stands for the accumulated word count of my stress test, regulation and risk 
management word list based on stress test disclosures as defined under Equation 3.2. The 
interaction term of the latter two measures (i.e., STHC_I*STS) captures stress test 
sentiment during individual stress test periods and estimates the impact on disclosure tone. 
When banks acknowledge stress tests in their annual and interim reports they might 
attempt to hide ‘bad’ news from stress test results by changing their disclosure tone and 
including more positive (fewer negative) words. Further, I control for the same 
confounders as defined under Equation 3.2 and include bank-specific fixed effects (a), 
quarterly fixed effects (d) and the residual (e). 
Finally, I combine stress test sentiment and disclosure tone with the level of bank 
opacity using market microstructure variables to analyse if those textual attributes, which 
are influenced by stress test participation, convert into market prices and analyst coverage 
(H3a, H3b). Therefore, I estimate the following two models: pqCr1.#2) = GH + GJK.ng_E + GNK.K#2) + GQK.ng_E ∗ K.K#2) +																																			∑ GS(p\a^cb		sd_ahebai_biac)#2=N) +																																			∑ GU(ghi]ba"	_ℎ\a\_bcadebd_e)2) + j# + k2 + l#2)   (3.4A) pqCr1.#2) = GH + GJK.ng_E + GN./01#2) + GQK.ng_E ∗ ./01#2) +																																			∑ GS(p\a^cb		sd_ahebai_biac)#2=N) +																																			∑ GU(ghi]ba"	_ℎ\a\_bcadebd_e)2) + j# + k2 + l#2)   (3.4B) 
where, for bank i, quarter t and country j, the dependent variable MARKET is one of the 
following measures: information asymmetry captured by the bid-ask spread (BIDASK) 
and analyst coverage estimated by the number of analyst recommendations (RECNO). 
The time-dummy variable estimates the individual stress test participation of each bank 
in my sample (STHC_I), whilst STS and TONE stand respectively for stress test sentiment 
(i.e., STHC_I*STS) and disclosure tone (i.e., STHC_I*TONE) as defined under 
Equations 3.2 and 3.3. The interaction term of the time-dummy and the textual variables 
measure the effect of stress test sentiment and disclosure tone on market microstructure 
during individual stress test periods. According to H3a and H3b, when banks use a more 
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positive (negative) tone in their disclosures, the bid-ask spread should be lower (higher) 
and the number of analyst recommendations should increase (decrease) (Flannery et al., 
2013; Lang and Lundholm, 1996). 
Further, similar to Equations 3.2 and 3.3, the setting creates various challenges due to 
potentially confounding factors that arise from the financial and sovereign debt crisis and 
may alternatively explain the movement of the dependent variables. Therefore, (Market 
microstructure) considers market instabilities such as illiquidity, constrained capital, 
market performance and higher volatility as well as contemporaneous fiscal and monetary 
policy changes (Bonner and Eijffinger, 2016). In particular, I include share turnover 
(TOVER), also known as trading volume, which is often used to capture market liquidity. 
The rationale here is that more liquid markets lead to lower spreads (Bamber et al., 2011; 
Karpoff, 1986). Next, the inverse share price controls for effects related to idiosyncratic 
differences in share prices. For instance, Black (1986) assumes that market movements 
of low-priced shares are particularly affected by ‘noise’, i.e., uninformed, so called 
speculative trading. A high share price limits the number of potential investors and may 
decrease market liquidity (Asparouhova et al., 2013). Another control is return volatility 
(RETVOL); I calculate this as the daily standard deviation of continuously compounded 
share price returns (Bischof and Daske, 2013). Higher volatility in the markets indicates 
uncertainty, which could affect bid-ask spreads and analyst coverage, in particular, during 
crises (Flannery et al., 2013, 2017). 
Further, I employ the logarithm of market value of equity (MVALUE) and the market-
to-book value (MTBV). Research argues that larger banks have more impact on the 
markets, which is why market participants follow larger banks more closely (Amiram et 
al., 2016; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). This development could result in lower spreads 
and higher trading, which, in turn, may attract more analyst coverage. I also control for 
analyst recommendation consensus (RECCON) that illustrates a snapshot of the current 
trend of analysts’ sentiment. Analysts favour buy over sell recommendations; this is due 
to certain factors that are linked to potential investment banking relationships of their 
brokerage firm that provide conflicts of interest and therefore bias analyst 
recommendations towards more optimistic views (McNichols and O’Brien, 1997; 
Womack, 1996). Further, (Country characteristics) utilises economic growth (ΔGDP), 
unemployment growth (ΔUNEM), and the sovereign debt risk (IRATE) to control for 
contemporaneous variations in countries’ macroeconomic fundamentals such as 
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economic cycles (Hamadi et al., 2016; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013; Bushman and 
Williams, 2012). Finally, I include bank-specific fixed effects (a), quarterly fixed effects 
(d) and the residual (e). 
To ensure that Equations 3.4A and 3.4B precisely estimate the effect of the narratives’ 
stress test sentiment and disclosure tone, I measure information asymmetry (BIDASK) 
and analyst coverage (RECNO) during the days around and after the bank report release 
dates. In particular, I hand-collect the release dates of the annual and interim reports and 
calculate the specific average of the daily bid-ask spreads (BIDASK) and the number of 
analyst recommendations (RECNO) for five different periods around and after the bank 
report release date: (1) one day before to one day after (t–1, t+1), (2) two days to 31 days 
after (t+2, t+31), (3) two days to 61 days after (t+2, t+61), (4) two days to 121 days after 
(t+2, t+121), and (5) two days to 250 days after (t+2, t+250). All other variables remain 
the same as in Equations 3.4A and 3.4B. As stated previously in this section, market 
variables are influenced by many other factors. Drawing attention to the particular 
window of interest is therefore crucial and increases the reliability of the results 
(Campbell et al., 2014; Huang et al., 2014; Loughran and McDonald, 2011a). 
3.5. Results 
This section provides and discusses empirical evidence on the effect of stress tests on 
bank disclosure profiles and opacity in the settings established in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. 
3.5.1. Implications of stress tests on bank disclosure profiles 
First, I provide the results of Equation 3.2, which estimates stress-tested banks’ 
behaviour related to disclosure profiles; namely the stress test sentiment, disclosure tone 
and quantitative disclosures (H1). Table 3.5 illustrates the stress test sentiment of stress 
test participants. The table uses the textual attributes established from the word count of 
my stress test, regulation and risk management word lists, built on frequently used words 
within stress test disclosures (STS, STS_ID, STS_PERF, STS_PRO, STS_REGIN, 
STS_REQ, and STS_RM). As expected in H1, the coefficients of the time-dummies 
capturing stress test periods (ST1011, ST1415, and ST16) are mostly positive and 
significant. This implies that stress-tested banks have been using more words linked to 
stress tests during ‘hot’ stress test periods, compared to times without regulatory exercises. 
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[Please refer to Table 3.5 here] 
In relation to stress test participants’ total report length (TWA), the portion of the word 
count and recognition of stress test related terms increases from 1.99% in 2010-11, 2.91% 
in 2014-15 to 3.11% in 2016. Importantly, for the main dependent variable in Model 1 
that stands for the accumulated stress test sentiment (STS), the coefficient of the 
interaction terms ST1011*FTST1011, is positive and significant at the 10% confidence 
level. This result indicates that first-time participants in 2010-11 utilised more stress test 
terms in response to stress tests in 2010-11 compared to those banks that did not 
participate in those early stress tests. Interestingly, the interaction terms ST1415* 
FTST1011 and ST16*FTST1011 are negative and significant at the 1% and 10% 
confidence levels. This result shows that for the periods of the later stress tests in 2014 
and 2016, the first-time participants in 2010-11 use fewer stress test terms than those 
banks that participated for the first time in 2014. In other words, banks previously 
considered and regularly tested in stress tests seem to take less note of regulatory 
assessments on a later stage and make fewer adjustments to their disclosures compared 
to newly involved 2014 first-time participants. 
Analysing significant differences between the accumulated stress test word list and 
the six individual categories, I find that during the first stress test period (ST1011), 
compared with their 2014 counterparts, first-time participants in 2010-11, utilise more 
stress test terms. However, this does not apply to all categories. In particular, regularly 
tested banks use more words that identify stress tests (STS_ID), regulatory institutions 
(STS_REGIN), and risk management (STS_RM) indicating the particular regulatory and 
supervisory impact during this time. Consistent with the accumulated results (STS), the 
identification of stress tests (STS_ID) then turns negative in the subsequent stress test 
periods. On the other hand, the word count for the regulatory institution terms 
(STS_REGIN) turns negative in later stress test periods (ST1415, ST16) but is statistically 
and economically insignificant. This result shows that during those later periods both sub-
samples of first-time participants are equally affected by the regulatory enforcements and 
amendments. Overall, the results suggest that stress-tested banks adjust language and 
sentiment of textual narratives during stress test periods. 
[Please refer to Table 3.6 here] 
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Second, in Table 3.6, I examine the tone of textual disclosures of stress-tested banks 
using the disclosure tone measure based on Loughran and McDonald’s (2011a) financial 
word lists and Henry and Leone’s (2016) disclosure tone definition. As expected in H1, 
in Model 1, the coefficients of the time-dummies (ST1011, ST1415, and ST16) are 
negative and significant at the 1% confidence level; this implies that all stress-tested 
banks generally apply a more negative tone during stress test periods than non-tested 
periods. In economic terms, on a scale of -1 (purely negative), 0 (purely natural) to 1 
(purely positive), disclosure tone changes by -0.29 points in 2010-11, by -0.32 in        
2014-15 and by -0.28 in 2016. Consistently, in Models 2 and 3, the relative number of 
‘negative’, ‘uncertainty’ and ‘modal’ words used in textual narratives (AGGNUM, 
NEGATIVE) increases during those assessment periods. This result supports earlier 
findings arguing that more negative language is a sign of stronger regulation and 
accounting rules; this is because bank managers might fear litigation concerns and are 
less positive (Huang et al., 2014; Li, 2010). 
Moreover, in Models 2, 4 and 5, the coefficients of the interaction terms 
ST1415*FTST1011 and ST16*FTST1011 are negative and significant at the 1% and 5% 
confidence levels. This result indicates that first-time participants in 2010-11 use 
relatively fewer ‘negative’, ‘uncertainty’ and ‘modal’ words in response to the 2014, 2015 
and 2016 assessments, compared to the first-time participants in 2014. In summary, stress 
test participants adjust their textual narratives and utilise stronger language in their 
narratives (i.e., more negative, uncertainty and modal words). In particular, this result 
holds true for newly compared to regularly involved banks. 
Third, in Table 3.7, I scrutinise quantitative disclosure behaviour by applying the 
transparency index based on the method of Nier and Baumann (2006). As hypothesised 
by H1, in all models, the coefficients of the time-dummies are positive and significant at 
the 1% and 5% confidence levels. Therefore, all stress test participants increase the 
number of figures within their disclosures due to the impact of stress test results. In 
economic terms, the transparency index (TRANX) increases by 6.04% in 2010-11, by  
8.72% in 2014-15 to 9.33% in 2016. An alternative explanation of the result is that 
regulatory requirements based on Basel III have been subsequently implemented, 
requiring more mandatory disclosures. It is likely that the observed development is a 
result of both regulatory actions, while stress tests seem to exacerbate the evolvement of 
the transparency process during stress test periods. 
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[Please refer to Table 3.7 here] 
Furthermore, the coefficients of the interaction terms in all models indicate an 
interesting change of disclosure behaviour. While the coefficients of the interaction terms 
ST1011*FTST1011 and ST1415*FTST1011 are insignificant, implying no significant 
difference between 2010-11 and 2014 first-time participants, the coefficients of the 
interaction term ST16*FTST1011 in Models 1 and 4 are positive and significant at the 1% 
confidence level. This result illustrates that first-time participants in 2010-11 reported 
more quantitative disclosures during the 2016 stress test periods, compared to those banks 
that participated for the first time in 2014. I therefore see a slight learning effect implying 
that banks might have been educated through raised risk management requirements 
forwarded by the regulators. Overall, the results suggest that stress test participants adjust 
their disclosure profiles during stress test periods from a qualitative and quantitative view. 
3.5.2. The effect of stress tests on bank opacity 
I examine the impact of stress test sentiment on distinct forms of disclosure tone (H2) 
as well as the effect of stress tests on bank opacity (H3a, H3b). In Table 3.8, I run 
Equation 3.3 and scrutinise stress test sentiment based on the accumulated word count of 
my stress test, regulation and risk management word lists (STS). I estimate the impact of 
this word count during individual stress test periods (STHC_I) on the variation of 
disclosure tone (ΔTONE), aggregated ‘negative’, ‘uncertain’ and ‘modal’ tone 
(AGGNUM) and ‘litigious’ tone (LITIGIOUS). 
[Please refer to Table 3.8 here] 
In all models, I find that the coefficients of the interaction term STHC_I*STS are 
significant at the 5% and 10% confidence levels, implying that the effect of stress test 
sentiment, recognised in banks’ disclosures, is related to the distinct forms of disclosure 
tone. Consistent with H2, whilst more stress test language indicates a positive variation 
of disclosure tone, the aggregated negative, uncertain and modal tone and litigious tone 
appear to be negative. In numerical terms, in Model 1, a 5% increase in stress test terms, 
during ‘hot’ stress test periods, is related to a positive variation of disclosure tone of 0.069 
points, equal to 54.93% of the average standard deviation (SD) of ΔTONE. Further, 
considering the same 5% increase in stress test language, the portion of aggregated 
‘negative’, ‘uncertain’ and ‘modal’ words (AGGNUM) and ‘litigious’ words 
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(LITIGIOUS), in relation to total report length, respectively decreases by -0.0010 and         
-0.0006 percentage points; this yields 17.00% and 32.00% of the average SD of 
AGGNUM and LITIGIOUS. 
Therefore, I document that when stress-tested banks acknowledge stress tests in their 
annual and interim reports, they tend to partly reduce the number of negative and litigious 
words in an attempt to work against the stress test sentiment and potentially hide ‘bad’ 
news from stress tests. However, the results also suggest that the magnitude of variation 
towards more positive (less negative) language is limited due to regulatory and 
accounting rules (Huang et al., 2014; Li, 2010). Nevertheless, this change in distinct 
forms of disclosure tone may be an indicator that banks attempt to obfuscate investors 
because textual narratives report a tone that appears more positive. 
In Table 3.9, I estimate Equations 3.4A and 3.4B and examine the individual effect of 
stress test participation. I analyse the impact of stress test sentiment (STS) and disclosure 
tone (TONE) on current and future bank opacity measures (H3a, H3b). In Table 3.9, 
Panel A, throughout all models, I find that the interaction terms STHC_I*STS and 
STHC_I*TONE are, respectively, positive and negative and significant at the 1% and 5% 
confidence levels. This result indicates that an increased stress test sentiment appears to 
lead to a higher current and future bid-ask spread, whilst a more positive tone may 
decrease the current and future bid-ask spread (BIDASK) of stress-tested banks during 
assessment periods. In economic terms, an increase of one SD of stress test sentiment 
during stress test periods is linked to an increase of current and future bid-ask spreads of 
0.0014 and 0.0014 (9.68% and 10.16% of SD), respectively. Further, a more positive 
disclosure tone leads to a decrease of the current and future bid-ask spread by -0.0006 
(4.22% of SD). Interestingly, it appears that, in contradiction with H3a, more stress test 
words in annual and interim reports are associated with higher information asymmetry 
(or uncertainty) among investors. 
[Please refer to Table 3.9 here] 
Furthermore, analysing analyst coverage (RECNO), in Table 3.9, Panel B, the 
coefficients of the interaction terms STHC_I*STS and STHC_I*TONE are respectively 
negative and positive and significant at the 1% and 10% confidence levels. Therefore, the 
current and future analyst coverage decreases with stress test sentiment and increases 
when the tone of the disclosure turns more positive. In numeric terms, an increase of one 
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SD of stress test sentiment is related to a decrease in analyst coverage by -0.8480 and        
-0.7059 (8.35% and 6.95% of SD), whilst disclosure tone is connected to a growth in 
analyst coverage of 0.2988 and 0.2952 (2.94% and 2.91% of SD). Thus, bank managers 
might not be able to condition the number of stress test words precisely to the market’s 
expectations. However, consistent with H3b, this result implies that a more positive 
disclosure tone is related to a decrease in information asymmetry or increase in analyst 
coverage. 
In Tables 3.10 and 3.11, I increase precision of prior analysis by estimating the effect 
of stress test sentiment (STS) and disclosure tone (TONE) around the dates when banks 
publish their reports. In particular, I measure the daily average of bid-ask spread (BIDASK) 
and the number of analyst recommendations (RECNO) during five periods around and 
after the individual bank report release dates. I calculate this average (1) one day before 
to one day after (t–1, t+1), (2) two days to 31 days after (t+2, t+31), (3) two days to 61 
days after (t+2, t+61), (4) two days to 121 days after (t+2, t+121), and (5) two days to 
250 days after (t+2, t+250). In Table 3.10, I document the impact on bid-ask spreads 
(BIDASK) by stress test sentiment (Panel A) and disclosure tone (Panel B). Further, in 
Table 3.11, I demonstrate the results for analyst coverage (RECNO) in terms of stress test 
sentiment (Panel A) and disclosure tone (Panel B). 
[Please refer to Tables 3.10 and 3.11 here] 
As expected in H3b, but contradicting H3a, I find similar results as in Table 3.9, 
indicating that increased stress test sentiment appears to increase information asymmetry 
and more positive disclosure tone increases analyst coverage. Interestingly, the effect 
remains relatively stable throughout various periods around and after the bank report 
release dates. Only in Model 5, which estimates the period 2-250 days after the bank 
report release date (t+2, t+250), the statistical and economic significance reduces. 
Consequently, stress test participants have an incentive to be cautious using stress test 
words and to use positive language in their annual and interim reports, especially during 
stress test periods. This is because market participants seem to appreciate this behaviour 
to an extent through more favourable market activities. 
In summary, the results suggest that stress test sentiment might directly affect the 
variation of disclosure tone during stress test periods. Moreover, market participants 
appear to be effectively obfuscated, as bank opacity measures demonstrate less 
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information asymmetry when disclosures display a positive tone during stress test periods. 
However, due to accounting rules and regulatory requirements (Huang et al., 2014; Li, 
2010), the magnitude of altering disclosure tone is limited, as is the effect on investor and 
analyst obfuscation. Similar to Lang and Stice-Lawrence (2015), I am hesitant to make 
causal assumptions because it is difficult to rule out that the results are, at least partly, 
caused by the disclosure per se. Nevertheless, I conclude that, as expected, a more 
positive disclosure tone is related to less informative market measures. 
3.6. Robustness analysis 
The main conclusion of my study is that stress tests influence participating banks’ 
disclosure profiles and ultimately affect their market measures. The validity of this 
finding depends on the correct implementation of textual and regression analyses. In this 
section, I run various robustness checks, which I illustrate in Tables 3.12 and 3.13. 
Additional robustness is displayed in the APPENDIX (Tables A.9 to A.14). 
3.6.1. Textual measure robustness 
To ensure that my textual measures for stress test sentiment and disclosure tone are 
sound and solid estimates, I follow the most recent standards of textual analysis. First, 
concerning textual parsing methods, I carefully construct my stress test word lists 
resorting to frequently used words in stress test discourses. I also select and analyse the 
textual disclosures including various checks, which I explain in Section 3.4.2.2. Second, 
I measure disclosure tone by applying Loughran and McDonald’s (2011a) financial 
disclosure dictionaries, which are widely accepted within the textual analysis literature. 
However, as indicated earlier, the disclosure tone measure (TONE) might be influenced 
by the fact that the ‘negative’ word list consists of considerably more words than the 
‘positive’ word list. Unlike other studies, I do not use alternative ‘general’ dictionaries 
such as Harvard General Inquirer or DICTION, as recent research suggests that those 
dictionaries are inaccurate for analysing financial disclosures (Loughran and McDonald, 
2015, 2016). Instead, I resort to distinct variations of my disclosure tone measures. For 
instance, I follow Lang and Stice-Lawrence (2015) and implement a factor analysis of 
my stress test sentiment and disclosure tone variables. This analysis provides the 
opportunity to identify variances and similarities of applied word lists. 
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[Please refer to Tables 3.12 and 3.13 here] 
Table 3.12 illustrates factor patterns before and after varimax rotation. While STS_F1 
is driven by the word count of ‘stress test identity’ (STS_ID), ‘stress test performance’ 
(STS_PERF) and ‘stress test procedure’ (STS_PRO) word lists, STS_F2 captures the word 
count of ‘regulatory institutions’ (STS_REGIN), ‘regulatory requirements’ (STS_REQ) 
and ‘risk management’ (STS_RM) word lists. Further, TONE_F1 measures ‘negative’ 
(NEGATIVE), ‘uncertainty’ (UNCERTAIN), ‘litigious’ (LITIGIOUS) and ‘superfluous’ 
(SUPERFLU) disclosure tone, whereas TONE_F2 is mainly directed by the ‘positive’ 
disclosure tone (POSITIVE). In Table 3.13, I report results of those factor analysis 
variables and an alternative disclosure tone measure (TONE_ALT), which are consistent 
with my baseline analysis. Interestingly, dominant factors are driven by ‘stress test 
identity’, ‘performance’ and ‘procedure’ words (STS_F1) and ‘negative’, ‘uncertain’, 
‘superfluous’ and ‘litigious’ tone (TONE_F1) during stress test periods. Overall, I retrieve 
similar results, compared to my baseline analysis, that do not alter my conclusions. 
3.6.2. Additional robustness checks 
Next, I ensure that the composition of the fixed effects models is robust by employing 
additional robustness checks (displayed in the APPENDIX, Tables A.9 to A.14). First, in 
Table A.9, I run an alternative model for stress test participation applying the individual 
stress test time-dummy (STHC_I). The results suggest that, during stress test periods, 
textual narratives include more stress test terms and tone that is more negative, while 
quantitative disclosure behaviour does not differ significantly. In Table A.10, I link my 
stress test sentiment factors with disclosure tone estimates, whereas Table A.11 illustrates 
the relationship between factors and bank opacity measures. Second, in Table A.12, I 
estimate Equation 3.3 to analyse whether stress-tested banks that participated more than 
four times change their disclosure tone towards less negative language. Consistent with 
my baseline analysis, I find significant results for variation of disclosure tone (ΔTONE) 
and aggregated ‘negative’, ‘uncertain’ and ‘modal’ tone (AGGNUM), while ‘litigious’ 
tone (LITIGIOUS) is not significant. The latter result supports my view and that of the 
literature that banks are limited owing to regulatory and accounting rules (Huang et al., 
2014; Li, 2010). Third, in Table A.13, I rank stress-tested banks according to their capital 
adequacy performance documented by stress test disclosures and run Equations 3.4A and 
3.4B on the lower-ranked half of the sample. The results show a slightly stronger 
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relationship between bank opacity and stress test sentiment as well as disclosure tone; 
this implies that banks with weaker stress test results might influence their disclosure tone 
more aggressively than stronger banks. 
Finally, in Table A.14, I exclude a different set of sample banks to test if inclusion of 
those banks, that are inherently different, might alter my conclusions. Similar to Lang and 
Stice-Lawrence (2015), I analyse translated disclosure narratives, which might be 
affected by the translation process. As almost all banks in my sample are located in 
countries where English is not the official language, I cannot fully rule out this issue. 
However, I do not believe that this limitation is a major problem as many of my sample 
banks are listed and internationalised, while financial reporting in English has been 
established over decades. Nevertheless, I exclude banks from the United Kingdom to rule 
out any skewness from native English language usage and retrieve similar results. Further, 
I remove banks from countries outside the European Monetary Union (EMU) because 
European regulators, in particular the ECB, are mainly focused on the stability of prices 
and the entire Eurozone. In addition, I delete inactive banks (i.e., bankruptcies, M&As) 
from my sample to ensure that my results are not influenced by any special bank survival 
issue (e.g., Beatty and Liao, 2011). Overall, the results from my robustness checks are 
similar to my baseline analysis and support my conclusions. 
3.7. Concluding remarks 
Stress tests have been largely studied in terms of market reactions and conceptual 
frameworks, while the impact of those tests on stress test participants has been widely 
left aside. On the other hand, bank transparency lies at the centre of a recent debate that 
aims to improve the market’s wellbeing. Therefore, my work advances the literature by 
combining these two important literature streams and analyses the influence of regulatory 
stress tests on banks’ disclosure profiles and, therefore, on bank transparency. In 
particular, using a unique sample and dataset from 25 European countries, I apply textual 
analysis to measure the effect of stress test sentiment and disclosure tone of stress-tested 
banks on their level of opacity. Importantly, I find that stress test participants’ textual 
disclosures are influenced by stress test disclosure language, which I call ‘stress test 
sentiment’. Further, my results suggest that disclosure tone and quantitative disclosure 
behaviour changes; they seem to affect the evolvement of the transparency process during 
stress test periods. Ultimately, market participants appear to be obfuscated, as bank 
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opacity measures show less information asymmetry when banks amend disclosure tone 
to sound more positive, compensating regulatory stress test sentiment during times of 
assessment. Although I am cautious to draw causal inference, I conclude that there is a 
relationship between stress test language, textual disclosure tone and bank transparency. 
This study is the first that links stress tests and bank transparency by introducing the 
innovative textual analysis approach. Hence, my novel results raise several political and 
business implications. I do not doubt that, besides intrinsic limitations, stress tests are 
useful during crises to separate sound from unsound banks (Borio et al., 2014; 
Schuermann, 2014). Moreover, regulatory assessments are unique opportunities for 
regulators and supervisors to improve the supervision of SIFIs from their in-depth 
insights (Carboni et al., 2017; Sahin and de Haan, 2016). However, my findings suggest 
that stress test participants may change their disclosure profiles to mitigate the effect of 
stress test disclosures on investors. Further, bank opacity measures report less information 
asymmetry, which appears to confirm the operation of such disclosure strategies. In 
combination with earlier stress test studies, my results indicate that stress tests seem to 
exacerbate pressure, particularly on relatively weak institutions as they expose bank-
specific information in calm economic times, which can lead to financial instability 
(Bouvard et al., 2015). Therefore, by shedding light on banks’ disclosure profiles and 
bank transparency, this study empirically supports previous research on stress tests that 
suggests, in normal economic times, to disclose mainly aggregated information, as this 
approach would reduce pressure on stress test participants and their signalling motives 
(Goldstein and Sapra, 2013). 
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Table 3.1 Variable definitions and data sources 
Abbreviations Variables Description Data sources 
TRANX Quantitative 
disclosure 
behaviour 
Transparency index based on Nier and Baumann 
(2006); see Note 1 (page 109) 
FitchConnect 
SIZE Bank size Natural logarithm of total assets BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect  
LOAN Traditional banking 
activities 
Outstanding loans scaled by lagged total assets BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect  
LLR Credit portfolio 
quality 
Loan loss reserves for non-performing or 
impaired loans scaled by lagged total assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect  
LLP (Forward-looking) 
asset quality 
Loan loss provisions for non-performing or 
impaired loans scaled by lagged total assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect  
NPL (Backward-looking) 
asset quality 
Non-performing or impaired loans scaled by 
lagged total assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect  
TRADE Non-traditional 
banking activities 
Trading securities scaled by lagged total assets BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect  
CET1R Capital adequacy Core/common Tier 1 capital divided by risk-
weighted assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect  
T1R Capital adequacy Regulatory Tier 1 capital divided by risk-
weighted assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect  
TRR Capital adequacy Total regulatory capital divided by risk-weighted 
assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect  
DSTF Liquidity risk Deposits and short-term funding scaled by 
lagged total assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect  
CAP Bank capital Total equity capital divided by total assets BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect  
EBPT Profitability Earnings before provision and taxes scaled by 
lagged total assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect  
TWA Report length Total words analysed Bank reports 
STS Stress test 
sentiment 
Word count of the accumulated stress test, 
regulation and risk management word list scaled 
by TWA (sum of STS_ID, STS_PERF, STS_ 
PRO, STS_REGIN, STS_REQ, and STS_RM) 
EBA and ECB stress test 
disclosures, Bank reports 
STS_ID Stress test identity Word count of the ‘stress test identity’ word list 
scaled by TWA; see Note 2 (page 110) 
EBA and ECB stress test 
disclosures, Bank reports 
STS_PERF Stress test 
performance 
Word count of the ‘stress test performance’ word 
list scaled by TWA; see Note 2 (page 110) 
EBA and ECB stress test 
disclosures, Bank reports 
STS_PRO Stress test 
procedure 
Word count of the ‘stress test procedure’ word 
list scaled by TWA; see Note 2 (page 110) 
EBA and ECB stress test 
disclosures, Bank reports 
STS_REGIN Regulatory 
institutions 
Word count of the ‘regulatory institutions’ word 
list scaled by TWA; see Note 2 (page 110) 
EBA and ECB stress test 
disclosures, Bank reports 
STS_REQ Regulatory 
requirements 
Word count of the ‘regulatory requirements’ 
word list scaled by TWA; see Note 2 (page 110) 
EBA and ECB stress test 
disclosures, Bank reports 
STS_RM Risk management Word count of the ‘risk management’ word list 
scaled by TWA; see Note 2 (page 110) 
EBA and ECB stress test 
disclosures, Bank reports 
TONE Disclosure tone POSITIVE – NEGATIVE / (POSITIVE + 
NEGATIVE); 1 yields positive, 0 neutral and -1 
negative tone (Henry and Leone, 2016) 
Bank reports 
TONE_ALT Disclosure tone POSITIVE – NEGATIVE / TWA according to 
Huang et al. (2014) 
Bank reports 
ΔTONE Variation of 
disclosure tone 
TONE – TONEt–1 (Henry and Leone, 2016; 
Loughran and McDonald, 2011a) 
Bank reports 
NEGATIVE ‘Negative’ tone Word count of ‘negative’ word list scaled by 
TWA (Loughran and McDonald, 2011a) 
Bank reports 
POSITIVE ‘Positive’ tone Word count of ‘positive’ word list scaled by 
TWA (Loughran and McDonald, 2011a) 
Bank reports 
AGGNUM Aggregated 
‘negative’, 
‘uncertain’ and 
‘modal’ tone 
Word count of the aggregated ‘negative’, 
‘uncertain’ and ‘modal’ word lists scaled by 
TWA (Loughran and McDonald, 2011a) 
Bank reports 
 
108 
 
Table 3.1 continued 
UNCERTAIN ‘Uncertain’ tone Word count of ‘uncertainty’ word list scaled by 
TWA (Loughran and McDonald, 2011a) 
Bank reports 
MODAL ‘Modal’ tone Word count of ‘modal’ word list scaled by TWA 
(Loughran and McDonald, 2011a) 
Bank reports 
LITIGIOUS ‘Litigious’ tone Word count of ‘litigious’ word list scaled by 
TWA (Loughran and McDonald, 2011a) 
Bank reports 
SUPERFLU ‘Superfluous’ tone Word count of ‘superfluous’ word list scaled by 
TWA (Loughran and McDonald, 2011a) 
Bank reports 
BIDASK Information 
asymmetry 
Quarterly average of daily bid-ask-spreads (Ask 
– Bid / (Ask + Bid / 2)) 
Thomson Reuters 
(Datastream/IBES) 
RECNO Analyst coverage Quarterly average of the daily number of 
analysts filing a recommendation 
Thomson Reuters 
(Datastream/IBES) 
RECSBUY Analyst strong-buy 
recommendation 
Quarterly average of the daily percentage of 
analysts’ strong-buy recommendations 
Thomson Reuters 
(Datastream/IBES) 
RECMBUY Analyst moderate-
buy 
recommendation 
Quarterly average of the daily percentage of 
analysts’ moderate-buy recommendations 
Thomson Reuters 
(Datastream/IBES) 
RECHOLD Analyst hold 
recommendation 
Quarterly average of the daily percentage of 
analysts’ hold recommendations 
Thomson Reuters 
(Datastream/IBES) 
RECMSELL Analyst moderate-
sell 
recommendation 
Quarterly average of the daily percentage of 
analysts’ moderate-sell recommendations 
Thomson Reuters 
(Datastream/IBES) 
RECSSELL Analyst strong-sell 
recommendation 
Quarterly average of the daily percentage of 
analysts’ strong-sell recommendations 
Thomson Reuters 
(Datastream/IBES) 
RECCON Analyst 
recommendation 
consensus 
Quarterly average of the daily recommendation 
consensus of analysts; yields the mean of all 
daily recommendations: Strong-buy (1-1.49), 
moderate-buy (1.5-2.49), hold (2.5-3.49), 
moderate-sell (3.5-4.49), strong-sell (4.5-5) 
Thomson Reuters 
(Datastream/IBES) 
TOVER Share turnover Quarterly average of the daily number of shares 
outstanding divided by free float 
Thomson Reuters 
(Datastream/IBES) 
INVPRICE Inverse share price Quarterly average of 1 divided by daily share 
price 
Thomson Reuters 
(Datastream/IBES) 
RETVOL Return volatility Quarterly average of the daily standard deviation 
of continuously compounded share price returns 
Thomson Reuters 
(Datastream/IBES) 
MVALUE Market value Quarterly average of the daily logarithm of 
market value of equity 
Thomson Reuters 
(Datastream/IBES) 
MTBV Market-to-book 
value 
Quarterly average of the daily market value of 
equity divided by the book value of equity 
Thomson Reuters 
(Datastream/IBES) 
FTST1011 First-time 
participation in the 
2010-11 stress tests 
A binary variable that yields 1 for all banks that 
were tested for the first time in 2010-11, and 0 
otherwise 
EBA and ECB stress test 
disclosures 
ST1011 Stress test period in 
2010-11 
A binary variable that yields 1 from 2010Q2-
2012Q1, and 0 otherwise 
EBA and ECB stress test 
disclosures 
ST1415 Stress test period in 
2014-15 
A binary variable that yields 1 from 2014Q2-
2016Q1, and 0 otherwise 
EBA and ECB stress test 
disclosures 
ST16 Stress test period in 
2016 
A binary variable that yields 1 from 2016Q2-
2017Q1, and 0 otherwise 
EBA and ECB stress test 
disclosures 
STHC_I Individual stress 
test period 
A binary variable that yields 1 for the period that 
each bank participated in a stress test; i.e. equals 
1 for the exercises in 2010 at 2010Q2-2011Q1, 
in 2011 at 2011Q2-2012Q1, in 2014 at 2014Q2-
2015Q1, in 2015 at 2015Q2-2016Q1, and in 
2016 at 2016Q2-2017Q1, and 0 otherwise 
EBA and ECB stress test 
disclosures 
ΔGDP Economic growth Change in Gross Domestic Product in Euros OECD, Bloomberg 
ΔUNEM Unemployment 
growth 
Change in unemployment rate OECD, Bloomberg 
IRATE Sovereign debt risk The difference between short- and long-term 
interest rates in government bond markets 
OECD 
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Note 1. Detailed definition of the transparency index (TRANX) 
The transparency index (TRANX) is a comprehensive measure of bank transparency 
inspired by Nier and Baumann (2006). I divide the categories into nineteen sub-indices 
and compose an aggregated transparency index by counting the disclosed figures within 
the sub-indices available on FitchConnect. Accordingly, TRANX is defined as follows: 
.Cq0t = 119vK#Jf#wJ  
where, the nineteen sub-indices Si relate to distinct bank risk categories (credit risk, 
market risk, liquidity risk, capital risk). To ensure full transparency of the data collection 
process, I follow the description and sorting of the items according to FitchConnect.  
Transparency index components 
Category Sub-index Item 
Loans S1: Loans Net loans, Gross loans, Reserves for impaired loans/NPLs 
S2: Loans by type Mortgages, Other consumer/retail loans, Corporate & commercial loans, 
Other loans and loan-related balances 
S3: Loans by counterparty Loans & advances to banks, Quasi government loans, Total corporate 
loans, Total consumer loans 
S4: Loans by maturity Loans & advances < 3M, Loans & advances 3-12M, Loans & advances 1-
5Y, Loans & advances > 5Y 
S5: Problem and impaired 
loans 
NPLs - Doubtful loans, NPLs - +90 Days past due, NPLs - Restructured 
loans, Total impaired loans 
Other 
earning 
assets 
S6: Securities by type Reverse repo & cash collateral, Trading securities at FV through income, 
Derivatives (assets), Available for sales securities, Held to maturity 
securities, Equity investments in associates, Other securities, Total 
securities 
S7: Securities by purpose Trading securities, Investment securities 
Liabilities S8: Deposits by type Customer deposits (current), Customer deposits (savings), Customer 
deposits (term), Total customer deposits, Deposits from banks 
S9: Deposits by maturity Deposits - sub 3 months, Deposits - 3 months-1 year, Deposits - 1-5 years, 
Deposits - 5 years + 
S10: Short-term funding Repos & cash collateral, Other deposits & short-term borrowings, Total 
deposits, Money market & short-term funding 
S11: Long-term funding Long-term senior debts, Subordinated debts, Total long-term funding 
S12: Other liabilities by type Derivatives (liabilities), Trading liabilities 
Equity S13: Equity Total common equity, Preferred shares & hybrid capital accounted for as 
equity, Total equity 
Off-balance 
sheet 
S14: Off-balance sheet items 
by type 
Guarantees, acceptances & documentary credits reported off-B/S, 
Committed credit lines, Other off-balance sheet items, Off-balance sheet 
items 
Income 
statement 
S15: Income by type Net interest income, Net fees & commissions, Net gains (losses) on 
trading & derivatives, Net gains (losses) on assets at FV through I/S, Net 
gains (losses) on other securities, Total non-interest operating income 
S16: Loan loss provisions Pre-impairment operating profit, Loan impairment charge, Operating 
profit 
Regulatory 
memo lines 
S17: Regulatory capital Common equity Tier 1 capital, Regulatory Tier 1 capital, Total regulatory 
capital 
S18: Risk-weighted assets Total risk-weighted assets (RWA), Risk-weighted assets - Credit risk, 
Risk-weighted assets - Market risk, Risk-weighted assets - Operational 
market risk, Risk-weighted assets - Other 
S19: Regulatory capital 
ratios 
Common equity Tier 1 capital ratio, Regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio, Total 
regulatory capital ratio 
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Note 2. Stress test sentiment (STS) word list by category 
Category Keywords Category Keywords Category Keywords 
STS_ID AQR STS_PERF RESTRUCTURING STS_PRO PHASE-IN 
STS_ID ASSESSMENT STS_PERF ROBUST STS_PRO PHASING-IN 
STS_ID ASSESSMENTS STS_PERF ROBUSTNESS STS_PRO PIT 
STS_ID EU-WIDE STS_PERF SEVERE STS_PRO POINT-IN-TIME 
STS_ID EXERCISE STS_PERF SIGNIFICANT STS_PRO QA 
STS_ID EXERCISES STS_PERF SOLVENCY STS_PRO REVERSE 
STS_ID REVIEW STS_PERF SOLVENT STS_PRO SCENARIO 
STS_ID REVIEWS STS_PERF SOUND STS_PRO SCENARIOS 
STS_ID STRESS STS_PERF SOUNDNESS STS_PRO SHOCK 
STS_ID STRESS-TEST STS_PERF STABILITY STS_PRO SHOCKS 
STS_ID STRESS-TESTING STS_PERF STABLE STS_PRO SHORTFALL 
STS_ID STRESS-TESTS STS_PERF STRENGTH STS_PRO SHORTFALLS 
STS_ID STRESSED STS_PERF STRENGTHEN STS_PRO SIMULATE 
STS_ID TEST STS_PERF STRENGTHENED STS_PRO SIMULATED 
STS_ID TESTING STS_PERF STRENGTHENING STS_PRO SIMULATES 
STS_ID TESTS STS_PERF STRENGTHS STS_PRO SIMULATING 
STS_ID TREATMENT STS_PERF VULNERABILITIES STS_PRO SIMULATION 
STS_ID TREATMENTS STS_PERF VULNERABILITY STS_PRO SIMULATIONS 
STS_PERF ACCORDANCE STS_PERF VULNERABLE STS_PRO SPREAD 
STS_PERF APPROPRIATE STS_PERF WORSE STS_PRO SPREADS 
STS_PERF COMPLIANCE STS_PERF WORST STS_PRO SREP 
STS_PERF COMPLIANT STS_PRO ADVERSE STS_PRO STA 
STS_PERF CONSTRAINT STS_PRO APPROACH STS_PRO TEMPLATE 
STS_PERF CONSTRAINTS STS_PRO APPROACHES STS_PRO TEMPLATES 
STS_PERF EQUAL STS_PRO ASSESS STS_PRO THRESHOLD 
STS_PERF EXCEED STS_PRO ASSESSED STS_PRO THRESHOLDS 
STS_PERF EXCEEDING STS_PRO ASSESSING STS_PRO TOP-DOWN 
STS_PERF EXCEEDED STS_PRO ASSURANCE STS_PRO TRIGGER 
STS_PERF EXCESS STS_PRO BASELINE STS_PRO TRIGGERS 
STS_PERF EXCESSIVE STS_PRO BENCHMARK STS_PRO VALUATION 
STS_PERF EXTREME STS_PRO BENCHMARKS STS_PRO VALUATIONS 
STS_PERF FAIL STS_PRO BOTTOM-UP STS_REGIN AUDITOR 
STS_PERF FAILED STS_PRO CVA STS_REGIN AUDITORS 
STS_PERF FAILS STS_PRO DRIVER STS_REGIN AUTHORITIES 
STS_PERF FINDING STS_PRO DRIVERS STS_REGIN AUTHORITY 
STS_PERF FINDINGS STS_PRO EVENT STS_REGIN CEBS 
STS_PERF FORECAST STS_PRO EVENTS STS_REGIN COMMISSION 
STS_PERF FORECASTED STS_PRO FACTOR STS_REGIN EBA 
STS_PERF FORECASTING STS_PRO FACTORS STS_REGIN ECB 
STS_PERF FORECASTS STS_PRO HAIRCUT STS_REGIN ESRB 
STS_PERF FUTURE STS_PRO HAIRCUTS STS_REGIN EU 
STS_PERF GAIN STS_PRO HURDLE STS_REGIN GOVERNMENT 
STS_PERF GAINING STS_PRO HYPOTHETICAL STS_REGIN GOVERNMENTS 
STS_PERF GAINS STS_PRO IMPACT STS_REGIN INSTITUTION 
STS_PERF INAPPROPRIATE STS_PRO IMPACTS STS_REGIN INSTITUTIONS 
STS_PERF PASS STS_PRO JOIN-UP STS_REGIN NCA 
STS_PERF PASSED STS_PRO LGI STS_REGIN NCAS 
STS_PERF PASSING STS_PRO MACRO-ECONOMIC STS_REGIN REGULATOR 
STS_PERF PASSES STS_PRO MACRO-FINANCIAL STS_REGIN REGULATORS 
STS_PERF PROJECTED STS_PRO MACRO-PRUDENTIAL STS_REGIN SSM 
STS_PERF PROJECTING STS_PRO MACROECONOMIC STS_REGIN SUPERVISION 
STS_PERF PROJECTION STS_PRO MEASURE STS_REGIN SUPERVISOR 
STS_PERF PROJECTIONS STS_PRO MEASURES STS_REGIN SUPERVISORS 
STS_PERF QUALITY STS_PRO METHODOLOGICAL STS_REGIN SUPERVISORY 
STS_PERF RAISE STS_PRO METHODOLOGIES STS_REQ ACCORD 
STS_PERF RAISED STS_PRO METHODOLOGY STS_REQ ADEQUACY 
STS_PERF RAISING STS_PRO MODEL STS_REQ BASE 
STS_PERF REDUCTION STS_PRO MODELED STS_REQ BASEL 
STS_PERF REPUTATION STS_PRO MODELLING STS_REQ BASIS 
STS_PERF REPUTATIONAL STS_PRO MODELS STS_REQ CAPITAL 
STS_PERF RESILIENCE STS_PRO PARAMETER STS_REQ CAPITALISATION 
STS_PERF RESILIENT STS_PRO PARAMETERS STS_REQ CAPITALISED 
STS_PERF RESIST STS_PRO PARTICIPATE STS_REQ CAPITALIZATION 
STS_PERF RESISTANCE STS_PRO PARTICIPATED STS_REQ CCR 
STS_PERF RESISTING STS_PRO PARTICIPATING STS_REQ CET1 
STS_PERF RESISTED STS_PRO PARTICIPATION STS_REQ CLASS 
STS_PERF RESTRUCTION STS_PRO PARTICIPATIONS STS_REQ CLASSES 
STS_PERF RESTRUCTURE STS_PRO PHASE STS_REQ CLASSIFICATION 
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Category Keywords Category Keywords Category Keywords 
STS_REQ CLASSIFICATIONS STS_RM ESTIMATE STS_RM SECURITIZATION 
STS_REQ CONFIDENCE STS_RM ESTIMATING STS_RM SECURITIZATIONS 
STS_REQ COVERAGE STS_RM ESTIMATES STS_RM SOVEREIGN 
STS_REQ CRD STS_RM EVOLUTION STS_RM SYSTEMIC 
STS_REQ CRISES STS_RM EXPECTED STS_RM UNEXPECTED 
STS_REQ CRISIS STS_RM EXPOSURE STS_RM VAR 
STS_REQ CRR STS_RM EXPOSURES STS_RM VOLATILITY 
STS_REQ CRWA STS_RM FORBEARANCE STS_RM VOLUME 
STS_REQ DISCLOSURE STS_RM FORBORNE STS_RM VOLUMES 
STS_REQ FLOOR STS_RM FUND   
STS_REQ FULLY-LOADED STS_RM FUNDING   
STS_REQ IMPLEMENTATION STS_RM FUNDS   
STS_REQ LEVEL STS_RM HEDGE   
STS_REQ LEVELS STS_RM HEDGED   
STS_REQ LOADED STS_RM HEDGES   
STS_REQ MINIMUM STS_RM HEDGING   
STS_REQ MISCLASSIFICATION STS_RM IDIOSYNCRATIC   
STS_REQ MISCLASSIFICATIONS STS_RM ILLIQUID   
STS_REQ MISCLASSIFIED STS_RM ILLIQUIDITY   
STS_REQ PILLAR STS_RM IMPAIRED   
STS_REQ RE-CAPITALISATION STS_RM IMPAIRMENT   
STS_REQ RECAPITALISATION STS_RM IMPAIRMENTS   
STS_REQ RECLASSIFICATION STS_RM IRB   
STS_REQ RECLASSIFICATIONS STS_RM LEVERAGE   
STS_REQ RECLASSIFIED STS_RM LGD   
STS_REQ REGULATE STS_RM LGDS   
STS_REQ REGULATED STS_RM LIQUID   
STS_REQ REGULATION STS_RM LIQUIDITY   
STS_REQ REGULATORY STS_RM LITIGATION   
STS_REQ REQUIRED STS_RM LOAN   
STS_REQ REQUIREMENT STS_RM LOANS   
STS_REQ REQUIREMENTS STS_RM LOSS   
STS_REQ RISK-WEIGHTED STS_RM LOSSED   
STS_REQ RWA STS_RM LOSSES   
STS_REQ STANDARD STS_RM MITIGATING   
STS_REQ STANDARDISED STS_RM MITIGATION   
STS_REQ STANDARDS STS_RM MITIGATIONS   
STS_REQ TIER STS_RM NON-DEFAULTED   
STS_REQ TIER-1 STS_RM NON-PERFORMING  
STS_REQ TRANSPARENCY STS_RM NONDEFAULTED   
STS_REQ WEIGHTED STS_RM NONPERFORMING   
STS_RM ACCRUAL STS_RM NPE   
STS_RM ACCRUALS STS_RM NPES   
STS_RM ALLOWANCE STS_RM PD   
STS_RM APPETITE STS_RM PDS   
STS_RM CHARGE STS_RM PROBABILITIES   
STS_RM CHARGES STS_RM PROBABILITY   
STS_RM COLLATERAL STS_RM PROFILE   
STS_RM COLLATERALISED STS_RM PROFILES   
STS_RM COLLATERALS STS_RM PROVISION   
STS_RM COUNTERPARTIES STS_RM PROVISIONING   
STS_RM COUNTERPARTY STS_RM PROVISIONS   
STS_RM COVER STS_RM PRUDENTIAL   
STS_RM COVERED STS_RM QUALITATIVE   
STS_RM COVERING STS_RM QUANTITATIVE   
STS_RM COVERS STS_RM RATED   
STS_RM CREDIT STS_RM RATING   
STS_RM CREDITWORTHINESS STS_RM RATINGS   
STS_RM DEFAULT STS_RM REA   
STS_RM DEFAULTED STS_RM RECOVERED   
STS_RM DEFAULTING STS_RM RECOVERIES   
STS_RM DEFAULTS STS_RM RECOVERY   
STS_RM DISCRETION STS_RM RISK   
STS_RM DISCRETIONARY STS_RM RISK-BASED   
STS_RM DTA STS_RM RISKS   
STS_RM DTAS STS_RM RISKY   
STS_RM DUE STS_RM SECURITISATION   
STS_RM EQUITY STS_RM SECURITISATIONS   
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Table 3.2 European stress tests and sample construction 
Panel A: Geographical structure of sample banks 
 Stress test participation CEBS/EBAa  Stress test participation ECB 
 
First-time participants 
2010-11 (FTST1011) 
First-time participants 
2014 (FTST14) Country 2010 2011 2014 2016  2014 2015 Total stress test sample 
Austria 2 3 6 2  6 2 10 4 3 
Belgium 2 2 5 2  6 1 7 2 4 
Cyprus 2 2 3 0  4 0 5 2 3 
Denmark 3 4 4 3  0 0 4 4 0 
Estonia 0 0 0 0  3 0 3 0 3 
Finland 1 1 1 1  3 1 4 1 2 
France 4 4 11 6  13 1 15 4 9 
Germany 14 12 24 9  25 0 27 14 13 
Greece 6 6 4 0  4 4 6 6 0 
Hungary 2 1 1 1  0 0 2 2 0 
Ireland 2 3 3 2  5 0 5 3 2 
Italy 5 5 15 5  15 0 15 5 10 
Latvia 0 0 1 0  3 0 3 0 3 
Lithuania 0 0 0 0  3 0 3 0 3 
Luxembourg 2 1 2 0  6 1 8 2 5 
Malta 1 1 1 0  3 1 4 1 2 
Netherlands 4 4 6 4  7 0 7 4 3 
Norway 0 1 1 1  0 0 1 1 0 
Poland 1 1 6 1  0 0 6 1 5 
Portugal 4 4 3 0  3 1 5 4 0 
Slovakia 0 0 0 0  3 0 3 0 3 
Slovenia 1 2 3 0  3 1 4 2 1 
Spain 27 25 15 6  15 0 32 28 3 
Sweden 4 4 4 4  0 0 4 4 0 
United Kingdom 4 4 4 4  0 0 4 4 0 
Total samples 91 90 123 51  130 13 187 98 77 
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Table 3.2 continued 
Panel B: Sample construction 
         Total sample FTST1011 FTST14 
Total stress test participation    187 98 77 
Excluded (data unavailability due to M&As)   16 15 1 
Excluded (unavailability of bank reports)   15 6 6 
Excluded (unavailability of accounting data)   10 4 5 
Excluded (data unavailability due to bankruptcies)  4 4 0 
Total excluded stress-tested banks   45 29 12 
Stress test participation sample    142 69 65 
- Thereof publicly listed   61 45 15 
This table presents the European stress test participation and sample construction. Panel A reports per country and assessment the number of banks that participated in 
CEBS/EBA and ECB stress tests over the period 2010-2016. Panel B describes the filtering criteria I apply to my samples of banks in the conduct of the empirical analysis 
(based on textual, accounting and market data). I exclude banks due to unavailability of bank reports and accounting data in FitchConnect. I also remove banks due to lack of 
data caused by either M&As, or bankruptcies. 
aThe stress tests in 2009 and 2010 were conducted by CEBS. The names of the participating banks of CEBS's stress test in 2009 were not published. 
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Table 3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Bank accounting characteristics 
Variables Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. Median 
TRANX 4699 0.588 0.132 0.176 0.892 0.595 
SIZE 4966 11.073 1.795 6.724 14.529 11.014 
LOAN 3267 0.601 0.153 0.172 0.908 0.617 
LLR 2844 0.032 0.037 0.001 0.193 0.019 
LLP 3274 0.004 0.006 -0.003 0.036 0.002 
NPL 2476 0.055 0.066 0.002 0.347 0.033 
TRADE 2775 0.107 0.107 0.001 0.493 0.073 
CET1R 2260 0.136 0.056 0.058 0.407 0.125 
T1R 4278 0.129 0.058 0.056 0.413 0.117 
TRR 4472 0.153 0.057 0.083 0.428 0.140 
DSTF 3282 0.629 0.195 0.040 0.966 0.644 
CAP 3307 0.072 0.037 0.001 0.204 0.065 
EBPT 3276 0.007 0.006 -0.004 0.031 0.006 
Panel B: Textual analysis characteristics 
Variables Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. Median 
TWA 4178 56,310 59,945 3686 286,451 32,905 
STS 4178 0.054 0.013 0.026 0.086 0.053 
STS_ID 4178 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.001 
STS_PERF 4178 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.005 
STS_PRO 4178 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.010 0.004 
STS_REGIN 4178 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.003 
STS_REQ 4178 0.010 0.004 0.003 0.022 0.010 
STS_RM 4178 0.031 0.008 0.012 0.052 0.030 
TONE 4175 -0.275 0.219 -0.667 0.398 -0.316 
ΔTONE 3701 -0.012 0.125 -0.457 0.361 -0.007 
NEGATIVE 4178 0.012 0.004 0.004 0.024 0.012 
POSITIVE 4178 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.015 0.006 
AGGNUM 4178 0.021 0.006 0.007 0.038 0.021 
UNCERTAIN 4178 0.009 0.004 0.002 0.020 0.009 
MODAL 4178 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.009 0.004 
LITIGIOUS 4178 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.011 0.004 
Panel C: Market microstructure characteristics 
Variables Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. Median 
BIDASK 2650 0.008 0.014 0.000 0.095 0.003 
RECNO 2511 19.388 10.154 1.000 39.000 21.108 
RECSBUY 2516 15.873 13.274 0.000 66.670 14.313 
RECMBUY 2518 23.895 16.035 0.000 66.670 23.796 
RECHOLD 2511 39.322 18.907 0.000 100.000 37.678 
RECMSELL 2518 15.662 15.172 0.000 66.670 12.157 
RECSSELL 2516 4.357 6.532 0.000 33.330 1.383 
RECCON 2511 2.687 0.532 1.500 4.130 2.649 
TOVER 2822 0.014 0.040 0.000 0.304 0.004 
INVPRICE 2834 0.248 0.481 0.000 3.906 0.097 
RETVOL 2834 0.025 0.017 0.005 0.101 0.020 
MVALUE 2834 8.609 1.692 4.482 11.840 8.744 
MTBV 2731 1.108 0.753 -0.100 3.890 0.922 
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Table 3.3 continued 
Panel D: Macroeconomic fundamentals 
Country ΔGDP (Mean) 
ΔGDP 
(SD) 
ΔUNEM 
(Mean) 
ΔUNEM 
(SD) 
IRATE 
(Mean) 
IRATE 
(SD) 
Austria 0.006 0.048 0.003 0.058 1.221 0.917 
Belgium 0.006 0.049 -0.003 0.055 1.451 1.050 
Cyprus 0.006 0.018 0.035 0.171 N/A N/A 
Denmark 0.006 0.050 0.011 0.071 0.746 0.794 
Estonia 0.006 0.052 0.011 0.136 N/A N/A 
Finland 0.004 0.050 0.005 0.037 1.092 0.841 
France 0.006 0.049 0.003 0.034 1.257 0.901 
Germany 0.006 0.048 -0.017 0.040 0.825 0.793 
Greece -0.003 0.049 0.020 0.051 7.457 6.189 
Hungary 0.006 0.051 -0.012 0.048 0.863 1.315 
Ireland 0.015 0.075 0.009 0.076 2.660 2.529 
Italy 0.003 0.049 0.014 0.048 2.407 1.511 
Latvia 0.005 0.051 0.005 0.117 1.588 3.188 
Lithuania 0.007 0.050 0.007 0.136 2.221 2.068 
Luxembourg 0.008 0.052 0.006 0.038 1.031 0.637 
Malta 0.020 0.049 -0.008 0.061 N/A N/A 
Netherlands 0.006 0.049 0.003 0.064 1.082 0.856 
Norway 0.006 0.053 0.013 0.094 0.406 0.911 
Poland 0.011 0.049 -0.012 0.101 1.045 0.692 
Portugal 0.004 0.049 -0.002 0.043 3.789 3.123 
Slovakia 0.010 0.050 -0.006 0.066 1.891 1.292 
Slovenia 0.006 0.047 0.007 0.083 2.324 1.866 
Spain 0.004 0.049 0.017 0.055 2.316 1.679 
Sweden 0.007 0.051 0.003 0.050 1.221 0.815 
United Kingdom 0.006 0.050 -0.004 0.040 1.100 1.293 
Total 0.006 0.050 0.003 0.068 1.716 2.090 
This table reports descriptive statistics (i.e., observation, mean, standard deviation, minimum maximum and 
median) of the variables I use in my analysis. Panel A presents the following accounting variables, winsorised at 
the 1 and 99 percentiles: Quantitative disclosure behaviour measured by the transparency index (TRANX), bank 
size captured by the natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE), traditional banking activities shown by outstanding 
loans (LOAN), credit portfolio quality measured by loan loss reserves (LLR), asset quality captured by loan loss 
provisions (LLP) and non-performing loans (NPL), non-traditional banking activities measured by trading 
securities (TRADE), capital adequacy shown by ratios of regulatory core/common Tier 1 capital (CET1R), Tier 1 
capital (T1R) and total regulatory capital (TRR), liquidity risk shown by deposits and short-term funding (DSTF), 
bank capital captured by total equity capital (CAP), and profitability measured by earnings before provision and 
taxes (EBPT). Panel B presents the following textual analysis characteristics, winsorised at the 1 and 99 
percentiles: Report length estimated by total words analysed (TWA), stress test sentiment measured by the word 
count of the accumulated stress test, regulation and risk management word list (STS), i.e. sum of ‘stress test 
identity’ (STS_ID), ‘stress test performance’ (STS_PERF), ‘stress test procedure’ (STS_PRO), ‘regulatory 
institutions’ (STS_ REGIN), ‘regulatory requirements’ (STS_REQ) and ‘risk management’ (STS_RM); various 
forms of disclosure tone captured by (variation of) disclosure tone (TONE, ΔTONE), ‘negative’ tone 
(NEGATIVE), ‘positive’ tone, (POSITIVE), aggregated ‘negative’, ‘uncertain’ and ‘modal’ tone (AGGNUM), 
‘uncertain’ tone (UNCERTAIN), ‘modal’ tone (MODAL), and ‘litigious’ tone (LITIGIOUS). Panel C presents the 
following market microstructure characteristics, daily winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentiles and quarterly 
averaged: Information asymmetry estimated by the bid-ask-spread (BIDASK), analyst coverage covered by the 
number of analyst recommendations (RECNO), the percentage of analysts’ strong-buy, moderate-buy, hold, 
moderate-sell and strong-sell recommendations (RECSBUY, RECMBUY, RECHOLD, RECMSELL, RECSSELL), 
analyst recommendation consensus (RECCON), share turnover (TOVER), inverse share price (INVPRICE), 
return volatility (RETVOL), market value (MVALUE), and market-to-book value (MTBV). Panel D illustrates 
mean and standard deviation of the following macroeconomic fundamentals: Economic growth (ΔGDP), 
unemployment growth (ΔUNEM) and sovereign debt risk (IRATE). Data range 2005-2017. The description of 
the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 Graphical illustration of bank accounting characteristics 
The charts plot mean evolvement of the following variables: Traditional and non-traditional banking activities (LOAN, 
TRADE), liquidity risk (DSTF) and bank capital (CAP), credit portfolio quality (LLR), asset quality (NPL), and capital 
adequacy (CET1R, T1R, TRR). The dashed lines indicate the European stress test exercises in 2010, 2011, 2014 and 
2016. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.2 Graphical illustration of stress test sentiment. 
The charts plot mean evolvement of stress test sentiment (STS) using the word count of the accumulated stress test, 
regulation and risk management, and its components of ‘stress test identity’ (STS_ID), ‘stress test performance’ 
(STS_PERF), ‘stress test procedure’ (STS_PRO), ‘regulatory institutions’ (STS_ REGIN), ‘regulatory requirements’ 
(STS_REQ), and ‘risk management’ (STS_RM). The dashed lines indicate the European stress test exercises in 2010, 
2011, 2014 and 2016. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 3.1. 
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Figure 3.3 Graphical illustration of disclosure tone 
The charts plot mean evolvement of the following variables: Various forms of disclosure tone captured by (variation 
of) disclosure tone (TONE, ΔTONE), aggregated ‘negative’, ‘uncertain’ and ‘modal’ tone (AGGNUM), ‘negative’ tone 
(NEGATIVE), and ‘uncertain’ tone (UNCERTAIN). The dashed lines indicate the European stress test exercises in 2010, 
2011, 2014 and 2016. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.4 Graphical illustration of information asymmetry and analyst coverage 
The charts plot quarterly and/or daily mean evolvement of bid-ask-spread (BIDASK), the number of analyst 
recommendations (RECNO), and the percentage of analysts’ strong-buy, moderate-buy, hold, moderate-sell and strong-
sell recommendations (RECSBUY, RECMBUY, RECHOLD, RECMSELL, RECSSELL). The dashed lines indicate the 
European stress test exercises in the second quarter of 2010, 2011, 2014 and 2016. The description of the variables and 
the relevant data sources are provided in Table 3.1. 
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Figure 3.5 Graphical illustration of market microstructure characteristics 
The charts plot quarterly or daily mean evolvement of the following variables: Share turnover (TOVER), inverse share 
price (INVPRICE), return volatility (RETVOL), market value (MVALUE), market-to-book value (MTBV) and analyst 
recommendation consensus (RECCON). The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in 
Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.4 Correlation coefficients 
Panel A: Disclosure profile and tone models (Equations 3.2 and 3.3) 
Variables STS SIZEt–2 LOANt–2 LLRt–2 LLPt–2 NPLt–2 TRADEt–2 T1Rt–2 DSTFt–2 EBPTt–2 ΔGDP ΔUNEM 
STS 1.000            
             
SIZEt–2 0.166*** 1.000           
 (0.000)            
LOANt–2 -0.180*** -0.423*** 1.000          
 (0.000) (0.000)           
LLRt–2 -0.019 -0.335*** 0.092*** 1.000         
 (0.340) (0.000) (0.000)          
LLPt–2 -0.042** -0.166*** 0.129*** 0.577*** 1.000        
 (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
NPLt–2 0.049** -0.366*** 0.122*** 0.934*** 0.550*** 1.000       
 (0.024) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)        
TRADEt–2 0.242*** 0.625*** -0.609*** -0.405*** -0.270*** -0.400*** 1.000      
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
T1Rt–2 0.318*** -0.164*** -0.050*** 0.073*** -0.134*** 0.062*** -0.033 1.000     
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.103)      
DSTFt–2 -0.150*** -0.391*** 0.311*** 0.387*** 0.253*** 0.369*** -0.443*** 0.041** 1.000    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029)     
EBPTt–2 -0.189*** -0.280*** 0.245*** 0.174*** 0.379*** 0.137*** -0.221*** 0.085*** 0.311*** 1.000   
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
ΔGDP 0.052*** -0.009 -0.024 0.025 0.046** 0.033 0.003 0.055*** 0.010 -0.004 1.000  
 (0.001) (0.550) (0.184) (0.188) (0.011) (0.108) (0.886) (0.000) (0.579) (0.806)   
ΔUNEM -0.094*** 0.030** 0.120*** -0.080*** 0.059*** -0.088*** -0.019 -0.155*** -0.009 0.035** 0.056*** 1.000 
 (0.000) (0.039) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.329) (0.000) (0.614) (0.050) (0.000)  
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Table 3.4 continued 
Panel B: Bank opacity models (Equations 3.4A and 3.4B) 
Variables STS TONE TOVERt–2 INVPRICEt–2 RETVOLt–2 MVALUEt–2 MTBVt–2 RECCONt–2 ΔGDP ΔUNEM IRATE 
STS 1.000           
            
TONE -0.339*** 1.000          
 (0.000)           
TOVERt–2 -0.005 -0.145*** 1.000         
 (0.816) (0.000)          
INVPRICEt–2 0.061*** -0.104*** 0.336*** 1.000        
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)         
RETVOLt–2 0.082*** -0.209*** 0.048** 0.068*** 1.000       
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000)        
MVALUEt–2 0.070*** 0.250*** -0.131*** -0.198*** -0.219*** 1.000      
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
MTBVt–2 -0.293*** 0.220*** -0.118*** -0.209*** -0.382*** 0.180*** 1.000     
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)      
RECCONt–2 -0.039* -0.068*** 0.085*** 0.049** 0.130*** -0.187*** -0.131*** 1.000    
 (0.067) (0.002) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
ΔGDP 0.052*** -0.047*** -0.018 -0.003 -0.024 -0.008 -0.023 0.034 1.000   
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.338) (0.891) (0.217) (0.665) (0.248) (0.100)    
ΔUNEM -0.094*** -0.031* 0.063*** -0.070*** 0.230*** -0.022 -0.090*** 0.050** 0.056*** 1.000  
 (0.000) (0.051) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.257) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000)   
IRATE -0.066*** -0.136*** 0.060*** 0.090*** 0.478*** -0.259*** -0.393*** 0.230*** -0.028** 0.118*** 1.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000)  
This table reports Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients and p-values for the variables I use in my disclosure profile and tone analysis (Panel A), and for those used in the bank opacity 
models. I apply the following variables, winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentiles and lagged by two quarters (as indicated): Stress test sentiment measured by the word count of the 
accumulated stress test, regulation and risk management word list (STS), bank size captured by natural logarithm of total assets (SIZEt–2), traditional banking activities shown by 
outstanding loans (LOANt–2), credit portfolio quality measured by loan loss reserves (LLRt–2), asset quality captured by loan loss provisions (LLPt–2) and non-performing loans         (NPLt–
2), non-traditional banking activities measured by trading securities (TRADEt–2), capital adequacy measured by ratio of regulatory Tier 1 capital (T1Rt–2), liquidity risk shown by deposits 
and short-term funding (DSTFt–2), profitability measured by earnings before provision and taxes (EBPTt–2), disclosure tone (TONE), share turnover (TOVERt–2), inverse share price 
(INVPRICEt–2), return volatility (RETVOLt–2), market value (MVALUEt–2), market-to-book value (MTBVt–2), and analyst recommendation consensus (RECCONt–2). Macroeconomic 
fundamentals are captured by economic growth (ΔGDP), unemployment growth (ΔUNEM), and sovereign debt risk (IRATE). Data range 2005-2017. *, **, and *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.5 Stress test sentiment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables STSitj STS_IDitj STS_PERFitj STS_PROitj STS_REGINitj STS_REQitj STS_RMitj 
ST1011 0.0199*** 0.0002 0.0010* 0.0023*** 0.0007*** 0.0050*** 0.0106*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0012) (0.0021) 
ST1011*FTST1011 0.0027* 0.0003*** 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004*** -0.0003 0.0019* 
 (0.0016) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0011) 
ST1415 0.0291*** 0.0005*** 0.0018*** 0.0036*** 0.0011*** 0.0066*** 0.0154*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0012) (0.0018) 
ST1415*FTST1011 -0.0022** -0.0001 -0.0004*** -0.0003* -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0013** 
 (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
ST16 0.0311*** 0.0005*** 0.0018*** 0.0036*** 0.0012*** 0.0076*** 0.0163*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0012) (0.0020) 
ST16*FTST1011 -0.0035*** -0.0002** -0.0003* -0.0004** -0.0001 -0.0007* -0.0019** 
 (0.0012) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0008) 
SIZEit–2j -0.0047** -0.0002* -0.0006*** -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0010* -0.0025* 
 (0.0018) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0014) 
LOANit–2j 0.0027 -0.0000 -0.0010* 0.0006 -0.0001 0.0032** 0.0003 
 (0.0054) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0016) (0.0038) 
LLRit–2j 0.0368* 0.0025*** 0.0077** 0.0041 0.0064*** -0.0125*** 0.0290** 
 (0.0207) (0.0009) (0.0031) (0.0028) (0.0014) (0.0044) (0.0142) 
LLPit–2j 0.0107 0.0034 0.0053 0.0025 0.0026 0.0000 -0.0029 
 (0.0382) (0.0029) (0.0052) (0.0070) (0.0054) (0.0137) (0.0272) 
TRADEit–2j -0.0067 -0.0007* -0.0004 -0.0014 -0.0018*** -0.0012 -0.0006 
 (0.0067) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0022) (0.0044) 
T1Rit–2j 0.0081 0.0006 0.0007 0.0018 0.0014 0.0051** -0.0003 
 (0.0093) (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0009) (0.0024) (0.0062) 
DSTFit–2j -0.0041 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0004 0.0008** -0.0006 -0.0043 
 (0.0037) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0026) 
EBPTit–2j -0.1394* -0.0120** -0.0154* -0.0258* -0.0119 -0.0169 -0.0664 
 (0.0834) (0.0048) (0.0088) (0.0145) (0.0075) (0.0194) (0.0517) 
ΔGDPtj 0.0454*** -0.0010 0.0004 0.0021 0.0023* 0.0070* 0.0353*** 
 (0.0093) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0036) (0.0067) 
ΔUNEMtj 0.0096* -0.0004 0.0007 0.0007 0.0006 0.0002 0.0074** 
 (0.0052) (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0034) 
Constant 0.0866*** 0.0024** 0.0107*** 0.0049 0.0040* 0.0157** 0.0509*** 
 (0.0218) (0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0033) (0.0021) (0.0062) (0.0161) 
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Table 3.5 continued 
Observations 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 
Number of banks 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3350 0.3885 0.2284 0.4047 0.1733 0.2442 0.2055 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports the effect of first-time stress test participation on banks' disclosure sentiment (Equation 2.2). I measure stress test sentiment using the word count of the stress test, regulation and risk management word 
lists (STSitj, STS_IDitj, STS_PERFitj, STS_PROitj, STS_REGINitj, STS_REQitj, and STS_RMitj). I include dummy variables in my analysis to measure first-time participation in 2010-11 (FTST1011) and the stress test periods 
in 2010-11 (ST1011), 2014-15 (ST1415), and 2016 (ST16). I control for bank characteristics, winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentiles and lagged by two quarters, and country-specific fundamentals, using the following 
variables: Bank size captured by natural logarithm of total assets (SIZEit–2j), traditional banking activities shown by outstanding loans (LOANit–2j), credit portfolio quality measured by loan loss reserves (LLRit–2j), asset 
quality captured by loan loss provisions (LLPit–2j), non-traditional banking activities measured by trading securities (TRADEit–2j), capital adequacy captured by regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio (T1Rit–2j), liquidity risk shown 
by deposits and short-term funding (DSTFit–2j), profitability measured by earnings before provision and taxes (EBPTit–2j); and macroeconomic fundamentals captured by economic growth (ΔGDPtj), and unemployment 
growth (ΔUNEMtj). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data 
sources are provided in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.6 Disclosure tone 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables TONEitj AGGNUMitj NEGATIVEitj UNCERTAINitj MODALitj 
ST1011 -0.2948*** 0.0095*** 0.0044*** 0.0054*** 0.0014** 
 (0.0688) (0.0023) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0006) 
ST1011*FTST1011 -0.0057 0.0013 0.0006 0.0006 0.0001 
 (0.0206) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0002) 
ST1415 -0.3180*** 0.0137*** 0.0069*** 0.0071*** 0.0020*** 
 (0.0720) (0.0020) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0005) 
ST1415*FTST1011 -0.0248 -0.0016*** -0.0007* -0.0009*** -0.0005*** 
 (0.0197) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0001) 
ST16 -0.2776*** 0.0128*** 0.0059*** 0.0072*** 0.0023*** 
 (0.0735) (0.0020) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0005) 
ST16*FTST1011 -0.0252 -0.0016*** -0.0005 -0.0010*** -0.0004** 
 (0.0165) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0002) 
SIZEit–2j 0.0902*** -0.0020** -0.0016*** -0.0006 0.0001 
 (0.0319) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0002) 
LOANit–2j 0.1915** -0.0010 -0.0022 0.0016 0.0003 
 (0.0843) (0.0022) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0007) 
LLRit–2j -0.5921** 0.0317*** 0.0251*** 0.0057 0.0006 
 (0.2819) (0.0086) (0.0057) (0.0046) (0.0021) 
LLPit–2j -1.2696 0.0475** 0.0313** 0.0155 0.0074 
 (0.9918) (0.0182) (0.0131) (0.0139) (0.0060) 
TRADEit–2j -0.0638 -0.0049 -0.0013 -0.0030 -0.0016* 
 (0.1662) (0.0039) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0009) 
T1Rit–2j 0.5153** 0.0033 -0.0075*** 0.0106*** 0.0018 
 (0.2066) (0.0049) (0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0012) 
DSTFit–2j 0.0346 -0.0047** -0.0018 -0.0030*** -0.0004 
 (0.0640) (0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0004) 
EBPTit–2j 2.4281* -0.0714 -0.0770*** 0.0027 -0.0083 
 (1.3056) (0.0442) (0.0271) (0.0300) (0.0079) 
ΔGDPtj -0.0266 0.0133*** 0.0031 0.0100*** -0.0006 
 (0.2281) (0.0045) (0.0035) (0.0028) (0.0020) 
ΔUNEMtj -0.2879** 0.0052** 0.0044*** 0.0009 -0.0003 
 (0.1110) (0.0024) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0006) 
Constant -1.2330*** 0.0352*** 0.0284*** 0.0084 0.0005 
 (0.3684) (0.0105) (0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0026) 
      
Observations 2,029 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 
Number of banks 84 84 84 84 84 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1375 0.3589 0.2396 0.4504 0.3673 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports the effect of first-time stress test participation on banks' disclosure tone (Equation 3.2). I measure 
distinct forms of disclosure tone using disclosure tone (TONEitj), aggregated ‘negative’, ‘uncertain’ and ‘modal’ tone 
(AGGNUMitj), ‘negative’ tone (NEGATIVEitj), ‘uncertain’ tone (UNCERTAINitj), and ‘modal’ tone (MODALitj). I 
include dummy variables in my analysis to measure first-time participation in 2010-11 (FTST1011) and the stress test 
periods in 2010-11 (ST1011), 2014-15 (ST1415), and 2016 (ST16). I control for bank characteristics, winsorised at the 
1 and 99 percentiles and lagged by two quarters, and country-specific fundamentals, using the following variables: 
Bank size captured by natural logarithm of total assets (SIZEit–2j), traditional banking activities shown by outstanding 
loans (LOANit–2j), credit portfolio quality measured by loan loss reserves (LLRit–2j), asset quality captured by and loan 
loss provisions (LLPit–2j), non-traditional banking activities measured by trading securities (TRADEit–2j), capital 
adequacy captured by regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio (T1Rit–2j), liquidity risk shown by deposits and short-term funding        
(DSTFit–2j), profitability measured by earnings before provision and taxes (EBPTit–2j); and macroeconomic 
fundamentals captured by economic growth (ΔGDPtj), and unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj). Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.7 Quantitative disclosure behaviour 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables TRANXitj TRANXitj TRANXitj TRANXitj 
ST1011 0.0604** 0.0672**   
 (0.0248) (0.0262)   
ST1011*FTST1011 -0.0068 -0.0136   
 (0.0095) (0.0111)   
ST1415 0.0872***  0.0938***  
 (0.0265)  (0.0269)  
ST1415*FTST1011 0.0085  0.0032  
 (0.0072)  (0.0067)  
ST16 0.0933***   0.0958*** 
 (0.0275)   (0.0280) 
ST16*FTST1011 0.0305***   0.0284*** 
 (0.0095)   (0.0088) 
SIZEit–2j 0.0371** 0.0358** 0.0353** 0.0363** 
 (0.0148) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0146) 
LOANit–2j -0.0447 -0.0438 -0.0421 -0.0431 
 (0.0357) (0.0361) (0.0366) (0.0363) 
LLRit–2j 0.0338 0.0353 0.0347 0.0356 
 (0.1624) (0.1591) (0.1590) (0.1607) 
LLPit–2j -0.2972 -0.3352 -0.3245 -0.3016 
 (0.4359) (0.4334) (0.4347) (0.4364) 
TRADEit–2j -0.0349 -0.0335 -0.0361 -0.0374 
 (0.0625) (0.0631) (0.0634) (0.0632) 
T1Rit–2j 0.2243*** 0.2144** 0.2126** 0.2230*** 
 (0.0800) (0.0824) (0.0828) (0.0808) 
DSTFit–2j -0.0261 -0.0249 -0.0248 -0.0248 
 (0.0272) (0.0274) (0.0275) (0.0273) 
EBPTit–2j 0.4901 0.5846 0.5626 0.4642 
 (0.5495) (0.5418) (0.5433) (0.5453) 
ΔGDPtj -0.0716 -0.0694 -0.0654 -0.0629 
 (0.0928) (0.0941) (0.0925) (0.0928) 
ΔUNEMtj -0.0066 -0.0063 -0.0080 -0.0057 
 (0.0365) (0.0366) (0.0368) (0.0363) 
Constant 0.0951 0.1076 0.1132 0.1024 
 (0.1775) (0.1760) (0.1753) (0.1751) 
     
Observations 2,110 2,110 2,110 2,110 
Number of banks 90 90 90 90 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5924 0.5910 0.5906 0.5924 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports the effect of first-time stress test participation on banks' quantitative disclosure behaviour 
(Equation 3.2). I measure quantitative disclosure behaviour using a transparency index (TRANXitj) following Nier and 
Baumann (2006). I include dummy variables in my analysis to measure first-time participation in 2010-11 (FTST1011) 
and the stress test periods in 2010-11 (ST1011), 2014-15 (ST1415), and 2016 (ST16). I control for bank characteristics, 
winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentiles and lagged by two quarters, and country-specific fundamentals, using the 
following variables: Bank size captured by natural logarithm of total assets (SIZEit–2j), traditional banking activities 
shown by outstanding loans (LOANit–2j), credit portfolio quality measured by loan loss reserves  (LLRit–2j), asset quality 
captured by and loan loss provisions (LLPit–2j), non-traditional banking activities measured by trading securities 
(TRADEit–2j), capital adequacy captured by regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio (T1Rit–2j), liquidity risk shown by deposits 
and short-term funding (DSTFit–2j), profitability measured by earnings before provision and taxes (EBPTit–2j), and 
macroeconomic fundamentals captured by economic growth (ΔGDPtj); and unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj). 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.8 Effect of stress test sentiment on disclosure tone 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables ΔTONEitj AGGNUMitj LITIGIOUSitj 
STHC_I -0.0971** 0.0012** 0.0008** 
 (0.0475) (0.0006) (0.0004) 
STSitj -0.6087 0.4081*** 0.0369*** 
 (0.5246) (0.0181) (0.0074) 
STHC_I*STSitj 1.3733* -0.0204* -0.0128** 
 (0.7147) (0.0105) (0.0060) 
SIZEit–2j -0.0156 -0.0001 -0.0007** 
 (0.0138) (0.0006) (0.0003) 
LOANit–2j 0.0731 -0.0021* 0.0009 
 (0.0598) (0.0012) (0.0007) 
LLRit–2j 0.1515 0.0164*** 0.0089** 
 (0.1458) (0.0042) (0.0040) 
LLPit–2j 0.0100 0.0443*** 0.0054 
 (0.6299) (0.0140) (0.0090) 
TRADEit–2j 0.0637 -0.0020 -0.0009 
 (0.0739) (0.0028) (0.0010) 
T1Rit–2j 0.1749 0.0003 -0.0007 
 (0.1142) (0.0023) (0.0017) 
DSTFit–2j -0.0188 -0.0030*** -0.0002 
 (0.0414) (0.0011) (0.0007) 
EBPTit–2j 1.4571* -0.0149 -0.0228 
 (0.7398) (0.0232) (0.0150) 
ΔGDPtj 0.0978 -0.0058* -0.0033 
 (0.2556) (0.0032) (0.0026) 
ΔUNEMtj -0.2786*** 0.0011 0.0024*** 
 (0.0704) (0.0014) (0.0008) 
Constant 0.1727 0.0001 0.0084** 
 (0.1555) (0.0067) (0.0039) 
    
Observations 1,959 2,030 2,030 
Number of banks 84 84 84 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1054 0.7533 0.4607 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports the individual effect of stress test participation and the stress test sentiment on banks’ disclosure 
tone (Equation 3.3). I measure distinct forms of disclosure tone using variation of disclosure tone (ΔTONEitj), 
aggregated ‘negative’, ‘uncertain’ and ‘modal’ tone (AGGNUMitj), and ‘litigious’ tone (LITIGIOUSitj). I estimate 
the impact of stress test sentiment using the accumulated stress test, regulation and risk management word list 
(STSitj), in combination with a time-dummy that estimates the individual stress test periods (STHC_I). I control 
for bank characteristics, winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentiles and lagged by two quarters, and country-specific 
fundamentals, using the following variables: Bank size captured by natural logarithm of total assets (SIZEit–2j), 
traditional banking activities shown by outstanding loans (LOANit–2j), credit portfolio quality measured by loan 
loss reserves (LLRit–2j), asset quality captured by loan loss provisions (LLPit–2j), non-traditional banking activities 
measured by trading securities (TRADEit–2j), capital adequacy captured by regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio        
(T1Rit–2j), liquidity risk shown by deposits and short-term funding (DSTFit–2j), profitability measured by earnings 
before provision and taxes (EBPTit–2j); and macroeconomic fundamentals captured by economic growth (ΔGDPtj), 
and unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and the 
relevant data sources are provided in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.9 Bank opacity 
Panel A: Information asymmetry 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables BIDASKitj BIDASKit+1j BIDASKitj BIDASKit+1j 
STHC_I -0.0004 -0.0014 -0.0052** -0.0065*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0021) (0.0024) 
STSitj   -0.0540* -0.0610* 
   (0.0288) (0.0319) 
STHC_I*STSitj   0.1042*** 0.1094*** 
   (0.0328) (0.0381) 
TONEitj -0.0008 -0.0013   
 (0.0011) (0.0010)   
STHC_I*TONEitj -0.0027** -0.0027**   
 (0.0011) (0.0011)   
TOVERit–2j -0.0098 -0.0069 -0.0073 -0.0045 
 (0.0151) (0.0155) (0.0146) (0.0149) 
INVPRICEit–2j 0.0031** 0.0027** 0.0032** 0.0028** 
 (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012) 
RETVOLit–2j 0.1398** 0.1475** 0.1394** 0.1479** 
 (0.0616) (0.0660) (0.0610) (0.0655) 
MVALUEit–2j 0.0028*** 0.0028*** 0.0027*** 0.0026*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
MTBVit–2j 0.0009 0.0013 0.0010 0.0014 
 (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0014) 
RECCONit–2j 0.0033*** 0.0030*** 0.0033*** 0.0030*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0010) 
ΔGDPtj 0.0137 0.0051 0.0107 0.0046 
 (0.0238) (0.0195) (0.0237) (0.0192) 
ΔUNEMtj -0.0062 -0.0044 -0.0050 -0.0029 
 (0.0067) (0.0071) (0.0065) (0.0068) 
IRATEtj 0.0003 0.0003* 0.0003 0.0003* 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Constant -0.0351*** -0.0355*** -0.0316*** -0.0314*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0114) (0.0101) (0.0103) 
     
Observations 2,015 1,968 2,016 1,969 
Number of banks 55 55 55 55 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2111 0.2028 0.2160 0.2077 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Analyst coverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables RECNOitj RECNOit+1j RECNOitj RECNOit+1j 
STHC_I 0.6666 0.5031 3.7504*** 2.9774** 
 (0.5752) (0.5649) (1.1907) (1.1176) 
STSitj   40.0378** 36.2189* 
   (17.8701) (19.1813) 
STHC_I*STSitj   -65.2303*** -54.2973*** 
   (17.9820) (16.8632) 
TONEitj 0.6070 0.6423   
 (0.8840) (0.8820)   
STHC_I*TONEitj 1.3644* 1.3481**   
 (0.6927) (0.6193)   
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Table 3.9 continued 
TOVERit–2j 6.6389 6.7238 5.0327 5.3632 
 (7.1087) (6.8686) (7.0642) (6.8751) 
INVPRICEit–2j 1.5438*** 1.7033*** 1.4552*** 1.6242*** 
 (0.4719) (0.4244) (0.4578) (0.4178) 
RETVOLit–2j -49.2822*** -35.5995** -48.7568** -35.0697** 
 (18.4549) (16.9271) (18.6897) (17.2091) 
MVALUEit–2j 2.1434*** 2.2996*** 2.2705*** 2.4363*** 
 (0.5989) (0.5926) (0.6031) (0.6047) 
MTBVit–2j -0.3799 -0.4414 -0.4196 -0.4862 
 (0.7406) (0.7353) (0.7426) (0.7411) 
RECCONit–2j -0.9582** -0.7163 -0.9525** -0.6978 
 (0.4705) (0.4499) (0.4682) (0.4489) 
ΔGDPtj -26.6836** -33.4785*** -25.6021** -32.6707*** 
 (11.7690) (10.7316) (11.0770) (10.1336) 
ΔUNEMtj 7.2859** 6.7710* 6.4166* 5.9394* 
 (3.5260) (3.4492) (3.5235) (3.4593) 
IRATEtj -0.2890*** -0.4677*** -0.2943*** -0.4716*** 
 (0.0758) (0.0716) (0.0731) (0.0709) 
Constant 2.7316 0.5128 -0.0356 -2.2352 
 (6.7370) (6.5610) (6.7468) (6.7168) 
     
Observations 2,078 2,022 2,079 2,023 
Number of banks 55 55 55 55 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3066 0.3597 0.3113 0.3606 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports the individual effect of stress test participation, stress test sentiment and disclosure tone on 
information asymmetry and analyst coverage (Equations 3.4A and 3.4B). Panel A presents information asymmetry 
captured by the current and future bid-ask-spread (BIDASKitj, BIDASKit+1j), and Panel B applies analyst coverage 
estimated by the current and future number of analyst recommendations (RECNOitj, RECNOit+1j). I estimate the 
impact of stress test sentiment using the word count of the accumulated stress test, regulation and risk 
management word list (STSitj), disclosure tone using TONEitj, in combination with a time-dummy that estimates 
the individual stress test periods (STHC_I). I control for market microstructure characteristics, daily winsorised 
at the 1 and 99 percentiles, quarterly averaged and lagged by two quarters, and country-specific fundamentals, 
using the following variables: Share turnover (TOVERit–2j), inverse share price (INVPRICEit–2j), return volatility 
(RETVOLit–2j), market value (MVALUEit–2j), market-to-book value (MTBVit–2j), analyst recommendation 
consensus (RECCONt–2); and macroeconomic fundamentals captured by economic growth (ΔGDPtj), 
unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj), and sovereign debt risk (IRATEtj). Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The 
description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.10 Information asymmetry around bank report releases 
Panel A: Stress test sentiment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables BIDASKitj     
(t–1, t+1) 
BIDASKitj     
(t+2, t+31) 
BIDASKitj   
(t+2, t+61) 
BIDASKitj   
(t+2, t+121) 
BIDASKitj   
(t+2, t+250) 
STHC_I -0.0048* -0.0043* -0.0047* -0.0048** -0.0043* 
 (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
STSitj -0.0163 -0.0363 -0.0408 -0.0350 -0.0346 
 (0.0290) (0.0268) (0.0267) (0.0277) (0.0268) 
STHC_I*STSitj 0.0883** 0.0778** 0.0747** 0.0764** 0.0652* 
 (0.0399) (0.0306) (0.0307) (0.0320) (0.0334) 
TOVERit–2j 0.0210* -0.0057 0.0041 0.0081 0.0136 
 (0.0112) (0.0190) (0.0177) (0.0165) (0.0149) 
INVPRICEit–2j 0.0035** 0.0028* 0.0030** 0.0032** 0.0033** 
 (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0014) 
RETVOLit–2j 0.0542 0.0775* 0.0779* 0.0752 0.0658 
 (0.0568) (0.0435) (0.0424) (0.0451) (0.0479) 
MVALUEit–2j 0.0028* 0.0019 0.0025 0.0029* 0.0032* 
 (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0018) 
MTBVit–2j 0.0003 0.0005 0.0006 0.0004 0.0002 
 (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
RECCONit–2j 0.0026** 0.0028** 0.0032** 0.0032** 0.0034** 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0015) 
ΔGDPtj 0.0109 -0.0057 -0.0019 -0.0027 0.0015 
 (0.0279) (0.0210) (0.0178) (0.0175) (0.0164) 
ΔUNEMtj -0.0009 0.0046 0.0056 0.0040 0.0003 
 (0.0055) (0.0050) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0051) 
IRATEtj 0.0007*** 0.0004* 0.0003** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Constant -0.0306* -0.0215 -0.0276 -0.0312 -0.0349* 
 (0.0164) (0.0161) (0.0169) (0.0189) (0.0208) 
      
Observations 1,706 1,801 1,814 1,833 1,842 
Number of banks 53 53 53 53 53 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0929 0.1431 0.1453 0.1506 0.1496 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Disclosure tone 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables BIDASKitj     
(t–1, t+1) 
BIDASKitj     
(t+2, t+31) 
BIDASKitj   
(t+2, t+61) 
BIDASKitj   
(t+2, t+121) 
BIDASKitj   
(t+2, t+250) 
STHC_I -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0013 
 (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
TONEitj -0.0014 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0014 
 (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0011) 
STHC_I*TONEitj -0.0028** -0.0024** -0.0024** -0.0023** -0.0016 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0011) 
TOVERit–2j 0.0206* -0.0074 0.0021 0.0065 0.0124 
 (0.0110) (0.0192) (0.0178) (0.0166) (0.0150) 
INVPRICEit–2j 0.0034** 0.0027* 0.0030** 0.0031** 0.0032** 
 (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
RETVOLit–2j 0.0544 0.0779* 0.0785* 0.0750 0.0651 
 (0.0574) (0.0441) (0.0430) (0.0452) (0.0479) 
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Table 3.10 continued 
MVALUEit–2j 0.0030* 0.0020 0.0027* 0.0030* 0.0034* 
 (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0019) 
MTBVit–2j 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0003 0.0002 
 (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
RECCONit–2j 0.0026** 0.0028** 0.0031** 0.0032** 0.0034** 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0015) 
ΔGDPtj 0.0141 -0.0032 0.0003 -0.0009 0.0031 
 (0.0292) (0.0220) (0.0189) (0.0187) (0.0177) 
ΔUNEMtj -0.0019 0.0036 0.0046 0.0030 -0.0009 
 (0.0058) (0.0050) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0051) 
IRATEtj 0.0007*** 0.0004* 0.0003** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Constant -0.0326* -0.0240 -0.0304 -0.0338 -0.0379* 
 (0.0168) (0.0174) (0.0183) (0.0204) (0.0224) 
      
Observations 1,705 1,800 1,813 1,832 1,841 
Number of banks 53 53 53 53 53 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0927 0.1407 0.1427 0.1482 0.1489 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports the individual effect of stress test participation, stress test sentiment and disclosure tone on the 
bank report release date-specific bid-ask spread (Equations 3.4A and 3.4B). I measure information asymmetry 
applying the average bid-ask spread (BIDASKitj) for specific periods around and after the individual bank report 
release date (i.e., t–1, t+1; t+2, t+31; t+2, t+61; t+2, t+121; and t+2, t+250). Panel A illustrates the date-specific 
stress test sentiment (STSitj), whilst Panel B applies the disclosure tone (TONEitj). I estimate the impact of stress 
test sentiment using the word count of the accumulated stress test, regulation and risk management word list 
(STSitj) and disclosure tone (TONEitj) in combination with a time-dummy that estimates the individual stress test 
periods (STHC_I). I control for market microstructure characteristics, daily winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentiles, 
quarterly averaged and lagged by two quarters, and country-specific fundamentals, using the following variables: 
Share turnover (TOVERit–2j), inverse share price (INVPRICEit–2j), return volatility (RETVOLit–2j), market value 
(MVALUEit–2j), market-to-book value (MTBVit–2j), analyst recommendation consensus (RECCONt–2); and 
macroeconomic fundamentals captured by economic growth (ΔGDPtj), unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj), and 
sovereign debt risk (IRATEtj). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant 
data sources are provided in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.11 Analyst coverage around bank report releases 
Panel A: Stress test sentiment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables RECNOitj      
(t–1, t+1) 
RECNOitj     
(t+2, t+31) 
RECNOitj     
(t+2, t+61) 
RECNOitj     
(t+2, t+121) 
RECNOitj     
(t+2, t+250) 
STHC_I 4.1846*** 4.3250*** 4.0907*** 3.7598*** 3.1186*** 
 (1.2482) (1.2262) (1.2204) (1.1872) (1.1593) 
STSitj 44.4389** 43.7953** 42.9277** 39.9079** 34.3887* 
 (17.1699) (18.3208) (18.4251) (18.4982) (18.2649) 
STHC_I*STSitj -68.0147*** -68.7250*** -66.1385*** -61.2173*** -48.4032*** 
 (18.6808) (17.9629) (17.8394) (17.3200) (16.5282) 
TOVERit–2j 9.1030 9.4280 9.8231 9.8072 8.9114 
 (7.9249) (8.5698) (8.5896) (8.4727) (8.4447) 
INVPRICEit–2j 1.8061*** 1.7952*** 1.8307*** 1.8655*** 1.9130*** 
 (0.4734) (0.4650) (0.4502) (0.4395) (0.4268) 
RETVOLit–2j -30.2271* -25.4355 -22.7631 -18.4987 -4.4050 
 (17.9745) (17.5016) (17.0750) (16.3626) (14.7680) 
MVALUEit–2j 2.8898*** 2.9489*** 2.9954*** 2.9334*** 2.9241*** 
 (0.6709) (0.6660) (0.6637) (0.6511) (0.6345) 
MTBVit–2j -0.1206 -0.1191 -0.1211 -0.0963 -0.1419 
 (0.6338) (0.6331) (0.6246) (0.6137) (0.5999) 
RECCONit–2j -0.5746 -0.5668 -0.5173 -0.4367 -0.3346 
 (0.4528) (0.4508) (0.4435) (0.4317) (0.4220) 
ΔGDPtj -28.2465** -26.5005** -29.0815** -32.7790*** -30.8064*** 
 (11.9399) (11.8489) (11.7444) (11.4124) (10.7967) 
ΔUNEMtj 3.7930 3.0163 2.9364 3.1503 1.8245 
 (3.5234) (3.5452) (3.5848) (3.6581) (3.3802) 
IRATEtj -0.3063*** -0.3309*** -0.3641*** -0.4357*** -0.5422*** 
 (0.0770) (0.0771) (0.0771) (0.0764) (0.0783) 
Constant -7.2138 -7.8588 -8.8047 -8.5360 -7.9696 
 (6.1777) (6.1505) (6.1622) (6.0572) (5.8215) 
      
Observations 1,886 1,886 1,886 1,886 1,886 
Number of banks 53 53 53 53 53 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3088 0.3235 0.3352 0.3571 0.3951 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Disclosure tone 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables RECNOitj      
(t–1, t+1) 
RECNOitj     
(t+2, t+31) 
RECNOitj     
(t+2, t+61) 
RECNOitj     
(t+2, t+121) 
RECNOitj     
(t+2, t+250) 
STHC_I 0.9772 1.0744* 1.0132* 0.9099 0.9420* 
 (0.5995) (0.5885) (0.5810) (0.5714) (0.5286) 
TONEitj 0.0568 0.2180 0.2265 0.2911 0.5564 
 (0.8553) (0.8919) (0.8971) (0.8875) (0.8391) 
STHC_I*TONEitj 1.4497** 1.4402** 1.5328** 1.3976** 1.2955** 
 (0.6823) (0.6827) (0.6680) (0.6356) (0.5645) 
TOVERit–2j 11.0231 11.2741 11.6474 11.4708 10.2816 
 (7.9941) (8.6060) (8.5931) (8.4678) (8.3929) 
INVPRICEit–2j 1.8742*** 1.8649*** 1.8966*** 1.9258*** 1.9600*** 
 (0.5023) (0.4916) (0.4738) (0.4596) (0.4378) 
RETVOLit–2j -31.0734* -26.1955 -23.5596 -19.3301 -5.1482 
 (17.6273) (17.2132) (16.7894) (16.0490) (14.4696) 
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Table 3.11 continued 
MVALUEit–2j 2.7359*** 2.7875*** 2.8304*** 2.7689*** 2.7485*** 
 (0.6662) (0.6562) (0.6500) (0.6320) (0.6057) 
MTBVit–2j -0.0735 -0.0721 -0.0729 -0.0492 -0.0957 
 (0.6385) (0.6380) (0.6284) (0.6163) (0.6000) 
RECCONit–2j -0.5955 -0.5860 -0.5397 -0.4614 -0.3625 
 (0.4609) (0.4583) (0.4511) (0.4383) (0.4270) 
ΔGDPtj -29.2736** -27.6352** -30.1101** -33.7365*** -31.3913*** 
 (12.7351) (12.6887) (12.5867) (12.2126) (11.3971) 
ΔUNEMtj 4.5831 3.8522 3.7727 3.9419 2.6095 
 (3.5466) (3.5455) (3.5829) (3.6609) (3.3581) 
IRATEtj -0.3067*** -0.3311*** -0.3644*** -0.4360*** -0.5434*** 
 (0.0803) (0.0799) (0.0794) (0.0779) (0.0781) 
Constant -4.1074 -4.6872 -5.6215 -5.4528 -4.9251 
 (6.2658) (6.1702) (6.1246) (5.9414) (5.5907) 
      
Observations 1,885 1,885 1,885 1,885 1,885 
Number of banks 53 53 53 53 53 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3012 0.3161 0.3289 0.3527 0.3947 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports the individual effect of stress test participation, stress test sentiment and disclosure tone on the 
bank report release date-specific analyst coverage (Equations 3.4A and 3.4B). I measure analyst coverage applying 
the average number of analyst recommendations (RECNOitj) for specific periods around and after the individual 
bank report release date (i.e., t–1, t+1; t+2, t+31; t+2, t+61; t+2, t+121; and t+2, t+250). Panel A illustrates the 
date-specific stress test sentiment (STSitj), whilst Panel B applies the disclosure tone (TONEitj). I estimate the 
impact of stress test sentiment using the word count of the accumulated stress test, regulation and risk 
management word lists (STSitj) and disclosure tone using (TONEitj) in combination with a time-dummy that 
estimates the individual stress test periods (STHC_I). I control for market microstructure characteristics, daily 
winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentiles, quarterly averaged and lagged by two quarters, and country-specific 
fundamentals, using the following variables: Share turnover (TOVERit–2j), inverse share price (INVPRICEit–2j), 
return volatility (RETVOLit–2j), market value (MVALUEit–2j), market-to-book value (MTBVit–2j), analyst 
recommendation consensus (RECCONt–2); and macroeconomic fundamentals captured by economic growth 
(ΔGDPtj), unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj), and sovereign debt risk (IRATEtj). Standard errors (in parentheses) 
are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.12 Textual measure robustness using factor analysis 
Panel A: Stress test disclosure sentiment factors 
 Factor pattern 
 Factor pattern: varimax rotation 
  STS_F1 STS_F2  STS_F1 STS_F2 
STS_IDitj 0.7171 -0.1667  0.7172 0.1665 
STS_PERFitj 0.6548 -0.4364  0.7801 -0.1031 
STS_PROitj 0.7901 -0.2664  0.8266 0.1092 
STS_REGINitj 0.3009 0.7991  -0.0822 0.8499 
STS_REQitj 0.6875 0.3008  0.4845 0.5731 
STS_RMitj 0.7284 0.2314   0.5518 0.5288 
Panel B: Disclosure tone factors 
 Factor pattern 
 Factor pattern: varimax rotation 
  TONE_F1 TONE_F2   TONE_F1 TONE_F2 
NEGATIVEitj 0.6883 -0.1133  0.6976 0.0024 
UNCERTAINitj 0.8045 0.0877  0.7788 0.2199 
MODALitj 0.7062 0.4225  0.6263 0.5338 
POSITIVEitj 0.1091 0.9128  -0.0438 0.9182 
LITIGIOUSitj 0.6605 -0.3102  0.7028 -0.1964 
SUPERFLUitj 0.7027 -0.2642   0.7368 -0.1440 
This table reports the factor analysis of the textual measures. Panel A presents factors and factor pattern of 
the stress test disclosure sentiment estimates, using the word count of my accumulated stress test, regulation 
and risk management word lists based on stress test disclosures (STS_IDitj, STS_PERFitj, STS_PROitj, 
STS_REGINitj, STS_REQitj, and STS_RMitj). Panel B illustrates factors and factor pattern of the disclosure 
tone measures using the word count of Loughran and McDonald’s (2011a) word lists (NEGATIVEitj, 
UNCERTAINitj, MODALitj, POSITIVEitj, LITIGIOUSitj, and SUPERFLUitj). The description of the variables 
and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.13 Stress test sentiment and tone robustness using factor analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables STS_F1 STS_F2 TONE_F1 TONE_F2 TONE_ALT 
ST1011 1.0391*** 1.0481*** 1.2476*** -0.0634 -0.0056*** 
 (0.2660) (0.2313) (0.3401) (0.3657) (0.0015) 
ST1011*FTST1011 0.1761 0.2062** 0.1284 0.0646 -0.0004 
 (0.1117) (0.0994) (0.1313) (0.1069) (0.0004) 
ST1415 1.7361*** 1.3852*** 1.8506*** 0.0647 -0.0076*** 
 (0.2470) (0.2585) (0.3057) (0.3481) (0.0016) 
ST1415*FTST1011 -0.2507*** 0.0231 -0.1619** -0.2896*** 0.0002 
 (0.0805) (0.0864) (0.0791) (0.0859) (0.0004) 
ST2016 1.7753*** 1.5708*** 1.9093*** 0.0832 -0.0065*** 
 (0.2595) (0.2511) (0.2992) (0.3686) (0.0016) 
ST2016*FTST1011 -0.2482*** -0.1293 -0.1858** -0.1939** 0.0001 
 (0.0810) (0.1058) (0.0796) (0.0780) (0.0004) 
SIZEit–2j -0.3437*** -0.1946 -0.2578** 0.2459 0.0021*** 
 (0.1206) (0.1649) (0.1229) (0.1481) (0.0007) 
LOANit–2j -0.0327 0.4400 0.0755 0.2152 0.0027* 
 (0.3133) (0.5466) (0.2907) (0.4812) (0.0016) 
LLRit–2j 2.9187* 1.8860* 4.5847*** -0.4292 -0.0214*** 
 (1.4848) (1.1111) (1.5427) (1.0738) (0.0057) 
LLPit–2j 2.7933 0.2553 6.3229* -0.6108 -0.0354* 
 (2.7824) (3.4590) (3.2228) (4.4355) (0.0187) 
TRADEit–2j -0.4145 -1.0028* -0.5683 -0.7195 0.0001 
 (0.4980) (0.5616) (0.5452) (0.5619) (0.0032) 
T1Rit–2j 0.7011 1.0813* 0.6289 1.7589** 0.0111*** 
 (0.7159) (0.5969) (0.8292) (0.8704) (0.0039) 
DSTFit–2j -0.3420 0.2540 -0.5513* -0.0382 0.0018 
 (0.2106) (0.2760) (0.2943) (0.3027) (0.0013) 
EBPTit–2j -13.9161** -6.8360 -11.8389* 3.2145 0.0806*** 
 (6.4239) (5.1189) (6.3718) (4.7260) (0.0278) 
ΔGDPtj 0.5546 3.2620*** 1.5224 -0.0589 -0.0025 
 (0.7701) (0.9962) (1.1262) (0.7972) (0.0040) 
ΔUNEMtj 0.2022 0.5270 1.2493*** -1.2273** -0.0066*** 
 (0.3934) (0.3568) (0.3825) (0.5837) (0.0020) 
Constant 2.6232* 0.9050 1.5137 -3.1452* -0.0282*** 
 (1.3638) (1.8005) (1.4632) (1.7696) (0.0076) 
      
Observations 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 
Number of banks 84 84 84 84 84 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3910 0.2147 0.4963 0.0613 0.1940 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports the effect of first-time stress test participation on banks' disclosure sentiment and tone based on the 
factor analysis. I measure stress test disclosure sentiment and disclosure tone using factors created in Table 3.11, while 
the sentiment factors STS_F1 and STS_F2 are based on the word count of my accumulated word lists and tone factors 
TONE_F1 and TONE_F2 are built on the word count of Loughran and McDonald’s (2011a) word lists. TONE_ALT is 
an alternative disclosure tone measure calculated as the difference of NEGATIVE and POSITIVE divided by TWA 
(Huang et al., 2014). I include dummy variables in my analysis to measure first-time participation in 2010-11 
(FTST1011) and the stress test periods in 2010-11 (ST1011), 2014-15 (ST1415), and 2016 (ST2016). I control for bank 
characteristics, winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentiles and lagged by two quarters, and country-specific fundamentals, 
using the following variables: Bank size captured by natural logarithm of total assets (SIZEit–2j), traditional banking 
activities shown by outstanding loans (LOANit–2j), credit portfolio quality measured by loan loss reserves (LLRit–2j), 
asset quality captured by loan loss provisions (LLPit–2j), non-traditional banking activities measured by trading 
securities (TRADEit–2j), capital adequacy captured by regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio (T1Rit–2j), liquidity risk shown by 
deposits and short-term funding (DSTFit–2j), profitability measured by earnings before provision and taxes (EBPTit–2j); 
and macroeconomic fundamentals captured by economic growth (ΔGDPtj), and unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj). 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 3.1. 
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Chapter 4 – Market discipline and financial stability: Are bank stress 
tests meeting expectations? 
4.1. Introduction 
After the 2008 financial crisis, regulators worldwide have undertaken large-scale stress 
tests to reveal the solvency and soundness of Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions (SIFI) to market participants.29 Stress test disclosures are supposed to enhance 
transparency, therefore reducing information asymmetries in the market, and enabling 
market players to make more efficient investment decisions. It is considered that this 
revelation mechanism enforces market discipline, penalises excessive risk-taking and 
makes bank managers take more prudent decisions that can boost the level of certainty to 
the banking system and strengthen its stability (Cornett et al., 2019; Acharya et al., 2018; 
Flannery et al., 2017; Bischof and Daske, 2013). 
 The concept of market discipline is twofold and builds on monitoring bank activities. 
On the one hand, public information enables investors to assess the true value of a bank 
by estimating future cash flows. On the other hand, this information directs investors’ 
pricing which creates pressure on a bank’s behaviour. In principle, assuming perfect and 
complete information, no regulation would be necessary because markets would 
discipline banks when their risk-taking does not meet market expectations. However, 
banks are relatively opaque compared to corporate firms (Morgan, 2002). Therefore, the 
idea of including market discipline in banking regulation has two challenges. First, to 
enable investors to identify risky activities that, second, lead to influence which curbs 
bank risk-taking and shifting (Danisewicz et al., 2018; Nier and Baumann, 2006). 
 Since 2004, even before the 2008 financial crisis, market discipline became important 
as the third pillar within the Basel Accord. Therefore, subsequently, more detailed 
financial reporting and regulatory disclosures demand more transparency from SIFIs. For 
instance, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has consequently 
 
29 Since 2009, U.S. bank holding companies with $50 billion or more in total consolidated assets have been 
within the scope of yearly Dodd-Frank Act Stress tests (DFAST) and Comprehensive Capital Analysis and 
Reviews (CCAR) undertaken by the Federal Reserve. European stress tests were conducted by the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) (former Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS)) in 
2009, 2010, 2011, 2014, 2016 and 2018. In addition, the European Central Bank (ECB) assessed European 
SIFIs within the European Monetary Union (EMU) member states in 2014 and 2015 as part of the induction 
of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). 
  
135 
followed the strategy of introducing standardised templates as part of Pillar 3 to improve 
and supplement the effectiveness of the capital regime under Pillar 1 (BCBS, 2013, 2017). 
An important component of the authority’s strategy is regular stress test disclosures; these 
aim to reveal a bank’s solvency and soundness against adverse market developments, and 
to respectively rebuild and maintain the trust of market participants during crises and 
normal times (Goldstein and Leitner, 2018; Bouvard et al., 2015; Borio et al., 2014; 
Schuermann, 2014; Goldstein and Sapra, 2013). 
 On the European market, some event studies have shown that markets can benefit from 
stress test reports as those disclosures add new and valuable information, whilst other 
studies highlight potential negative consequences. In particular, Petrella and Resti (2013) 
observe positive market reactions around EBA’s 2011 exercise, while Carboni et al. (2017) 
and Lazzari et al. (2017) show that markets reacted to ECB’s 2014 comprehensive 
assessment. On the negative side, Goncharenko et al. (2018) provide theoretical evidence 
that stress tests produce negative disclosure effects which they support with empirical 
data from the EBA’s 2011 and 2014 stress test exercises. Similarly, Sahin and de Haan 
(2016) document no market reactions on the ECB’s 2014 stress test  and argue that the 
outcome was aligned with market expectations. Furthermore, cross-country studies by 
Breckenfelder and Schwaab (2018) and Barucci et al. (2018) focus on bank risk spill-over 
effects and supervisory forbearance, respectively. In terms of individual bank behaviour, 
Bischof and Daske (2013) find that the participants of the CEBS’s 2010 and EBA’s 2011 
stress tests as well as EBA’s 2011 capital exercise issue voluntarily disclosures to curb 
bad signals from stress test information. Likewise, Gropp et al. (2019) show capital 
management practices, indicating that such assessments might unintendedly incentivise 
discretionary bank behaviour. 
 In the U.S., research examines different aspects of the assessments on a large scale, 
mainly agreeing that those exercises are informative. The first event studies finding 
market reactions around the result release of the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program 
(SCAP) were undertaken by Morgan et al. (2014) and Quijano (2014). In theoretical 
studies, researchers argue that stress test disclosures may reduce investors’ risk-sharing 
incentives, interrupt private information production, exacerbate bank managers’ short-
sighted decision making and may even lead to bank runs if regulators intentionally hold 
back negative information (Goldstein and Leitner, 2018; Bouvard et al., 2015; Goldstein 
and Sapra, 2013). However, those theories have not yet been supported by empirical 
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evidence. For example, Flannery et al. (2017) support previous findings that stress tests 
provide useful information on bank risk-taking. However, the information impact has 
decreased in recent years. Also, they do not find negative welfare effects from stress 
testing on analyst information production, neither have they influenced manager’s 
investment decisions. Recently, researchers have extended their analysis towards 
implications of stress tests on bank lending (Acharya et al., 2018) and lobbying (Cornett 
et al., 2019). These studies find, respectively, that stress-tested banks reduce lending 
activities to large and risky borrowers and raise political spending to pass stress tests. 
 Motivated by the growing influence of regulatory stress tests on the financial sector, I 
scrutinise whether such exercises meet expectations in enhancing the market discipline 
that safeguards financial stability. Importantly, with regards to European stress tests, 
studies examine one or two stress test exercises, but no attempt has been made to jointly 
assess European and U.S. stress tests. However, to make sense of the debate and to draw 
conclusions about the cost and benefit of stress tests, I provide a comprehensive picture 
that might support regulators and policymakers on establishing a stress test disclosure 
strategy (Bouvard et al., 2015; Borio et al., 2014; Schuermann, 2014). In particular, I 
examine the subsequent research questions. Do stress tests provide new information to 
the markets that disciplines banks? Is the disciplining effect stronger when experienced 
for the first time? Does the disciplining effect exacerbate future abnormal return trends? 
Do stress tests contribute to market discipline by reducing information asymmetry, bank 
risk-taking and improving bank funding structure?  
 The stress test literature provides some theoretical and empirical evidence on stress 
tests; however, the effect of stress tests on market discipline has not yet been concluded 
(Acharya et al., 2018; Goldstein and Leitner, 2018; Flannery et al., 2017; Goldstein and 
Sapra, 2013). Thus, I contribute to this literature by substantiating the link between stress 
tests and market discipline from two perspectives. First, the stock market’s sentiment 
reflects market discipline from stress tests as security prices quickly integrate the 
disclosure of new information. I measure the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and buy-
and-hold return (BHAR) over various short-term event windows. A negative market 
response indicates ‘bad’ news and market discipline, whilst a positive reaction implies 
‘good’ news and market reward. Further, I implement a calendar-time portfolio (CTIME) 
approach that tests if stress-tested banks over- or under-perform the markets in the long-
run after the stress test event. Second, I expand related empirical work on bank behaviour 
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and explore the influencing power of market discipline from stress tests (Cornett et al., 
2019; Gropp et al., 2019; Bischof and Daske, 2013). I conduct a fundamental analysis 
that captures information asymmetry, bank risk-taking and funding structure. The purpose 
is to scrutinise the time-series impact of stress tests on bank fundamentals and whether 
those exercises empower market players to influence bank behaviour. This contribution 
also expands the market discipline literature (Danisewicz et al., 2018; Bushman and 
Williams, 2012; Nier and Baumann, 2006). 
 The event study results that concern the disciplining effect of stress tests are mixed for 
both the European and U.S. market due to the intrinsic difference of the individual 
assessment. In Europe, I find that only the 2011 stress test stimulate significant positive 
market reactions, whilst the market responses of the recent stress tests in 2014, 2016 and 
2018 appear to be insignificant and, therefore, correspond with the investor’s expectations. 
Furthermore, the first-time participation event triggers significant positive market 
responses in short-term event windows and prove to be more informative than taking all 
stress test events together. As the market reactions are mainly positive, I conclude that 
European banks are not disciplined but rewarded, as market confidence is restored (for 
instance, after the 2011 stress test). Moreover, I document that stress test events may be 
an accelerating factor that exacerbates positive and negative share price performance. In 
particular, if a bank’s abnormal return reports a positive or negative response in a 3-day 
event window around the stress test (i.e., one day before and after the event), the 
succeeding abnormal returns continue this positive or negative trend. Therefore, stress 
tests exacerbate abnormal return trends, and the disciplining effect lasts longer when the 
bank shares are in a downward rather than in an upward trend. This incident might harm 
financial stability as weaker institutions are penalised even more. 
 In the U.S., the results indicate that information from stress tests appears to correspond 
with market expectation or is seen as ‘bad’ news that leads to disciplining activities by 
the markets. In particular, I only report positive responses for the Comprehensive Capital 
Analysis and Review (CCAR) in 2012, whilst I see significant negative market reactions 
for the CCARs in 2013, 2017 and 2018 as well as for the 2016 Dodd-Frank Act Stress 
Test (DFAST). It appears that CCARs are more informative than the DFASTs, which 
could mean that investors hold back their investments until the regulatory announcement 
is complete. In contrast to the European stress tests, the first-time participation event does 
not produce significant market reactions. However, taking all stress test events together, 
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I find negative and significant responses over a 7-day event window around the stress test 
observation (i.e., three days before and after the event). Therefore, U.S. banks are 
disciplined by the markets when regulators release stress test information. Moreover, 
similar to the European case, stress tests exacerbate abnormal return trends, whereas 
negative return trends remain more persistent than the positive equivalents. This holds 
true specifically for the initial stress test exercise in 2009 and total stress test participation. 
 In the long-run, I report that, on certain occasions, European and U.S. stress-tested 
banks over, but also under-perform the markets. In particular, I document that positive 
and negative trends observed in short-term event windows continue over a longer period 
following the stress test. For example, in Europe, the positive market momentum of the 
2011 stress test transfers over 1-12 months after the stress test, whilst the negative 
tendency of the 2014 assessment was still considered for the long-term stock performance 
over 1-24 months after the 2014 exercise. Similarly, in the U.S., I measure this negative 
trend for the assessments in 2013. This result might be connected to the fact that 2013 
was the first year when the regulator conducted two assessments (DFAST and CCAR). 
 Analysing bank fundamentals, I find several time-series variations in terms of 
information asymmetry, analyst behaviour, bank risk-taking and funding structure that 
appear during stress test periods. In particular, concerning information asymmetry and 
analyst behaviour, in both jurisdictions the results appear to be strong during the earlier 
stress test periods in Europe (in 2010-11) and in the U.S. (in 2009-13). The findings 
weaken in recent stress test periods, which indicate that stress test information 
corresponds with market expectations. For instance, I report that European first-time 
participation in 2010-11 not only reduces information asymmetry and raises analyst 
coverage, but also increases analyst estimates dispersion. In support of my event study 
findings, the 2011 stress test contributes to stabilising liquidity in the markets, while some 
uncertainty remains among analyst forecasts. Further, in the U.S., I show that information 
asymmetry decreases significantly. In contrast, stress tests do not appear to substantially 
influence U.S. analyst behaviour. I only observe a decrease in analyst coverage in       
2009-13; however, I cannot confirm a conclusive impact on earnings surprises and 
estimate dispersion. The results supplement Flannery et al. (2017), who also report a weak 
relationship between analyst behaviour and stress test information. 
 Furthermore, European stress-tested banks show significant signs of reduced risk-
taking as capital adequacy, leverage risk, insolvency risk, credit risk and credit portfolio 
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quality improve during stress test periods. Further, in Europe, I find rewarding market 
discipline within the bank funding structure. For instance, depositors appear to charge 
lower interest rates during stress test periods. The results are particularly strong for the 
earlier 2010-11 than the recent 2014 first-time stress test participants and may be 
explained by the growing confidence in the markets and a potential learning curve to 
which stress tests may have contributed. In contrast, in the U.S. the results with regards 
to bank risk-taking and funding structure are mixed and not as conclusive as for the 
European case. In particular, U.S. banks seem to be less risky during stress test periods, 
as the insolvency risk decreases, and profitability improves. However, I cannot observe 
strong evidence of market discipline within the other risk-taking variables such as 
leverage, credit risk and credit portfolio quality as well as the funding structure analysis. 
 The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents the 
theoretical framework and related literature; it also discusses the main arguments and the 
limitations of relevant studies. Section 4.3 develops the empirical hypotheses to be tested 
in Section 4.4. The latter section illustrates the data collection and the econometric 
techniques I apply in my analysis. Section 4.5 reports and discusses the empirical results, 
while Section 4.6 shows robustness. Section 4.7 concludes the chapter and presents the 
political implications. 
4.2. Theoretical framework and related literature 
4.2.1. The theory of efficiently disciplined markets 
The concept of market discipline may be traced back to Adam Smith’s theories (Smith, 
1759, 1776). Accordingly, markets should be left free from regulation because they 
regulate themselves through supply, demand, competition and self-interest. As argued by 
Flannery (2001), market discipline is a two-step process that consists of the assumptions 
that markets monitor a bank’s condition and influence a manager’s actions. However, to 
enable markets to monitor and impose influence, adequate information needs to be 
provided on the markets that display a bank’s financial condition. Then, in theory, the 
share price includes publicly available information as market participants timely 
incorporate new monitoring information into their risk assessment and investment 
strategies. 
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Several researchers have worked on the theory of efficient capital markets and on 
building an asset pricing model. Simultaneously, Lintner (1965b, 1965a), Sharpe (1964) 
and Mossin (1966) independently created the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) that 
builds on the assumption of efficient markets. In a theoretical review, Fama (1970, p. 383) 
defines a market as efficient when “prices always ‘fully reflect’ available information”. 
He further distinguishes the extant literature of that time into tests of weak, semi-strong 
and strong form of market efficiency. In its weak from, market prices reflect only 
historical information, whereas the semi-strong form adjusts prices quickly when current 
information is made publicly available. The strong form includes price information that 
only monopolistic investors (i.e., insiders) might be able to access. In later work, Fama 
(1991) argues that the efficient market hypothesis is untestable because of the joint 
hypothesis problem. It is ambiguous to conclude that markets are inefficient because 
inefficacy might be at least partly explained by the asset pricing model’s inaccuracy. To 
improve the estimation of asset prices, researchers extended the CAPM and introduced 
distinct factors that control for market capitalisation, book-to-market ratio (Fama and 
French, 1993), return momentum (Carhart, 1997) and liquidity (Fama and French, 2015). 
Nevertheless, Fama (1991) argues that the efficient market hypothesis has significantly 
enhanced the understanding of security returns and their movements. Therefore, bank 
managers need to closely examine their share price and, in some cases, respond to adverse 
changes to mitigate the impact. Those managerial decisions may then serve the interests 
of stakeholders. This potential influence is divided into a ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ stream. 
While equity and debt owners impose direct impact through increased funding costs 
and/or reduced trading volume for riskier banks, supervisors may indirectly react to 
changes of a bank’s condition by stricter regulation of asset quality, liquidity and capital 
adequacy (Bliss and Flannery, 2002; Flannery, 2001). 
This potential impact of stakeholders may concern bank risk-taking, as banks are 
exposed to different risk types. In particular, credit risk is based on the likelihood of a 
borrower defaulting and being unable to repay either principal or interest. Liquidiy risk 
is driven by asset transformation of short-term deposits and savings to long-term loans 
and the possibility of sudden extensive withdrawals by depositors. In addition, banks face 
other types of risk based on the variation of the financial markets (market risk and 
currency risk), the balance between capital and debts (leverage risk) together with 
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operational risk (López-Espinosa et al., 2013). Therefore, a bank’s degree of risk depends 
on the management of their business models. 
Consequently, a bank’s individual risk strategy is externally driven by uncertainty, 
volatility and sensitivity of their business models, but is also determined by the intrinsic 
risk appetite and the management of the risk-return dilemma that high expected returns 
lead to higher risk and vice versa. This has been analysed in various studies. First, a 
growing literature stream finds evidence for increased risk-taking that is related to non-
interest income (Bushman et al., 2016; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). Second, 
global SIFIs in particular might have the incentive to increase their size by risk-taking, 
classified as too-big-to-fail, and be saved through governmental bail-outs in case of 
bankruptcy (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2013). Third, exogenous factors such as 
financial liberalisation or bank competition can influence banks’ risk-taking. While the 
risk-increasing impact of liberalisation is well-documented, controversial debates raise 
the opinion that bank competition can benefit both financial stability or fragility (Boyd 
and De Nicolo, 2005; Allen and Gale, 2004). 
4.2.2. Transparency, market discipline and financial stability 
In the context of market discipline, more or qualitatively better bank transparency is 
generally considered to safeguard financial stability, henceforth ‘good’ transparency, as 
it aims to mitigate information asymmetry between managers and other market players 
such as depositors and creditors.30 For instance, objective and solid financial accounting 
information, as an important transparency channel, can enable shareholders and internal 
controlling bodies to execute the corporate governance role to monitor decision makers. 
Further, ‘good’ transparency increases the efficiency of identifying investment 
opportunities to create value for managers and investors; in turn this supports and 
enhances financial markets to become more efficient and precise in reflecting the true 
value of a firm (Bushman and Smith, 2003). 
In addition, this improved efficiency can specifically mitigate liquidity risk as it 
enhances short-term debt refinancing (Ratnovski, 2013). Moreover, studies have 
particularly observed that ‘good’ transparency strengthens market discipline, which is an 
 
30 Beatty and Liao (2014), Bushman (2014) and Acharya and Ryan (2016) provide excellent reviews of the 
bank transparency and opacity literature. For conciseness, I do not mention all references and refer to those 
articles for a thorough discussion. 
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important mechanism to monitor and penalise bank risk-taking practices (e.g., Nier and 
Baumann, 2006; Blum, 2002). More recently, empirical evidence indicates that market 
discipline varies across countries, decreases when banks become larger and becomes 
weaker during and after crises due to governmental intervention (Cubillas et al., 2012, 
2017; Berger and Turk-Ariss, 2015). 
In addition to the positive effects of transparency, the literature identifies that under 
specific circumstances, more transparency can negatively affect financial stability. They 
argue that inefficient information, henceforth ‘bad’ transparency, could irritate and 
misguide bank insiders and outsiders, which can lead to market failure. Consequently, it 
might be better to hide this information and retain a level of opacity. For example, if 
public information, and therefore transparency, becomes too precise, depositors might 
overreact particularly to negative information and, in the worst case, start bank runs. 
However, this inefficiency can be mitigated if a depositor insurance system is in place 
(Chen and Hasan, 2006; Morris and Shin, 2002). 
Furthermore, Dang et al. (2017) argue that less information about the credit worthiness 
of banks’ loan holders is desirable to provide risk-sharing benefits to depositors and to 
maintain market liquidity. Morrison and White (2013) argue that a weak regulator 
reputation combined with a transparent regulatory procedure might lead to financial 
contagion in case of a bank failure of one of the regulator’s supervised banks. In this case, 
uninformed depositors might lose confidence in the regulator’s competence and withdraw 
their deposits from other banks under the same regime. In addition, more transparency 
might motivate managers to exercise accounting discretion to hide excessive risk-taking 
activities, which in turn may curb market discipline and harm financial stability (Bushman 
and Williams, 2012, 2015). 
4.2.3. Stress tests, market discipline and financial stability 
In a conceptual study, Goldstein and Sapra (2013) examine the impact of stress test 
disclosures on financial stability and identify positive and negative effects. For instance, 
stress test disclosures provide bank-specific information about the risk profile; this 
enhances investors’ precision in their risk assessment that ultimately leads to more share 
price efficiency, thus market discipline. Further, the disclosure of stress test results may 
enrich depositors’ trust due to supervisory discipline. In particular, when regulators are 
committed to reporting the methodology and results, it may enhance the market’s trust as 
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it mitigates potential regulatory forbearance. On the other hand, stress test disclosures 
might reduce risk sharing among market participants (i.e., Hirshleifer (1971) effect) and 
exacerbate contagion. Also, investors might follow the regulator’s stress test results 
instead of sourcing their own information, which curbs the regulator’s learning curve 
from market prices. Moreover, bank managers might tend to make short-sighted 
investment decisions to avoid failing stress tests. 
However, this theoretical framework is essentially connected to the state of the 
economy, as well as to the quantity and quality of stress test disclosures (i.e., aggregated 
or bank-specific information). In a theoretical paper, Bouvard et al. (2015) suggest that if 
the average condition of stress-tested banks is above a specified threshold, no bank-
specific information (i.e., aggregated information) should be disclosed because there is a 
risk of a run on low-quality banks. Particularly in normal times, pooling some low-quality 
banks with other banks of higher quality does not negatively affect good banks but 
significantly decreases the rollover risk on bad banks. In times of financial distress, 
regulators need to show bank-specific information because uncertainty might lead to a 
run on the entire system. Therefore, stress test disclosures distinguish good and bad banks 
and limit potential bank runs to low-quality banks. However, if the regulator has private 
information about a potential economic downturn, this circumstance might result in a 
commitment problem of the regulator. The regulator might not want to disclose ‘bad’ 
news that could produce a shock and thus hold back information, in more cases than 
optimal. This opacity could lead to a misguidance of market players who might be more 
likely to run on the entire system. 
4.3. Hypotheses 
In the following sub-sections, I develop my hypotheses that test how effective stress 
tests may stimulate market discipline and thus contribute to financial stability. As 
discussed in Section 4.2.1, market discipline is divided into two functions, that are 
monitoring and influence (Schaeck et al., 2012; Bliss and Flannery, 2002; Flannery, 2001). 
The monitoring (i.e., disciplining) effect refers to the market players (e.g., regulators, 
investors, depositors, and others) ability to effectively assess bank performance and to 
take action on incorporating these evaluations into market prices. On the other hand, the 
concept of influence implies that these disciplining activities may lead to changes in bank 
managers behaviours. 
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4.3.1. The disciplining effect of new stress test information 
The main purpose of stress tests is to inform investors about participating banks’ risk-
taking activities. In particular, stress tests provide a current snapshot of the state of each 
bank’s capital adequacy to project the bank’s financial ability to avoid severe financial 
distress and business disruptions in an adverse scenario (Borio et al., 2014; Schuermann, 
2014). In a semi-strong efficient market, an investor’s sentiment reflects the short-term 
disciplining effect as security prices quickly integrate the disclosure of new information 
(Fama, 1970). However, stress test reports are special because they disclose bank-specific 
regulatory information, that would be kept confidential under normal circumstances 
(Feldberg and Metrick, 2019; Bushman, 2014), to restore and maintain the market’s trust 
during crises and normal economic times, respectively (Bouvard et al., 2015; Borio et al., 
2014). For this reason, this improved transparency from stress test information may 
trigger market player’s disciplining activities that may be observed by positive and 
negative market price reactions (Flannery et al., 2017). 
Using a sample of stress-tested banks, I test the European (2010-2018) and U.S. (2009-
2018) assessments and compare these particular market reactions and, therefore, the 
disciplining effect that the new information from stress tests may provoke in the short-
term. In particular, if regulators reveal more risk-taking than markets expect, investors 
might reduce or even reject an investment, and vice versa. Therefore, a negative market 
response indicates ‘bad’ news and market discipline, whilst a positive reaction implies 
‘good’ news and market reward. Further, taking the average market reactions of first-time 
and total stress test participation, I hypothesise that the information power of first-time 
participation is stronger because the disciplining intensity may deteriorate over time if 
banks participate on a regular basis (Flannery et al., 2017). In addition, I test if this short-
term market response from stress tests exacerbates the abnormal return trend in either a 
positive or negative direction. In other words, if the initial market reaction on stress test 
information is negative (i.e., disciplining), abnormal returns could continue this negative 
trend, and vice versa. Accordingly, I formulate the first set of hypotheses: 
H1a. Stress tests have a disciplining effect on banks. 
H1b. The disciplining effect of stress tests is stronger for first-time participants. 
H1c. An initial disciplining effect of stress tests is followed by negative abnormal returns. 
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4.3.2. The long-term performance of stress-tested stocks 
Extending H1c, I investigate how the release of stress test information contributes to 
improve market confidence that might influence long-term stock performance of stress-
tested banks. As explained earlier, stress tests provide a projection into the future 
performance of participating banks. A negative outlook may lead to an instant short-term 
market reaction (as hypothesised in Section 4.3.1) but could also affect the investor’s 
long-term investment strategy. In particular, in normal economic times, stress test 
information provided by the authorities might reduce the investor’s incentive to produce 
and trade on their own information; this might decrease the authority’s ability to learn 
from share price movements (Bond and Goldstein, 2015; Bouvard et al., 2015; Goldstein 
and Sapra, 2013). Therefore, if investors follow the stress test information in the long-
run, I expect that stress-tested banks’ stocks over- or under-perform the market in the case 
of a positive or negative stress test outlook, respectively. Thus, I propose the next 
hypothesis: 
H2. The release of stress test information affects bank stock performance in the long-run. 
 
4.3.3. Market discipline towards financial stability 
Can one comprehensively conclude from market reactions alone that market 
confidence has been restored and/or maintained as a consequence of additional stress test 
information that triggers market discipline? It is one perspective to analyse if markets 
react to stress test information, but the other side is to examine bank-individual 
fundamentals that should mirror the influencing effect of these imposed market 
disciplining activities. More specific, if the disciplining effect is transferred into a 
negative market response (i.e., short-term costs), this should lead to a change in bank 
managers behaviour to reverse the negative trend in the bank’s condition (Bliss and 
Flannery, 2002, Flannery, 2001). Thus, I further investigate different micro-prudential 
market and accounting factors that are linked to information asymmetry and analyst 
behaviour; this is in addition to the bank risk-taking and funding structure to test the 
market’s disciplining influence on bank-specific characteristics (Acharya et al., 2018; 
Flannery et al., 2017). 
First, stress test disclosures improve the provision of public information that reduces 
information asymmetry amongst economic agents. The more transparent a bank’s 
operation is, the more accurately outsiders can assess its value leading to better-informed 
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investment decisions (Bushman et al., 2004). Further, lower information asymmetry 
magnifies the quality of information that analysts produce thus leading to a lower 
likelihood of disagreements among analysts (e.g., Flannery et al., 2017; Marquardt and 
Wiedman, 1998). Second, this transparency mechanism links to market discipline as it 
enables investors and depositors to identify and react to a bank’s risk-taking activities by 
charging a higher premium for funding resources (Danisewicz et al., 2018). In particular, 
investors and depositors have incentives to influence bank management to ex ante prevent 
failures that might lead to a loss of their charter value (Schaeck et al., 2012; Martinez 
Peria and Schmukler, 2001). For instance, evidence shows that depositor preference 
structures and more uninsured liabilities enhance market influence and reduce bank risk-
taking (Danisewicz et al., 2018; Nier and Baumann, 2006). On certain occasions, higher 
bank risk increases even the likelihood of bank executives to step down (Schaeck et al., 
2012). Ultimately, this also refers to financial stability as stricter monitored banks are less 
prone to market volatility, financial distress and insolvency risk, therefore reducing the 
probability of a banking crisis (Bushman and Williams, 2012; Nier and Baumann, 2006; 
Nier, 2005). Consequently, I hypothesise that the described market discipline mechanism 
leads to a decline in information asymmetry and less diverse analyst behaviour as well as 
reduced bank risk-taking and an improved funding structure. 
H3. Information asymmetry is reduced following stress tests 
H4. Analyst behaviour is less diverse following stress tests.  
H5. Bank risk-taking activities are reduced following stress tests. 
H6. Bank funding structures are improved following stress tests. 
4.4. Empirical analysis 
In this section, I provide detailed description of the sample selection process, variables 
construction and empirical models that I employ in my analysis. The description of 
variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 4.1. 
[Please refer to Table 4.1 here] 
4.4.1. Sample selection 
I select the sample of stress-tested banks based on the European and U.S. stress test 
reports published by the regulatory stress test authorities (i.e., CEBS, EBA, ECB and 
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Federal Reserve).31 These reports disclose all banks that participated in the regulatory 
stress tests between 2009 and 2018, with detailed information about the stress test 
performance of each bank.32 Similar to Flannery et al. (2017) and Bischof and Daske 
(2013), I illustrate both the stress test observations of each European and U.S. exercise 
alongside the accumulated total samples of banks and first-time participants. This enables 
me to examine the effect of each stress test exercise and the impact of first-time (FTSTO) 
and total stress test participation (TOTALSTO). Accordingly, Table 4.2, Panels A and B, 
shows the total samples of 188 European and 42 U.S. banks as well as 98 European first-
time participants in 2010-11 (77 banks in 2014) and 19 U.S. first-time participants in 2009 
(12 banks in 2014). In Europe, stress test participation varies substantially from one 
exercise to another and peaks in 2014, while recent observations decrease (i.e., 2016 and 
2018). In the U.S., stress test participation remains steady over the period 2009-2013, 
increases in 2014, and varies slightly in recent years (i.e., 2015-2018). 
[Please refer to Table 4.2 here] 
Since I examine the samples of banks over a 10-year period, in which the market 
structure of the banking industry has radically changed as a result of the global financial 
crisis, I need to account for data limitations due to the timing of IPOs, M&As, 
bankruptcies and other factors. First, in Table 4.2, Panels C and D, I present how I refine 
my dataset to obtain the data I employed in the event study analysis. For both European 
and U.S. samples, I exclude a small number of bank event observations because the daily 
share prices are not available for the particular event and estimation windows. For 
instance, the listed banks Bankia, Liberbank and ABN AMRO (European) and Ally 
Financial, Inc. (U.S.) went public after some event dates (i.e., that of 2009-2014); this 
explains the unavailability of the share price data.  
Second, in Table 4.2, Panel E, I prepare the European and U.S. samples for the time-
series approach. For instance, 20 European banks, mainly from Spain, were merged, 
resolved or consolidated after the 2008 financial crisis (Bischof and Daske, 2013). This 
 
31  The reports may be accessed on the EBA, ECB and Federal Reserve websites (see: 
https://eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/eu-wide-stress-testing, https://www.bankingsupervision.europ 
a.eu/banking/tasks/comprehensive_assessment/html/index.en.html, https://www.federalreserve.gov/super 
visionreg/stress-tests-capital-planning.htm. 
32 The relevant press release of the CEBS does not provide the names of the stress-tested banks in 2009; it 
simply states that “22 major European cross border banking groups” were tested (for further details, see: 
http://www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/eu-wide-stress-testing/2009). 
  
148 
circumstance results in inherent data limitations. Furthermore, I remove 25 European and 
13 U.S. institutions for which the accounting data on FitchConnect is of poor quality (i.e., 
covers less than half of the data period from 2005-2017). In Europe, this issue concerns 
private institutions, whilst in the U.S. those banks are non-U.S.-owned subsidiaries that 
do not provide separate annual reports. Similarly, one U.S. institution (i.e., Metlife, Inc.) 
is excluded because it is an insurance company that exited its banking engagement in 
2013 (Cornett et al., 2019; Flannery et al., 2017).33 In sum, I reduce the initial stress test 
samples (Panel A) by 45 European and 13 U.S. institutions due to the explained data 
limitations that could not be manually corrected. This process leads to a final sample of 
143 (listed: 62) European banks from 25 countries and 29 U.S. (listed: 28) banks. 
4.4.2. Data construction and key variables 
I use various variables to estimate market discipline from different angles based on the 
relevant stress test, accounting and market discipline literature and further expand my 
database that I describe in Chapter 3 (Section 3.4.2). I collect accounting measures from 
BvD Bankscope and FitchConnect (supplemented by hand-collection) and the market 
variables from Thomson Reuters (Datastream/IBES). To conduct the event study, I also 
resort to this database using the daily share prices and, in addition, factors from the Fama 
and French website. I accommodate outliers that potentially bias the results by removing 
particular low and high share prices, thin trading days, and winsorise the accounting and 
market data at the 1 and 99 percentiles. Accounting data are obtained and winsorised on 
a quarterly basis, while I collect and winsorise market data daily and average those daily 
values to construct quarterly frequencies. I follow the recent banking literature that 
employs such methods (Gropp et al., 2014; Bischof and Daske, 2013; Flannery et al., 
2013; Beatty and Liao, 2011). The data period of the quarterly obtained accounting and 
market data spans from 2005-2017. To analyse the most recent European and U.S. stress 
tests in 2018, the daily share prices are extended until year-end 2018. 
First, I comprehensively assess bank risk-taking (Cubillas et al., 2012, 2017; Nier and 
Baumann, 2006) using capital adequacy captured by the Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio 
(T1R); leverage risk measured by the natural logarithm of leverage ratio that is liabilities 
over equity (LEVERAGE); credit risk of banks reflected in the risk-weighted assets (RWA); 
 
33 The European sample consists of a wide range of commercial, savings and cooperative banks, whilst the 
in the U.S. regulators predominantly observe bank holding companies. 
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credit portfolio quality captured by loan loss reserves (LLR); insolvency risk estimated 
by the natural logarithm of Z-Score that equals return on assets plus capital over total 
asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of return on assets (ZSCORE); and 
profitability shown by return on assets (ROA). The intuition behind these bank risk-taking 
measures is that stress test information might enforce market discipline that should then 
be reflected in more capital adequacy (T1R), lower leverage risk (LEVERAGE) as well as 
quality and quantity of the credit portfolio (RWA, LLR). Further, a higher Z-Score 
(ZSCORE) and its component return on assets (ROA) should indicate lower insolvency 
risk due to the market discipline mechanism (Beck et al., 2013; Laeven and Levine, 2009).  
Second, I measure bank funding structure (Danisewicz et al., 2018; Ben-David et al., 
2017; Nier and Baumann, 2006) using total funding cost reflected by total interest 
expenses (TIE); uninsured funding cost captured by other interest expenses (OIE) and 
insured funding cost shown by interest paid on customer deposits (IECD); uninsured 
funding using bank deposits (DEPBA) and subordinated debts (SUBD); insured funding 
estimated by customer deposits (CUSTD) and interest margin reflected in the net interest 
margin ratio (NIM). The literature argues that lower uninsured funding and higher funding 
costs are signs of market discipline as such a movement of these variables indicates that 
depositors withdraw their funds and charge higher premiums (Danisewicz et al., 2018). 
Third, I estimate information asymmetry using the bid-ask spread (BIDASK) and 
analyst behaviour captured by analyst coverage (RECNO), earnings surprises (EPSSUR / 
PRICE) and estimate dispersion (ESTSD / PRICE) both as a proportion of the bank share 
price. Importantly, as the level of information increases due to stress test reports, this 
should lead to reduced information asymmetry that might encourage more analyst 
coverage and precise earnings forecasts. In turn, if this mechanism is ineffective, markets 
should be less liquid as more diversity of recommendations and earnings forecasts is 
widely believed to indicate uncertainty (Flannery et al., 2013, 2017; Bischof and Daske, 
2013; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). 
4.4.3. Descriptive statistics and correlation tests 
Table 4.3 provides descriptive statistics on bank risk-taking, funding structure and 
bank accounting characteristics as well as information asymmetry, analyst behaviour and 
market microstructure. Panel A presents European banks, while Panel B illustrates U.S. 
banks. On average, there is only a slight difference in the accounting characteristics 
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between the U.S. and European banks. U.S. banks are marginally larger than European 
banks (SIZE) but have lower capital adequacy (T1R). Further, in both markets, the banks 
provide similar liquidity with regards to total funding (DEPO). However, European banks 
conduct more traditional banking activities (LOAN), whilst U.S. banks account for a 
higher credit risk portfolio (RWA). This may be explained by the higher off-balance sheet 
activities (OBSI) that are included in the calculation of risk-weighted assets and lead to a 
higher portion of credit portfolio risk. From a market perspective, U.S. banks account for 
a higher market value (MVALUE) and market-to-book value (MTBV). In terms of 
information asymmetry and analyst behaviour, U.S. bank shares trade at a lower bid-ask 
spread (BIDASK) and are covered by more analysts (RECNO). Further, the dispersion of 
analyst earnings surprises (EPSSUR / PRICE, ESTSD / PRICE) is on average lower for 
U.S. compared to European banks. Therefore, U.S. bank shares may be seen as more 
liquid (lower bid-ask spread and estimate dispersion), compared to European banks. 
[Please refer to Table 4.3 here] 
In Table 4.4, I provide Pearson correlation coefficients and p-values for the variables 
that I use in the time-series regressions (Equations 4.9A,B and 4.10A,B). Panel A illustrates 
the European and Panel B shows the U.S. banks. In particular, I find statistically 
significant correlation within some accounting and market variables, as those are 
mechanically related. The correlation coefficients are consistent across both jurisdictions, 
but usually higher in the U.S. than in Europe. For instance, I observe a significant positive 
correlation (62.90% in the U.S. and 33.40% in Europe) between total deposits (DEPO) 
and outstanding loans (LOAN). Further, there is a significant negative correlation                
(-71.00% in the U.S. and -60.90% in Europe) between outstanding loans (LOAN) and 
trading securities (TRADE). These two relationships display the financial intermediation 
and business activities, respectively. Interestingly, earnings (EBPT) and loan loss 
provisions (LLP) are positively correlated (65.30% in the U.S. and 37.90% in Europe) at 
the 1% level of significance. This result is in line with the accounting discretion literature 
that well-documents bank loan loss provisioning to smooth income (Beatty and Liao, 
2014; Bushman and Williams, 2012). Moreover, the market value (MVALUE) and total 
assets (SIZE) are strongly positively correlated (82.90% in the U.S. and 85.30% in 
Europe), due to the significant relationship between market and book value of bank size. 
[Please refer to Table 4.4 here] 
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4.4.4. Empirical models 
4.4.4.1. Short-term event study approach 
I employ a short-term event study approach that is widely established in the literature 
(Flannery et al., 2017; Morgan et al., 2014; Petrella and Resti, 2013; Campbell et al., 1997; 
Mikkelson and Partch, 1986; Brown and Warner, 1985). The nature of short-term event 
studies is to isolate the effect of a specific event from other confounding market 
movements (MacKinlay, 1997). First, it is crucial to define the particular event and event 
dates that are in this case the regulator’s release dates of the stress test results for the 
various European and U.S. stress tests. The importance of stress tests in the banking 
industry justifies the release of the outcome of such tests as an essential event that drives 
equity prices. As regulatory information is usually kept confidential and regulators 
carefully prepare the release including various ex ante announcements (i.e., methodology 
updates), investors expect this exceptional information (Feldberg and Metrick, 2019; 
Bushman, 2014). Second, according to the design of event studies, the days around this 
event date are of main interest that form the event window and are usually the day of the 
event and one day or multiple days before and after. As the event window sheds the 
spotlight on these particular days on and around the event, the possible influences of other 
confounding market movements are significantly mitigated (Flannery et al., 2017; 
Petrella and Resti, 2013; MacKinlay, 1997). Third, the abnormal return, that is explained 
later in this section, is the crucial measure to assess the impact of an event. The abnormal 
return of a bank and event over the event window is defined as the difference of the 
realised return and the expected return given the absence of the event. 
In this way, I test H1a, H1b and H1c that concern the short-term information value of 
stress testing and the potential disciplining effect arising from this new information. 
‘Short-term’ refers to the length of event windows that are defined below Equations 4.2 
and 4.7. I employ this methodology for each European and U.S. stress test, in addition, I 
accumulate the observations of individual first-time and total participation as explained 
later in this section. I calculate the abnormal return (AR) that separates the impact of the 
event from generic market activities, for each stress test event as follows: !"#$ = ("#$) − )("#$)                          (4.1) 
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where, for bank i at event date t, Rit is the individual realised stress test event return and 
E(Rit) is the corresponding expected (or also called ‘normal’)34 return. 
I calculate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over a period T around the stress test 
events, which is: *!"+ = ∑ !"#$+$-.               (4.2) 
where, the period T is defined as the subsequent short-term event windows, that are (a) 
one day prior and after (t–1, t+1), (b) one day prior and two days after (t–1, t+2), (c) three 
days prior and after  (t–3, t+3), and (d) one day prior and five days after (t–1, t+5) the 
release of the stress test results. I follow the stress test literature that employs various 
event windows (Carboni et al., 2017; Flannery et al., 2017; Morgan et al., 2014; Petrella 
and Resti, 2013). The one or three days prior to the event captures potential information 
leaks, whilst the short-term event windows reduce the risk from being confounded by 
other market factors and events. 
Then, I measure the cross-sectional average of the cumulative abnormal returns (CAAR) 
over the four event periods T defined in Equation 4.2 as follows: 
*!!"+ = /0∑ *!"+0#-/          (4.3) 
To calculate the expected returns for the CAAR, I resort to three distinct models; these 
are the standard models for conducting an event study (Campbell et al., 1997; MacKinlay, 
1997) and enable me to examine the implications of different market factors. First, I apply 
the standard capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Second, I employ the Fama and French 
(1993) three-factors model that comprises of two additional factors, ‘small minus big 
market capitalisation’ (SMB) and ‘high minus low book-to-market ratio’ (HML). Third, I 
use the model by Carhart (1997) that extends the Fama and French three-factors model 
by the ‘high minus low momentum’ (MOM) factor. As the third model is the most 
developed one that not only captures bank size features (SMB, HML) but also stock 
performance (MOM) to explain expected returns, I consider the Carhart (1997) four-
factors model (C4F) the baseline model, whilst I show the other two models as robustness 
tests. Thus, the most robust event study results should be consistent over the three models. 
 
34 MacKinlay (1997) defines the normal return as the “expected return without conditioning the event taking 
place”. I use ‘expected’ and ‘normal’ return as synonyms. 
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Model 1: Capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
("#$ − "1$) = 2# + 4#5"6$ − "1$7 + 8#$                     (4.4) 
where, for bank i at event date t, ("#$ − "1$)	is the daily expected return for each security, 
Rit is the daily realised return, Rft is the risk-free rate, αi is the constant, βi is the CAPM 
beta coefficient (BETA), Rmt is the daily return of a benchmark portfolio and εit is the error 
term. 
Model 2: Fama and French (1993) three-factors model (FF3F) 
The CAPM can be extended to increase explanatory power as follows: 
("#$ − "1$) = 2# + 4#65"6$ − "1$7 + 4#:;<=>?$ + 4#@;AB>C$ + 8#$     (4.5) 
where, all other variables equally defined as in Equation 4.4, SMBt stands for the excess 
return of ‘small versus big market capitalisation shares’ and HMLt is the excess return of 
‘high versus low book-to-market ratio shares’. 
Model 3: Carhart (1997) four-factors model (C4F) 
Another common extension of Model 2 is as follows: ("#$ − "1$) = 2# + 4#65"6$ − "1$7 + 4#:;<=>?$ + 4#@;AB>C$ +																											4#;D;>E>$ + 8#$         (4.6) 
where, all other variables equally defined as in Equation 4.4, MOMt is the excess return 
of ‘high versus low momentum shares’. 
In all models, I apply the ‘FTSE Europe Banks Index’ (European sample) and the 
‘S&P 500 Banks Index’ (U.S. sample) to calculate the daily returns of the benchmark 
portfolio. Further, I gather the risk-free rate (U.S. one-month T-bill rate) and three as well 
as four European and U.S. factors from the Fama and French website.35 I employ a 200-
day estimation window that is from t–11 to t–210 to calculate the normal returns. This 
approach is consistent with the literature (see, e.g., Petrella and Resti, 2013). For 
robustness (see, Section 4.6.1), I run the analysis with a 120-day estimation window that 
produces similar results (Flannery et al., 2017; MacKinlay, 1997). 
 
35 Please visit: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
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Further, I test the significance of CAAR using the non-parametric generalised sign test 
proposed by Cowan (1992). As discussed by the event study literature, researchers have 
a choice between several parametric (Boehmer et al., 1991; Patell, 1976) and non-
parametric (Cowan, 1992; Corrado, 1989) tests. However, daily returns are right-skewed 
(Brown and Warner, 1985), suggesting non-parametric tests to be more robust because, 
compared to parametric tests, they do not require as strict assumptions about the 
probability distribution of daily returns. The Cowan (1992) generalised sign test estimates 
the difference between the positive CAAR within the event and the estimation windows. 
As it only considers the sign of the CAAR, it is unaffected by potential asymmetric 
distribution of daily returns. Moreover, Cowan (1992) argues that the generalised sign 
test is more powerful than other non-parametric tests such as the Corrado (1989) rank test. 
This is because it can be applied to event windows longer than one day (i.e., up to eleven 
days), and it is less sensitive to return outliers and thin trading volumes. 
As an alternative measure to CAAR, I calculate the abnormal buy-and-hold return 
(BHAR), which is defined as follows (Barber and Lyon, 1997; Ritter, 1991): ?B!"+ = ∏ (1 + "#$)+$-. − ∏ (1 + )("#$))+$-.     (4.7) 
where, for bank i, at event date t, "#$ is the realised and )("#$) the expected buy-and-hold 
returns over the period T, which is the event window that is (a) one day prior and after  
(t–1, t+1), (b) one day prior and two days after (t–1, t+2), (c) one day prior and four days 
after (t–1, t+4), and (d) one day prior and seven days after (t–1, t+7) the release of the 
stress test results. I extend the event period up to seven days to measure the persistence 
of the abnormal buy-and-hold return (MacKinlay, 1997). 
Accordingly, the mean BHAR over the period T defined in Equation 4.7 is as follows: 
?B!"+ = /0∑ ?B!"+0#-/            (4.8) 
To calculate BHAR, I resort to a simple market return model (MRM), where the banks’ 
returns are subtracted by the contemporaneous returns of the market index (MacKinlay, 
1997). As for the prior measure CAAR, I employ the ‘FTSE Europe Banks Index’ 
(European sample) and the ‘S&P 500 Banks Index’ (U.S. sample) to calculate the daily 
returns of the benchmark portfolio. As BHAR is positively skewed (Barber and Lyon, 
1997), I test the significance of BHAR using the skewness-adjusted t-test proposed by 
Lyon et al. (1999). 
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In the context of H1b, I employ the event study approach on the 59 European and 25 
U.S. first-time stress test observations (FTSTO) as well as 206 European and 195 (339)36 
U.S. total stress test observations (TOTALSTO). This provides me with an overall picture 
of the impact of stress tests (Flannery et al., 2017). In terms of H1c, and based on the 
baseline model (C4F) results, I split my sample into banks that experience a positive (i.e., 
‘good’ news) or negative (i.e., ‘bad’ news) market response within the 3-day event 
window, one day before and after the  stress test (i.e., CARt–1, t+1). I then examine the 
development of CAR for the same event windows as in Equations 4.2 and 4.7 and, in 
addition, plot average CARs over a 21-day window (i.e., CARt–10, t+10) to analyse the 
persistence of positive and negative responses from stress tests (MacKinlay, 1997). 
4.4.4.2. Calendar time portfolio approach 
To analyse the long-term effect of stress tests on participating banks’ stock 
performance in the context of H2, I employ the calendar-time portfolio (CTIME) 
methodology, also known as ‘Jensen’s alpha’ (Jensen, 1968). I calculate the abnormal 
returns based on the baseline approach of the Carhart (1997) four-factors model (C4F)37 
developed in Section 4.4.4.1 and consider a period of 1 to 12, 24 and 36 months after the 
individual stress test exercise, first-time participation and total stress test participation. 
Further, I estimate the CTIME-coefficients applying equal and value weights. The value 
weights are based on the bank’s market value (MVALUE) that is calculated as a quarterly 
average of daily market values of the year-end quarter (Q4) prior to the stress test event. 
I employ this quarter because regulators select stress test participants based on the last 
year-end figures before the stress test. The purpose of this approach is to estimate if stress-
tested banks generate significant ‘alphas’ that show that those banks perform better 
(positive) or worse (negative) than the market in the long-run. If stress test information 
does significantly influence market confidence on stress-tested banks, I would expect that 
a positive (negative) outlook from stress tests would be reflected in stress-tested banks’ 
abnormal returns that over- or under-perform the markets. 
 
36 Since 2013, the Federal Reserve has conducted DFAST and CCAR each year. The number in parentheses 
includes both DFAST and CCAR observations. 
37 I also employ the Fama and French (1993) three-factors model (FF3F) in a robustness test with a similar 
outcome. Results are available in Section 4.6.1. 
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4.4.4.3. Time-series effects 
Finally, I construct two time-series approaches to analyse the long-term disciplining 
effect of stress tests on information asymmetry (H3) and analyst behaviour (H4), as well 
as bank risk-taking (H5) and funding structure (H6). In the context of H3 and H4, I 
estimate if stress test information leads to a market influence in the change of information 
asymmetry and/or analyst behaviour (INFO); for H5 and H6, I test if the market discipline 
effect (MARKET) can be measured in certain accounting variables on bank risk-taking 
and funding structure. I construct the equations separately for the European (4.9A, 4.10A) 
and U.S. (4.9B, 4.10B) markets because the period and participation effects vary 
significantly for those two jurisdictions. In all Equations 4.9A,B and 4.10A,B, I employ 
recent literature standards and lag the accounting and market microstructure controls by 
two quarters based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC). 38  This mitigates 
endogeneity concerns between current asset choice and stress test effects. Moreover, I 
resort to bank-specific and quarterly fixed effects to account respectively for time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity and time-variant common shocks that might not be 
covered by the various bank- and country-specific control variables. In addition, I cluster 
the standard errors at the bank level to mitigate bias from heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation (Acharya et al., 2018; Flannery et al., 2017). 
First, I estimate the following fixed effects models on H3 and H4 that are constructed 
for the European (Equation 4.9A) and U.S. (Equation 4.9B) markets: HIJE#$K = L. + L/=M1011)O + LP=M1415)O + LS=M16)O + LUJM=M1011)O +																										LV=M1011)O ∗ JM=M1011)O + LX=M1415)O ∗ JM=M1011)O +																										LY=M16)O ∗ JM=M1011)O + ∑LZ(>2[\]^	_`a[bc^[da^d[])#$ePK +																										∑ Lf(*bdg^[h	aℎ2[2a^][`c^`ac)$K + j# + k$ + 8#$K                                      (4.9A) HIJE#$K = L. + L/=M0913O= + LP=M1417O= + LSJM=M09O= + LU=M0913O= ∗																										JM=M09O= + LV=M1417O= ∗ JM=M09O= +																										∑ LX(>2[\]^	_`a[bc^[da^d[])#$ePK +																										∑ LY(*bdg^[h	aℎ2[2a^][`c^`ac)$K + j# + k$ + 8#$K                                      (4.9B) 
where, for bank i, quarter t and country j, the dependent variable INFO is one of the 
following market measures based on the stress test literature (Flannery et al., 2013, 2017; 
 
38 I find no substantial improvement in model strength when I consider one- to four-quarter lags. 
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Bischof and Daske, 2013): Information asymmetry captured by the bid-ask spread 
(BIDASK), analyst behaviour estimated by analyst coverage (RECNO), earnings surprises 
and estimate dispersion (EPSSUR / PRICE, ESTSD / PRICE). 
The time-dummies in Equation 4.9A show the different European stress test periods of 
2010-11 (ST1011EU), 2014-15 (ST1415EU) and 2016 (ST16EU), while the participation 
dummy FTST1011EU captures European banks that participated for the first time in 
2010-11. In the U.S. case, the time-dummies in Equation 4.9B measure the U.S. stress test 
periods from 2009-13 and 2014-17, while the participation dummy FTST09US captures 
U.S. banks that participated for the first time in 2009 (Flannery et al., 2017). In both 
markets, the interaction terms of the time- and participation dummies estimate the effect 
of stress tests on information asymmetry and analyst behaviour. They compare first-time 
stress-tested banks of 2010-11 (in Europe) and 2009 (in the U.S.) with banks that 
participate for the first time at a later point in time. A positive (negative) sign of the 
coefficients indicates that earlier first-time participants experience more (less) 
information asymmetry and analyst behaviour than later ones. 
The setting might be influenced by confounding factors that arise from the 2008 
financial and sovereign debt crises. Therefore, (Market microstructure) controls for 
instabilities that concern market illiquidity, performance, constrained capital and higher 
volatility (Bonner and Eijffinger, 2016). First, I consider share turnover (TOVER), or 
trading volume, which is an alternative measure to capture market liquidity. More 
liquidity on the markets lead to lower spreads (Bamber et al., 2011; Karpoff, 1986). 
Second, the inverse share price (INVPRICE) controls for effects related to idiosyncratic 
differences in share prices. For instance, Black (1986) assumes that market movements 
of shares that are lower priced are affected by ‘noise’, i.e., uninformed or speculative 
trading; this is because more expensive shares limit potential investors which decreases 
market liquidity (Asparouhova et al., 2013). 
Moreover, I control for return volatility (RETVOL) that I estimate as the daily standard 
deviation of continuously compounded share price returns (Bischof and Daske, 2013). 
More volatile markets, in particular during crises, infer uncertainty, which affects bid-ask 
spreads and analyst information production (Flannery et al., 2013, 2017). In addition, I 
include the logarithm of market value of equity (MVALUE) and the market-to-book value 
(MTBV). Studies show that market participants follow larger firms closely due to their 
stronger influence on the markets (Amiram et al., 2016; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). This 
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could result in lower spreads and higher trading volume that could also attract analyst 
coverage. 
I also control for analyst recommendation consensus (RECCON) that constitutes the 
current analyst sentiment. Analyst recommendations are positively biased due to conflict 
of interest between investment banking and brokerage activities leading to analysts 
publishing buy over sell recommendations (McNichols and O’Brien, 1997; Womack, 
1996). In addition, (Country characteristics) yields recent fiscal and monetary policy 
changes (Bonner and Eijffinger, 2016). I utilise economic growth (ΔGDP), 
unemployment growth (ΔUNEM), and sovereign debt risk (IRATE) to control for current 
variations in countries’ macroeconomic fundamentals such as economic cycles (Hamadi 
et al., 2016; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013; Bushman and Williams, 2012). Finally, I 
specify bank-specific fixed effects (a), quarterly fixed effects (d) and the residual (e). 
To test H5 and H6, I amend Equations 4.9A and 4.9B and resort to bank accounting 
instead of market measures. I estimate the subsequent models for the European 
(Equation 4.10A) and the U.S. market (Equation 4.10B): >!"o)M#$K = L. + L/=M1011)O + LP=M1415)O + LS=M16)O + LUJM=M1011)O +																																			LV=M1011)O ∗ JM=M1011)O + LX=M1415)O ∗ JM=M1011)O +																																			LY=M16)O ∗ JM=M1011)O + ∑LZ(?2g\	2aabdg^`gp)#$ePK +																																			∑ Lf(*bdg^[h	aℎ2[2a^][`c^`ac)$K + j# + k$ + 8#$K             (4.10A) >!"o)M#$K = 	L. + L/=M0913O= + LP=M1417O= + LSJM=M09O= +																																			LU=M0913O= ∗ JM=M09O= + LV=M1417O= ∗ JM=M09O= +																																			∑ LX(?2g\	2aabdg^`gp)#$ePK + ∑LY(*bdg^[h	aℎ2[2a^][`c^`ac)$K +																																			j# + k$ + 8#$K                   (4.10B) 
where, for bank i, quarter t and country j, the dependent variable MARKET yields one of 
the following individual bank risk measures to estimate the strength of market discipline 
(Danisewicz et al., 2018; Berger and Turk-Ariss, 2015; Nier and Baumann, 2006): The 
level of capital adequacy (T1R), leverage risk (LEVERAGE) and credit risk (RWA) are 
regulatory indicators for a banks’ risk-taking behaviour as more capital increases survival 
likelihood during crises and normal times (Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Thakor, 2012; 
Allen et al., 2011). Therefore, banks with more capital are expected to be more robust 
against adverse financial shocks. Another regulatory predictor for bank risk-taking is loan 
quality. Based on stress test results and the related literature, I identify credit portfolio 
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quality (LLR) as an important idiosyncratic risk measure (Nier and Baumann, 2006; 
Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2001). In total, the insolvency risk (ZSCORE) is a widely-
applied measure to assess bank insolvency risk, whilst return-on-assets (ROA) is a 
component of ZSCORE and may be used to estimate profitability (e.g., Beck et al., 2013; 
Houston et al., 2010; Laeven and Levine, 2009). 
Furthermore, increased cost of funding (TIE, OIE, IECD, NIM) and reduced level of 
uninsured (DEPBA, SUBD) and insured (CUSTD) funding are indicators for market 
discipline (Danisewicz et al., 2018; Berger and Turk-Ariss, 2015). In addition, to 
disentangle stress test participation, (Bank accounting) controls for confounding bank-
specific and macro-economic factors arising from the recent financial and sovereign debt 
crisis (Beatty and Liao, 2014; Flannery et al., 2013; Jones et al., 2012). In particular, I 
include bank size assessed by the natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE), traditional- and 
non-traditional banking activities (LOAN, TRADE), asset quality (LLP), liquidity risk 
(DEPO) and profitability (EBPT). Further, (Country characteristics) considers current 
fiscal and monetary policy changes by utilising countries’ macroeconomic fundamentals 
such as economic growth (ΔGDP), and unemployment growth (ΔUNEM). Finally, I 
incorporate bank-specific fixed effects (a), quarterly fixed effects (d) and the residual (e). 
4.5. Results 
4.5.1. Event study results 
First, I conduct a short-term event study to test if stress tests provide new information 
that disciplines banks (H1a, H1b and H1c). I display the event study results for the 
European and U.S. markets in the following sub-sections. 
4.5.1.1. Short-term disciplining effects in Europe 
In Table 4.5, Panels A, B and C, I illustrate the average CARs of the three distinct 
models (CAPM, FF3F and C4F), whilst Panel D shows the average BHARs of the market 
return model (MRM). I estimate the average CARs and BHARs separately for each 
European stress test event (i.e., for the assessments in 2010, 2011, 2014, 2015, 2016 and 
2018), for the observations of the first-time (FTSTO) and total (TOTALSTO) stress test 
participation. 
[Please refer to Table 4.5 here] 
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In the context of H1a, I observe the separate impact of each stress test exercise on 
share price returns of participating banks. It may be seen that, on average, stress tests do, 
on certain occasions, affect share price returns in the short-term. For example, for the 
EBA stress test in 2011, the event window t–1, t+5 accounts for a model-consistent 
positive CAAR that is statistically significant at the confidence levels of 1% and 10%. In 
economic terms, when applying the C4F baseline model (Panel C), the realised return of 
the stress-tested bank’s share is 3.18% higher than the expected return measured within 
the estimation window. In support of the results, I find statistically significant average 
BHARs at event windows t–1, t+4. I also document significant BHARs for the initial stress 
test exercise in 2010 at different event windows (i.e., that of t–1, t+1; t–1, t+2; t–1, t+4; 
and t–1, t+7); however, these results are not supported by significant average CARs across 
the other models. Similarly, the ECB’s comprehensive assessment in 2014 states average 
CARs that are positive and statistically significant at the 5% confidence level (i.e., that of 
t–1, t+1). The 2015 ECB’s Greek assessment is a special case and includes four large 
Greek banks as a follow up to the 2014 exercise. The results for this stress test show 
positive, but insignificant, short-term BHARs (t–1, t+1 event window) that turn into a 
significant negative impact in the longer run (t–1, t+5 event window). On the other hand, 
the recent EBA stress tests in 2016 and 2018 do not trigger any statistically significant 
market responses. 
After analysing the stress tests on a separate basis, I scrutinise the impact of first-time 
(FTSTO) and total (TOTALSTO) stress test participation. First-time participation may be 
more informative or surprising than subsequent participation, in particular, if banks are 
stress-tested on a regular basis (H1b). In Table 4.5, the CARs and BHARs for first-time 
participation (FTSTO) are positive and statistically significant at the 3-day event window 
(t–1, t+1). In economic terms, employing the C4F baseline model (Panel C), the realised 
return of the stress-tested bank’s share is 1.34% higher than the expected return measured 
within the estimation window. In contrast, for total stress test participation (TOTALSTO), 
I do not find significant average CARs. It is only in Panel D, that the 3-day BAHR (at       
t–1, t+1 event window) is positive and statistically significant (0.65%), whilst the 4-day 
BHAR (t–1, t+2) for FTSTO is also positive and significant (2.08%). This result indicates 
that, in support of H1b, the effect of stress tests is stronger and lasts marginally longer 
when experienced for the first time, compared to taking all stress test events together 
(TOTALSTO). 
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The results of the recent European stress tests from 2014 to 2018 imply that, on average, 
the provided information mainly conforms with market expectation (Sahin and de Haan, 
2016). On the other hand, the latter results indicate that the earlier stress test in 2011 and 
the first-time stress test event provide additional information that is new to the markets 
(Petrella and Resti, 2013). As it is a positive market response, stress-tested banks are 
rewarded and not disciplined. This could be also explained by the growing confidence in 
the banking system after the 2008 financial crisis (Schuermann, 2014). However, the 
average market reaction on stress-tested banks’ abnormal returns is not immediate and 
takes a few days to develop. The slight delay could be also partly explained by the stress 
test result release dates, which were on a Friday afternoon, when European markets were 
already closed (Petrella and Resti, 2013). 
Interestingly, in the context of H1c, the truth may be deeper than within the average 
CAR and BHAR analysis. In Tables 4.5A and 4.5B, I evaluate the individual CARs of the 
baseline model C4F at the standard 3-day event window (t–1, t+1) for each stress-tested 
bank. I find that the observations are usually split into an almost equal number of banks 
with positive (Table 4.5A) and negative (Table 4.5B) abnormal returns. This holds true 
in particular for the recent stress test exercises in 2016 and 2018. Therefore, this 
discrepancy of stress test experience among participating banks might contribute to the 
fact that the average results reported in Table 4.5 are only occasionally significant. This 
tendency may also be seen in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, where I illustrate the evolvement of the 
average CARs for banks that experience a positive and a negative CAR at the 3-day event 
window.  
[Please refer to Tables 4.5A and 4.5B here] 
[Please refer to Figures 4.1 and 4.2 here] 
Accordingly, Tables 4.5A and 4.5B show that, for all exercises (and in support of H1c), 
the stress test event is an accelerating factor that contributes to the general trend of the 
share price. In 2010-11, the stress test exercises exacerbate both the positive and negative 
market trend. In particular, in Figure 4.1, the stress test effect of both assessments remains 
stable over the 10-day period after the event date (t0) and is on average positive. However, 
supported by the average CARs in Table 4.5A, in 2011 the positive response is 
numerically stronger, compared to 2010, and increases from the shorter (t–1, t+1) to the 
longer (t–1, t+5) event windows. The converse holds true for the 2010 stress test, where 
the negative trend is more persistent in the longer (t–1, t+5) event window (see 
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Table 4.5B). This result is consistent with previous studies who confirm the market 
success of the 2011 over the 2010 stress test (Borio et al., 2014; Schuermann, 2014). In 
2014, the stress test event exacerbates almost equally the positive and negative trend, 
whilst both the negative and positive effects decline over the 10-day period after the event. 
In 2016 and 2018, there is a positive and a negative short-term market reaction (t–1, t+1 
event window). Although in 2016 both responses are not significant among all models 
over the longer event windows (t–3, t+3; t–1, t+5), in 2018 the negative trend remains 
strong for those windows. Interestingly, in 2016 and 2018, the stress test event appears to 
be a turning point for share performance. Banks that report positive average CARs before 
the stress test event turn negative after the event and vice versa. 
Analysing the positive and negative market responses of first-time participation 
(FTSTO) and total stress test participation (TOTALSTO), it may be seen that the negative 
market responses are more persistent than the positive responses. On the positive side 
(Table 4.5A), the response for the 3-day stress test event window (t–1, t+1) does not differ 
much, whether it is for the first time or total stress test participation. However, the first-
time positive response remains stronger in the longer event windows in comparison to the 
positive market response of the total participation. On the negative side, the two market 
responses show a similar pattern. However, for both cases, the negative market response 
remains equally strong or gets even more powerful, while the positive response slightly 
deteriorates in longer event windows. Therefore, the market’s reward seems to be 
forgotten quickly, but the market’s punishment appears to damage the reputation 
sustainably. 
In summary, I may conclude that stress test participation in Europe is acknowledged 
by the markets on certain occasions. In particular, the earlier stress test in 2011 and the 
first-time participation event provide more surprising (positive) results that are rewarded 
by the markets, whilst the recent exercises are mainly insignificant and therefore 
anticipated. Moreover, stress tests may exacerbate positive and negative share 
performance. Hence, regulators should be mindful of the consequences for weaker 
institutions, as investors may punish those banks even more. 
4.5.1.2. Short-term disciplining effects in the U.S. 
In Table 4.6, Panels A, B and C, I illustrate the average CARs of the three distinct 
models (CAPM, FF3F and C4F), whilst Panel D shows the average BHARs of the market 
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return model (MRM). I estimate the average CARs and BHARs separately for each U.S. 
stress test event (i.e., for the assessments in 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 
2017 and 2018), for the observations of the first-time (FTSTO) and total (TOTALSTO) 
stress test participation. Since 2013, the Federal Reserve discloses DFAST and CCAR 
within a very short period (usually 4-5 trading days) and the first event (DFAST) might 
influence the market response of the subsequent event (CCAR). Therefore, I not only 
provide results including all stress test observations but also show separate results 
excluding potentially related CCAR results. 
Analysing the individual assessments to test H1a, I find that only one third of the stress 
tests indicate statistically significant abnormal returns and if significant, the overall 
market reaction is mainly affirmed by a negative abnormal return (four out of five cases). 
On average, therefore, the release of stress test information in the U.S. appears to either 
align with market expectation or ‘bad’ news that leads to disciplining actions by the 
markets. In particular, I document positive CAARs for the CCAR 2012 that are 
statistically significant at the 10% confidence level. In economic terms, applying the C4F 
baseline model (Table 4.6, Panel C) and a 7-day event window (t–1, t+5), the realised 
return of the stress-tested bank’s share yields 2.12% higher, compared to the return that I 
would expect based on the estimation window. 
[Please refer to Table 4.6 here] 
On the other hand, the assessments in 2013 (CCAR), 2016 (DFAST), 2017 (CCAR) 
and 2018 (CCAR) show negative and statistically significant abnormal returns. Therefore, 
the capital exercise seems to provide more interesting and surprising results than the 
DFAST. Investors might also wait for the final results to pursue their investment decision. 
In all cases, the abnormal return and market reaction is purely negative across short-term 
(t–1, t+1; t–1, t+2) and longer event windows (t–3, t+3; t–1, t+5). In economic terms, 
considering the C4F baseline model (Table 4.6, Panel C) and a 3-day (t–1, t+1) event 
window, the realised return of the stress-tested bank’s share is -1.41% (CCAR 2013),         
-1.13% (CCAR 2017) and -0.83% (CCAR 2018) lower compared to the expected return 
within the estimation window. For the longer 7-day event window (t–3, t+3) the abnormal 
returns yield -2.12% (CCAR 2013), -0.95% (CCAR 2017) and -1.08% (CCAR 2018). In 
support of Flannery et al. (2017), the market response is numerically stronger for the 
earlier exercises in 2012 and 2013, compared to the later assessments in 2017 and 2018. 
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In terms of H1b and the first-time (FTSTO) and total (TOTALSTO) stress test 
participation, the results indicate that on average, first-time participation is not 
consistently significant, while the abnormal return for total participation is negative and 
significant for the 7-day event window (t–3, t+3). In economic terms, considering the C4F 
baseline model (Table 4.6, Panel C) and a 7-day event window, the realised return of the 
stress-tested bank’s share is -0.69% (-0.71% excluding double CCARs) below the 
expected return based on the estimation window. The results are mainly the same whether 
I include or exclude the CCAR exercises (due to the double stress test approach). 
Next, I split the stress test observations into banks that experience a positive or 
negative (CARt–1, t+1) employing the C4F baseline model to test H1c. In contrast to the 
European case, the number of banks that report a positive and a negative market response 
(CARt–1, t+1) may vary significantly from one exercise to another. In particular, the SCAP 
2009 exercise reports an almost even proportional split and indicates strong positive 
development for eight participating banks, whilst nine banks experience a strong negative 
development. In economic terms, applying the C4F baseline model and a 3-day event 
window, the realised return of the stress-tested bank’s share yields 13.66% above 
(Table 4.6A, Panel C) or -9.63% below (Table 4.6B, Panel C) the return that I would 
expect based on the estimation window, respectively. This is consistent with previous 
literature (Flannery et al., 2017; Morgan et al., 2014) who also found significant market 
reactions for this exercise, as well. 
[Please refer to Tables 4.6A and 4.6B here] 
[Please refer to Figures 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 here] 
On the other hand, the majority of banks (11 out of 17 banks) of the CCAR 2012 
experience a positive market response which supports my previous results in Table 4.6. 
Similarly, I find that both DFAST and CCAR assessments in 2015 report more banks (17 
and 15 out of 26 banks) with positive abnormal returns (CARt–1, t+1), whilst both the 
DFAST and CCAR exercises in 2013 (11 and 15 out of 17 banks) and 2017 (22 and 20 
out of 28 banks) document more banks with negative abnormal returns (CARt–1, t+1). 
Interestingly, for the stress tests in 2014, 2016 and 2018, the number of banks may even 
vary from DFAST to CCAR. For example, more banks report a negative abnormal return 
at DFAST 2014 (13 out of 23 banks), but at CCAR 2014 (just 5 days later), the number 
turns to a majority of banks with a positive abnormal return (17 out of 23 banks). This is 
the same for the 2016 DFAST (17 out of 26 banks) and CCAR (16 out of 26 banks) that 
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report a negative and then a positive abnormal return, respectively. The converse holds 
true for the 2018 exercise where the DFAST reports more banks with a positive abnormal 
return (13 out of 24 banks) that turns negative at the CCAR (20 out of 24 banks).  
Consequently, I document that the stress tests in 2012 and 2015 exacerbate the positive 
trend of stress-tested banks, while the 2013 and 2017 show a negative trend. Further, the 
market response may even change from DFAST to CCAR, as indicated by the results of 
the assessments in 2014 and 2016 that turn positive and the stress test in 2018 that turns 
negative. 
When I analyse the positive and negative observations for first-time (FTSTO) and the 
total (TOTALSTO) participation, the abnormal returns are statistically significant across 
all event windows and almost evenly split between positive and negative market 
responses (CARt–1, t+1). In particular, the positive market reaction is numerically stronger 
than the negative market reaction for the short-term 3-day and 4-day event windows (i.e., 
t–1, t+1; t–1, t+2), whilst the negative market reaction is more forceful in the long-term 
7-day and 6-day event windows (i.e., t–3, t+3; t–1, t+5). Overall, I may conclude that the 
positive and negative returns are equally strong in numeric terms but may vary 
significantly from one exercise to another, whilst the negative abnormal returns usually 
remain stable over the longer event windows compared to the positive responses that 
deteriorate over time. This holds true, in particular, for the initial SCAP in 2009 as well 
as for the first-time (FTSTO) and total stress test participation (TOTALSTO). 
4.5.1.3. Long-term disciplining effects of stress test exercises 
Next, I analyse the long-term effect of stress test information on bank returns. In 
particular, I am interested whether stress-tested banks over- or under-perform the markets 
following a stress test event (H2). In Table 4.7, I show the calendar-time portfolio 
(CTIME) results for the European (Panel A) and the U.S. (Panel B) samples. I illustrate 
the results for both jurisdictions and all stress test events 1 to 12, 24 and 36 months after 
the stress test event using the baseline Carhart (1997) four-factors model (C4F). Further, 
I estimate the CTIME-coefficients employing equal and value weights. The value weights 
are based on bank market value (MVALUE). The variable of interest is ‘alpha’ (also 
known as ‘Jensen’s alpha’) which denotes the intercept of the four-factor model. A 
significant ‘alpha’ means that the stress-tested banks’ portfolio produces abnormal returns 
that either over (positive coefficient) or under-perform (negative coefficient) the market. 
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In addition, the four factors capture asset sensitivity to market risk (BETA), the difference 
between small and big firms’ shares (SMB), the difference between high and low market-
to-book ratio shares (HML) and the momentum of the shares (MOM). 
[Please refer to Table 4.7 here] 
In Table 4.7, Panel A, the results of the equally- or MVALUE-weighted portfolio show 
that, on average, European stress-tested banks do, on certain occasions, over- or under-
perform the market portfolio after a stress test event (which is indicated by a significant 
‘alpha’). First, scrutinising the individual EBA stress test in 2011 (2), I can see stress test 
participants over-perform the market in the period 1-12 months following the stress test 
event. The ‘alpha’ coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 10% 
confidence level. In economic terms, the portfolio of stress-tested banks outperforms the 
market by 0.34% in the long-run. Second, the EBA/ECB assessments in 2014 (3) of which 
the results were jointly announced produce negative and statistically significant ‘alphas’ 
at the 1% and 5% confidence levels; however, this is only for the MVALUE-weighted 
portfolio. Therefore, when I weight larger banks more than smaller ones, stress-tested 
banks under-perform the market by -0.22% and -0.18% in the periods 1-12 and 1-24 
months following the stress test event, respectively. Both results are in support of the 
overall market sentiment that I could measure in the short-term event study, which show 
a positive and negative trend in 2011 and 2014, respectively. On the other hand, when I 
analyse the individual CEBS 2010 (1) and EBA 2016 (4) stress test, as well as the first-
time participation (5) and the total stress test participation (6), stress-tested banks’ stocks 
do not perform significantly different from the market. 
Similar to the European market, I find that U.S. stress-tested banks occasionally over- 
and under-perform the market in the long-run. In Table 4.7, Panel B, the results of the 
equally- or MVALUE-weighted portfolio show that, on average, U.S. stress-tested banks 
produce statistically significant ‘alphas’ for the individual U.S. stress tests in 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2015 and 2016. In particular, in 2011 and 2012, the ‘alphas’ of the equally-weighted 
portfolios are positive and statistically significant at the 5% and 10% confidence levels, 
respectively. This result indicates that stress-tested banks’ stocks over perform the market 
by 0.12% and 0.20% in the period 1-12 months following the 2011 and 2012 assessments, 
respectively. Interestingly, as the short-term results (in Table 4.6) are not strongly 
significant for those two exercises, the markets’ confidence might have been restored in 
the long-run due to the regulatory changes made at that time (i.e., Dodd-Frank Act). 
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Similarly, for the CCARs in 2015 and 2016, I report positive and statistically 
significant ‘alphas’, which are, however, numerically lower (i.e., 0.08% and 0.11%, 
respectively) than for the earlier stress tests in 2011 and 2012. In contrast, the CCAR 
2013 yields negative and statistically significant ‘alphas’ at the 1% and 5% confidence 
levels. The result of stocks’ under-performance remains persistent, in particular, for the 
MVALUE-weighted portfolio, which is significant for the periods 1-12 (-0.23%) and         
1-24 (-0.18%) months after the exercise. This result might be partly explained by the 
intensity of the stress test, as it was the first time that two exercises were released in such 
a short period of time (i.e., DFAST and CCAR). On the other hand, when I analyse the 
individual SCAP 2009 (1), CCAR 2014 (5) and CCAR 2017 (8) as well as the first-time 
participation (9) and the total stress test participation (10), stress-tested banks’ stocks do 
not perform significantly differently from the market. 
In another vein, the results for the European and U.S. stress-tested banks show that the 
beta coefficient (BETA) that represents the asset’s sensitivity to market risk is in most 
cases statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. Further, BETA is usually below 1, 
indicating that stress-tested banks stocks have lower volatility than the market. Only for 
the 2011 and 2014 European stress test exercises, does the MVALUE-weighted portfolio 
yield a BETA exceeding 1. This implies that when I give a stronger weight on larger banks 
than smaller ones, the stress-tested banks’ stocks have a higher volatility and, therefore, 
sensitivity to market risk. This might contribute towards the under-performance of the 
European stress-tested banks in 2014. Similarly, the U.S. banks that over- or under-
perform in the periods after the CCAR 2012, 2013, 2015 and 2016 have a BETA 
exceeding 1, which is consistent with the performance and perhaps a contributing factor. 
In addition, I find that in the U.S. the momentum factor is negative and statistically 
significant, in particular analysing first-time (FTSTO) and total (TOTALSTO) stress test 
participation. This further strengthens the overall result that stress tests appear to be seen 
as ‘bad’ news leading to the trend that stock performance might be influenced negatively. 
4.5.2. Fundamental analysis 
In this section, I analyse whether stress tests may incentivise investors and debtholders 
to influence bank behaviour. I first explore the conversion of stress test information into 
reduced information asymmetry and increased analyst coverage. Second, I scrutinise if 
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the influencing effect leads to decreased bank risk-taking behaviour and improved 
funding structures. 
4.5.2.1. Information asymmetry and analyst behaviour 
In the context of H3 and H4, I analyse the impact of stress test disclosures on 
information asymmetry and analyst information production. In Table 4.8, I illustrate the 
results of the time-series analysis for the European (Panel A) and the U.S. (Panel B) 
samples. I measure information asymmetry using the bid-ask spread (BIDASK) as well as 
analyst behaviour applying analyst coverage (RECNO), earnings surprises (EPSSUR / 
PRICE) and estimate dispersion (ESTSD / PRICE). 
[Please refer to Table 4.8 here] 
In Europe, I report mixed results on information asymmetry (Model 1) when analysing 
the various stress test periods in 2010-11 (ST1011EU), 2014-15 (ST1415EU) and 2016 
(ST16EU). First, the time-dummy ST1011EU is positive and significant at the 10% 
confidence level, implying an increased level of information asymmetry in the stress test 
period in 2010-11. Then, information asymmetry in 2014-15 decreases as the time-
dummy ST1415EU turns negative and significant at the 5% confidence level. Further, in 
2016, the level of information asymmetry remains negative (ST16EU), but the coefficient 
is statistically insignificant. Comparing the first-time participants in 2010-11 with later 
first-time participants, I find that the interaction term ST1011EU*FTST1011EU is 
negative and significant at the 10% confidence level, whilst the interaction term 
ST1415EU*FTST1011EU is positive and significant at the 5% confidence level. This 
result indicates that first-time participants in 2010-11 experience less information 
asymmetry when they were stress-tested for the first time. However, the effect of the 
stress test on the level of information asymmetry deteriorates at the later exercises. 
In terms of analyst behaviour, I document in Model 2 that the time-dummy ST1011EU 
and interaction term ST1011EU*FTST1011EU are positive and statistically significant at 
the 5% confidence level. This result implies that analysts produce more analyst 
recommendations (RECNO) during stress test periods in 2010-11. Interestingly, this result 
turns negative for the later stress test in 2016. Further, examining the analyst earnings 
surprises and estimate dispersion in Models 3 and 4, only the stress tests in 2010-11 affect 
analyst earnings forecasts. Therefore, in support of prior analysis stress test results 
  
169 
influence analyst behaviour in the earlier stress tests in terms of analyst coverage and 
earnings forecasts, however, this deteriorates for the recent stress tests. 
In the U.S., the time-dummy variables ST0913US and ST1417US in Model 1 are 
negative and significant at the 5% and 10% confidence levels, respectively. Therefore, 
information asymmetry is reduced during the initial (2009-2013) and recent (2014-2017) 
exercise periods. Considering analyst coverage (Model 2), only the time-dummy variable 
ST0913US is negative and significant at the 10% confidence level, while the time-dummy 
ST1417US is negative but insignificant. This result indicates that the analyst coverage 
significantly decreases during the initial but not the recent stress test periods. Moreover, 
the results are supported by the analyst earnings surprises in Model 3. In particular, I find 
that in this model the time-dummies (ST0913US and ST1417US) are positive and 
significant at the 5% and 10% confidence levels, whilst the interaction term 
ST0913US*FTST09US is negative and significant. In economic terms, earnings surprises 
rise 10.57% and 4.41% during the initial and recent stress test periods, respectively. The 
results indicate, therefore, that the actual earnings are higher than analyst expectations. 
Further, the actual earnings of the first-time participants in 2009 are lower than expected 
by analysts (-2.23%). On the other hand, in Model 4, the variables of interest are not 
statistically significant, implying that analyst estimates are not significantly dispersed. 
Overall, I find mixed results on information asymmetry and analyst behaviour in both 
European and U.S. markets. In Europe, it appears that the 2010-11 first-time stress test 
participants, compared to the 2014 counterparts, may experience reduced information 
asymmetry and increased analyst coverage, whilst the dispersion of analyst earnings 
forecasts may be higher indicating some uncertainty among analysts. In the U.S., I 
conclude that stress tests may have some effect on information asymmetry, analyst 
coverage and earnings surprises. However, in compliance with Flannery et al. (2017), the 
results are inconclusive and do not fully support Goldstein and Sapra’s (2013) hypothesis 
that analysts follow stress test results more than their own produced information. 
4.5.2.2. Bank risk-taking and funding structure 
To test H5 and H6, I examine the influencing effect of investors and depositors on 
bank risk-taking activities and funding structure. I show the results for bank risk-taking 
in Table 4.9 and funding structure in Table 4.10. Both tables are split into the European 
(Panel A) and the U.S. (Panel B) samples. I measure bank risk-taking by employing 
  
170 
capital adequacy (T1R), leverage risk (LEVERAGE) and credit risk (RWA). In addition, I 
estimate credit portfolio quality (LLR), insolvency risk (ZSCORE) and profitability (ROA). 
In terms of bank funding structure, I shed light on total (TIE) uninsured (OIE) and insured 
(IECD) funding cost as well as uninsured (DEPBA, SUBD), insured funding (CUSTD) 
and interest margin (NIM). 
[Please refer to Tables 4.9 and 4.10 here] 
Table 4.9 (Panel A), that displays bank-risk taking (H5), illustrates that almost all time-
dummies (except that of Model 5) that measure the 2010-11 (ST1011EU), 2014-15 
(ST1415EU) and 2016 (ST16EU) stress test periods are statistically significant. In 
particular, the results show that for European stress-tested banks capital adequacy (T1R) 
and credit portfolio quality (LLR) has increased, whilst the credit risk (RWA) and leverage 
risk (LEVERAGE) has decreased during stress test periods. Also, both the insolvency risk 
(ZSCORE) and profitability (ROA) have fallen. Therefore, the variables mainly indicate 
that bank-risk taking significantly decreased during stress test periods. Further, in 
Model 5 (that yields insolvency risk) the interaction term ST1011EU*FTST1011EU is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% confidence level, while the one in Model 6 
(that is on profitability) is negative and significant at the 1% confidence level. This result 
suggests that first-time participants in 2010-11 are sounder compared to banks that are 
tested at a later stage. However, at the same time, these banks generate fewer earnings. 
Moreover, in Model 1 the interaction term ST1415EU*FTST1011EU is negative and 
significant at the 10% confidence level, indicating that newly involved first-time 
participants in 2014 have more adequate capital than regular participants from 2010-11. 
In contrast, in the U.S. (Panel B), the results for bank risk-taking are mixed. On the 
one hand, I find that in Models 1, 5 and 6 the time-dummies that indicate the initial     
2009-13 (ST0913US) and 2014-17 (ST1417US) stress test periods are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% and 10% confidence levels. Therefore, stress-tested 
banks account higher capital adequacy (T1R), profitability (ROA) and lower insolvency 
risk (ZSCORE) during stress test periods. On the other hand, in Models 3 and 4, credit 
portfolio quality (LLR) and credit risk (RWA) are only occasionally significant comparing 
stress test participants and periods, whilst in Model 2 leverage risk (LEVERAGE) is 
entirely insignificant. The results suggest that banks react during stress test periods by 
raising the capital base (T1R) consistent with regulatory requirements; this affects their 
insolvency risk (ZSCORE) and overall soundness. However, in terms of leverage risk 
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(LEVERAGE), credit risk (RWA) and credit portfolio quality (LLR), stress test participants 
do not change during stress test periods. This result is consistent with the increase in 
profitability (ROA). Overall, I conclude that in both jurisdictions (Europe and U.S.), bank 
risk-taking is reduced as, in particular, higher capital base (T1R) and lower insolvency 
risk (ZSCORE) indicate a more robust banking system. The results are more profound in 
Europe (than in the U.S.), as decreased risk-taking is also reflected in leverage risk 
(LEVERAGE), credit risk (RWA) and credit portfolio quality (LLR). 
Table 4.10 (Panel A), that displays the funding structure (H6), shows that almost all 
time-dummies (except those of Models 3 and 5) that measure the 2010-11 (ST1011EU), 
2014-15 (ST1415EU) and 2016 (ST16EU) stress test periods are statistically significant. 
Importantly, stress-tested banks have lower total (TIE), insured (IECD) and uninsured 
(OIE) funding costs during stress test periods, indicating that those banks experience 
lower market discipline from depositors. However, the interest margin (NIM) in Model 6 
is negative; this shows that stress-tested banks also appear to earn less interest income, 
which is consistent with prior results on profitability (ROA). Further, the insured funding 
(CUSTD) is not statistically significant, whilst uninsured funding (DEPBA) is negative 
and significant at the 1% confidence level. This result indicates that stress-tested banks 
experience market discipline from decreased bank deposits but not from customer 
deposits. Further, in Model 3, the interaction term ST1011EU*FTST1011EU is negative 
and statistically significant, while both later interaction terms ST1415EU*FTST1011EU 
and ST16EU*FTST1011EU are positive and significant. Hence, the first-time participants 
in 2010-11 experienced stronger market discipline from decreased uninsured funding 
(DEPBA). In recent years, confidence has been restored and the earlier first-time 
participants experience lower market discipline from uninsured funding than recent ones. 
In the U.S. (Panel B), I report mixed results on funding structure for banks during 
stress test periods. In Model 1, the time-dummies that measure the 2009-13 (ST0913US) 
and the 2014-17 (ST1417US) stress test periods are positive and statistically significant, 
indicating higher total funding costs (TIE) during stress test periods. Further, for both 
periods, stress-tested banks experience higher customer deposits (CUSTD) and a higher 
interest margin (NIM). This result indicates that stress-tested banks are exposed to higher 
total interest expenses (TIE), which are, however, due to increased customer deposits 
(CUSTD). In turn, banks are capable of generating interest margins (NIM), which are 
consistent with prior results on profitability (ROA). On the other hand, in Models 2, 3 
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and 4, the variables of interests are insignificant, indicating that the uninsured funding 
(SUBD), together with the costs for uninsured (OIE) and insured funding (IECD) are 
unaffected by stress tests. Overall, I conclude that U.S. stress-tested banks’ funding 
structure is generally unaltered by market discipline. 
The result may be also partly explained by the significantly lower interest rates 
imposed by the ECB and Federal Reserve and by deposit insurance schemes that have 
been implemented during and after the 2008 financial crisis. Nevertheless, the results 
show that, on certain occasions, stress-tested banks experience stronger market discipline 
which is reflected in their accounting fundamentals. 
4.6. Robustness analysis 
In this section, I run several robustness checks to ensure that the results of my 
econometric analysis are valid and free from confounding factors. Main tests are shown 
in Table 4.11 and additional robustness checks are provided in the APPENDIX 
(Tables A.15 to A.19). 
4.6.1. Event study robustness 
Based on the recent stress test literature, the main concern for event study analyses is 
the choice of the relevant event and estimation windows, the underlying asset pricing 
model and the statistical significance tests. As explained in Section 4.4.4.1, I construct 
numerous models to estimate the abnormal returns. In particular, I calculate average CAR 
and BHAR estimates for different event windows using the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM), the Fama and French (1993) three-factors model (FF3F) and the Carhart (1997) 
four-factors model (C4F). The combination of these three models already confirms 
statistical robustness of my findings across the models. However, the baseline results 
depend on the defined 200-day estimation window. The literature employs different 
lengths of estimation windows that are usually between 120-250 days (Flannery et al., 
2017; Morgan et al., 2014; Petrella and Resti, 2013). As I use a long-term 200-day 
estimation window in the baseline analysis that, on some occasions, overlaps with the 
previous year’s stress tests (e.g., 2010-11), I apply a shorter 120-day estimation window 
to verify the results. 
[Please refer to Table 4.11 here] 
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In Table 4.11 (Panel A: Europe; Panel B: U.S.), I display the results of the baseline 
C4F-model for the 120-day estimation window. I find that the results do not differ when 
I use a shorter event window. Further, as abnormal returns are usually right-skewed, I test 
the statistical significance of the abnormal returns using an alternative significance test. 
In Table 4.11 (Panel C: Europe; Panel D: U.S.), I show the statistical significance of the 
abnormal returns based on Patell (1976). As the Patell (1976) standardised residual test 
is of parametric nature, the results are marginally different in contrast to the baseline 
analysis; however, these do not alter my conclusions. Overall, I constitute that the 
robustness checks provide similar results that are in support of the baseline analysis. 
4.6.2. Additional robustness checks 
In addition, to the robustness checks in Section 4.6.1, I run various additional tests to 
further support the resilience of the baseline results (shown in the APPENDIX, 
Tables A.15 to A.19). First, in Table A.15 (Panel A: Europe; Panel B: U.S.) I run the 
calendar-time portfolio (CTIME) analysis using the Fama and French (1993) three-factors 
model (FF3F) as an alternative approach. Due to the nature of the FF3F model, which 
does not consider the momentum factor, the results vary slightly compared to the baseline 
analysis, which, however, support my main conclusions. Second, in Table A.16, I test the 
baseline time-series approach on funding structure using an additional control variable 
for sovereign debt risk; this is measured by the difference in short- and long-term 
government bonds’ interest rates (IRATE). Part of the results on the cost and structure of 
bank funding could be explained by the low interest rates and the European sovereign 
debt crisis. The findings do not differ when I include sovereign debt risk. 
Finally, I follow studies that exclude certain banks that might drive the results. From 
the European sample, I remove inactive banks (i.e., bankruptcies, M&As) because the 
results might be influenced by bank survival actions (Beatty and Liao, 2011). Further, 
following other U.S. research (Cornett et al., 2019; Flannery et al., 2017), I adjust the U.S. 
sample by deleting banks that are owned by foreign parent banks (i.e., non-U.S. 
subsidiaries) and are not purely representative of the U.S. market. In Table A.17 (Panel A: 
Europe; Panel B: U.S.), I provide the results on information asymmetry. Table A.18 
(Panel A: Europe; Panel B: U.S.) shows banks’ risk-taking and Table A.19 (Panel A: 
Europe; Panel B: U.S.) illustrates bank funding structure. In summary, the findings are 
similar compared to the baseline analysis and in support of my main conclusions. 
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4.7. Concluding remarks 
The literature has analysed certain aspects of bank stress tests and their potential costs 
and benefits. For instance, U.S. studies by Flannery et al. (2017) provide implications of 
stress tests on transparency and analyst information production. Acharya et al. (2018) 
display that stress-tested banks reduce credit supply with the intention of enhancing 
capital adequacy, while Cornett et al. (2019) find increased lobbying activities of stress 
test participants. In Europe, Bischof and Daske (2013) show that banks disclose additional 
sovereign risk information and Gropp et al. (2019) conclude that banks manage capital 
ratios. However, the studies do not comprehensively scrutinise how stress tests contribute 
to market discipline to safeguard financial stability. Therefore, my study provides an 
empirical analysis on all European and U.S. stress tests that further sheds light on the 
disciplining effect of stress tests concerning market sentiment and bank fundamentals. 
In particular, I document that in Europe and the U.S. market responses depend on the 
particular stress test exercise and do not follow a certain pattern. On certain occasions, in 
Europe, I constitute positive market responses (e.g., the 2011 exercise), while in the U.S., 
I report mainly negative responses (e.g., the assessments in 2013, 2016, 2017 and 2018). 
However, whilst the majority of stress tests largely conform to market expectations, my 
analysis shows that there is an on-going trend of abnormal returns triggered by the initial 
stress test market response. In particular, bank shares that experience a positive or 
negative market response around the event day (3-day window), are largely exacerbated 
towards this upward or downward trend, respectively. Furthermore, I show that the 
positive or negative momentum may convert into long-term ‘alphas’ implying that bank 
stocks over- or under-perform in relation to the market portfolio. Consequently, market 
discipline is enforced on weaker banks, while stronger banks are rewarded (Bouvard et 
al., 2015). Analysing bank fundamentals, I find consistent evidence of market discipline 
as information asymmetry declines and European banks reduce risk-taking activities; in 
addition, they report improved funding structures during stress test periods. In contrast, 
U.S. banks only display partial signs of market discipline within their accounting figures. 
I conclude from this study that regulators and supervisors need to consider the market 
sentiment to identify the specific purpose of the stress test. A stress test may be useful at 
restoring or maintaining market confidence (Borio et al., 2014). However, a regular stress 
test setting may not be needed for this purpose, as markets only occasionally respond to 
stress test information. This indicates that markets are already well-informed about bank 
  
175 
risk profiles and might not need a particular regulatory signal. Further, more transparency 
from stress tests does not automatically promote market discipline where it is most needed. 
In recent years, regular European (in 2014) and U.S. (in 2016, 2017 and 2018) stress tests 
have led to negative abnormal returns that penalise bank behaviour. However, the results 
also show that stress tests exacerbate abnormal returns in either positive or negative 
direction. In this way, stress test information may lead to market discipline on weaker 
institutions. This might be an unintended consequence as weak banks might struggle more 
contributing to financial instability. Overall regulators need to be mindful of the 
information provided by stress tests. As suggested by the literature, more intense 
regulation and supervision without detailed disclosures could be a more suitable approach 
(Goldstein and Sapra, 2013). 
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Table 4.1 Variable definitions and data sources 
Abbreviation Variable Description Data source 
T1R Capital adequacy Regulatory Tier 1 capital divided by risk-weighted 
assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect 
LEVERAGE Leverage risk Natural logarithm of leverage ratio: total liabilities 
divided by total equity 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect 
RWA Credit risk Risk-weighted assets scaled by lagged total assets BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect 
LLR Credit portfolio 
quality 
Loan loss reserves for non-performing or impaired 
loans scaled by lagged total assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect 
ZSCORE Insolvency risk Natural logarithm of Z-Score that equals return on 
assets plus capital asset ratio divided by standard 
deviation of asset returns 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect 
ROA Profitability Return on assets: earnings before taxes divided by 
total assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect 
TIE Total funding cost Total interest expenses scaled by lagged total assets BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect 
OIE Uninsured funding 
cost 
Interest expense on all non-customer deposit 
liabilities (uninsured) scaled by lagged total assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect 
DEPBA Uninsured funding Deposits from banks (uninsured) scaled by lagged 
total assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect 
SUBD Uninsured funding Subordinated debts (uninsured) scaled by lagged 
total assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect 
IECD Insured funding 
cost 
Interest paid on customer deposits (insured) scaled 
by lagged total assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect 
CUSTD Insured funding Customer deposits (insured) scaled by lagged total 
assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect 
NIM Interest margin Net interest margin (net interest divided by total 
average earning assets) 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect 
SIZE Bank size Natural logarithm of total assets BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect 
LOAN Traditional 
banking activities 
Outstanding loans scaled by lagged total assets BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect 
LLP (Forward-looking) 
asset quality 
Loan loss provisions for non-performing or impaired 
loans scaled by lagged total assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect 
TRADE Non-traditional 
banking activities 
Trading securities scaled by lagged total assets BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect 
DEPO Liquidity risk Total deposits (market share of deposits) scaled by 
lagged total assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect 
EBPT Profitability Earnings before provision and taxes scaled by 
lagged total assets 
BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect 
OBSI Off-balance sheet 
activities 
Off-balance sheet items scaled by lagged total assets BvD Bankscope, Bank 
reports, FitchConnect 
BIDASK Information 
asymmetry 
Quarterly average of daily bid-ask-spreads (Ask – 
Bid / (Ask + Bid / 2)) 
Thomson Reuters 
(Datastream/IBES) 
RECNO Analyst coverage Quarterly average of the daily number of analysts 
filing a recommendation 
Thomson Reuters 
(Datastream/IBES) 
EPSSUR / 
PRICE 
Earnings surprise Quarterly average of the daily difference between 
the actual and estimated earnings per share scaled by 
the average share price of the previous quarter 
Thomson Reuters 
(Datastream/IBES) 
ESTSD / 
PRICE 
Estimate 
dispersion 
Quarterly average of daily standard deviation of all 
earnings per share estimates scaled by the average 
share price of the previous quarter 
Thomson Reuters 
(Datastream/IBES) 
TOVER Share turnover Quarterly average of the daily number of shares 
outstanding scaled by free float 
Thomson Reuters 
(Datastream/IBES) 
INVPRICE Inverse share 
price 
Quarterly average of 1 divided by daily share price Thomson Reuters 
(Datastream/IBES) 
RETVOL Return volatility Quarterly average of the daily standard deviation of 
continuously compounded share price returns 
Thomson Reuters 
(Datastream/IBES) 
MVALUE Market value Quarterly average of the daily natural logarithm of 
market value of equity 
Thomson Reuters 
(Datastream/IBES) 
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Table 4.1 continued 
MTBV Market-to-book 
value 
Quarterly average of the daily market value of equity 
divided by the book value of equity 
Thomson Reuters 
(Datastream/IBES) 
RECCON Analyst 
recommendation 
consensus 
Quarterly average of the daily recommendation 
consensus of analysts; yields the mean of all daily 
recommendations: Strong-buy (1-1.49), moderate-
buy (1.5-2.49), hold (2.5-3.49), moderate-sell (3.5-
4.49), strong-sell (4.5-5) 
Thomson Reuters 
(Datastream/IBES) 
FTST1011EU European first-
time participation 
in the 2010-11 
stress tests 
A binary variable that yields 1 for all banks that 
were tested for the first time in 2010-11, and 0 
otherwise 
EBA and ECB stress 
test disclosures 
ST1011EU European stress 
test period in 
2010-11 
A binary variable that yields 1 for the European 
2010-11 stress test period (2010Q2-2012Q1), and 0 
otherwise 
EBA and ECB stress 
test disclosures 
ST1415EU European stress 
test period in 
2014-15 
A binary variable that yields 1 for the European 
2014-15 stress test period (2014Q2-2016Q1), and 0 
otherwise 
EBA and ECB stress 
test disclosures 
ST2016EU European stress 
test period in 2016 
A binary variable that yields 1 for the European 
2016 stress test period (2016Q2-2017Q1), and 0 
otherwise 
EBA and ECB stress 
test disclosures 
FTST09US U.S. first-time 
participation in 
the 2009 stress 
test 
A binary variable that yields 1 for all banks that 
were tested for the first time in 2009, and 0 
otherwise 
Federal Reserve stress 
test disclosures 
ST0913US U.S. stress test 
period in 2009-13 
A binary variable that yields 1 for the initial U.S. 
2009-13 stress test period (2009Q3-2013Q4), and 0 
otherwise 
Federal Reserve stress 
test disclosures 
ST1417US U.S. stress test 
period in 2014-17 
A binary variable that yields 1 for the recent U.S. 
2014-17 stress test period (2014Q2-2017Q4), and 0 
otherwise 
Federal Reserve stress 
test disclosures 
ΔGDP Economic growth Change in Gross Domestic Product in Euros OECD, Bloomberg 
ΔUNEM Unemployment 
growth 
Change in unemployment rate OECD, Bloomberg 
IRATE Sovereign debt 
risk 
The difference between the short- and long-term 
interest rates in the government bond markets 
OECD 
BETA Asset sensitivity 
to market risk 
Beta coefficient of the capital asset pricing model, 
which yields the sensitivity of the asset in relation to 
the return of the market portfolio 
Thomson Reuters 
(Datastream/IBES) 
SMB Capitalisation 
factor 
Small minus big market capitalisation factor of the 
FF3F and C4F 
Fama and French 
database 
HML Book-to-market 
factor 
High minus low book-to-market ratio factor of the 
FF3F and C4F 
Fama and French 
database 
MOM Momentum factor High minus low momentum shares factor of the 
FF3F and C4F 
Fama and French 
database 
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Table 4.2 Sample construction 
Panel A: European stress test participation 
 CEBS/EBAa  ECB Stress test 
sample     
(TOTALEU) 
First-time participants 
2010-11 
(FTST1011EU) 
First-time 
participants 
2014 (FTST14EU) Country 2010 2011 2014 2016 2018 
 2014 2015 
Austria 2 3 6 2 2  6 2 10 4 3 
Belgium 2 2 5 2 2  6 1 7 2 4 
Cyprus 2 2 3 0 0  4 0 5 2 3 
Denmark 3 4 4 3 3  0 0 4 4 0 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0  3 0 3 0 3 
Finland 1 1 1 1 1  3 1 4 1 2 
France 4 4 11 6 6  13 1 15 4 9 
Germany 14 12 24 9 8  25 0 27 14 13 
Greece 6 6 4 0 0  4 4 6 6 0 
Hungary 2 1 1 1 1  0 0 2 2 0 
Ireland 2 3 3 2 2  5 0 5 3 2 
Italy 5 5 15 5 4  15 0 15 5 10 
Latvia 0 0 1 0 0  3 0 3 0 3 
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0  3 0 3 0 3 
Luxembourg 2 1 2 0 0  6 1 8 2 5 
Malta 1 1 1 0 0  3 1 4 1 2 
Netherlands 4 4 6 4 4  7 0 7 4 3 
Norway 0 1 1 1 1  0 0 1 1 0 
Poland 1 1 6 1 2  0 0 7 1 5 
Portugal 4 4 3 0 0  3 1 5 4 0 
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0  3 0 3 0 3 
Slovenia 1 2 3 0 0  3 1 4 2 1 
Spain 27 25 15 6 4  15 0 32 28 3 
Sweden 4 4 4 4 4  0 0 4 4 0 
United Kingdom 4 4 4 4 4  0 0 4 4 0 
Total samples 91 90 123 51 48  130 13 188 98 77 
- of which listed 42 44 58 32 32  58 4 62 45 15 
Panel B: U.S. stress test participation 
  Federal Reserve Stress test 
sample 
(TOTALUS) 
First-time 
participants 2009 
(FTST09US) 
First-time 
participants 
2014 
(FTST14US) 
Country 2009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
U.S.-Owned 19 19 19 18 24 24 24 25 22 26 19 6 
Non-U.S.-Owned - - - - 6 7 9 9 13 16 - 6 
Total sample 19 19 19 18 30 31 33 34 35 42 19 12 
- of which listed 19 19 19 18 27 28 30 31 27 32 19 9 
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Table 4.2 continued 
Panel C: European event study preparations 
Stress test observations CEBS 2010 
EBA 
2011 
EBA/ECB 
2014 
ECB 
2015 
EBA 
2016 
EBA 
2018 
First-time observations 
(FTSTO) 
Total observations 
(TOTALSTO) 
Listed banks / event observations 42 44 58 4 32 32 62 212 
Excluded due to data limitations 2 3 1 - - - 3 6 
Short-term event study sample 40 41 57 4 32 32 59 206 
Calendar-time portfolio sample 40 41 57 - 32b - 57b 138b 
Panel D: U.S. event study preparations 
Stress test observations SCAP 2009 
CCAR 
2011 
CCAR 
2012 
DFAST/
CCAR 
2013 
DFAST/ 
CCAR 
2014 
DFAST/
CCAR 
2015 
DFAST/ 
CCAR 
2016 
DFAST/ 
CCAR 
2017 
DFAST/
CCAR 
2018 
First-time 
observations 
(FTSTO) 
Total 
observations 
(TOTALSTO) 
Listed banks / event observations 19 19 19 18 27 28 30 31 27 32 (45) 218 (379) 
Excluded due to data limitations 2 2 2 1 4 2 4 3 3 7 (12) 23 (40) 
Short-term event study sample 17 17 17 17 23 26 26 28 24 25 (33) 195 (339) 
Calendar-time portfolio sample 17 17 17 17 23 26 26b 28b - 23 (29)b,c 117 (183)b,c 
Panel E: European and U.S. time-series preparations 
 Europe  U.S. 
 TOTALEU FTST1011EU FTST14EU  TOTALUS FTST09US FTST14US 
Total stress-tested banks  188 98 77  42 19 12 
Excluded banks due to M&As / bankruptcy / consolidation 20 19 1  - - - 
Excluded banks due to accounting data limitations 25 10 11  13 1 4 
Number of sample banks 143 69 65  29 18 8 
- of which listed 62 45 15  28 17 8 
This table presents the stress test participation in Europe and the U.S. and the construction of the final samples. Panel A reports the number of stress-tested banks by European country and stress test exercise. 
Participation in either the CEBS/EBA, or the ECB stress tests over the period 2010-2018 is considered. Panel B shows the number of stress test participants in the U.S. by ownership and year of assessment. 
Participation in the Federal Reserve's SCAP, DFAST and CCAR over the period 2009-2018 is considered. The subsequent panels describe the preparation process for the European (Panel C) and the U.S. 
(Panel D) event studies and the time series analysis (Panel E). I exclude stress test observations and banks due to lack of data caused by IPOs, M&As, bankruptcies and other factors. 
aThe stress tests in 2010 were conducted by CEBS, whilst the subsequent assessments were undertaken by EBA. 
bThe observations of the recent European and U.S. stress tests (i.e., that between 2016-2018) are not considered in the CTIME approach and thus not included in the portfolios of first-time (FTSTO) and total 
stress test observations (TOTALSTO). The long-term period of 1-36 months following those exercises cannot be fully captured (as of December 2018). 
cSince 2013, the Federal Reserve undertakes DFAST and CCAR each year. The numbers in parentheses include both DFAST and CCAR observations. 
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Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: European banks 
 Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. Median 
Bank risk-taking 
T1R 4278 0.129 0.058 0.056 0.413 0.117 
LEVERAGE 4626 2.743 0.652 1.107 5.161 2.698 
RWA 2850 0.497 0.178 0.162 0.899 0.491 
LLR 2844 0.032 0.037 0.001 0.193 0.019 
ZSCORE 4241 3.292 0.976 0.542 6.203 3.273 
ROA 3296 0.003 0.008 -0.028 0.027 0.003 
 
Bank funding structure 
TIE 2721 0.012 0.011 0.001 0.061 0.009 
OIE 2687 0.008 0.009 0.000 0.052 0.006 
DEPBA 3007 0.115 0.102 0.000 0.489 0.090 
IECD 1620 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.031 0.004 
CUSTD 3032 0.471 0.197 0.000 0.901 0.462 
NIM 4523 0.012 0.009 0.001 0.043 0.010 
       
Bank accounting characteristics 
SIZE 4966 11.073 1.795 6.724 14.529 11.014 
LOAN 3267 0.601 0.153 0.172 0.908 0.617 
LLP 3274 0.004 0.006 -0.003 0.036 0.002 
TRADE 2775 0.107 0.107 0.001 0.493 0.073 
DEPO 3068 0.579 0.205 0.004 0.940 0.571 
EBPT 3276 0.007 0.006 -0.004 0.031 0.006 
OBSI 2396 0.172 0.162 0.010 1.130 0.136 
 
Information asymmetry and analyst behaviour 
BIDASK 2650 0.008 0.014 0.000 0.095 0.003 
RECNO 2511 19.388 10.154 1.000 39.000 21.108 
EPSSUR / PRICE 2513 0.042 0.237 -0.171 1.768 -0.004 
ESTSD / PRICE 2455 0.048 0.139 0.001 1.024 0.012 
 
Market microstructure 
TOVER 2822 0.014 0.040 0.000 0.304 0.004 
INVPRICE 2834 0.248 0.481 0.000 3.906 0.097 
RETVOL 2834 0.025 0.017 0.005 0.101 0.020 
MVALUE 2834 8.609 1.692 4.482 11.840 8.744 
MTBV 2731 1.108 0.753 -0.100 3.890 0.922 
RECCON 2511 2.687 0.532 1.500 4.130 2.649 
Panel A: U.S. banks 
 Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. Median 
Bank risk-taking 
T1R 1504 0.119 0.038 -0.055 0.245 0.119 
LEVERAGE 1594 2.155 0.407 1.412 4.370 2.097 
RWA 1299 0.712 0.218 0.000 1.122 0.768 
LLR 1463 0.011 0.011 0.000 0.087 0.009 
ZSCORE 1492 3.163 0.758 1.265 5.516 3.126 
ROA 1517 0.005 0.007 -0.018 0.041 0.003 
 
Bank funding structure 
TIE 1517 0.005 0.007 0.000 0.039 0.003 
OIE 1517 0.004 0.006 0.000 0.037 0.002 
SUBD 1150 0.016 0.011 0.000 0.055 0.015 
IECD 1223 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.017 0.001 
CUSTD 1451 0.607 0.209 0.033 0.939 0.670 
NIM 1555 0.014 0.013 0.000 0.068 0.008 
       
Bank accounting characteristics 
SIZE 1595 11.928 1.151 10.100 14.513 11.660 
LOAN 1517 0.512 0.230 0.000 0.861 0.597 
LLP 1443 0.003 0.006 -0.001 0.034 0.001 
TRADE 1421 0.068 0.104 0.000 0.418 0.016 
DEPO 1446 0.604 0.219 0.016 0.939 0.672 
EBPT 1517 0.008 0.010 -0.007 0.065 0.005 
OBSI 1174 0.467 0.495 0.000 3.077 0.378 
 
Information asymmetry and analyst behaviour 
BIDASK 1347 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.001 
RECNO 1414 22.473 7.906 1.000 35.000 22.946 
EPSSUR / PRICE 1384 -0.002 0.041 -0.111 0.247 -0.004 
ESTSD / PRICE 1370 0.006 0.010 0.000 0.074 0.003 
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Table 4.3 continued 
Market microstructure 
TOVER 1401 0.011 0.009 0.000 0.061 0.008 
INVPRICE 1402 0.040 0.041 0.004 0.216 0.026 
RETVOL 1402 0.020 0.017 0.006 0.102 0.015 
MVALUE 1402 10.260 1.095 7.959 12.522 10.231 
MTBV 1353 1.375 0.857 0.330 6.020 1.141 
RECCON 1414 2.451 0.462 1.000 3.470 2.447 
This table reports descriptive statistics (i.e., observation, mean, standard deviation, minimum maximum and median) of the 
variables I use in my analysis. Panel A illustrates the European sample and Panel B shows the U.S. sample. I include the 
following accounting variables to measure market discipline, quarterly winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentiles, in my analysis: 
Bank risk-taking using capital adequacy (T1R), leverage risk (LEVERAGE), credit risk (RWA), credit portfolio quality (LLR), 
insolvency risk (ZSCORE), profitability (ROA). I estimate bank funding structure using total (TIE) uninsured (OIE) and 
insured (IECD) funding cost, uninsured (DEPBA, SUBD), insured funding (CUSTD), and interest margin (NIM). I measure 
bank accounting characteristics using bank size captured by natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE), traditional banking activity 
shown by outstanding loans (LOAN), asset quality measured by loan loss provisions (LLP), non-traditional banking activity 
measured by trading securities (TRADE), liquidity shown by total deposits (DEPO), profitability measured by earnings before 
provision and taxes (EBPT), and off-balance sheet activities (OBSI). I include the following market variables, daily winsorised 
at the 1 and 99 percentiles and quarterly averaged, in my analysis: Information asymmetry using the bid-ask spread (BIDASK) 
and analyst behaviour employing analyst coverage (RECNO), earnings surprises (EPSSUR / PRICE) and estimate dispersion 
(ESTSD / PRICE). I measure market microstructure characteristics using share turnover (TOVER), inverse share price 
(INVPRICE), return volatility (RETVOL), market value (MVALUE), market-to-book value (MTBV), and analyst 
recommendation consensus (RECCON). The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in 
Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.4 Correlation coefficients 
Panel A: European banks 
Variables SIZE LOAN LLP TRADE DEPO EBPT TOVER INVPRICE RETVOL MVALUE MTBV RECCON ΔGDP ΔUNEM IRATE 
SIZE 1.000               
                
LOAN -0.423*** 1.000              
 (0.000)               
LLP -0.166*** 0.129*** 1.000             
 (0.000) (0.000)              
TRADE 0.625*** -0.609*** -0.270*** 1.000            
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)             
DEPO -0.424*** 0.334*** 0.200*** -0.419*** 1.000           
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)            
EBPT -0.280*** 0.245*** 0.379*** -0.221*** 0.277*** 1.000          
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)           
TOVER -0.106*** 0.179*** 0.087*** -0.203*** 0.045** -0.042* 1.000         
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.046) (0.053)          
INVPRICE -0.118*** 0.096*** 0.106*** -0.249*** 0.122*** -0.106*** 0.336*** 1.000        
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
RETVOL 0.035* 0.037* 0.364*** -0.143*** 0.072*** -0.065*** 0.048** 0.068*** 1.000       
 (0.085) (0.094) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.014) (0.000)        
MVALUE 0.853*** -0.395*** -0.304*** 0.550*** -0.335*** -0.057*** -0.131*** -0.198*** -0.219*** 1.000      
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
MTBV -0.225*** 0.198*** -0.244*** -0.043* 0.120*** 0.372*** -0.118*** -0.209*** -0.382*** 0.180*** 1.000     
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.069) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)      
RECCON -0.077*** 0.152*** 0.098*** -0.109*** -0.050** -0.105*** 0.085*** 0.049** 0.130*** -0.187*** -0.131*** 1.000    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
ΔGDP -0.009 -0.024 0.046** 0.003 0.000 -0.004 -0.018 -0.003 -0.024 -0.008 -0.023 0.034 1.000   
 (0.550) (0.184) (0.011) (0.886) (0.996) (0.806) (0.338) (0.891) (0.217) (0.665) (0.248) (0.100)    
ΔUNEM 0.030** 0.120*** 0.059*** -0.019 -0.038** 0.035* 0.063*** -0.070*** 0.230*** -0.022 -0.090*** 0.050** 0.056*** 1.000  
 (0.039) (0.000) (0.001) (0.329) (0.039) (0.050) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.257) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000)   
IRATE -0.030** 0.107*** 0.418*** -0.249*** 0.104*** 0.020 0.060*** 0.090*** 0.478*** -0.259*** -0.393*** 0.230*** -0.028** 0.118*** 1.000 
 (0.045) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.285) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000)  
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Table 4.4 continued 
Panel B: U.S. banks 
 SIZE LOAN LLP TRADE DEPO EBPT TOVER INVPRICE RETVOL MVALUE MTBV RECCON ΔGDP ΔUNEM IRATE 
SIZE 1.000               
                
LOAN -0.507*** 1.000              
 (0.000)               
LLP -0.101*** 0.206*** 1.000             
 (0.000) (0.000)              
TRADE 0.674*** -0.710*** -0.091*** 1.000            
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)             
DEPO -0.448*** 0.629*** -0.063** -0.745*** 1.000           
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.024) (0.000)            
EBPT -0.096*** 0.207*** 0.653*** -0.174*** 0.043 1.000          
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.109)           
TOVER -0.094*** 0.081*** 0.259*** 0.085*** -0.025 -0.044 1.000         
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.000) (0.005) (0.400) (0.136)          
INVPRICE -0.249*** 0.282*** 0.139*** -0.209*** 0.252*** -0.064** 0.292*** 1.000        
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000)         
RETVOL -0.057** 0.062** 0.323*** 0.043 -0.015 0.020 0.729*** 0.297*** 1.000       
 (0.045) (0.034) (0.000) (0.157) (0.612) (0.504) (0.000) (0.000)        
MVALUE 0.829*** -0.429*** -0.183*** 0.497*** -0.462*** -0.029 -0.436*** -0.248*** -0.260*** 1.000      
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.329) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
MTBV -0.137*** -0.058* 0.145*** -0.101*** -0.188*** 0.371*** -0.312*** -0.322*** -0.248*** 0.153*** 1.000     
 (0.000) (0.051) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)      
RECCON -0.253*** 0.117*** 0.084*** -0.146*** 0.113*** -0.067** 0.254*** -0.093*** 0.193*** -0.408*** -0.016 1.000    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.568)     
ΔGDP -0.034 0.027 0.069** -0.005 0.034 0.092*** 0.013 0.056** 0.007 -0.034 -0.034 -0.036 1.000   
 (0.193) (0.308) (0.011) (0.847) (0.203) (0.001) (0.633) (0.042) (0.808) (0.217) (0.225) (0.183)    
ΔUNEM -0.059** 0.050* 0.160*** 0.078*** -0.080*** -0.013 0.299*** -0.014 0.562*** -0.063** 0.076*** 0.192*** -0.124*** 1.000  
 (0.022) (0.057) (0.000) (0.004) (0.003) (0.617) (0.000) (0.603) (0.000) (0.020) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000)   
IRATE -0.017 0.004 0.269*** -0.083*** 0.036 0.059** 0.385*** 0.251*** 0.353*** -0.142*** -0.371*** -0.011 0.156*** -0.148*** 1.000 
 (0.516) (0.879) (0.000) (0.002) (0.180) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.687) (0.000) (0.000)  
This table reports Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients and p-values for the variables I use in my regression models. Panel A illustrates the European sample and Panel B shows the U.S. sample. I include the following 
accounting variables, quarterly winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentiles and lagged by two quarters, in my analysis: Bank size captured by natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE), traditional banking activity shown by 
outstanding loans (LOAN), asset quality measured by loan loss provisions (LLP), non-traditional banking activity measured by trading securities (TRADE), liquidity shown by total deposits (DEPO), and profitability 
measured by earnings before provision and taxes (EBPT). I include the following market variables, daily winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentiles, quarterly averaged and lagged by two quarters, in my analysis: Share 
turnover (TOVER), inverse share price (INVPRICE), return volatility (RETVOL), market value (MVALUE), market-to-book value (MTBV), and analyst recommendation consensus (RECCON). Macroeconomic 
fundamentals are captured by economic growth (ΔGDP), unemployment growth (ΔUNEM), and sovereign debt risk (IRATE). Data range 2005-2017. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.5 European short-term event study results 
Panel A: Capital asset pricing model (CAPM)       
   Average CARs (CAAR) 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–3, t+3 t–1, t+5 
(1) CEBS 2010 (23 July) 40 0.0084 0.0116 -0.0031 0.0130 
(2) EBA 2011 (15 July) 41 0.0003 0.0087 0.0072 0.0347*** 
(3) EBA/ECB 2014 (27 Oct.) 57 0.0036** -0.0024 -0.0084 -0.0158 
(4) ECB 2015 (2 Nov.) 4 0.1386 -0.0087 -0.2061 -0.2422 
(5) EBA 2016 (29 July) 32 0.0069 -0.0006 -0.0102 -0.0092 
(6) EBA 2018 (2 Nov.) 32 0.0018 0.0019 0.0031 0.0080 
(7) FTSTO 59 0.0133** 0.0161 -0.0037 0.0058* 
(8) TOTALSTO 206 0.0067* 0.0034 -0.0066 0.0002* 
Panel B: Fama and French (1993) three-factors model (FF3F)     
   Average CARs (CAAR) 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–3, t+3 t–1, t+5 
(1) CEBS 2010 (23 July) 40 0.0078 0.0047 -0.0063 0.0005 
(2) EBA 2011 (15 July) 41 0.0048 0.0146 0.0180 0.0321* 
(3) EBA/ECB 2014 (27 Oct.) 57 0.0061** 0.0028 0.0040 -0.0080 
(4) ECB 2015 (2 Nov.) 4 0.1331 -0.0053 -0.1127 -0.2324 
(5) EBA 2016 (29 July) 32 0.0083 0.0014 -0.0102 -0.0085 
(6) EBA 2018 (2 Nov.) 32 0.0007 0.0006 0.0022 0.0067 
(7) FTSTO 59 0.0148** 0.0145 0.0010 0.0014 
(8) TOTALSTO 206 0.0081 0.0048 0.0000 -0.0005 
Panel C: Carhart (1997) four-factors model (C4F)       
   Average CARs (CAAR) 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–3, t+3 t–1, t+5 
(1) CEBS 2010 (23 July) 40 0.0062 0.0002 -0.0106 -0.0042 
(2) EBA 2011 (15 July) 41 0.0054 0.0149 0.0181 0.0318* 
(3) EBA/ECB 2014 (27 Oct.) 57 0.0025 -0.0023 -0.0074 -0.0129 
(4) ECB 2015 (2 Nov.) 4 0.1158 -0.0356 -0.1480 -0.2520 
(5) EBA 2016 (29 July) 32 0.0081 0.0016 -0.0094 -0.0091 
(6) EBA 2018 (2 Nov.) 32 0.0007 0.0006 0.0022 0.0067 
(7) FTSTO 59 0.0134** 0.0110 -0.0031 -0.0023 
(8) TOTALSTO 206 0.0066 0.0020 -0.0045 -0.0033 
Panel D: Market return model (MRM)     
   Average BHARs 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–1, t+4 t–1, t+7 
(1) CEBS 2010 (23 July) 40 0.0107* 0.0169* 0.0189** 0.0256*** 
(2) EBA 2011 (15 July) 41 -0.0081 0.0017 0.0149** 0.0101 
(3) EBA/ECB 2014 (27 Oct.) 57 -0.0051 -0.0060 -0.0016 -0.0029 
(4) ECB 2015 (2 Nov.) 4 0.1328 -0.0292 -0.2515** -0.3792* 
(5) EBA 2016 (29 July) 32 0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0039 -0.0025 
(6) EBA 2018 (2 Nov.) 32 0.0017 0.0019 0.0044 0.0032 
(7) FTSTO 59 0.0153*** 0.0208** 0.0137 0.0176* 
(8) TOTALSTO 206 0.0065** 0.0034 -0.0016 -0.0027 
This table reports short-term market reactions around the European stress test events. Models 1 to 6 show 
the results for the individual European stress tests in 2010, 2011, 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2018, whilst 
Models 7 and 8 illustrate first-time and total stress test observations (FTSTO, TOTALSTO). For the 
indicated event windows, Panel A illustrates the average CARs of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), 
Panel B estimates the average CARs of the Fama and French (1993) three-factors model (FF3F), Panel C 
examines the average CARs of the Carhart (1997) four-factors model (C4F), and Panel D shows the average 
BHARs of the market return model (MRM). *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.5A European positive CAR (t–1, t+1) analysis 
Panel A: Capital asset pricing model (CAPM)       
   Average CARs (CAAR) 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–3, t+3 t–1, t+5 
(1) CEBS 2010 (23 July) 23 0.0256*** 0.0352*** 0.0168*** 0.0334** 
(2) EBA 2011 (15 July) 17 0.0385*** 0.0397*** 0.0081 0.0619*** 
(3) EBA/ECB 2014 (27 Oct.) 32 0.0239*** 0.0164 0.0069 0.0098 
(4) EBA 2016 (29 July) 17 0.0293*** 0.0125 0.0061 -0.0056 
(5) EBA 2018 (2 Nov.) 17 0.0189*** 0.0172*** 0.0218 0.0273 
(6) FTSTO 38 0.0314*** 0.0392*** 0.0182*** 0.0292*** 
(7) TOTALSTO 109 0.0319*** 0.0241*** 0.0063*** 0.0169*** 
Panel B: Fama and French (1993) three-factors model (FF3F)     
   Average CARs (CAAR) 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–3, t+3 t–1, t+5 
(1) CEBS 2010 (23 July) 23 0.0261*** 0.0272** 0.0142** 0.0180* 
(2) EBA 2011 (15 July) 17 0.0494*** 0.0537*** 0.0335 0.0633*** 
(3) EBA/ECB 2014 (27 Oct.) 32 0.0266*** 0.0223** 0.0204 0.0189** 
(4) EBA 2016 (29 July) 17 0.0296*** 0.0119** 0.0045 -0.0055* 
(5) EBA 2018 (2 Nov.) 17 0.0180*** 0.0162** 0.0223 0.0272** 
(6) FTSTO 38 0.0344*** 0.0389*** 0.0261** 0.0253*** 
(7) TOTALSTO 109 0.0344*** 0.0263*** 0.0161*** 0.0169*** 
Panel C: Carhart (1997) four-factors model (C4F)       
   Average CARs (CAAR) 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–3, t+3 t–1, t+5 
(1) CEBS 2010 (23 July) 23 0.0290*** 0.0352* 0.0219* 0.0265** 
(2) EBA 2011 (15 July) 17 0.0526*** 0.0552*** 0.0341 0.0615*** 
(3) EBA/ECB 2014 (27 Oct.) 32 0.0240*** 0.0186* 0.0120 0.0153* 
(4) EBA 2016 (29 July) 17 0.0295*** 0.0120*** 0.0047 -0.0057* 
(5) EBA 2018 (2 Nov.) 17 0.0182*** 0.0164 0.0225 0.0274 
(6) FTSTO 38 0.0356*** 0.0429*** 0.0287** 0.0296** 
(7) TOTALSTO 109 0.0344*** 0.0265*** 0.0147** 0.0170*** 
Panel D: Market return model (MRM)     
   Average BHARs 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–1, t+4 t–1, t+7 
(1) CEBS 2010 (23 July) 23 0.0159** 0.0300** 0.0253** 0.0316** 
(2) EBA 2011 (15 July) 17 0.0209 0.0176 0.0071 0.0170 
(3) EBA/ECB 2014 (27 Oct.) 32 0.0134*** 0.0002 0.0077 0.0067 
(4) EBA 2016 (29 July) 17 0.0252*** 0.0154* 0.0132 0.0101 
(5) EBA 2018 (2 Nov.) 17 0.0189*** 0.0171*** 0.0277*** 0.0179** 
(6) FTSTO 38 0.0343*** 0.0455*** 0.0361*** 0.0421*** 
(7) TOTALSTO 109 0.0323*** 0.0248*** 0.0150* 0.0139 
This table reports short-term market reactions around the European stress test events for the banks that 
experience a positive CAR (t–1, t+1). Models 1 to 5 show the results for the individual European stress tests 
in 2010, 2011, 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2018, whilst Models 6 and 7 illustrate first-time and total stress test 
observations (FTSTO, TOTALSTO). For the indicated event windows, Panel A illustrates the average 
CARs of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), Panel B estimates the average CARs of the Fama and 
French (1993) three-factors model (FF3F), Panel C examines the average CARs of the Carhart (1997) four-
factors model (C4F), and Panel D shows the average BHARs of the market return model (MRM). *, **, and 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and 
the relevant data sources are provided in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.5B European negative CAR (t–1, t+1) analysis 
Panel A: Capital asset pricing model (CAPM)       
   Average CARs (CAAR) 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–3, t+3 t–1, t+5 
(1) CEBS 2010 (23 July) 17 -0.0149** -0.0204 -0.0301** -0.0148 
(2) EBA 2011 (15 July) 24 -0.0268*** -0.0132 0.0066 0.0155 
(3) EBA/ECB 2014 (27 Oct.) 25 -0.0225*** -0.0264*** -0.0279 -0.0484 
(4) EBA 2016 (29 July) 15 -0.0185*** -0.0154 -0.0286 -0.0134 
(5) EBA 2018 (2 Nov.) 15 -0.0176*** -0.0154** -0.0181** -0.0138*** 
(6) FTSTO 21 -0.0196** -0.0259* -0.0434*** -0.0365 
(7) TOTALSTO 97 -0.0216*** -0.0199*** -0.0211** -0.0186** 
Panel B: Fama and French (1993) three-factors model (FF3F)     
   Average CARs (CAAR) 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–3, t+3 t–1, t+5 
(1) CEBS 2010 (23 July) 17 -0.0169** -0.0257** -0.0341** -0.0231 
(2) EBA 2011 (15 July) 24 -0.0269*** -0.0131*** 0.0070 0.0101 
(3) EBA/ECB 2014 (27 Oct.) 25 -0.0202*** -0.0222** -0.0170 -0.0425 
(4) EBA 2016 (29 July) 15 -0.0158*** -0.0104*** -0.0269* -0.0119 
(5) EBA 2018 (2 Nov.) 15 -0.0189*** -0.0171** -0.0206*** -0.0165*** 
(6) FTSTO 21 -0.0207*** -0.0295*** -0.0445*** -0.0418 
(7) TOTALSTO 97 -0.0214*** -0.0193*** -0.0181*** -0.0201*** 
Panel C: Carhart (1997) four-factors model (C4F)       
   Average CARs (CAAR) 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–3, t+3 t–1, t+5 
(1) CEBS 2010 (23 July) 17 -0.0246*** -0.0471*** -0.0546*** -0.0458** 
(2) EBA 2011 (15 July) 24 -0.0280*** -0.0137** 0.0068 0.0107 
(3) EBA/ECB 2014 (27 Oct.) 25 -0.0249*** -0.0290*** -0.0323** -0.0490** 
(4) EBA 2016 (29 July) 15 -0.0163*** -0.0102*** -0.0253* -0.0129 
(5) EBA 2018 (2 Nov.) 15 -0.0192*** -0.0174*** -0.0209*** -0.0166*** 
(6) FTSTO 21 -0.0268*** -0.0467*** -0.0606*** -0.0600*** 
(7) TOTALSTO 97 -0.0246*** -0.0255*** -0.0261*** -0.0261*** 
Panel D: Market return model (MRM)     
   Average BHARs 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–1, t+4 t–1, t+7 
(1) CEBS 2010 (23 July) 17 0.0039 0.0007 -0.0011 -0.0001 
(2) EBA 2011 (15 July) 24 -0.0244*** -0.0072 0.0192*** 0.0062 
(3) EBA/ECB 2014 (27 Oct.) 25 -0.0176*** -0.0101 -0.0079 -0.0094 
(4) EBA 2016 (29 July) 15 -0.0182*** -0.0149 -0.0179 -0.0128 
(5) EBA 2018 (2 Nov.) 15 -0.0178*** -0.0154*** -0.0220*** -0.0134* 
(6) FTSTO 21 -0.0190*** -0.0240*** -0.0269*** -0.0269** 
(7) TOTALSTO 97 -0.0224*** -0.0206*** -0.0203*** -0.0213*** 
This table reports short-term market reactions around the European stress test events for the banks that 
experience a negative CAR (t–1, t+1). Models 1 to 5 show the results for the individual European stress 
tests in 2010, 2011, 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2018, whilst Models 6 and 7 illustrate first-time and total stress 
test observations (FTSTO, TOTALSTO). For the indicated event windows, Panel A illustrates the average 
CARs of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), Panel B estimates the average CARs of the Fama and 
French (1993) three-factors model (FF3F), Panel C examines the average CARs of the Carhart (1997) four-
factors model (C4F), and Panel D shows the average BHARs of the market return model (MRM). *, **, and 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and 
the relevant data sources are provided in Table 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1 European stress test events (2010, 2011, 2014 and 2015) 
The graphs plot the average CARs (CAAR) of the stress-tested banks within a 21-day event window              
(t–10, t+10). Based on the baseline Carhart (1997) four-factors model (C4F), the observations are split into 
banks that experience a positive (‘good’ news) and a negative (‘bad’ news) CARt–1, t+1. The stress tests in 
2010, 2011, 2014 and 2015 are considered. 
 
Figure 4.2 European stress test events (2016, 2018, FTSTO and TOTALSTO) 
The graphs plot the average CARs (CAAR) of the stress-tested banks within a 21-day event window              
(t–10, t+10). Based on the baseline Carhart (1997) four-factors model (C4F), the observations are is split 
into banks that experience a positive (‘good’ news) and a negative (‘bad’ news) CARt–1, t+1. The stress tests 
in 2016, 2018, the first-time (FTSTO), and total (TOTALSTO) stress test participation are considered. 
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Table 4.6 U.S. short-term event study results 
Panel A: Capital asset pricing model (CAPM)       
   Average CARs (CAAR) 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–3, t+3 t–1, t+5 
(1) SCAP 2009 (7 May) 17 0.0409 0.0266 -0.0014 0.0092 
(2) CCAR 2011 (18 March) 17 0.0051 0.0090 0.0096 0.0014 
(3) CCAR 2012 (13 March) 17 -0.0046 0.0004 -0.0069 0.0107* 
(4) DFAST 2013 (7 March) 17 0.0044 0.0008 0.0092 0.0037 
(5) CCAR 2013 (14 March) 17 -0.0078** -0.0088** -0.0130** -0.0105 
(6) DFAST 2014 (20 March) 23 -0.0011 -0.0030 -0.0092 -0.0035 
(7) CCAR 2014 (26 March) 23 -0.0006 0.0033 0.0007 0.0063 
(8) DFAST 2015 (5 March) 26 0.0062 0.0072 0.0005 0.0103 
(9) CCAR 2015 (11 March) 26 0.0032 0.0012 0.0086 0.0014 
(10) DFAST 2016 (23 June) 26 -0.0034 -0.0175*** -0.0216*** -0.0120 
(11) CCAR 2016 (29 June) 26 0.0054 0.0056 -0.0168* -0.0021 
(12) DFAST 2017 (22 June) 28 -0.0038* -0.0014 -0.0065** -0.0140*** 
(13) CCAR 2017 (28 June) 28 -0.0126*** -0.0107** -0.0100** -0.0120** 
(14) DFAST 2018 (21 June) 24 0.0017 0.0005 -0.0054** -0.0092** 
(15) CCAR 2018 (28 June) 24 -0.0092*** -0.0088*** -0.0103*** -0.0069*** 
(16) FTSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 25 0.0280 0.0175 -0.0074 0.0042 
(17) FTSTO 33 0.0201 0.0144 -0.0050 0.0068 
(18) TOTALSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 195 0.0039 0.0013 -0.0046*** -0.0016 
(19) TOTALSTO 339 0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0054*** -0.0026** 
Panel B: Fama and French (1993) three-factors model (FF3F)     
   Average CARs (CAAR) 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–3, t+3 t–1, t+5 
(1) SCAP 2009 (7 May) 17 0.0188 0.0150 -0.0167 -0.0100 
(2) CCAR 2011 (18 March) 17 0.0028 0.0068 0.0051 0.0028 
(3) CCAR 2012 (13 March) 17 0.0031 0.0076 -0.0011 0.0205* 
(4) DFAST 2013 (7 March) 17 -0.0014 -0.0047 0.0038 -0.0072 
(5) CCAR 2013 (14 March) 17 -0.0141*** -0.0153** -0.0199** -0.0192 
(6) DFAST 2014 (20 March) 23 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0052 0.0026 
(7) CCAR 2014 (26 March) 23 0.0024* 0.0069* 0.0041 0.0068 
(8) DFAST 2015 (5 March) 26 0.0057 0.0068* -0.0005 0.0092* 
(9) CCAR 2015 (11 March) 26 0.0025 0.0002 0.0085 0.0014 
(10) DFAST 2016 (23 June) 26 -0.0049 -0.0178*** -0.0207*** -0.0114 
(11) CCAR 2016 (29 June) 26 0.0065 0.0059 -0.0172 -0.0009 
(12) DFAST 2017 (22 June) 28 -0.0075*** -0.0050 -0.0090** -0.0163** 
(13) CCAR 2017 (28 June) 28 -0.0113** -0.0096** -0.0104** -0.0096** 
(14) DFAST 2018 (21 June) 24 0.0020 0.0014 -0.0060* -0.0079** 
(15) CCAR 2018 (28 June) 24 -0.0083*** -0.0083*** -0.0108** -0.0079** 
(16) FTSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 25 0.0132 0.0106 -0.0166** -0.0068 
(17) FTSTO 33 0.0097 0.0100 -0.0111 -0.0015 
(18) TOTALSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 195 0.0013 0.0001 -0.0062*** -0.0028 
(19) TOTALSTO 339 -0.0006** -0.0011 -0.0066*** -0.0034* 
Panel C: Carhart (1997) four-factors model (C4F)       
   Average CARs (CAAR) 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–3, t+3 t–1, t+5 
(1) SCAP 2009 (7 May) 17 0.0133 0.0103 -0.0278 -0.0016 
(2) CCAR 2011 (18 March) 17 0.0012 0.0054 0.0036 0.0003 
(3) CCAR 2012 (13 March) 17 0.0054 0.0089 -0.0019 0.0212* 
(4) DFAST 2013 (7 March) 17 -0.0025 -0.0065 0.0043 -0.0089 
(5) CCAR 2013 (14 March) 17 -0.0141*** -0.0156** -0.0212** -0.0186 
(6) DFAST 2014 (20 March) 23 0.0011 0.0022 -0.0033 0.0060 
(7) CCAR 2014 (26 March) 23 0.0035** 0.0080** 0.0068* 0.0053 
(8) DFAST 2015 (5 March) 26 0.0057 0.0067* -0.0008 0.0086* 
(9) CCAR 2015 (11 March) 26 0.0022 -0.0002 0.0079 0.0009 
(10) DFAST 2016 (23 June) 26 -0.0044 -0.0169*** -0.0198*** -0.0105 
(11) CCAR 2016 (29 June) 26 0.0064 0.0055 -0.0163* -0.0009 
(12) DFAST 2017 (22 June) 28 -0.0076*** -0.0046 -0.0089** -0.0158** 
(13) CCAR 2017 (28 June) 28 -0.0113** -0.0094** -0.0095** -0.0100** 
(14) DFAST 2018 (21 June) 24 0.0020 0.0014 -0.0060 -0.0079** 
(15) CCAR 2018 (28 June) 24 -0.0083*** -0.0083*** -0.0108** -0.0079** 
(16) FTSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 25 0.0098 0.0080 -0.0238** -0.0003 
(17) FTSTO 33 0.0073 0.0083 -0.0159 0.0032 
(18) TOTALSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 195 0.0010 0.0000 -0.0071** -0.0018 
(19) TOTALSTO 339 -0.0008* -0.0012 -0.0069*** -0.0030* 
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Table 4.6 continued 
Panel D: Market return model (MRM)     
   Average BHARs 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–1, t+4 t–1, t+7 
(1) SCAP 2009 (7 May) 17 0.0540 0.0345 0.0163 0.0130 
(2) CCAR 2011 (18 March) 17 0.0039 0.0083** 0.0071 0.0063 
(3) CCAR 2012 (13 March) 17 -0.0024 0.0039 0.0092* 0.0177*** 
(4) DFAST 2013 (7 March) 17 0.0053 0.0021 0.0041 -0.0059 
(5) CCAR 2013 (14 March) 17 -0.0068 -0.0082* -0.0045 -0.0099* 
(6) DFAST 2014 (20 March) 23 -0.0007 -0.0025 -0.0039 0.0002 
(7) CCAR 2014 (26 March) 23 0.0003 0.0006 0.0001 -0.0006 
(8) DFAST 2015 (5 March) 26 0.0065** 0.0073** 0.0055* 0.0088*** 
(9) CCAR 2015 (11 March) 26 0.0026 0.0009 0.0020 0.0051 
(10) DFAST 2016 (23 June) 26 -0.0027 -0.0147*** -0.021*** -0.0122*** 
(11) CCAR 2016 (29 June) 26 0.0036 0.0040 -0.0019 0.0020 
(12) DFAST 2017 (22 June) 28 -0.0030 -0.0009 -0.0068* -0.0122*** 
(13) CCAR 2017 (28 June) 28 -0.0146*** -0.0125*** -0.0113*** -0.0184*** 
(14) DFAST 2018 (21 June) 24 0.0022 0.0013 -0.0027 -0.0101* 
(15) CCAR 2018 (28 June) 24 -0.0091** -0.0091 -0.0059* -0.0093* 
(16) FTSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 25 0.0372 0.0230 0.0087 0.0108 
(17) FTSTO 33 0.0266 0.0182 0.0089 0.0109 
(18) TOTALSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 195 0.0056 0.0030 -0.0006 -0.0007 
(19) TOTALSTO 339 0.0014 0.0002 -0.0016 -0.0021 
This table reports short-term market reactions around the U.S. stress test events. Models 1 to 15 show the results for the 
individual U.S. stress tests in 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018, whilst Models 16 and 19 illustrate 
first-time and total stress test observations (FTSTO, TOTALSTO). For the indicated event windows, Panel A illustrates the 
average CARs of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), Panel B estimates the average CARs of the Fama and French (1993) 
three-factors model (FF3F), Panel C examines the average CARs of the Carhart (1997) four-factors model (C4F), and Panel D 
shows the average BHARs of the market return model (MRM). *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.6A U.S. positive CAR (t–1, t+1) analysis 
Panel A: Capital asset pricing model (CAPM)       
   Average CARs (CAAR) 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–3, t+3 t–1, t+5 
(1) SCAP 2009 (7 May) 8 0.1573*** 0.1382*** 0.1210 0.1077** 
(2) CCAR 2011 (18 March) 9 0.0163*** 0.0207** 0.0139 0.0065 
(3) CCAR 2012 (13 March) 11 0.0047 0.0096 0.0008 0.0184** 
(4) DFAST 2013 (7 March) 6 0.0218** 0.0183** 0.0258 0.0223** 
(5) CCAR 2013 (14 March) 2 0.0183 0.0225 0.0264 0.0294 
(6) DFAST 2014 (20 March) 10 0.0129*** 0.0159** 0.0121* 0.0138* 
(7) CCAR 2014 (26 March) 17 0.0053 0.0100*** 0.0050 0.0121 
(8) DFAST 2015 (5 March) 17 0.0160*** 0.0161*** 0.0081** 0.0166** 
(9) CCAR 2015 (11 March) 15 0.0109*** 0.0088*** 0.0132* 0.0065* 
(10) DFAST 2016 (23 June) 9 0.0078*** 0.0007 -0.0060 -0.0062 
(11) CCAR 2016 (29 June) 16 0.0178*** 0.0165*** -0.0074 0.0078** 
(12) DFAST 2017 (22 June) 6 0.0129** 0.0145** 0.0110 0.0071 
(13) CCAR 2017 (28 June) 8 0.0064** 0.0073** 0.0092*** 0.0042** 
(14) DFAST 2018 (21 June) 13 0.0083*** 0.0033 -0.0015 -0.0058 
(15) CCAR 2018 (28 June) 4 0.0171** 0.0179 0.0170 0.0218 
(16) FTSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 12 0.1105*** 0.0978*** 0.0783 0.0763*** 
(17) FTSTO 17 0.0792*** 0.073*** 0.0541 0.0607*** 
(18) TOTALSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 89 0.0252*** 0.0233*** 0.0170*** 0.0178*** 
(19) TOTALSTO 151 0.0194*** 0.0187*** 0.0124*** 0.0145*** 
Panel B: Fama and French (1993) three-factors model (FF3F)     
   Average CARs (CAAR) 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–3, t+3 t–1, t+5 
(1) SCAP 2009 (7 May) 8 0.1405*** 0.1287 0.1048 0.0912 
(2) CCAR 2011 (18 March) 9 0.0139*** 0.0184*** 0.0089 0.0084 
(3) CCAR 2012 (13 March) 11 0.0136** 0.0186 0.0088 0.0305*** 
(4) DFAST 2013 (7 March) 6 0.0145*** 0.0111* 0.0189* 0.0084* 
(5) CCAR 2013 (14 March) 2 0.0108 0.0161 0.0195 0.0227 
(6) DFAST 2014 (20 March) 10 0.0169*** 0.0227*** 0.0208** 0.0244* 
(7) CCAR 2014 (26 March) 17 0.0088*** 0.0146*** 0.0107** 0.0131** 
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Table 4.6A continued 
(8) DFAST 2015 (5 March) 17 0.0156*** 0.0160*** 0.0075** 0.0145** 
(9) CCAR 2015 (11 March) 15 0.0109*** 0.0087*** 0.0139** 0.0074 
(10) DFAST 2016 (23 June) 9 0.0069*** 0.0000 -0.0056 -0.0057 
(11) CCAR 2016 (29 June) 16 0.019*** 0.0168** -0.0084 0.0088** 
(12) DFAST 2017 (22 June) 6 0.0107** 0.0127** 0.0115 0.0077 
(13) CCAR 2017 (28 June) 8 0.0069*** 0.0077*** 0.0081 0.0058 
(14) DFAST 2018 (21 June) 13 0.0093*** 0.0055 -0.0010 -0.0030 
(15) CCAR 2018 (28 June) 4 0.0186* 0.0194 0.0180 0.0227 
(16) FTSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 12 0.0996*** 0.0924** 0.0685 0.0668* 
(17) FTSTO 17 0.0729*** 0.0709*** 0.0495 0.0543*** 
(18) TOTALSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 89 0.0243*** 0.0237*** 0.0165*** 0.0184*** 
(19) TOTALSTO 151 0.0194*** 0.0194*** 0.0126*** 0.0152*** 
Panel C: Carhart (1997) four-factors model (C4F)       
   Average CARs (CAAR) 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–3, t+3 t–1, t+5 
(1) SCAP 2009 (7 May) 8 0.1366*** 0.1254 0.0969 0.0972 
(2) CCAR 2011 (18 March) 9 0.0121*** 0.0168** 0.0069 0.0053 
(3) CCAR 2012 (13 March) 11 0.0157*** 0.0197** 0.0081 0.0311*** 
(4) DFAST 2013 (7 March) 6 0.0130*** 0.0088 0.0195* 0.0062* 
(5) CCAR 2013 (14 March) 2 0.0108 0.0157 0.0179 0.0234 
(6) DFAST 2014 (20 March) 10 0.0182*** 0.0251*** 0.0228** 0.0280* 
(7) CCAR 2014 (26 March) 17 0.0099*** 0.0158*** 0.0135*** 0.0115* 
(8) DFAST 2015 (5 March) 17 0.0156*** 0.0159*** 0.0073** 0.014** 
(9) CCAR 2015 (11 March) 15 0.0107*** 0.0084*** 0.0135* 0.0071** 
(10) DFAST 2016 (23 June) 9 0.0073*** 0.0008 -0.0049 -0.0049 
(11) CCAR 2016 (29 June) 16 0.0190*** 0.0162** -0.0072 0.0087* 
(12) DFAST 2017 (22 June) 6 0.0108** 0.0120** 0.0113 0.0066 
(13) CCAR 2017 (28 June) 8 0.0069*** 0.0079** 0.0088 0.0055 
(14) DFAST 2018 (21 June) 13 0.0092*** 0.0055 -0.0012 -0.0030 
(15) CCAR 2018 (28 June) 4 0.0186* 0.0194 0.0180 0.0228 
(16) FTSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 12 0.0972*** 0.0907** 0.0635 0.0713** 
(17) FTSTO 17 0.0716*** 0.0701*** 0.0469 0.0570*** 
(18) TOTALSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 89 0.0241*** 0.0236*** 0.0158*** 0.0188*** 
(19) TOTALSTO 151 0.0194*** 0.0194*** 0.0126*** 0.0152*** 
Panel D: Market return model (MRM)     
   Average BHARs 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–1, t+4 t–1, t+7 
(1) SCAP 2009 (7 May) 8 0.1097 0.0841 0.0544 0.0451 
(2) CCAR 2011 (18 March) 9 0.0148*** 0.0199*** 0.0164* 0.0127 
(3) CCAR 2012 (13 March) 11 0.0060 0.0121* 0.0163** 0.0276** 
(4) DFAST 2013 (7 March) 6 0.0238*** 0.0215*** 0.0248*** 0.0105 
(5) CCAR 2013 (14 March) 2 0.0214*** 0.0227*** 0.0275 0.0193** 
(6) DFAST 2014 (20 March) 10 0.0126*** 0.0158*** 0.0172*** 0.0158* 
(7) CCAR 2014 (26 March) 17 0.005*** 0.0097*** 0.0124*** 0.0129*** 
(8) DFAST 2015 (5 March) 17 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 0.0137*** 0.0141*** 
(9) CCAR 2015 (11 March) 15 0.0110*** 0.0089*** 0.0085** 0.0125** 
(10) DFAST 2016 (23 June) 9 0.0092*** 0.0033 -0.0070 -0.0021 
(11) CCAR 2016 (29 June) 16 0.0125*** 0.0119*** 0.0083*** 0.0129*** 
(12) DFAST 2017 (22 June) 6 0.0080 0.0087 0.0071 0.0074 
(13) CCAR 2017 (28 June) 8 0.0031 0.0034 0.0026 0.0009 
(14) DFAST 2018 (21 June) 13 0.0088*** 0.0041 -0.0002 -0.0075 
(15) CCAR 2018 (28 June) 4 0.0171** 0.0176 0.0213* 0.0189 
(16) FTSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 12 0.1369*** 0.1106** 0.0778** 0.0831* 
(17) FTSTO 17 0.0978*** 0.0819*** 0.0612** 0.0663** 
(18) TOTALSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 89 0.0292*** 0.0260*** 0.0200*** 0.0189*** 
(19) TOTALSTO 151 0.0215*** 0.0199*** 0.0160*** 0.0159*** 
This table reports short-term market reactions around the U.S. stress test events for the banks that experience a positive CAR 
(t–1, t+1). Models 1 to 15 show the results for the individual U.S. stress tests in 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 
2017 and 2018, whilst Models 16 and 19 illustrate first-time and total stress test observations (FTSTO, TOTALSTO). For the 
indicated event windows, Panel A illustrates the average CARs of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), Panel B estimates 
the average CARs of the Fama and French (1993) three-factors model (FF3F), Panel C examines the average CARs of the 
Carhart (1997) four-factors model (C4F), and Panel D shows the average BHARs of the market return model (MRM). *, **, 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data 
sources are provided in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.6B U.S. negative CAR (t–1, t+1) analysis 
Panel A: Capital asset pricing model (CAPM)       
   Average CARs (CAAR) 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–3, t+3 t–1, t+5 
(1) SCAP 2009 (7 May) 9 -0.0625* -0.0726* -0.1101** -0.0784** 
(2) CCAR 2011 (18 March) 8 -0.0075 -0.0042 0.0048 -0.0043 
(3) CCAR 2012 (13 March) 6 -0.0216* -0.0165* -0.0209* -0.0035 
(4) DFAST 2013 (7 March) 11 -0.0050* -0.0088* 0.0002 -0.0065 
(5) CCAR 2013 (14 March) 15 -0.0113*** -0.0130*** -0.0183*** -0.0158 
(6) DFAST 2014 (20 March) 13 -0.0120*** -0.0154** -0.0234*** -0.0109 
(7) CCAR 2014 (26 March) 6 -0.0170** -0.0158** -0.0116 -0.0099* 
(8) DFAST 2015 (5 March) 9 -0.0123*** -0.0097*** -0.0138*** -0.0016 
(9) CCAR 2015 (11 March) 11 -0.0074** -0.0093* 0.0022 -0.0056* 
(10) DFAST 2016 (23 June) 17 -0.0094** -0.0271*** -0.0299*** -0.0151 
(11) CCAR 2016 (29 June) 10 -0.0145*** -0.0119** -0.0318** -0.0181** 
(12) DFAST 2017 (22 June) 22 -0.0084*** -0.0058* -0.0113*** -0.0198*** 
(13) CCAR 2017 (28 June) 20 -0.0202*** -0.0178*** -0.0177*** -0.0184*** 
(14) DFAST 2018 (21 June) 11 -0.0060*** -0.0028 -0.0100** -0.0131** 
(15) CCAR 2018 (28 June) 20 -0.0145*** -0.0141*** -0.0158*** -0.0127*** 
(16) FTSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 13 -0.0481** -0.0567** -0.0864*** -0.0623*** 
(17) FTSTO 16 -0.0427*** -0.0479** -0.0677** -0.0504*** 
(18) TOTALSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 106 -0.0140*** -0.0171*** -0.0226*** -0.0179*** 
(19) TOTALSTO 188 -0.0142*** -0.0158*** -0.0197*** -0.0163*** 
Panel B: Fama and French (1993) three-factors model (FF3F)     
   Average CARs (CAAR) 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–3, t+3 t–1, t+5 
(1) SCAP 2009 (7 May) 9 -0.0893*** -0.0861** -0.1247*** -0.0999** 
(2) CCAR 2011 (18 March) 8 -0.0098*** -0.0064*** 0.0009 -0.0035 
(3) CCAR 2012 (13 March) 6 -0.0162** -0.0123** -0.0193 0.0022 
(4) DFAST 2013 (7 March) 11 -0.0100*** -0.0134 -0.0044 -0.0157 
(5) CCAR 2013 (14 March) 15 -0.0174*** -0.0195*** -0.0252*** -0.0248 
(6) DFAST 2014 (20 March) 13 -0.0131*** -0.0176*** -0.0252*** -0.0142 
(7) CCAR 2014 (26 March) 6 -0.0155** -0.0150 -0.0146 -0.0111 
(8) DFAST 2015 (5 March) 9 -0.0130*** -0.0106** -0.0158** -0.0008 
(9) CCAR 2015 (11 March) 11 -0.0090*** -0.0113** 0.0011 -0.0069** 
(10) DFAST 2016 (23 June) 17 -0.0111*** -0.0273*** -0.0286*** -0.0145 
(11) CCAR 2016 (29 June) 10 -0.0136*** -0.0115*** -0.0313** -0.0163** 
(12) DFAST 2017 (22 June) 22 -0.0125*** -0.0098** -0.0146*** -0.0228*** 
(13) CCAR 2017 (28 June) 20 -0.0186*** -0.0165*** -0.0178*** -0.0158*** 
(14) DFAST 2018 (21 June) 11 -0.0066*** -0.0034 -0.0119** -0.0137** 
(15) CCAR 2018 (28 June) 20 -0.0137*** -0.0139*** -0.0165*** -0.014*** 
(16) FTSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 13 -0.0665*** -0.0650** -0.0952*** -0.0747** 
(17) FTSTO 16 -0.0574*** -0.0547* -0.0754*** -0.0607** 
(18) TOTALSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 106 -0.0181*** -0.0197*** -0.0254*** -0.0205*** 
(19) TOTALSTO 188 -0.0167*** -0.0176*** -0.022*** -0.0184*** 
Panel C: Carhart (1997) four-factors model (C4F)       
   Average CARs (CAAR) 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–3, t+3 t–1, t+5 
(1) SCAP 2009 (7 May) 9 -0.0963*** -0.0920** -0.1387*** -0.0893** 
(2) CCAR 2011 (18 March) 8 -0.0109*** -0.0073 -0.0002 -0.0054 
(3) CCAR 2012 (13 March) 6 -0.0133** -0.0107** -0.0202 0.003 
(4) DFAST 2013 (7 March) 11 -0.0109*** -0.0149 -0.0040 -0.0172 
(5) CCAR 2013 (14 March) 15 -0.0174*** -0.0198*** -0.0264*** -0.0242 
(6) DFAST 2014 (20 March) 13 -0.0120*** -0.0154** -0.0234*** -0.0109 
(7) CCAR 2014 (26 March) 6 -0.0147** -0.0141 -0.0125 -0.0123 
(8) DFAST 2015 (5 March) 9 -0.0129*** -0.0108** -0.0162** -0.0017 
(9) CCAR 2015 (11 March) 11 -0.0094*** -0.0119*** 0.0003 -0.0075** 
(10) DFAST 2016 (23 June) 17 -0.0106*** -0.0263*** -0.0277*** -0.0135* 
(11) CCAR 2016 (29 June) 10 -0.0136*** -0.0117* -0.0309* -0.0164* 
(12) DFAST 2017 (22 June) 22 -0.0126*** -0.0092** -0.0144*** -0.0219*** 
(13) CCAR 2017 (28 June) 20 -0.0186*** -0.0163*** -0.0168*** -0.0162*** 
(14) DFAST 2018 (21 June) 11 -0.0064*** -0.0035 -0.0116 -0.0136** 
(15) CCAR 2018 (28 June) 20 -0.0137*** -0.0139*** -0.0166*** -0.0141*** 
(16) FTSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 13 -0.0709*** -0.0683** -0.1044*** -0.0663** 
(17) FTSTO 16 -0.0610*** -0.0573* -0.0826*** -0.0539** 
(18) TOTALSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 106 -0.0184*** -0.0198*** -0.0262*** -0.0192*** 
(19) TOTALSTO 188 -0.0170*** -0.0177*** -0.0225*** -0.0177*** 
 
 
 
      
       
192 
 
Table 4.6B continued 
Panel D: Market return model (MRM)     
   Average BHARs 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–1, t+4 t–1, t+7 
(1) SCAP 2009 (7 May) 9 -0.0609** -0.0586** -0.0334 -0.0405* 
(2) CCAR 2011 (18 March) 8 -0.0084*** -0.0048*** -0.0034 -0.0008 
(3) CCAR 2012 (13 March) 6 -0.0114** -0.0055 0.0023 0.0060 
(4) DFAST 2013 (7 March) 11 -0.0048* -0.0085** -0.0072 -0.0148** 
(5) CCAR 2013 (14 March) 15 -0.0150*** -0.0183*** -0.0186** -0.0254*** 
(6) DFAST 2014 (20 March) 13 -0.0109*** -0.0166*** -0.0201*** -0.0118** 
(7) CCAR 2014 (26 March) 6 -0.0177*** -0.0164*** -0.0149** -0.0137* 
(8) DFAST 2015 (5 March) 9 -0.0118*** -0.0095*** -0.0100* -0.0012 
(9) CCAR 2015 (11 March) 11 -0.0104*** -0.0079*** -0.0069 -0.0059 
(10) DFAST 2016 (23 June) 17 -0.0090*** -0.0242*** -0.0285*** -0.0175** 
(11) CCAR 2016 (29 June) 10 -0.0255*** -0.0208*** -0.0168*** -0.0217*** 
(12) DFAST 2017 (22 June) 22 -0.0056** -0.0049* -0.0079** -0.0167*** 
(13) CCAR 2017 (28 June) 20 -0.0255*** -0.0238*** -0.0228 -0.0284*** 
(14) DFAST 2018 (21 June) 11 -0.0055*** -0.0019 -0.0055 -0.0132 
(15) CCAR 2018 (28 June) 20 -0.0144*** -0.0144*** -0.0113*** -0.0149*** 
(16) FTSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 13 -0.0548*** -0.0577*** -0.0550*** -0.0560*** 
(17) FTSTO 16 -0.0490*** -0.0495*** -0.0467*** -0.0481*** 
(18) TOTALSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 106 -0.0143*** -0.0163*** -0.0180*** -0.0172*** 
(19) TOTALSTO 188 -0.0147*** -0.0156*** -0.0157*** -0.0166*** 
This table reports short-term market reactions around the U.S. stress test events for the banks that experience a negative CAR 
(t–1, t+1). Models 1 to 15 show the results for the individual U.S. stress tests in 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 
2017 and 2018, whilst Models 16 and 19 first-time and total stress test observations (FTSTO, TOTALSTO). For the indicated 
event windows, Panel A illustrates the average CARs of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), Panel B estimates the average 
CARs of the Fama and French (1993) three-factors model (FF3F), Panel C examines the average CARs of the Carhart (1997) 
four-factors model (C4F), and Panel D shows the average BHARs of the market return model (MRM). *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are 
provided in Table 4.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 U.S. stress test events (2009-2012) 
The graphs plot the average CARs (CAAR) of the stress-tested banks within a 21-day event window              
(t–10, t+10). Based on the baseline Carhart (1997) four-factors model (C4F), the observations are split into 
banks that experience a positive (‘good’ news) and a negative (‘bad’ news) CARt–1, t+1. The SCAP 2009 as 
well as the CCARs in 2011 and 2012 are considered. 
193 
 
 
Figure 4.4 U.S. stress test events (2013-2014) 
The graphs plot the average CARs (CAAR) of the stress-tested banks within a 21-day event window              
(t–10, t+10). Based on the baseline Carhart (1997) four-factors model (C4F), the observations are split into 
banks that experience a positive (‘good’ news) and a negative (‘bad’ news) CARt–1, t+1. The DFASTs and 
CCARs in 2013 and 2014 are considered. 
 
Figure 4.5 U.S. stress test events (2015-2016) 
The graphs plot the average CARs (CAAR) of the stress-tested banks within a 21-day event window               
(t–10, t+10). Based on the baseline Carhart (1997) four-factors model (C4F), the observations are split into 
banks that experience a positive (‘good’ news) and a negative (‘bad’ news) CARt–1, t+1. The DFASTs and 
CCARs in 2015 and 2016 are considered. 
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Figure 4.6 U.S. stress test events (2017-2018) 
The graphs plot the average CARs (CAAR) of the stress-tested banks within a 21-day event window              
(t–10, t+10). Based on the baseline Carhart (1997) four-factors model (C4F), observations are split into 
banks that experience a positive (‘good’ news) and a negative (‘bad’ news) CARt–1, t+1. The DFASTs and 
CCARs in 2017 and 2018 are considered. 
 
Figure 4.7 U.S. stress test events (FTSTO, TOTALSTO) 
 The graphs plot the average CARs (CAAR) of the stress-tested banks within a 21-day event window             
(t–10, t+10). Based on the baseline Carhart (1997) four-factors model (C4F), the observations are split into 
banks that experience a positive (‘good’ news) and a negative (‘bad’ news) CARt–1, t+1. The first-time 
(FTSTO) and total stress test observations (TOTALSTO) including and excluding CCARs in 2013, 2014, 
2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 are considered. 
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Table 4.7 Calendar-time portfolio (CTIME) analysis 
Panel A: European banks   
Equally-weighted (C4F) 
 
MVALUE-weighted (C4F) 
    1-12 mths. 1-24 mths. 1-36 mths.   1-12 mths. 1-24 mths. 1-36 mths. 
(1) CEBS 2010        
 Alpha -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0004  0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 
 BETA 0.5557 0.8740*** 0.7944***  0.7942*** 0.9631*** 0.9587*** 
 SMB -0.5896 -0.0687 -0.1090  -0.6785** -0.2736 -0.2272* 
 HML 1.0640 1.2243** 1.4280***  0.5388 0.1443 0.2093 
 MOM -0.5272 0.3043 0.2219  -0.1608 -0.2100 -0.1976* 
 Observations 12 24 36  12 24 36 
 R-squared 0.971 0.9749 0.9745  0.9965 0.9959 0.9944 
         
(2) EBA 2011        
 Alpha 0.0034* 0.0019 0.0005  -0.0002 0.0005 0.0005 
 BETA 0.7594*** 0.9845*** 0.9118***  1.0867*** 1.1293*** 1.1049*** 
 SMB 0.1318 0.4050 0.4374  -0.5808 0.1510 0.1284 
 HML 3.0088*** 0.9207 1.4213***  -0.1846 0.0386 0.2346 
 MOM 1.5203*** 0.2879 0.2694  -0.3994 -0.2178 -0.0773* 
 Observations 12 24 36  12 24 36 
 R-squared 0.9673 0.9551 0.936  0.9904 0.992 0.991 
         
(3) EBA/ECB 2014       
 Alpha -0.0033 -0.0009 -0.0002  -0.0022*** -0.0018** -0.0005 
 BETA 0.9823** 0.8396*** 0.8992***  1.2939*** 1.1369*** 1.0254*** 
 SMB 0.0987 -0.1486 0.0705  0.2074 -0.0765 -0.1633 
 HML 0.1642 0.6123* 0.6401**  -0.7469*** -0.6366*** -0.3562 
 MOM -0.0634 0.1734 0.1559  -0.3636*** -0.3491** -0.2785* 
 Observations 12 24 36  12 24 36 
 R-squared 0.9151 0.8942 0.9256  0.9923 0.9686 0.9576 
         
(4) EBA 2016        
 Alpha -0.0005 -0.0006   -0.0001 0.0000  
 BETA 0.8797** 1.0636***   0.8667*** 0.9492***  
 SMB -0.5944 -0.1540   -0.1950 -0.0240  
 HML 0.2150 -0.2424   0.0927 -0.1037  
 MOM -0.0334 -0.0752   -0.2879 -0.3367  
 Observations 12 24   12 24  
 R-squared 0.9541 0.9603   0.9845 0.9857  
         
(5) FTSTO       
 Alpha -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0001  0.0001 -0.0002 0.0002  BETA 0.6871 0.9013** 0.8032**  0.7738* 0.9286*** 0.8759*** 
 SMB -0.3718 0.1536 0.1670  -0.5846 -0.1256 -0.1804 
 HML 1.4399 1.0278 1.3089  1.1463* 0.7220* 0.8494 
 MOM 0.3547 0.3070 0.2842  0.2869 0.1854 0.1845 
 Observations 36 72 108  36 72 108 
 R-squared 0.0655 0.2388 0.2341  0.8374 0.8702 0.8043 
         
(6) TOTALSTO        
 Alpha -0.0005 0.0001 0.0000  -0.0008 -0.0006* -0.0001 
 BETA 0.9770*** 0.9730*** 0.9296***  1.1480*** 1.1390*** 1.1011*** 
 SMB 0.1369 0.2605 0.2571  -0.0842 0.0440 0.0241 
 HML 0.8678*** 0.7090** 0.9622***  -0.2978 -0.3563*** -0.1217 
 MOM 0.1620 0.1622 0.1259  -0.3772*** -0.3383*** -0.2178*** 
 Observations 36 72 108  36 72 108 
  R-squared 0.9437 0.9511 0.9417   0.9867 0.9883 0.9849 
Panel B: U.S. banks   
Equally-weighted (C4F) 
 
MVALUE-weighted (C4F) 
    1-12 mths. 1-24 mths. 1-36 mths.   1-12 mths 1-24 mths 1-36 mths 
(1) SCAP 2009        
 Alpha -0.0010 0.0021 0.0014  0.0023 0.0015 0.0005 
 BETA 0.8093*** 0.5773*** 0.7144***  0.3770** 0.6347*** 0.8049*** 
 SMB -0.3065 0.1559 0.1843  0.2814 -0.1103 -0.0780 
 HML 0.3863 1.5043* 0.8132*  2.3637** 1.0287** 0.1582 
 MOM -0.5236** -0.3857** -0.4077**  -0.0079 -0.1565* -0.2088*** 
 Observations 12 24 36  12 24 36 
 R-squared 0.9899 0.9772 0.9727  0.9919 0.986 0.9763 
  
       
(2) CCAR 2011        
 Alpha 0.0012** 0.0008 0.0006  0.0003 0.0005 0.0002 
 BETA 0.4624*** 0.5033** 0.5720***  0.5796** 0.6277*** 0.6244*** 
 SMB -0.2668 0.2306 0.1128  0.1555 0.1435 0.1118 
 HML 0.4133 0.5108 0.3166  0.1193 0.3743 0.2966 
 MOM 0.0849 0.0239 0.0237  -0.2258 -0.0010 -0.0564 
 Observations 12 24 36  12 24 36 
 R-squared 0.8786 0.7279 0.7818  0.8262 0.7538 0.7886          
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(3) CCAR 2012        
 Alpha 0.0020* 0.0007 0.0004  0.0019 0.0008 0.0000 
 BETA 1.0296*** 1.0822*** 1.0034***  0.9340*** 1.0157*** 0.9727*** 
 SMB -0.4778 -0.1157 0.0198  -0.0973 0.0920 -0.0434 
 HML -0.8240 -0.3952 -0.1938  -0.2912 -0.3008 -0.1918 
 MOM -0.7007** -0.4239*** -0.3996***  -0.5907* -0.5234*** -0.5590*** 
 Observations 12 24 36  12 24 36 
 R-squared 0.9627 0.9661 0.9561  0.9408 0.9635 0.9507 
  
       
(4) DFAST/CCAR 2013       
 Alpha -0.0025*** -0.0017 -0.0004  -0.0023*** -0.0018** -0.0007 
 BETA 1.2039*** 1.0949*** 1.0747***  1.0551*** 1.0419*** 1.0488*** 
 SMB 0.1651 0.1065 0.1086  -0.3807 -0.2284 -0.1054 
 HML -0.8632 -0.0429 0.2107  -0.2984 0.6308 0.3731 
 MOM 0.9232 0.7743*** 0.4816***  0.3979 0.8101*** 0.4512*** 
 Observations 12 24 36  12 24 36 
 R-squared 0.8813 0.8827 0.8915  0.9048 0.8694 0.8817 
  
       
(5) DFAST/CCAR 2014       
 Alpha 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0004  0.0001 0.0002 0.0003  BETA 0.9115*** 0.8017*** 0.8919***  0.8558*** 0.8697*** 0.9474*** 
 SMB -0.3017* -0.2007 0.0761  -0.1694 -0.1990** -0.0841 
 HML 0.5110*** 0.0351 0.1329  0.2006 -0.0116 -0.0155 
 MOM 0.5404*** 0.3385** 0.2027  0.3653 0.2603*** 0.1320* 
 Observations 12 24 36  12 24 36 
 R-squared 0.9929 0.9567 0.9381  0.9885 0.9879 0.986 
  
       
(6) DFAST/CCAR 2015       
 Alpha 0.0008* 0.0002 0.0004  0.0007 0.0004 0.0004 
 BETA 1.1271*** 0.9994*** 0.9732***  1.0741*** 0.9997*** 0.9863*** 
 SMB 0.1560 0.1988 0.1473  -0.0314 0.0190 0.0177 
 HML -0.2171 0.0917 0.0846  -0.0474 0.0458 -0.0278 
 MOM -0.0950 0.0305 0.0495  -0.0109 -0.0115 -0.0073 
 Observations 12 24 36  12 24 36 
 R-squared 0.9912 0.9432 0.929  0.9923 0.9623 0.9599 
  
       
(7) DFAST/CCAR 2016       
 Alpha 0.0014 0.0010*   0.0011* 0.0005  
 BETA 1.0460*** 1.0491***   0.8964*** 0.9334***  
 SMB 0.5330* 0.6763***   0.1956* 0.3308**  
 HML 0.3030 0.1975*   0.2294* 0.0750  
 MOM 0.1413 0.2032   -0.0703 0.0086  
 Observations 12 24   12 24  
 R-squared 0.9705 0.9573   0.9933 0.9741  
  
       
(8) DFAST/CCAR 2017       
 Alpha 0.0007    0.0001   
 BETA 0.8606***    0.9343***   
 SMB 0.2383    -0.0219   
 HML -0.3967*    -0.2560**   
 MOM -0.3538***    -0.1995***   
 Observations 12    12   
 R-squared 0.9365    0.9826   
  
       
(9) FTSTO        
 Alpha -0.0016 -0.0005 0.0004  -0.0006 -0.0003 0.0003 
 BETA 0.9993*** 0.8269*** 0.8420***  0.7762*** 0.8043*** 0.8554*** 
 SMB -0.2352 0.2060 0.2018  0.0727 -0.0447 -0.0668 
 HML -0.4564 0.2064 0.1843  0.4071 0.1532 -0.0674 
 MOM -0.4770** -0.3942*** -0.3478***  -0.0715 -0.1548 -0.1726** 
 Observations 36 72 108  36 72 108 
 R-squared 0.9349 0.8921 0.8424  0.9151 0.8903 0.8361 
         
(10) TOTALSTO        
 Alpha 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003  -0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 
 BETA 1.0283*** 0.9390*** 0.9353***  0.8893*** 0.8910*** 0.9036*** 
 SMB -0.0140 0.2378* 0.2198**  -0.0070 0.0806 0.0529 
 HML -0.3964* -0.2043 -0.1188  -0.0362 -0.1208 -0.1161 
 MOM -0.2934** -0.2574*** -0.1963***  -0.0613 -0.1044 -0.1032* 
 Observations 72 144 216  72 144 216 
  R-squared 0.9703 0.9399 0.9393   0.9673 0.9517 0.9476 
This table reports the results of the calendar-time portfolio (CTIME) approach. Panel A illustrates the European sample. Models 1 to 4 show 
the results for the stress tests in 2010, 2011, 2014 and 2016, whilst Models 5 and 6 display first-time and total stress test observations (FTSTO, 
TOTALSTO). Panel B illustrates the U.S. sample. Models 1 to 8 show the results for the stress tests in 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 
2016 and 2017, whilst Models 9 and 10 assess first-time and total stress test observations (FTSTO, TOTALSTO). I estimate the coefficients, 
equally-weighted and MVALUE-weighted (year-end quarter 4 prior to each stress test event) for 1 to 12, 24 and 36 months after the stress test 
using the baseline Carhart (1997) four-factors model (C4F). Bank performance is measured by Jensen’s alpha (Alpha), and the four factors are 
asset sensitivity (BETA), capitalisation (SMB), book-to-market (HML) and momentum (MOM)*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.8 Information asymmetry and analyst behaviour 
Panel A: European banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables BIDASKitj RECNOitj EPSSUR / 
PRICEitj 
ESTSD / 
PRICEitj 
ST1011EU 0.0059* 2.9847** -0.0948** -0.0408* 
 (0.0030) (1.4092) (0.0390) (0.0232) 
ST1011EU*FTST1011EU -0.0038* 2.2601** 0.0070 0.0307** 
 (0.0021) (0.9071) (0.0179) (0.0130) 
ST1415EU -0.0038** 2.7382 0.0490 0.0307 
 (0.0016) (1.8490) (0.0362) (0.0201) 
ST1415EU*FTST1011EU 0.0026** -1.9743 -0.0296 0.0067 
 (0.0011) (1.4639) (0.0222) (0.0158) 
ST16EU -0.0021 2.6641 0.0399 -0.0125 
 (0.0016) (2.1266) (0.0532) (0.0246) 
ST16EU*FTST1011EU 0.0019 -3.1897* -0.0866 0.0060 
 (0.0016) (1.6067) (0.0534) (0.0239) 
TOVERit–2j -0.0153 3.1699 -0.4539 -0.1537 
 (0.0169) (6.5492) (0.4876) (0.3218) 
INVPRICEit–2j 0.0031** 0.8785* -0.0421 -0.0389** 
 (0.0013) (0.5154) (0.0420) (0.0180) 
RETVOLit–2j 0.2045** -48.9321** 1.8337* 1.6021*** 
 (0.0863) (19.9484) (0.9406) (0.5396) 
MVALUEit–2j 0.0030*** 2.0336*** -0.1781*** -0.1038*** 
 (0.0009) (0.5916) (0.0490) (0.0189) 
MTBVit–2j 0.0013 -0.6076 0.0194 0.0120 
 (0.0011) (0.8274) (0.0174) (0.0103) 
RECCONit–2j 0.0035*** -1.1167** -0.0085 -0.0184** 
 (0.0012) (0.5234) (0.0232) (0.0082) 
ΔGDPtj 0.0109 -23.4682* -0.6040*** -0.1625 
 (0.0128) (12.2361) (0.2116) (0.1057) 
ΔUNEMtj -0.0121 7.2052* -0.1246 -0.1522* 
 (0.0090) (3.9419) (0.1018) (0.0853) 
IRATEtj 0.0003 -0.3152*** 0.0143** 0.0130*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0742) (0.0058) (0.0031) 
Constant -0.0388*** 4.6796 1.5629*** 0.9495*** 
 (0.0117) (7.0424) (0.4823) (0.1756) 
     
Observations 2,212 2,271 2,272 2,234 
Number of banks 55 55 55 53 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2491 0.3008 0.2952 0.4280 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: U.S. banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables BIDASKitj RECNOitj EPSSUR / 
PRICEitj 
ESTSD / 
PRICEitj 
ST0913US 0.0002 -6.4443* 0.1057*** 0.0018 
 (0.0002) (3.2171) (0.0201) (0.0045) 
ST0913US*FTST09US -0.0003** 0.9900 -0.0223** -0.0010 
 (0.0001) (1.1519) (0.0089) (0.0017) 
ST1417US -0.0001 -1.5527 0.0441** -0.0003 
 (0.0002) (1.8933) (0.0175) (0.0043) 
ST1417US*FTST09US -0.0003* 0.7666 -0.0004 0.0016 
 (0.0001) (1.4336) (0.0090) (0.0020) 
TOVERit–2j -0.0006 50.0157 0.1142 0.0540 
 (0.0082) (32.4836) (0.6673) (0.1341) 
INVPRICEit–2j 0.0028 -19.5172* 0.1623 0.0144 
 (0.0028) (10.7102) (0.1431) (0.0495) 
RETVOLit–2j 0.0077 -24.9992 1.2614** 0.3664*** 
 (0.0046) (18.6754) (0.5735) (0.1267) 
MVALUEit–2j -0.0004 0.0552 -0.0071 -0.0030 
 (0.0002) (0.9506) (0.0161) (0.0054) 
MTBVit–2j 0.0001 0.6915 -0.0071 0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.6251) (0.0077) (0.0022) 
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RECCONit–2j 0.0001 -2.1535*** 0.0037 0.0024** 
 (0.0001) (0.6062) (0.0059) (0.0011) 
ΔGDPtj -0.0015*** -3.5250 0.0735*** 0.0022 
 (0.0003) (2.2308) (0.0259) (0.0048) 
ΔUNEMtj -0.0010** -13.7281* 0.2304*** 0.0130 
 (0.0004) (6.8467) (0.0762) (0.0143) 
IRATEtj 0.0000 4.5368*** -0.0364*** -0.0009 
 (0.0001) (1.0063) (0.0071) (0.0012) 
Constant 0.0039* 25.1055** 0.0560 0.0223 
 (0.0022) (10.0820) (0.1624) (0.0511) 
     
Observations 1,178 1,176 1,171 1,155 
Number of banks 28 28 27 27 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8131 0.7916 0.2399 0.5891 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports the effect of stress tests on information asymmetry. Panel A illustrates the European sample 
and Panel B shows the U.S. sample. I use the following dependent variables, daily winsorised at the 1 and 99 
percentiles and quarterly averaged, in my analysis: Information asymmetry captured by the bid-ask spread 
(BIDASKitj) and analyst behaviour using analyst coverage (RECNOitj), earnings surprises (EPSSUR / PRICEitj) 
and estimate dispersion (ESTSD / PRICEitj). In Panel A, I include dummy variable to measure European first-
time participation in 2010-11 (FTST1011EU) and the stress test periods in 2010-11 (ST1011EU), 2014-15 
(ST1415EU), and 2016 (ST16EU). In Panel B, I include dummy variables to estimate U.S. first-time participation 
in 2009 (FTST09US) and the stress test periods in 2009-13 (ST0913US) and 2014-17 (ST1417US). In both panels, 
I control for market microstructure characteristics, lagged by two quarters, and country-specific fundamentals 
using the following variables: Share turnover (TOVERit–2j), inverse share price (INVPRICEit–2j), return volatility 
(RETVOLit–2j), market value (MVALUEit–2j), market-to-book value (MTBVit–2j), analyst recommendation 
consensus (RECCONt–2); and macroeconomic fundamentals captured by the economic growth (ΔGDPtj), the 
unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj), and sovereign debt risk (IRATEtj). Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The 
description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 4.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
199 
 
Table 4.9 Bank risk-taking 
Panel A: European banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables T1Ritj LEVERAGEitj RWAitj LLRitj ZSCOREitj ROAitj 
ST1011EU 0.0329*** -0.2055** -0.0518* 0.0225** 0.4068 -0.0044*** 
 (0.0120) (0.0819) (0.0303) (0.0088) (0.2912) (0.0015) 
ST1011EU*FTST1011EU 0.0012 0.0431 0.0001 -0.0030 0.2742* -0.0020*** 
 (0.0067) (0.0370) (0.0164) (0.0041) (0.1512) (0.0007) 
ST1415EU 0.0836*** -0.4451*** -0.1311*** 0.0271*** 0.8808*** -0.0052*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0714) (0.0330) (0.0098) (0.2323) (0.0018) 
ST1415EU*FTST1011EU -0.0167* -0.0426 0.0227 0.0043 -0.0679 -0.0010 
 (0.0087) (0.0393) (0.0174) (0.0042) (0.1367) (0.0009) 
ST16EU 0.0815*** -0.3904*** -0.1409*** 0.0335*** 0.7668*** -0.0067*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0670) (0.0336) (0.0125) (0.2648) (0.0017) 
ST16EU*FTST1011EU -0.0090 -0.0812* 0.0394* 0.0012 -0.1081 -0.0002 
 (0.0079) (0.0456) (0.0209) (0.0080) (0.1397) (0.0010) 
SIZEit–2j -0.0133 0.4598*** -0.1126*** -0.0129 -0.2998* -0.0024** 
 (0.0118) (0.0878) (0.0265) (0.0082) (0.1799) (0.0009) 
LOANit–2j -0.0534** -0.0831 0.2799*** -0.0346* -0.5115 0.0059 
 (0.0266) (0.2021) (0.0694) (0.0190) (0.4945) (0.0046) 
LLPit–2j -0.8493*** 7.9604*** 0.9187 2.0874*** -50.5358*** -0.3130*** 
 (0.2447) (1.9307) (0.5722) (0.2507) (6.2923) (0.0561) 
TRADEit–2j 0.0400 -0.8548*** -0.0543 -0.0313 0.6741 0.0087* 
 (0.0324) (0.3126) (0.0650) (0.0208) (0.5478) (0.0050) 
DEPOit–2j -0.0339*** 0.1230 -0.0516* -0.0146 0.4791* 0.0011 
 (0.0101) (0.1000) (0.0290) (0.0151) (0.2767) (0.0022) 
EBPTit–2j 1.2173*** -10.4602*** -1.0924 -0.3189 26.8717*** 0.1283* 
 (0.2906) (2.7519) (0.9147) (0.3116) (7.9974) (0.0729) 
ΔGDPtj 0.0719 -0.2892 -0.2438 0.0442 1.6333** 0.0304** 
 (0.0442) (0.5831) (0.1585) (0.0531) (0.7469) (0.0139) 
ΔUNEMtj 0.0087 0.3628*** -0.1511*** -0.0472*** -0.3501 -0.0021 
 (0.0172) (0.1223) (0.0478) (0.0105) (0.3195) (0.0024) 
Constant 0.2816* -2.1791** 1.7356*** 0.1846** 6.1171*** 0.0309*** 
 (0.1418) (0.9833) (0.3107) (0.0896) (2.0888) (0.0102) 
       
Observations 2,346 2,461 2,228 2,232 2,519 2,497 
Number of banks 89 91 87 87 91 87 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5176 0.3424 0.4681 0.3527 0.1611 0.1727 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: U.S. banks       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables T1Ritj LEVERAGEitj RWAitj LLRitj ZSCOREitj ROAitj 
ST0913US 0.0209* -0.0615 0.0428 0.0045* 1.0947*** 0.0466*** 
 (0.0109) (0.1086) (0.0308) (0.0022) (0.3757) (0.0044) 
ST0913US*FTST09US 0.0014 -0.0222 0.0020 0.0002 0.3335 -0.0001 
 (0.0035) (0.0570) (0.0172) (0.0012) (0.1997) (0.0009) 
ST1417US 0.0275* 0.0071 -0.0209 0.0031 1.0959*** 0.0506*** 
 (0.0144) (0.1317) (0.0471) (0.0023) (0.3927) (0.0042) 
ST1417US*FTST09US -0.0079 -0.0418 0.1021** -0.0005 0.0520 -0.0007 
 (0.0073) (0.0699) (0.0475) (0.0007) (0.1868) (0.0009) 
SIZEit–2j -0.0085 0.0123 -0.0826*** 0.0001 0.3092 -0.0037*** 
 (0.0071) (0.0740) (0.0215) (0.0010) (0.2038) (0.0007) 
LOANit–2j -0.0451* 0.3073 0.2789** -0.0022 0.0075 -0.0023 
 (0.0231) (0.2347) (0.1064) (0.0052) (0.8789) (0.0036) 
LLPit–2j 0.2754 2.6425 -1.5346 0.5046*** -11.6537 -0.1522** 
 (0.2833) (2.5256) (1.0395) (0.0611) (12.0168) (0.0603) 
TRADEit–2j -0.0041 1.2690 -0.3897 -0.0134 -1.1196 -0.0041 
 (0.0503) (0.8178) (0.2840) (0.0089) (1.8932) (0.0080) 
DEPOit–2j 0.0051 0.0648 -0.2143*** 0.0044 0.6967 0.0097*** 
 (0.0233) (0.2351) (0.0542) (0.0036) (0.5689) (0.0035) 
EBPTit–2j -0.0797 0.1156 0.5572 -0.0708* 6.1589 -0.0945*** 
 (0.0992) (0.9378) (0.4519) (0.0387) (4.5171) (0.0265) 
ΔGDPtj -0.1213** 1.5014** 0.5605*** 0.0206** 2.7718** 0.2689*** 
 (0.0491) (0.5625) (0.1374) (0.0081) (1.1662) (0.0206) 
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ΔUNEMtj -0.4239** 5.3577** 2.2763*** 0.0825** 10.9336** 0.8174*** 
 (0.1789) (2.0990) (0.5240) (0.0339) (4.6195) (0.0600) 
Constant 0.2062** 1.9650** 1.7977*** 0.0059 -1.6162 0.0461*** 
 (0.0745) (0.8137) (0.2435) (0.0112) (2.1155) (0.0081) 
       
Observations 975 993 894 973 993 992 
Number of banks 28 28 28 27 28 28 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5474 0.3274 0.2606 0.7472 0.1517 0.5932 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports the effect of stress tests on bank risk-taking. Panel A illustrates the European sample and 
Panel B shows the U.S. sample. I use the following dependent variables, winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentiles, 
in my analysis: Bank risk-taking using capital adequacy (T1Ritj), leverage risk (LEVERAGEitj), credit risk (RWAitj), 
credit portfolio quality (LLRitj), insolvency risk (ZSCOREitj) and profitability (ROAitj). In Panel A, I include 
dummy variable to measure European first-time participation in 2010-11 (FTST1011EU) and the stress test 
periods in 2010-11 (ST1011EU), 2014-15 (ST1415EU), and 2016 (ST16EU). In Panel B, I include dummy 
variables to estimate U.S. first-time participation in 2009 (FTST09US) and the stress test periods in 2009-13 
(ST0913US) and 2014-17 (ST1417US). In both panels, I control for bank characteristics, lagged by two quarters, 
and country-specific fundamentals using the following variables: Bank size captured by natural logarithm of total 
assets (SIZEit–2j), traditional banking activities shown by outstanding loans (LOANit–2j), asset quality measured by 
loan loss provisions (LLPit–2j), non-traditional banking activities measured by trading securities (TRADEit–2j), 
liquidity shown by total deposits (DEPOit–2j), profitability measured by earnings before provision and taxes 
(EBPTit–2j); and macroeconomic fundamentals captured by economic growth (ΔGDPtj), and unemployment 
growth (ΔUNEMtj). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data 
sources are provided in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.10 Bank funding structure 
Panel A: European banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables TIEitj OIEitj DEPBAitj IECDitj CUSTDitj NIMitj 
ST1011EU -0.0157*** -0.0119*** -0.0063 -0.0069*** -0.0001 -0.0088*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0029) (0.0252) (0.0012) (0.0435) (0.0011) 
ST1011EU*FTST1011EU 0.0011 0.0006 -0.0350** 0.0005 0.0187 0.0004 
 (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0158) (0.0005) (0.0146) (0.0005) 
ST1415EU -0.0180*** -0.0131*** -0.1065*** -0.0090*** 0.0514 -0.0101*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0028) (0.0250) (0.0014) (0.0446) (0.0012) 
ST1415EU*FTST1011EU 0.0002 0.0000 0.0235* 0.0001 -0.0066 0.0011* 
 (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0123) (0.0005) (0.0106) (0.0006) 
ST16EU -0.0181*** -0.0130*** -0.1140*** -0.0092*** 0.0820* -0.0097*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0028) (0.0272) (0.0014) (0.0453) (0.0012) 
ST16EU*FTST1011EU -0.0004 -0.0005 0.0432*** 0.0002 -0.0184 0.0012 
 (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0155) (0.0007) (0.0181) (0.0007) 
SIZEit–2j -0.0003 0.0008 0.0405*** -0.0015* -0.0976*** -0.0017* 
 (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0130) (0.0008) (0.0258) (0.0009) 
LOANit–2j 0.0096** 0.0072* -0.1074** 0.0011 -0.0211 0.0052** 
 (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0459) (0.0025) (0.0734) (0.0025) 
LLPit–2j 0.0122 0.0497 3.0388*** -0.0076 -2.4236*** -0.0622** 
 (0.0344) (0.0348) (0.6080) (0.0362) (0.6618) (0.0312) 
TRADEit–2j -0.0202*** -0.0155*** -0.1816*** -0.0112*** -0.0812 0.0030 
 (0.0046) (0.0041) (0.0593) (0.0036) (0.0811) (0.0031) 
DEPOit–2j 0.0010 -0.0014 0.1712*** 0.0036** 0.2923*** 0.0014 
 (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0502) (0.0016) (0.0431) (0.0016) 
EBPTit–2j 0.0300 0.0556 -1.5403** -0.0838** 0.1116 -0.0577 
 (0.0668) (0.0634) (0.6503) (0.0372) (0.8231) (0.0533) 
ΔGDPtj 0.0021 -0.0042 -0.0227 -0.0048 0.2519 -0.0113* 
 (0.0069) (0.0089) (0.1073) (0.0116) (0.1983) (0.0066) 
ΔUNEMtj -0.0008 -0.0037 -0.0030 0.0066*** -0.0648** -0.0006 
 (0.0027) (0.0032) (0.0327) (0.0025) (0.0317) (0.0024) 
Constant 0.0194 0.0036 -0.3092** 0.0255*** 1.4398*** 0.0290*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0180) (0.1470) (0.0087) (0.3012) (0.0103) 
       
Observations 2,155 2,132 2,388 1,345 2,415 2,422 
Number of banks 87 87 87 81 87 91 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7061 0.4766 0.2355 0.6301 0.3363 0.7381 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: U.S. banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables TIEitj OIEitj SUBDitj IECDitj CUSTDitj NIMitj 
ST0913US 0.0074*** -0.0010 -0.0050 -0.0033 0.3169*** 0.1041*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0017) (0.0069) (0.0026) (0.0484) (0.0087) 
ST0913US*FTST09US -0.0004 0.0003 0.0009 0.0008** -0.0067 -0.0007 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0018) (0.0003) (0.0093) (0.0009) 
ST1417US 0.0077*** -0.0014 -0.0080 -0.0029 0.3513*** 0.1080*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0072) (0.0029) (0.0606) (0.0095) 
ST1417US*FTST09US -0.0004 0.0002 -0.0005 0.0008 0.0141 0.0001 
 (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0028) (0.0005) (0.0156) (0.0008) 
SIZEit–2j 0.0024*** 0.0026** 0.0004 0.0003 -0.1066*** -0.0021* 
 (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0045) (0.0005) (0.0141) (0.0010) 
LOANit–2j -0.0009 -0.0021 0.0273 -0.0000 0.0004 0.0052 
 (0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0162) (0.0017) (0.0656) (0.0063) 
LLPit–2j 0.0222 0.0136 -0.0048 0.0109 0.7689 -0.2058*** 
 (0.0265) (0.0298) (0.1636) (0.0166) (0.5550) (0.0551) 
TRADEit–2j 0.0008 0.0014 -0.0038 -0.0047 -0.0712 -0.0021 
 (0.0051) (0.0069) (0.0159) (0.0037) (0.1311) (0.0095) 
DEPOit–2j -0.0029 -0.0048* -0.0241** 0.0029** 0.3380*** 0.0026 
 (0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0094) (0.0014) (0.0880) (0.0038) 
EBPTit–2j -0.0468*** -0.0282** 0.0135 -0.0150 0.1108 -0.1211*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0131) (0.0618) (0.0109) (0.3260) (0.0358) 
ΔGDPtj 0.0930*** 0.0481*** 0.0098 0.0462*** 1.2342*** 0.5750*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0069) (0.0284) (0.0088) (0.2019) (0.0524) 
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ΔUNEMtj 0.2798*** 0.1397*** 0.0377 0.1454*** 4.6164*** 1.7648*** 
 (0.0407) (0.0223) (0.0967) (0.0299) (0.7784) (0.1610) 
Constant -0.0146* -0.0161 0.0170 0.0060 1.6397*** 0.0322*** 
 (0.0073) (0.0096) (0.0545) (0.0048) (0.1407) (0.0113) 
       
Observations 992 992 718 869 975 993 
Number of banks 28 28 28 27 28 28 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8689 0.7125 0.3317 0.8728 0.5801 0.8532 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports the effect of stress tests on bank funding structure. Panel A illustrates the European sample and 
Panel B shows the U.S. sample. I estimate bank funding structure using total (TIEitj) uninsured (OIEitj) and insured 
(IECDitj) funding cost as well as uninsured (DEPBAitj, SUBDitj), insured funding (CUSTDitj), and interest margin 
(NIMitj). In Panel A, I include dummy variable to measure European first-time participation in 2010-11 
(FTST1011EU) and the stress test periods in 2010-11 (ST1011EU), 2014-15 (ST1415EU), and 2016 (ST16EU). 
In Panel B, I include dummy variables to estimate U.S. first-time participation in 2009 (FTST09US) and the stress 
test periods in 2009-13 (ST0913US) and 2014-17 (ST1417US). In both panels, I control for bank characteristics, 
lagged by two quarters, and country-specific fundamentals using the following variables: Bank size captured by 
natural logarithm of total assets (SIZEit–2j), traditional banking activities shown by outstanding loans (LOANit–2j), 
asset quality measured by loan loss provisions (LLPit–2j), non-traditional banking activities measured by trading 
securities (TRADEit–2j), liquidity shown by total deposits (DEPOit–2j), profitability measured by earnings before 
provision and taxes (EBPTit–2j); and macroeconomic fundamentals captured by economic growth (ΔGDPtj), and 
unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and the 
relevant data sources are provided in Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.11 Event study robustness checks 
Panel A: C4F baseline model using 120-day estimation window on European banks 
   Average CARs (CAAR) 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–3, t+3 t–1, t+5 
(1) CEBS 2010 (23 July) 40 0.0061 0.0003 -0.0111 -0.0031 
(2) EBA 2011 (15 July) 41 0.0060 0.0152 0.0177 0.0300* 
(3) EBA/ECB 2014 (27 Oct.) 57 0.0024 -0.0028 -0.0122 -0.0143 
(4) ECB 2015 (2 Nov.) 4 0.1255 -0.0189 -0.1478 -0.2580 
(5) EBA 2016 (29 July) 32 0.0078 0.0014 -0.0096 -0.0098 
(6) EBA 2018 (2 Nov.) 32 -0.0023 -0.0026 -0.0021 0.0035 
(7) FTSTO 59 0.0125* 0.0103 -0.006 -0.0017 
(8) TOTALSTO 206 0.0063 0.0018 -0.0067 -0.0046 
Panel B: C4F baseline model using 120-day estimation window on U.S. banks 
   Average CARs (CAAR) 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–3, t+3 t–1, t+5 
(1) SCAP 2009 (7 May) 17 0.0027 0.0038 -0.0330 -0.0059 
(2) CCAR 2011 (18 March) 17 0.0049 0.0090* 0.0077 0.0058 
(3) CCAR 2012 (13 March) 17 0.0178** 0.0208* 0.0076 0.0306* 
(4) DFAST 2013 (7 March) 17 -0.0015 -0.0058 0.0041 -0.0077 
(5) CCAR 2013 (14 March) 17 -0.0136*** -0.0152** -0.0216** -0.0189 
(6) DFAST 2014 (20 March) 23 -0.0017 -0.0019 -0.0081 0.0011 
(7) CCAR 2014 (26 March) 23 0.0026** 0.0065 0.0033 0.0054 
(8) DFAST 2015 (5 March) 26 0.0059 0.0071* 0.0001 0.0096** 
(9) CCAR 2015 (11 March) 26 0.0026 0.0006 0.0089** 0.0017 
(10) DFAST 2016 (23 June) 26 -0.0053 -0.0185** -0.0211*** -0.0111 
(11) CCAR 2016 (29 June) 26 0.0070 0.0056 -0.0173 -0.0013 
(12) DFAST 2017 (22 June) 28 -0.0058 -0.0027 -0.0067** -0.0137** 
(13) CCAR 2017 (28 June) 28 -0.0112** -0.0090* -0.0081 -0.0092** 
(14) DFAST 2018 (21 June) 24 0.0023 0.0020 -0.0061** -0.0065 
(15) CCAR 2018 (28 June) 24 -0.0072*** -0.0072*** -0.0095** -0.0070** 
(16) FTSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 25 0.0017 0.0021 -0.0288* -0.0053 
(17) FTSTO 33 0.0007 0.0033 -0.0210 -0.0008 
(18) TOTALSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 195 0.0014 0.0005 -0.0066** -0.0009 
(19) TOTALSTO 339 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0067*** -0.0023* 
Panel C: C4F baseline model using Patell (1976) standardised residual test on European banks 
   Average CARs (CAAR) 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–3, t+3 t–1, t+5 
(1) CEBS 2010 (23 July) 40 0.0062 0.0002 -0.0106** -0.0042 
(2) EBA 2011 (15 July) 41 0.0054** 0.0149 0.0181** 0.0318*** 
(3) EBA/ECB 2014 (27 Oct.) 57 0.0025 -0.0023 -0.0074 -0.0129 
(4) ECB 2015 (2 Nov.) 4 0.1158 -0.0356 -0.1480 -0.2520** 
(5) EBA 2016 (29 July) 32 0.0081 0.0016 -0.0094 -0.0091 
(6) EBA 2018 (2 Nov.) 32 0.0007 0.0006 0.0022 0.0067 
(7) FTSTO 59 0.0134 0.011 -0.0031 -0.0023 
(8) TOTALSTO 206 0.0066 0.002 -0.0045 -0.0033 
Panel D: C4F baseline model using the Patell (1976) standardised residual test on U.S. banks 
   Average CARs (CAAR) 
    Obs. t–1, t+1 t–1, t+2 t–3, t+3 t–1, t+5 
(1) SCAP 2009 (7 May) 17 0.0133 0.0103 -0.0278 -0.0016 
(2) CCAR 2011 (18 March) 17 0.0012 0.0054 0.0036 0.0003 
(3) CCAR 2012 (13 March) 17 0.0054 0.0089 -0.0019 0.0212* 
(4) DFAST 2013 (7 March) 17 -0.0025 -0.0065 0.0043 -0.0089 
(5) CCAR 2013 (14 March) 17 -0.0141*** -0.0156*** -0.0212*** -0.0186*** 
(6) DFAST 2014 (20 March) 23 0.0011 0.0022 -0.0033 0.0060* 
(7) CCAR 2014 (26 March) 23 0.0035 0.0080*** 0.0068** 0.0053 
(8) DFAST 2015 (5 March) 26 0.0057** 0.0067*** -0.0008 0.0086** 
(9) CCAR 2015 (11 March) 26 0.0022 -0.0002 0.0079** 0.0009 
(10) DFAST 2016 (23 June) 26 -0.0044 -0.0169*** -0.0198*** -0.0105** 
(11) CCAR 2016 (29 June) 26 0.0064 0.0055 -0.0163*** -0.0009 
(12) DFAST 2017 (22 June) 28 -0.0076*** -0.0046* -0.0089** -0.0158*** 
(13) CCAR 2017 (28 June) 28 -0.0113*** -0.0094*** -0.0095*** -0.0100*** 
(14) DFAST 2018 (21 June) 24 0.0020 0.0014 -0.0060 -0.0079** 
(15) CCAR 2018 (28 June) 24 -0.0083*** -0.0083*** -0.0108*** -0.0079** 
(16) FTSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 25 0.0098 0.0080 -0.0238** -0.0003 
(17) FTSTO 33 0.0073 0.0083 -0.0159 0.0032 
(18) TOTALSTO (Excl. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15) 195 0.0010 0.0000 -0.0071*** -0.0018* 
(19) TOTALSTO 339 -0.0008** -0.0012** -0.0069*** -0.0030*** 
This table reports robustness checks on the event studies. Panels A (European) and B (U.S.) indicate the C4F baseline model using a 
120-day estimation window. Panels C (European) and D (U.S.) show the C4F baseline model using the Patell (1976) standardised 
residual test. For Europe (Panels A and C), Models 1 to 5 display the results for the European stress tests in 2010, 2011, 2014, 2015, 
2016 and 2018, and Models 6 and 7 illustrate first-time and total observations (FTSTO, TOTALSTO). For the U.S. (Panels B and D), 
Models 1 to 15 show the results for the U.S. stress tests in 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018, and Models 16 
and 19 illustrate first-time and total stress test observations (FTSTO, TOTALSTO). *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 4.1. 
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Chapter 5 – Conclusions 
The main objective of this thesis is to evaluate the costs and benefits of regulatory 
stress tests and if those exercises effectively contribute towards sustainable financial 
stability. Given the growing importance of bank stress tests within the financial industry 
and the extant literature (Gropp et al., 2019; Flannery et al., 2017; Bischof and Daske, 
2013), this thesis scrutinises the impact of stress tests concerning bank behaviour. The 
analysis is threefold. I examine the implications of bank stress tests on accounting 
discretion (Chapter 2), transparency and opacity (Chapter 3) and market discipline 
(Chapter 4). 
In particular, in my first empirical study (Chapter 2), I scrutinise the stress-tested 
bank’s accounting discretion practices, and if stress tests incentivise banks to exercise 
discretion over loan loss provisions. I find that stress tests produce a treatment effect that 
significantly affects banks’ capital adequacy, asset quality and credit risk. Further, stress-
tested banks delay discretionary loan loss provisions to strengthen their capital base. In 
support of prior research, my evidence suggests that the 2010-11 stress tests motivate 
banks to manage capital and earnings, while the 2014 assessment is more effective at 
preventing discretionary activities. 
In my second empirical work (Chapter 3), I focus on bank transparency from a 
quantitative and qualitative perspective. The purpose is to analyse bank disclosure 
profiles, and the strength of stress test language and disclosure tone on bank transparency. 
My results suggest that stress test participants adjust their textual disclosures using 
particular stress test language, i.e. ‘stress test sentiment’ that incentivises banks to change 
their disclosure tone in a positive direction. Ultimately, I report that a more positive 
disclosure tone is related to a reduction in information asymmetry that indicate investor’s 
obfuscation. 
Finally, in my third empirical study (Chapter 4), I explore market discipline within the 
market sentiment and bank-specific fundamentals that should display investor’s influence 
on bank behaviour. I conclude that the disciplining effect of stress tests is mixed in the 
U.S. and European markets and depends on the individual assessment. On certain 
occasions, stress test information exacerbates negative trends, which may harm financial 
stability as weaker institutions are penalised. Further, stress tests have contributed to 
reduce information asymmetry; however, this does not affect analyst behaviour. Also, 
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mainly in Europe, I find significant evidence for improved risk-taking and funding 
structure, while this is not conclusive for U.S. banks. 
The results from this thesis have important business and policy implications. Stress 
tests are seen as a useful regulatory tool; however, they need to be well-implemented to 
be effective in stimulating market discipline and financial stability (Borio et al., 2014; 
Schuermann, 2014). Importantly, despite potential difficulties that arise from their 
implementation, the authorities must commit to a specific disclosure policy (i.e., bank-
specific or aggregated) to inform market participants (Goldstein and Sapra, 2013). Further, 
regulatory assessments provide unique insights to the authorities that have improved the 
regulation and supervision of SIFIs (Carboni et al., 2017; Sahin and de Haan, 2016). 
However, my findings suggest that stress-tested banks tend to apply more discretion 
over loan loss provisions than untested banks. In particular, stress-tested banks manage 
their capital and earnings to boost accounting figures during stress test periods. Further, 
stress test sentiment affects a bank’s textual narratives, and stress-tested banks appear to 
amend their reports towards a more positive (or less negative) disclosure tone. The results 
from both studies imply that bank managers aim to mitigate the specific impact from 
stress test exercises. Importantly, the latter results show that a more positive disclosure 
tone that compensates for stress test sentiment is transferred into reduced information 
asymmetry, which could be an indication for investors’ obfuscation.  
As suggested by the literature, the regulatory transparency from bank-specific (widely 
employed in stress tests), compared to aggregated, stress test disclosures could be a 
contributing factor for the above described bank behaviour. I contribute empirical support 
to the propositions of the stress test theory (Goldstein and Leitner, 2018; Bouvard et al., 
2015; Goldstein and Sapra, 2013); this posits that, in normal economic times, the 
authorities should disclose aggregated rather than bank-specific results. The benefits for 
regulators and the public could be threefold. First, banks would perhaps be more open-
minded towards stress tests, effectively cooperate with regulators, and might share more 
information because they do not need to fear that this information might be disclosed 
(Prescott, 2008). Second, analyst’s information production would not be influenced by 
regulatory transparency and, therefore, regulators could learn from market movements. 
Third, banks would not undertake short-sighted investment decisions that assist in passing 
stress tests but potentially harm long-term cash flow prospects (Goldstein and Sapra, 
2013). A disadvantage, however, could be that markets suspect potential regulatory 
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forbearance (Wheeler, 2019; Bhat et al., 2011) and question political independence 
(García Osma et al., 2019), which could reduce the market’s trust in regulatory activities. 
Moreover, analysing market reactions on bank-specific disclosures, I find that markets 
seem to be well informed and mainly correspond to stress test information. Only on 
certain occasions, i.e., those that depend on the particular market sentiment, do stress tests 
stimulate market discipline or reward (e.g., EBA’s 2011 stress test). A closer look at 
market responses reveals that stress test disclosures exacerbate negative and positive 
abnormal return trends. Further, stress test information may even transfer into significant 
‘alphas’, indicating influence on long-term bank stock performance. This specifically 
penalises banks that perform poorly and could harm financial stability. Thus, market 
participants might not always need bank-specific disclosures to make conclusions about 
the solvency of stress-tested banks, while the additional information may trigger 
previously discussed unintended consequences. 
Therefore, I conclude that transparency from stress tests is a channel that promotes 
market discipline in both a positive and a negative direction. The one-size-fits-all 
approach might further contribute to this fact and, in turn, the authorities should disclose 
stress test information in a carefully executed disclosure policy. As the results vary 
depending on the particular stress test exercise, I am hesitant to fully support one ‘magic’ 
disclosure practice. Rather, regulators should closely examine the market sentiment at the 
specific point in time and act according to the individual situation. As such, stress tests 
certainly increase regulatory awareness within the financial industry that can contribute 
to financial stability. Specifically, stress tests are an important cornerstone that enhances 
the Basel Accord in Pillar 2 (supervisory review) and has led to a considerable learning 
curve for the authorities. The message that regulators convey to the markets must be 
strongly integrated into the regulatory culture. 
I am hesitant to draw overly strong conclusions from the studies of this thesis. It should 
be noted that the above conclusions arise from the analysis of bank-specific disclosures 
only; this is because I am unable to examine what would have happened if aggregated or 
no results had been disclosed. Furthermore, measuring the impact of bank stress tests is 
challenging because of some confounding factors. For instance, the consistently low 
interest rates in the U.S. and Europe, the on-going sovereign debt risk, as well as 
regulatory amendments such as Basel III, amongst other factors, might be partly 
responsible for certain results. It is therefore difficult to conclude that stress test exercises 
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are the sole contributing factor. I tackle these empirical challenges, employing robust and 
widely recognised methodologies, such as propensity score matching, to analyse 
accounting quality and discretion (Chapter 2). I also apply a textual analysis approach to 
measure disclosure profiles (Chapter 3), and event study techniques to estimate market 
discipline (Chapter 4). Moreover, in all studies, I control for various bank-specific and 
institutional factors such as sovereign debt risk, economic and unemployment growth. In 
summary, I believe that my studies provide robust results that are based on recent cutting-
edge econometric methods and techniques. 
Lastly, there are various avenues for future research on bank stress tests that could be 
explored. As stress tests are a crucial component of legislation and regulatory policies, 
the authorities will continue to conduct stress tests on SIFIs. In addition to the large-scale 
exercises in the U.S. and Europe, local supervisors have also implemented such tests. For 
instance, in the United Kingdom, the Bank of England has stress-tested locally important 
banks, insurances and building societies since 2014.39 In a joint exercise, the German 
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) and the Deutsche Bundesbank have 
assessed German small- and medium-sized banks concerning the impact of the low 
interest rates.40 
Due to the importance of stress tests to financial stability and the entire economy, it is 
of public interest to examine the success of such exercises. This may help regulators and 
supervisors to further amend and improve their policies. In another vein, to analyse the 
full effect and utility of stress tests during crises, only another financial crisis might shed 
further light on the resilience of the regulatory mechanisms in place (Acharya et al., 2018). 
In general, researchers should focus on different aspects (i.e., bank accounting, textual 
and market microstructure interactions) regarding bank transparency to better understand 
its impact on bank environments. Banks are seen to be opaque compared to other 
corporate firms (Morgan, 2002); however, do we need banks to be more or fully 
transparent? Dang et al. (2017) provides an interesting novel theoretical view on bank 
opacity, which might be worth analysing in an empirical study. 
 
 
39 Please visit the Bank of England website: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/stress-testing. 
40 Please visit the Bundesbank website: https://www.bundesbank.de/en/press/press-releases/results-of-the-
2017-low-interest-rate-survey-667444. 
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APPENDIX 
Theoretical framework of the PSM approach 
 According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), the treatment effect of a binary treatment 
on the treated τi, in a setting of a quasi-natural experiment, may be defined as: 
!" = $"(1) − $"(0)                 (A.1) 
where, Yi is the outcome of the bank i (with i = 1,…,N and N is the total population) if 
the bank is treated (1) or not treated (0). Therefore, assuming that the treatment of bank i 
affects only the outcome of i, accepted as stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) 
(Rubin, 1980), the purest result would be achieved if one could observe what would have 
happened to treatment banks had they not been treated. In the context of my study, the 
treatment effect on stress-tested banks may be defined as followed: 
!"(*+,*-). = / 012"(*+,*-).(1)345/64 = 17 − / 012"(*+,*-).(0)345/64 = 17          (A.2) 
where, / 012"(*+,*-).(1)345/64 = 17 stands for the change in the outcome of stress-tested 
banks and / 012"(*+,*-).(0)345/64 = 17 is the counterfactual (or hypothetical) change in the 
outcome if these banks had they not been stress-tested. The binary variable that yields 
stress test participation is TREAT. It takes the value of 1 for any of the three stress test 
samples (i.e., TREATALL, TREAT1011, and TREAT14) as discussed in Section 2.4.1. 12"(*+,*-). denotes the change in the outcome variables (y) of each bank i at country j over 
the treatment period T2 compared to the pre-treatment period T1. 
 However, observational studies face the problem of causal inference meaning that one 
can either examine banks with stress test treatment or without (Holland, 1986). As the 
counterfactual outcome is unobservable, to measure average treatment effects, I need to 
implement a proxy, which is the outcome of similar untested banks defined as / 012"(*+,*-).(0)345/64 = 07. The literature distinguishes between the average treatment 
effect (ATE) and average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). While ATE includes 
banks randomly and also those that would never receive the treatment, ATT focuses on 
banks for whom the treatment was designed (Heckman et al. 1997). As the latter is the 
effect of my interest, the stated formulas only refer to the ATT, which I state as (average) 
treatment effect of stress tests. Consequently, the equation yields: 
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!"(*+,*-). = / 012"(*+,*-).(1)345/64 = 17 − / 012"(*+,*-).(0)345/64 = 07           (A.3) 
 To find appropriate untreated (control) banks, I implement the conditioning covariate 
vector 8"*9.  of bank i observed in the period T0 prior to stress testing leading to the 
following equation: 
!"(*+,*-). = / 012"(*+,*-).(1)345/64 = 1, 8"*9.7 − / 012"(*+,*-).(0)345/64 = 0, 8"*9.7   (A.4) 
 As I use various covariates in the matching model, direct matching on a multi-
dimensional covariate vector may be impractical. Therefore, I use propensity scores as 
suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Hence, the equation can be written as: 
!"(*+,*-). = / :12"(*+,*-).(1);45/64 = 1, <=8"*9.>? − / :12"(*+,*-).(0);45/64 = 0, <=8"*9.>?  (A.5) 
where P is the propensity score conditional on the covariate vector 8"*9. . Hence, 
(!"(*+,*-).) yields the average difference, or DiD, in the outcome variables (y) of the 
treatment over the control group. In other words, the average treatment effect of stress 
tests is predicted as the difference between the mean change in the outcome of treated and 
untreated banks that had similar likelihood of being assessed by regulators but were not 
included. 
 The main benefit of PSM is the design of the above described quasi-natural experiment 
that enables to rule out observed confounding heterogeneity between the two banking 
groups. In particular, the implementation of a matched control group mitigates 
misspecification between the dependent and independent variables that may occur in 
multiple regressions (Rubin, 1979). In this way, the remaining difference after matching 
represents the ultimate treatment effect of the stress tests. 
 However, one need to consider that in observational studies the treatment assignment 
process might not be an exogenous shock and therefore might not be fully random causing 
selection bias. Consequently, to obtain a consistent treatment effect of stress tests, the 
unconfoundedness and common support assumptions must endure (Heckman et al. 1998). 
When these conditions, also known as internal validity, hold, the mean outcome of the 
matched control banks stands for the previously mentioned missing hypothetical change 
in the outcome of the treated banks (Smith and Todd 2005). 
 On the one hand, the concept of unconfoundedness, also referred to as conditional 
independence or selection on observables assumption (Heckman and Robb 1985; Lechner 
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1999), suggests that after matching the individuals based on the covariate vector 8"*9., 
the average outcomes are independent of the treatment. Hence, any systematic differences 
in the outcome between stress-tested and untested (control) banks are defined as an 
expression of the stress test treatment (Imbens 2004; Smith and Todd 2005). The 
unconfoundedness assumption may be written as: 
:12"(*+,*-).(1), 12"(*+,*-).(0)) ⊥ 45/64;<=8"*9.>?                      (A.6) 
 However, this is a powerful assumption as systematic bias might occur even after 
matching. First, as stress test participation is not fully random and depends on the 
regulator’s choice based on particular bank characteristics it is likely that this causes 
biased estimates and compromises causal inference. Therefore, a quasi-experimental 
setting allows to restore this randomisation condition if one controls for the observed rule 
(i.e., certain bank characteristics) behind the selection process (e.g., Dehejia and Wahba, 
2002; Heckman et al., 1997). This means that only variables that influence the 
participation decision and the outcome at the same time should be included. Further, the 
matching literature states that variables selection and balance of the covariate vector is 
essential. Omitted variable bias might occur if significant variables are left out (Heckman 
et al., 1997), but too many variables might produce weaker results owing to the higher 
likelihood of including insignificant variables, which in turn might increase the estimates’ 
variance (Bryson et al., 2002). In particular, for smaller samples such as the employed 
European sample, a higher variance might lead to exclusion of sample elements and 
intensify scarcity. Moreover, Smith and Todd (2005) argue that the most inclusive set of 
covariates might ultimately not be the best one to satisfy the matching condition. 
 Second, some portion of unobserved heterogeneity may remain even after matching, 
because, for instance, the impact of stress tests on treated and untreated banks is possible 
to vary due to regional differences. For this reason, the literature suggests relaxing the 
unconfoundedness condition by either applying instrumental variables (IVs) or a DiD 
approach. In my study, the latter DiD concept is more applicable due to the long data 
period 2005-2015. Furthermore, the literature prefers DiD as the most robust approach 
(Heckman et al. 1998; Smith and Todd 2005). More specific, I estimate the treatment 
effect of stress tests by measuring the DiD of the change in the outcome before and after 
stress testing. The time series difference controls for unobserved heterogeneity between 
the two groups and the cross-sectional difference addresses omitted trends. Importantly, 
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this approach assumes similar trends in the outcome variables during the pre-treatment 
period for both treatment and control groups (parallel trend assumption). As discussed in 
Section 2.5.1, the PSM approach removes meaningful differences between both groups 
so that the parallel trend assumption has been satisfied. 
 On the other hand, the matching approach requires an overhang in the distribution of 
covariates between tested and untested banks (Heckman et al. 1998; Imbens 2004). The 
so-called common support (or overlap) assumption may be defined as: 
0 < <B 045/64 = 13<=8"*9.>7 < 1                              (A.7) 
 This condition assumes a positive probability of being treated (TREAT = 1) or not 
treated (TREAT = 0) within a unit interval. Therefore, this assumption ensures sufficient 
overlap of characteristics between treated and untreated banks to find adequate matches. 
In addition, in case of multiple treatments or comparison groups, the (external) validity 
of the results of a quasi-experiment is strengthened when the possible maximum number 
of data points are identified and assessed (Gippel et al., 2015). Since the intensity of 
treatment and the timing of the first assessment for some banks vary, I have constructed 
three distinct samples to conduct PSM (i.e., TREATALL, TREAT1011, and TREAT14) as 
discussed in Section 2.4.1. 
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Table A.1 PSM robustness checks on covariate imbalance and matching equality 
Panel A: Determinants of banks' probability to participate in stress tests of alternative robustness model 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Covariates TREATALL TREAT1011 TREAT14 
SIZEitj 0.6912*** 0.8066*** 0.6074*** 
 (0.0754) (0.0953) (0.0882) 
GDPtj -0.2505 -0.4807*** -0.0417 
 (0.1551) (0.1638) (0.1669) 
LOANitj 0.2381 1.3786** -0.1788 
 (0.5710) (0.6581) (0.5405) 
LLRitj 52.3723*** -2.5009 1.1851 
 (16.6939) (4.8451) (2.0000) 
DSFRitj 0.6191 1.0240 1.3628** 
 (0.5683) (0.7011) (0.5695) 
CAPitj -9.2976** 1.1475 6.0233*** 
 (4.3436) (4.0276) (2.0635) 
ROAitj 43.0225*** 10.9350 -1.9824 
 (15.9550) (9.2963) (4.5279) 
Constant -7.0180*** -9.9177*** -7.4318*** 
 (1.0490) (1.4825) (1.1361) 
    
Observations 483 476 400 
Pseudo R2 0.693 0.628 0.458 
Log likelihood -90.19 -83.58 -86.80 
Panel B: Determinants of banks' probability to participate in stress tests using common support samples 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Covariates TREATALL TREAT1011 TREAT14 
SIZEitj 0.6461*** 0.7595*** 0.5601*** 
 (0.0841) (0.1125) (0.1335) 
GDPtj -0.2392 -0.4589*** -0.0848 
 (0.1543) (0.1625) (0.1612) 
OEAitj 0.0404 -1.1686* 0.7278 
 (0.5384) (0.6733) (0.5844) 
LLRitj 49.6264*** -3.3725 0.9953 
 (16.8155) (4.8944) (2.0697) 
DSFRitj 0.6344 1.0021 1.6917*** 
 (0.5613) (0.6814) (0.6093) 
CAPitj -9.1602** 0.8047 4.3314 
 (4.6633) (4.6329) (3.0334) 
ROAitj 40.8198** 10.3742 0.5106 
 (16.1080) (9.3365) (4.7977) 
Constant -6.4122*** -8.1456*** -7.1909*** 
 (1.0018) (1.5954) (1.6239) 
    
Observations 265 194 142 
Pseudo R2 0.511 0.370 0.197 
Log likelihood -89.46 -83.90 -76.08 
Panel C: Matching results of t-Test for equality of means of covariates with alternative matching algorithms including all 
treatment banks 
  Matched sample: Radius matching   Matched sample: Nearest-neighbour 
Covariates TREATALL Control banks 
Difference in 
means   TREATALL 
Control 
banks 
Difference in 
means 
SIZEitj 10.7470 10.7230 0.0240  10.7470 10.7300 0.0170 
GDPtj 0.9464 0.9488 -0.0024  0.9464 1.0209 -0.0745 
OEAitj 0.3505 0.3671 -0.0166  0.3505 0.3720 -0.0215 
LLRitj 0.0133 0.0113 0.0021  0.0133 0.0121 0.0012 
DSFRitj 0.5974 0.6133 -0.0159  0.5974 0.6150 -0.0177 
CAPitj 0.0636 0.0640 -0.0005  0.0636 0.0633 0.0002 
ROAitj 0.0069 0.0084 -0.0014  0.0069 0.0077 -0.0008 
        
Observations 132 122 254  132 122 254 
Pseudo-R2 0.011  0.010 
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Table A.1 continued 
Panel D: Matching results of t-Test for equality of means of covariates applying alternative matching algorithms including 
first-time participants in 2010-11 
  Matched sample: Radius matching   Matched sample: Nearest-neighbour 
Covariates TREAT1011 Control banks 
Difference in 
means   TREAT1011 
Control 
banks 
Difference in 
means 
SIZEitj 11.7870 11.6510 0.1360  11.5740 11.7000 -0.1260 
GDPtj 0.8882 0.9091 -0.0209  0.8504 0.9384 -0.0880 
OEAitj 0.3561 0.3745 -0.0185  0.3509 0.4088 -0.0578 
LLRitj 0.0149 0.0116 0.0032  0.0150 0.0119 0.0031 
DSFRitj 0.5864 0.6065 -0.0201  0.5864 0.5803 0.0061 
CAPitj 0.0549 0.0511 0.0039  0.0550 0.0550 0.0000 
ROAitj 0.0031 0.0028 0.0004  0.0031 0.0023 0.0008 
        
Observations 71 108 179  62 62 124 
Pseudo-R2 0.020  0.054 
Panel E: Matching results of t-Test for equality of means of covariates applying alternative matching algorithms including 
first-time participants in 2014 
  Matched sample: Radius matching   Matched sample: Nearest-neighbour 
Covariates TREAT14 Control banks 
Difference in 
means   TREAT14 
Control 
banks 
Difference in 
means 
SIZEitj 10.0510 9.9726 0.0784  10.0510 10.1040 -0.0530 
GDPtj 0.9849 1.0356 -0.0507  0.9849 1.0609 -0.0760 
OEAitj 0.3453 0.3356 0.0097  0.3453 0.3633 -0.0180 
LLRitj 0.0273 0.0453 -0.0180  0.0273 0.0382 -0.0109 
DSFRitj 0.6444 0.6213 0.0231  0.6444 0.6012 0.0432 
CAPitj 0.0819 0.0855 -0.0037  0.0819 0.0821 -0.0003 
ROAitj 0.0015 0.0013 0.0002  0.0015 0.0011 0.0004 
        
Observations 55 87 142  55 55 110 
Pseudo-R2 0.015  0.013 
This table reports additional PSM robustness checks. Panels A and B test covariate imbalance by using an alternative covariate 
combination for the samples of total stress test participation (TREATALL), first-time participation in 2010-11 (TREAT1011) 
and 2014 (TREAT14), and repeated estimation on the final matched samples. Panel C, D and E illustrate the mean comparison 
of bank-specific covariates of treatment and untreated banks after matching with Radius and Nearest-neighbour matching 
applying caliper and replacement options. The difference in means is calculated as the difference between treatment and 
untreated banks' means. The two rows below the covariates show the number of observations before and after matching and 
the pseudo-R2. I include the following covariates in my analysis: Bank size measured by natural logarithm of total assets 
(SIZEitj), economic growth estimated by Gross Domestic Product (GDPtj), (non-) traditional banking activities assessed by 
other earning assets and outstanding loans (OEAitj, LOANitj), credit portfolio quality predicted by loan loss reserves (LLRitj), 
liquidity risk captured by deposit ratio (DSFRitj), bank capital measured by equity divided by total assets (CAPitj), and 
profitability predicted by return on assets (ROAitj). The covariates are obtained as an average value from 2005S2-2008S2 
(TREATALL), from 2008S2-2009S2 (TREAT1011) and from 2012S2-2013S2 (TREAT14). *, **, and *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors of the coefficients in Panels A and B are clustered at bank level. 
The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 2.1. 
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Table A.2 PSM/DiD robustness checks on common support bias using adjusted samples 
Panel A: Total stress test participation effect 
  Coefficients Standard errors Coefficients Standard errors     
Asset quality (LLP) Asset quality (NPL) 
TREATALL 0.0004 (0.0009) -0.0037* (0.0022) 12"=*+,*->. 0.0018** (0.0008) 0.0046** (0.0023) !"(*+,*-). -0.0014 (0.0011) 0.0028 (0.0022) 
Observations 3,418 2,935 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7596 0.9002 
            
Capital adequacy (T1R) Credit risk (RWA) 
TREATALL -0.0118*** (0.0041) 0.0348 (0.0422) 12"=*+,*->. 0.0786*** (0.0074) -0.1947*** (0.0584) !"(*+,*-). -0.0115** (0.0055) 0.0089 (0.0489) 
Observations 2,634 2,845 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4502 0.5998 
Panel B: 2010-11 EBA first-time stress test participation effect 
  Coefficients Standard errors Coefficients Standard errors     
Asset quality (LLP) Asset quality (NPL) 
TREAT1011 0.0006 (0.0005) -0.0021* (0.0013) 12"=*+,*->. 0.0017*** (0.0004) 0.0034*** (0.0011) !"(*+,*-). -0.0010* (0.0006) 0.0033** (0.0013) 
Observations 1,167 1,011 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6652 0.8622 
            
Capital adequacy (T1R) Credit risk (RWA) 
TREAT1011 -0.0155*** (0.0052) 0.0248 (0.0280) 12"=*+,*->. 0.0441*** (0.0074) -0.1113*** (0.0214) !"(*+,*-). 0.0023 (0.0068) -0.0312* (0.0186) 
Observations 984 1,024 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4082 0.6674 
Panel C: 2014 EBA/ECB first-time stress test participation effect 
  Coefficients Standard errors Coefficients Standard errors 
        Asset quality (LLP) Asset quality (NPL) 
TREAT14 0.0003 (0.0008) -0.0059 (0.0039) 12"=*+,*->. 0.0011 (0.0011) -0.0041 (0.0052) !"(*+,*-). 0.0004 (0.0011) 0.0058* (0.0032) 
Observations 848 720 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5717 0.8869     
Capital adequacy (T1R) Credit risk (RWA) 
TREAT14 -0.0273** (0.0129) 0.0719** (0.0357) 12"=*+,*->. 0.0234** (0.0093) -0.1010*** (0.0228) !"(*+,*-). 0.0200** (0.0091) -0.0202 (0.0214) 
Observations 626 689 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3532 0.5251 
This table reports additional robustness checks of hidden bias adjusting samples according to common support option 
Panel A illustrates the total stress test participation effect (TREATALL). Panel B estimates the effect of the 2010-11 
treatments (TREAT1011). Panel C analyses the effect of the 2014 EBA/ECB treatments (TREAT14). I apply a DiD 
design using Gaussian Kernel probability weights and covariates obtained from the prior PSM analysis and control for 
half-year time effects. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors 
(parentheses) are clustered at bank level. I include the following variables in my analysis: Forward- and backward-
looking asset quality measured by loan loss provisions (LLPitj) and non-performing loans (NPLitj), capital adequacy 
captured by lagged regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio (T1Rit–1j), and credit risk assessed by risk-weighted assets (RWAitj). !"(*+,*-). yields the average double difference, or DiD, between the difference of the outcome variables before and after 
the treatment (12"=*+,*->.) and the difference of the treatment (TREAT, TREAT1011, and TREAT14) over the control 
group. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 2.1. 
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Table A.3 Fixed effects robustness checks on the entire treatment sample (TREATALL) excluding banks from non-EU 
countries, banks with multiple stress test participation, banks using local GAAP and inactive banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables EU MULTIPLE GAAP ACTIVE 
NPLit–1j 0.0388*** 0.0456*** 0.0401*** 0.0447*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0108) (0.0115) (0.0104) 
ΔNPLitj 0.1439*** 0.1509*** 0.1432*** 0.1451*** 
 (0.0295) (0.0307) (0.0296) (0.0313) 
ΔLOANitj -0.0168*** -0.0190*** -0.0159*** -0.0167*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0040) (0.0036) (0.0037) 
T1Rit–1j -0.0626*** -0.0398** -0.0570*** -0.0408** 
 (0.0110) (0.0176) (0.0117) (0.0168) 
EBPTit–1j -0.1807** -0.0687 -0.1816** -0.0570 
 (0.0887) (0.0720) (0.0780) (0.0713) 
STHC -0.0081*** -0.0041 -0.0068*** -0.0038 
 (0.0022) (0.0033) (0.0022) (0.0031) 
TREATALL*ST 0.0088*** 0.0042 0.0075*** 0.0047 
 (0.0022) (0.0031) (0.0022) (0.0029) 
TREATALL*T1Rit–1j 0.0336*** 0.0063 0.0269** 0.0065 
 (0.0121) (0.0188) (0.0126) (0.0168) 
STHC*T1Rit–1j 0.0641*** 0.0417** 0.0564*** 0.0418*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0169) (0.0110) (0.0159) 
TREATALL*STHC*T1Rit–1j -0.0546*** -0.0291* -0.0463*** -0.0296* 
 (0.0125) (0.0166) (0.0127) (0.0157) 
TREATALL*EBPTit–1j 0.2463*** 0.1607** 0.2423*** 0.1535** 
 (0.0842) (0.0672) (0.0729) (0.0660) 
STHC*EBPTit–1j 0.2791*** 0.1436 0.2575*** 0.1388 
 (0.0768) (0.1215) (0.0815) (0.1155) 
TREATALL*STHC*EBPTit–1j -0.1612* -0.0203 -0.1287 -0.0293 
 (0.0840) (0.1242) (0.0877) (0.1192) 
SIZEit–1j 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
 (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
ΔGDPtj -0.0282*** -0.0334*** -0.0303*** -0.0355*** 
 (0.0082) (0.0088) (0.0081) (0.0087) 
ΔUNEMtj -0.0014 -0.0044*** -0.0017 -0.0024 
 (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
HPItj -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
IRATEtj 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Constant 0.0048 0.0056 0.0061 0.0031 
 (0.0072) (0.0078) (0.0070) (0.0077) 
     
Observations 1,477 1,542 1,617 1,613 
Number of banks 131 141 142 142 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4125 0.4026 0.4084 0.4032 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Half-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports additional fixed effects robustness checks on the entire treatment sample (TREATALL) excluding banks from 
non-EU countries, banks with multiple stress test participation, banks using local GAAP and inactive banks. Model 1 assesses 
the stress test effect on discretionary behaviour excluding banks from non-EU countries (EU). Model 2 shows the stress test 
effect on discretionary behaviour without banks with multiple stress test participation (MULTIPLE). Model 3 examines the 
stress test effect on discretionary behaviour discarding banks using local GAAP (GAAP). Model 4 estimates the stress test 
effect on discretionary behaviour without inactive banks (ACTIVE). Standard errors (parentheses) are clustered at bank level. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. I include the following variables in my analysis: 
Forward- and (shift of) backward looking asset quality captured by loan loss provisions (LLPitj) and lagged (change in) non-
performing loans (NPLit–1j, ΔNPLitj), loan growth shown by change in outstanding loans (ΔLOANitj); capital management 
measured by lagged regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio (T1Rit–1j); income smoothing captured by earnings before provisions and 
taxes (EBPTit–1j); a dummy for stress test participation (TREATALL); a dummy for the ‘hot and ‘cold’ stress test periods 
(STHC); bank size captured by lagged natural logarithm of total assets (SIZEit–1j), and macroeconomic fundamentals to control 
for contemporaneous fiscal and monetary policy changes and market instabilities such as illiquidity, constrained capital and 
higher volatility shown by economic growth (ΔGDPtj), unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj), price level in the housing market 
(HPItj), and sovereign debt risk (IRATEtj). Data range 2005-2015. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources 
are provided in Table 2.1. 
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Table A.4 Fixed effects robustness checks on the first-time participants in 2010-11 (TREAT1011) excluding banks from 
non-EU countries, banks with multiple stress test participation, banks using local GAAP and inactive banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables EU MULTIPLE GAAP ACTIVE 
NPLit–1j 0.0704** 0.0690** 0.0705** 0.0764** 
 (0.0319) (0.0343) (0.0321) (0.0328) 
ΔNPLitj 0.1026*** 0.1017*** 0.1049*** 0.1219*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0239) (0.0250) 
ΔLOANitj 0.0028 0.0019 0.0027 0.0016 
 (0.0059) (0.0063) (0.0058) (0.0055) 
T1Rit–1j -0.0229 -0.0448*** -0.0225 -0.0244* 
 (0.0147) (0.0125) (0.0147) (0.0142) 
EBPTit–1j 0.0148 0.0949** 0.0217 0.0453 
 (0.0880) (0.0401) (0.0857) (0.0420) 
BAST1011 -0.0018 -0.0009 -0.0016 -0.0034*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0031) (0.0014) (0.0013) 
TREAT1011*BAST1011 0.0044* 0.0046** 0.0043* 0.0060** 
 (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0023) 
TREAT1011*T1Rit–1j 0.0097 0.0260 0.0105 -0.0072 
 (0.0239) (0.0225) (0.0240) (0.0203) 
BAST1011*T1Rit–1j 0.0445*** 0.0668*** 0.0427*** 0.0569*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0120) (0.0141) (0.0140) 
TREAT1011*BAST1011*T1Rit–1j -0.0580*** -0.0752*** -0.0578** -0.0678*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0203) (0.0221) (0.0221) 
TREAT1011*EBPTit–1j 0.2222** 0.1351 0.2129** 0.2089** 
 (0.0881) (0.1042) (0.0866) (0.0887) 
BAST1011*EBPTit–1j -0.1278*** -0.2463*** -0.1303*** -0.1457** 
 (0.0397) (0.0835) (0.0405) (0.0617) 
TREAT1011*BAST1011*EBPTit–1j 0.1866** 0.3144*** 0.1895** 0.1912** 
 (0.0817) (0.1066) (0.0817) (0.0834) 
SIZEit–1j -0.0026 -0.0022 -0.0026 -0.0024 
 (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
ΔGDPtj -0.0133 -0.0125 -0.0139 -0.0134 
 (0.0107) (0.0117) (0.0102) (0.0105) 
ΔUNEMtj 0.0014 -0.0006 0.0010 -0.0004 
 (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0022) 
HPItj -0.0001** -0.0001*** -0.0001** -0.0001*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
IRATEtj 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Constant 0.0455* 0.0450 0.0432* 0.0435* 
 (0.0233) (0.0294) (0.0227) (0.0246) 
     
Observations 579 557 628 611 
Number of banks 106 105 114 110 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5650 0.5681 0.5615 0.5967 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Half-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports additional fixed effects robustness checks on the first-time participants in 2010-11 (TREAT1011) excluding 
banks from non-EU countries, banks with multiple stress test participation, banks using local GAAP and inactive banks. 
Model 1 assesses the stress test effect on discretionary behaviour excluding banks from non-EU countries (EU). Model 2 
shows the stress test effect on discretionary behaviour without banks with multiple stress test participation (MULTIPLE). 
Model 3 examines the stress test effect on discretionary behaviour discarding banks using local GAAP (GAAP). Model 4 
estimates the stress test effect on discretionary behaviour without inactive banks (ACTIVE). Standard errors (parentheses) are 
clustered at bank level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. I include the following 
variables in my analysis: Forward- and (shift of) backward looking asset quality captured by loan loss provisions (LLPitj) and 
lagged (change in) non-performing loans (NPLit–1j, ΔNPLitj), loan growth shown by change in outstanding loans (ΔLOANitj); 
capital management measured by lagged regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio (T1Rit–1j); income smoothing captured by earnings 
before provisions and taxes (EBPTit–1j); a dummy for first-time participation in 2010-11 (TREAT1011); a dummy for 2010-11 
(BAST1011); bank size captured by lagged natural logarithm of total assets (SIZEit–1j), and macroeconomic fundamentals to 
control for contemporaneous fiscal and monetary policy changes and market instabilities such as illiquidity, constrained capital 
and higher volatility shown by economic growth (ΔGDPtj), unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj), price level in the housing 
market (HPItj), and sovereign debt risk (IRATEtj). Data range 2005-2015. The description of the variables and the relevant data 
sources are provided in Table 2.1. 
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Table A.5 Fixed effects robustness checks on the first-time participants in 2014 (TREAT14) excluding banks from non-EU 
countries, banks with multiple stress test participation, banks using local GAAP and inactive banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables EU MULTIPLE GAAP ACTIVE 
NPLit–1j 0.1336** 0.1385** 0.1303** 0.1291** 
 (0.0551) (0.0535) (0.0535) (0.0536) 
ΔNPLitj 0.1370** 0.1600*** 0.1272** 0.1283** 
 (0.0524) (0.0498) (0.0545) (0.0535) 
ΔLOANitj -0.0157 -0.0155* -0.0111 -0.0111 
 (0.0108) (0.0089) (0.0084) (0.0084) 
T1Rit–1j -0.0683*** -0.0333 -0.0363 -0.0367 
 (0.0184) (0.0246) (0.0258) (0.0247) 
EBPTit–1j -0.1156 -0.2689 -0.2300 -0.2275 
 (0.1399) (0.1776) (0.1581) (0.1577) 
BAST14 -0.0076*** -0.0113*** -0.0113*** -0.0112*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0021) 
TREAT14*BAST14 0.0091*** 0.0071* 0.0080** 0.0081** 
 (0.0031) (0.0036) (0.0038) (0.0036) 
TREAT14*T1Rit–1j 0.0069 -0.0364 -0.0321 -0.0303 
 (0.0263) (0.0340) (0.0352) (0.0346) 
BAST14*T1Rit–1j 0.0714*** 0.0603*** 0.0588*** 0.0587*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0151) (0.0148) (0.0144) 
TREAT14*BAST14*T1Rit–1j -0.0397* -0.0235 -0.0262 -0.0263 
 (0.0202) (0.0236) (0.0242) (0.0239) 
TREAT14*EBPTit–1j 0.2374 0.4055* 0.3449* 0.3565* 
 (0.1908) (0.2098) (0.1977) (0.1946) 
BAST14*EBPTit–1j 0.1697* 0.2114* 0.2089* 0.2045* 
 (0.0943) (0.1066) (0.1056) (0.1035) 
TREAT14*BAST14*EBPTit–1j -0.2887** -0.2983** -0.2952** -0.2984** 
 (0.1090) (0.1183) (0.1176) (0.1131) 
SIZEit–1j 0.0051 0.0026 0.0033 0.0030 
 (0.0042) (0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0033) 
ΔGDPtj -0.0912 -0.0932* -0.0771 -0.0703 
 (0.0687) (0.0489) (0.0518) (0.0488) 
ΔUNEMtj 0.0125* 0.0052 0.0044 0.0056 
 (0.0067) (0.0049) (0.0047) (0.0044) 
HPItj 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
IRATEtj -0.0001 0.0005 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Constant -0.0566 -0.0208 -0.0370 -0.0342 
 (0.0492) (0.0365) (0.0402) (0.0376) 
     
Observations 345 390 367 410 
Number of banks 61 69 60 72 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5149 0.5303 0.4942 0.4922 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Half-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports additional fixed effects robustness checks on the first-time participants in 2014 (TREAT14) excluding banks 
from non-EU countries, banks with multiple stress test participation, banks using local GAAP and inactive banks. Model 1 
assesses the stress test effect on discretionary behaviour excluding banks from non-EU countries (EU). Model 2 shows the 
stress test effect on discretionary behaviour without banks with multiple stress test participation (MULTIPLE). Model 3 
examines the stress test effect on discretionary behaviour discarding banks using local GAAP (GAAP). Model 4 estimates the 
stress test effect on discretionary behaviour without inactive banks (ACTIVE). Standard errors (parentheses) are clustered at 
bank level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. I include the following variables in 
my analysis: Forward- and (shift of) backward looking asset quality captured by loan loss provisions (LLPitj) and lagged 
(change in) non-performing loans (NPLit–1j, ΔNPLitj), loan growth shown by change in outstanding loans (ΔLOANitj); capital 
management measured by lagged regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio (T1Rit–1j); income smoothing captured by earnings before 
provisions and taxes (EBPTit–1j); a dummy for first-time participation in 2014 (TREAT14); a dummy for the 2014 stress test 
periods (BAST14); bank size captured by lagged natural logarithm of total assets (SIZEit–1j), and macroeconomic fundamentals 
to control for contemporaneous fiscal and monetary policy changes and market instabilities such as illiquidity, constrained 
capital and higher volatility shown by economic growth (ΔGDPtj), unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj), price level in the 
housing market (HPItj), and sovereign debt risk (IRATEtj). Data range 2005-2015. The description of the variables and the 
relevant data sources are provided in Table 2.1. 
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Table A.6 Additional robustness including interaction between the treatment groups and unemployment rate 
(based on Table 2.7) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables TREATALL TREAT1011 TREAT14 
TREATALL*ΔUNEMtj 0.0029   
 (0.0023)   
TREAT1011*ΔUNEMtj  0.0012  
  (0.0026)  
TREAT14*ΔUNEMtj   0.0077 
   (0.0090) 
NPLit–1j 0.0450*** 0.0733** 0.1302** 
 (0.0106) (0.0336) (0.0543) 
ΔNPLitj 0.1463*** 0.1091*** 0.1307** 
 (0.0302) (0.0240) (0.0532) 
ΔLOANitj -0.0168*** 0.0022 -0.0111 
 (0.0037) (0.0053) (0.0084) 
T1Rit–1j -0.0401** -0.0239* -0.0362 
 (0.0168) (0.0138) (0.0244) 
EBPTitj -0.0627 0.0363 -0.2287 
 (0.0636) (0.0431) (0.1594) 
STHC -0.0037   
 (0.0032)   
TREATALL*STHC 0.0045   
 (0.0030)   
TREATALL*T1Rit–1j 0.0095   
 (0.0166)   
STHC*T1Rit–1j 0.0411**   
 (0.0164)   
TREATALL*STHC*T1Rit–1j -0.0297*   
 (0.0161)   
TREATALL*EBPTitj 0.1511**   
 (0.0624)   
STHC*EBPTitj 0.1412   
 (0.1158)   
TREATALL*STHC*EBPTitj -0.0263   
 (0.1196)   
BAST1011  -0.0014  
  (0.0026)  
TREAT1011*BAST1011  0.0058**  
  (0.0023)  
TREAT1011*T1Rit–1j  0.0108  
  (0.0236)  
BAST1011*T1Rit–1j  0.0566***  
  (0.0145)  
TREAT1011*BAST1011*T1Rit–1j  -0.0709***  
  (0.0223)  
TREAT1011*EBPTitj  0.2074**  
  (0.0941)  
BAST1011*EBPTitj  -0.1457**  
  (0.0625)  
TREAT1011*BAST1011*EBPTitj  0.1990**  
  (0.0865)  
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Table A.6 continued 
BAST14   -0.0077*** 
   (0.0024) 
TREAT14*BAST14   0.0082** 
   (0.0035) 
TREAT14*T1Rit–1j   -0.0303 
   (0.0343) 
BAST14*T1Rit–1j   0.0586*** 
   (0.0145) 
TREAT14*BAST14*T1Rit–1j   -0.0253 
   (0.0244) 
TREAT14*EBPTitj   0.3588* 
   (0.1961) 
BAST14*EBPTitj   0.2079* 
   (0.1052) 
TREAT14*BAST14*EBPTitj   -0.2981** 
   (0.1140) 
SIZEit–1j -0.0001 -0.0024 0.0031 
 (0.0005) (0.0018) (0.0033) 
ΔGDPtj -0.0341*** -0.0130 -0.0702 
 (0.0085) (0.0096) (0.0485) 
ΔUNEMtj -0.0045*** -0.0016 0.0031 
 (0.0016) (0.0025) (0.0045) 
HPItj 0.0000 -0.0001** 0.0001 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
IRATEtj 0.0006*** 0.0003 0.0001 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0006) 
Constant 0.0046 0.0421* -0.0346 
 (0.0067) (0.0242) (0.0378) 
    
Observations 1,698 649 410 
Number of banks 152 119 72 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3945 0.5519 0.4920 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Half-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports additional robustness including interactions between the treatment groups and unemployment 
rate (based on Table 2.7). Model 1 presents the total stress test effect on banks' capital management and income 
smoothing behaviour. Model 2 illustrates the stress test effect on the discretionary behaviour of first-time 
participants in 2010-11. Model 3 examines the stress test effect on the discretionary behaviour of first-time 
participants in 2014. I include the following variables in my analysis: Forward- and (shift of) backward looking 
asset quality captured by loan loss provisions (LLPitj) and lagged (change in) non-performing loans (NPLit–1j, 
ΔNPLitj), loan growth shown by change in outstanding loans (ΔLOANitj), capital management measured by lagged 
regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio (T1Rit–1j), income smoothing captured by earnings before provisions and taxes 
(EBPTitj); a dummy for stress test participation (TREATALL), first-time participation in 2010-11 (TREAT1011) 
and 2014 (TREAT14); a dummy for 'hot' and 'cold' stress test periods (STHC), a dummy for four half-year periods 
before and after the 2010-11 (BAST1011) and 2014 treatments (BAST14); bank size captured by lagged natural 
logarithm of total assets (SIZEit–1j) and macroeconomic fundamentals to control for contemporaneous fiscal and 
monetary policy changes and market instabilities such as illiquidity, constrained capital and higher volatility 
shown by economic growth (ΔGDPtj), unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj), price level in the housing market (HPItj) 
and sovereign debt risk (IRATEtj). Data range 2005-2015. Standard errors (parentheses) are clustered at bank 
level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The description of the 
variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 2.1. 
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Table A.7 Marginal effects of capital management and income smoothing interaction terms 
Panel A: Marginal effects on bank discretionary behaviour (Table 2.7) 
 Overall: Capital management (T1R)  Overall: Income smoothing (EBPT) 
 TREATALL Control Diff (T–C)  TREATALL Control Diff (T–C) 
STHC (1) -0.0200 0.0020 -0.0220  0.2062 0.0757 0.1305 
STHC (0) -0.0311 -0.0401 0.0090  0.0907 -0.0615 0.1522 
Diff (1–0) 0.0111 0.0420   0.1155 0.1372  
DiD   -0.0310*    -0.0217         
 2010-11: Capital management (T1R)  2010-11: Income smoothing (EBPT) 
 TREAT1011 Control Diff (T–C)  TREAT1011 Control Diff (T–C) 
BAST1011 (1) -0.0269 0.0331 -0.0600  0.2998 -0.1077 0.4076 
BAST1011 (0) -0.0123 -0.0242 0.0119  0.2452 0.0383 0.2069 
Diff (1–0) -0.0147 0.0573   0.0546 -0.1461  
DiD   -0.0719***    0.2007** 
 2014: Capital management (T1R)  2014: Income smoothing (EBPT) 
 TREAT14 Control Diff (T–C)  TREAT14 Control Diff (T–C) 
BAST14 (1) -0.0347 0.0220 -0.0567  0.0351 -0.0230 0.0581 
BAST14 (0) -0.0671 -0.0367 -0.0303  0.1290 -0.2275 0.3565 
Diff (1–0) 0.0324 0.0587   -0.0938 0.2045  
DiD   -0.0263    -0.2984** 
Panel B: Marginal effects on discretionary behaviour of high-, medium- and low-capitalised banks (Table 2.9) 
 High capital: Capital management (T1R)  High capital: Income smoothing (EBPT) 
 CAPH Control Diff (T–C)  CAPH Control Diff (T–C) 
STHC (1) -0.0011 -0.0136 0.0125  0.0642 -0.0406 0.1048 
STHC (0) -0.0047 0.0235 -0.0282  -0.0231 -0.0073 -0.0158 
Diff (1–0) 0.0036 -0.0371   0.0874 -0.0332  
DiD   0.0407*    0.1206         
 Med. capital: Capital management (T1R)  Med. capital: Income smoothing (EBPT) 
 CAPM Control Diff (T–C)  CAPM Control Diff (T–C) 
STHC (1) 0.0055 -0.0026 0.0081  0.1366 -0.4995 0.6362 
STHC (0) -0.0043 -0.0020 -0.0023  0.0977 -0.2108 0.3085 
Diff (1–0) 0.0098 -0.0006   0.0389 -0.2888  
DiD   0.0104    0.3277** 
 Low capital: Capital management (T1R)  Low capital: Income smoothing (EBPT) 
 CAPL Control Diff (T–C)  CAPL Control Diff (T–C) 
STHC (1) -0.0826 -0.0125 -0.0702  0.2508 0.2810 -0.0302 
STHC (0) -0.0785 -0.0615 -0.0171  0.0796 0.1085 -0.0289 
Diff (1–0) -0.0041 0.0490   0.1712 0.1725  
DiD   -0.0531*    -0.0013 
Panel C: Marginal effects on fixed effects robustness on common support bias with adjusted samples (Table 2.11) 
 Overall: Capital management (T1R)  Overall: Income smoothing (EBPT) 
 TREATALL Control Diff (T–C)  TREATALL Control Diff (T–C) 
STHC (1) -0.0184 0.0032 -0.0216  0.2105 0.0661 0.1444 
STHC (0) -0.0307 -0.0391 0.0085  0.0978 -0.0625 0.1604 
Diff (1–0) 0.0123 0.0424   0.1127 0.1287  
DiD   -0.0301*    -0.0160         
 2010-11: Capital management (T1R)  2010-11: Income smoothing (EBPT) 
 TREAT1011 Control Diff (T–C)  TREAT1011 Control Diff (T–C) 
BAST1011 (1) -0.0112 0.0325 -0.0437  0.2743 -0.1050 0.3793 
BAST1011 (0) 0.0000 -0.0146 0.0146  0.2226 0.0507 0.1719 
Diff (1–0) -0.0111 0.0471   0.0517 -0.1557  
DiD   -0.0582***    0.2074*** 
 2014: Capital management (T1R)  2014: Income smoothing (EBPT) 
 TREAT14 Control Diff (T–C)  TREAT14 Control Diff (T–C) 
BAST14 (1) -0.0376 0.0207 -0.0583  0.0130 -0.0467 0.0597 
BAST14 (0) -0.0746 -0.0387 -0.0359  0.1222 -0.2534 0.3756 
Diff (1–0) 0.0370 0.0594   -0.1092 0.2066  
DiD   -0.0224    -0.3158** 
This table reports the marginal effects of the interaction terms in Tables 2.7, 2.9 and 2.11. Panel A illustrates the marginal effects on 
bank discretionary behaviour (Table 2.7). Panel B estimates marginal effects on discretionary behaviour of high-, medium- and low-
capitalised banks (Table 2.9). Panel C analyses marginal effects on fixed effects robustness on common support bias with adjusted 
samples (Table 2.11). I include the following variables in my analysis: Capital management measured by lagged regulatory Tier 1 
capital ratio (T1Rit–1j), income smoothing captured by earnings before provisions and taxes (EBPTitj); a dummy for stress test 
participation (TREATALL), first-time participation in 2010-11 (TREAT1011) and 2014 (TREAT14); a dummy for 'hot' and 'cold' stress 
test periods (STHC), a dummy for four half-year periods before and after the 2010-11 (BAST1011) and 2014 treatments (BAST14). *, 
**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data 
sources are provided in Table 2.1. 
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Figure A.1 Marginal effects of capital and income smoothing interaction terms in Table 2.8.  
The graphs plot average marginal effects of capital management (T1R) and income smoothing (EBPT) on a range 
of the three institutional variables bank supervisory strength (SUPERV), regulatory capital stringency (CAPREG) 
and corruption level (CORRUPT). The marginal effects are provided for each binary case of the treatment versus 
control groups (TREATALL = 1/0) and ‘hot’ versus ‘cold’ stress test periods (STHC = 1/0). 
 
 
Description of marginal effects 
In Table A.7, Panel A, concerning capital management (left hand side), the results 
show that current LLP decreases with T1R, suggesting that treatment banks, in contrast 
to untreated banks, delay more loan losses to manage their capital adequacy (as in 
Table 2.7). In particular, the overall and 2010-11 treatment effect (DiD) is statistically 
significant at the 1% and 10% level, indicating that treatment banks, compared to their 
untreated peers, manage capital to reduce pressure on earnings figures, to recover from 
regulatory re-capitalisation. This result is supported by the marginal effects that indicate 
that treatment banks remain delaying LLPs during the overall treatment period (STHC =1) 
and the 2010-11 treatment period (BAST1011 = 1). On the other hand, in Table A.7, 
Panel A, referring to income smoothing (right hand side), after the 2010-11 stress tests, 
first-time participants appear to influence their earnings by applying discretionary LLP, 
while the effect on 2014 first-time participants is negative (as in Table 2.7). The marginal 
effects confirm this result as the treatment banks increase their income smoothing during 
the 2010-11 treatment period (BAST1011 = 1), whilst their income smoothing is 
decreased during the 2014 treatment period (BAST14 = 1). 
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Similar results are provided in Table A.7, Panel B, which shows the marginal effects 
of the modification on low-, medium and high-capitalised banks (Table 2.9). In support 
of H5, low-capitalised treatment banks apply more discretionary practices, by further 
delaying LLPs during stress test periods (STHC =1). 
Moreover, Table A.7, Panel C, illustrates the marginal effects of the robustness check 
that includes adjusted samples to control for the common support bias (Table 2.11). The 
results are similar to the findings in Panel A and further support the main conclusion that 
stress-tested banks exercise discretion over LLPs to manage capital and earnings. 
Figure A.1 plots the marginal effects of the interaction terms in Table 2.8, the first 
modification of the baseline model that includes institutional variables (i.e., SUPERV, 
CAPREG, and CORRUPT) as suggested by Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011). The 
marginal effects of T1R and EBPT on SUPERV, CAPREG and CORRUPT show that the 
capital and earnings management of treatment banks remain relatively unchanged when 
the local supervisor’s strength, capital requirements and corruption level vary. In contrast, 
the control banks seem to exercise more discretion over LLP to manage capital and 
earnings depending on the supervisor’s strength during stress test periods (STHC = 1). I 
observe similar marginal effects of T1R on CAPREG and EBPT on CORRUPT as control 
banks appear to manage capital and earnings, respectively, during non-stress test periods 
(STHC = 0). In support of the baseline results in Table 2.8, a stricter institutional 
environment relates to both capital and earnings management. However, while stress-
tested banks are more closely regulated by European institutions (e.g., EBA, ECB), the 
control banks’ accounting discretions are more related to local institutional environments. 
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Table A.8 Additional robustness on multicollinearity (Table 2.7 excluding time fixed effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables TREATALL TREAT1011 TREAT14 
NPLit–1j 0.0464*** 0.0865** 0.1334** 
 (0.0092) (0.0374) (0.0595) 
ΔNPLitj 0.1577*** 0.1356*** 0.0959 
 (0.0334) (0.0264) (0.0625) 
ΔLOANitj -0.0219*** -0.0035 -0.0177* 
 (0.0040) (0.0050) (0.0095) 
T1Rit–1j -0.0388*** -0.0150 -0.0266 
 (0.0121) (0.0148) (0.0300) 
EBPTitj 0.0647*** 0.1669** 0.0295 
 (0.0233) (0.0730) (0.1813) 
STHC -0.0080***   
 (0.0023)   
TREATALL*STHC 0.0054**   
 (0.0024)   
TREATALL*T1Rit–1j 0.0108   
 (0.0139)   
STHC*T1Rit–1j 0.0465***   
 (0.0127)   
TREATALL*STHC*T1Rit–1j -0.0366**   
 (0.0144)   
TREATALL*EBPTitj 0.1389***   
 (0.0508)   
STHC*EBPTitj 0.1493*   
 (0.0758)   
TREATALL*STHC*EBPTitj -0.0342   
 (0.0900)   
BAST1011  -0.0065***  
  (0.0019)  
TREAT1011*BAST1011  0.0070**  
  (0.0028)  
TREAT1011*T1Rit–1j  0.0279  
  (0.0285)  
BAST1011*T1Rit–1j  0.0547***  
  (0.0158)  
TREAT1011*BAST1011*T1Rit–1j  -0.0841***  
  (0.0268)  
TREAT1011*EBPTitj  0.2238**  
  (0.1062)  
BAST1011*EBPTitj  -0.0881  
  (0.0589)  
TREAT1011*BAST1011*EBPTitj  0.1515  
  (0.0962)  
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Table A.8 continued 
BAST14   -0.0115*** 
   (0.0032) 
TREAT14*BAST14   0.0087* 
   (0.0046) 
TREAT14*T1Rit–1j   -0.0396 
   (0.0470) 
BAST14*T1Rit–1j   0.0638*** 
   (0.0215) 
TREAT14*BAST14*T1Rit–1j   -0.0280 
   (0.0320) 
TREAT14*EBPTitj   0.3025 
   (0.2150) 
BAST14*EBPTitj   0.1713 
   (0.1041) 
TREAT14*BAST14*EBPTitj   -0.2892** 
   (0.1223) 
SIZEit–1j 0.0007* -0.0007 0.0026 
 (0.0004) (0.0018) (0.0038) 
ΔGDPtj 0.0013 0.0021* -0.0072* 
 (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0041) 
ΔUNEMtj 0.0009 -0.0007 0.0043 
 (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0051) 
HPItj 0.0000* -0.0001** 0.0001 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
IRATEtj 0.0006*** 0.0004*** 0.0003 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0006) 
Constant -0.0058 0.0187 -0.0342 
 (0.0050) (0.0232) (0.0432) 
    
Observations 1,698 649 410 
Number of banks 152 119 72 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3247 0.4990 0.4058 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Half-year fixed effects No No No 
This table reports additional robustness on multicollinearity (Table 2.7 excluding time fixed effects). Model 1 
presents the total stress test effect on banks' capital management and income smoothing behaviour. Model 2 
illustrates the stress test effect on the discretionary behaviour of first-time participants in 2010-11. Model 3 
examines the stress test effect on the discretionary behaviour of first-time participants in 2014. I include the 
following variables in my analysis: Forward- and (shift of) backward looking asset quality captured by loan loss 
provisions (LLPitj) and lagged (change in) non-performing loans (NPLit–1j, ΔNPLitj), loan growth shown by change 
in outstanding loans (ΔLOANitj), capital management measured by lagged regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio        
(T1Rit–1j), income smoothing captured by earnings before provisions and taxes (EBPTitj); a dummy for stress test 
participation (TREATALL), first-time participation in 2010-11 (TREAT1011) and 2014 (TREAT14); a dummy for 
'hot' and 'cold' stress test periods (STHC), a dummy for four half-year periods before and after the 2010-11 
(BAST1011) and 2014 treatments (BAST14); bank size captured by lagged natural logarithm of total assets 
(SIZEit–1j) and macroeconomic fundamentals to control for contemporaneous fiscal and monetary policy changes 
and market instabilities such as illiquidity, constrained capital and higher volatility shown by economic growth 
(ΔGDPtj), unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj), price level in the housing market (HPItj) and sovereign debt risk 
(IRATEtj). Data range 2005-2015. Standard errors (parentheses) are clustered at bank level. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data 
sources are provided in Table 2.1. 
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Table A.9 Alternative model for stress test participation 
Panel A: Stress test disclosure sentiment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables STSitj STS_IDitj STS_PERFitj STS_PROitj STS_REGINitj STS_REQitj STS_RMitj 
STHC_I 0.0014** 0.0002*** 0.0001* 0.0003*** 0.0002** -0.0002 0.0007 
 (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0004) 
SIZEit–2j -0.0045** -0.0002* -0.0006*** -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0009* -0.0024* 
 (0.0019) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0014) 
LOANit–2j 0.0024 -0.0000 -0.0011* 0.0006 -0.0001 0.0032** 0.0001 
 (0.0054) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0016) (0.0038) 
LLRit–2j 0.0368* 0.0027*** 0.0076** 0.0043 0.0066*** -0.0126*** 0.0288* 
 (0.0212) (0.0009) (0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0015) (0.0043) (0.0145) 
LLPit–2j 0.0079 0.0025 0.0052 0.0013 0.0017 0.0013 -0.0037 
 (0.0393) (0.0028) (0.0053) (0.0071) (0.0051) (0.0140) (0.0277) 
TRADEit–2j -0.0061 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0014 -0.0017*** -0.0013 -0.0002 
 (0.0067) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0022) (0.0044) 
T1Rit–2j 0.0099 0.0007 0.0008 0.0020 0.0015* 0.0051** 0.0008 
 (0.0090) (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0008) (0.0024) (0.0062) 
DSTFit–2j -0.0044 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0008** -0.0006 -0.0044* 
 (0.0036) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0025) 
EBPTit–2j -0.1430* -0.0121** -0.0152* -0.0264* -0.0119 -0.0189 -0.0673 
 (0.0852) (0.0049) (0.0089) (0.0146) (0.0073) (0.0197) (0.0530) 
ΔGDPtj 0.0435*** -0.0010 0.0001 0.0022 0.0023* 0.0069* 0.0335*** 
 (0.0079) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0036) (0.0059) 
ΔUNEMtj 0.0092* -0.0004 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0002 0.0071** 
 (0.0051) (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0034) 
Constant 0.0852*** 0.0025** 0.0106*** 0.0050 0.0040* 0.0154** 0.0497*** 
 (0.0220) (0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0034) (0.0021) (0.0062) (0.0161) 
        
Observations 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 
Number of banks 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3297 0.3885 0.2230 0.4056 0.1731 0.2435 0.1991 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A.9 continued 
Panel B: Textual disclosure tone and quantitative disclosure behaviour 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables TONEitj AGGNUMitj NEGATIVEitj UNCERTAINitj MODALitj TRANXitj 
STHC_I -0.0256** 0.0006* 0.0004** 0.0002 0.0001 0.0054 
 (0.0122) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0056) 
SIZEit–2j 0.0946*** -0.0019** -0.0015*** -0.0005 0.0001 0.0345** 
 (0.0315) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0143) 
LOANit–2j 0.1895** -0.0012 -0.0023 0.0015 0.0002 -0.0415 
 (0.0833) (0.0022) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0007) (0.0367) 
LLRit–2j -0.6308** 0.0313*** 0.0251*** 0.0054 0.0004 0.0404 
 (0.2824) (0.0089) (0.0058) (0.0047) (0.0022) (0.1593) 
LLPit–2j -1.1054 0.0471** 0.0301** 0.0159 0.0077 -0.3488 
 (0.9840) (0.0184) (0.0132) (0.0139) (0.0060) (0.4403) 
TRADEit–2j -0.0580 -0.0046 -0.0012 -0.0028 -0.0016* -0.0373 
 (0.1648) (0.0039) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0009) (0.0637) 
T1Rit–2j 0.5195** 0.0042 -0.0072** 0.0111*** 0.0020* 0.2146** 
 (0.2082) (0.0048) (0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0012) (0.0833) 
DSTFit–2j 0.0308 -0.0049** -0.0019 -0.0031*** -0.0004 -0.0242 
 (0.0634) (0.0019) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0275) 
EBPTit–2j 2.4250* -0.0717 -0.0768*** 0.0022 -0.0084 0.5466 
 (1.2943) (0.0454) (0.0274) (0.0304) (0.0080) (0.5461) 
ΔGDPtj -0.0908 0.0117*** 0.0028 0.0090*** -0.0010 -0.0558 
 (0.2216) (0.0041) (0.0033) (0.0027) (0.0018) (0.0913) 
ΔUNEMtj -0.3003*** 0.0049** 0.0043** 0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0066 
 (0.1112) (0.0024) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0006) (0.0368) 
Constant -1.2793*** 0.0343*** 0.0283*** 0.0078 0.0003 0.1217 
 (0.3631) (0.0107) (0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0025) (0.1727) 
       
Observations 2,029 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,110 
Number of banks 84 84 84 84 84 90 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1391 0.3519 0.2376 0.4455 0.3623 0.5908 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports an alternative model of the individual effect of stress test participation on banks’ disclosure 
profiles. Panel A presents stress test disclosure sentiment. Panel B illustrates disclosure tone and quantitative 
disclosure behaviour. I measure stress test disclosure sentiment using the word count of my accumulated stress 
test, regulation and risk management word lists based on stress test disclosures (STS_ALLitj, STS_IDitj, 
STS_PERFitj, STS_PROitj, STS_REGINitj, STS_REQitj, and STS_RMitj). I estimate disclosure tone using the word 
count of Loughran and McDonald’s (2011a) word lists and Henry and Leone’s (2016) formulas (TONEitj, 
AGGNUMitj, NEGATIVEitj, UNCERTAINitj and MODALitj), and quantitative disclosure behaviour using a 
transparency index (TRANXitj) following Nier and Baumann (2006). I illustrate the individual stress test periods 
with a time-dummy (STHC_I). I control for bank characteristics, winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentiles and lagged 
by two quarters, and country-specific fundamentals using the following variables: Bank size captured by natural 
logarithm of total assets (SIZEit–2j), traditional banking activities shown by outstanding loans (LOANit–2j), credit 
portfolio quality measured by loan loss reserves (LLRit–2j), asset quality captured by loan loss provisions        
(LLPit–2j), non-traditional banking activities measured by trading securities (TRADEit–2j), capital adequacy 
captured by regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio (T1Rit–2j), liquidity risk shown by deposits and short-term funding 
(DSTFit–2j), profitability measured by earnings before provision and taxes (EBPTit–2j); and macroeconomic 
fundamentals captured by economic growth (ΔGDPtj), and unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj). Standard errors 
(in parentheses) are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 3.1. 
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Table A.10 Effect of stress test disclosure sentiment on (future) disclosure tone using alternative textual 
estimates and factor analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables ΔTONEitj AGGNUMitj LITIGIOUSitj 
STHC_I -0.0248* -0.0002 0.0001 
 (0.0146) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
STS_F1 0.0070 0.0045*** 0.0005*** 
 (0.0061) (0.0003) (0.0001) 
STHC_I*STS_F1 0.0088 -0.0007*** -0.0002** 
 (0.0065) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
STS_F2 -0.0102 0.0018*** 0.0004*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
STHC_I*STS_F2 0.0131 -0.0000 -0.0001 
 (0.0094) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
SIZEit–2j -0.0129 -0.0001 -0.0006* 
 (0.0142) (0.0006) (0.0003) 
LOANit–2j 0.0747 -0.0017 0.0008 
 (0.0608) (0.0014) (0.0007) 
LLRit–2j 0.1255 0.0152*** 0.0083** 
 (0.1461) (0.0046) (0.0039) 
LLPit–2j -0.0198 0.0371** 0.0047 
 (0.6328) (0.0159) (0.0088) 
TRADEit–2j 0.0621 -0.0012 -0.0006 
 (0.0723) (0.0027) (0.0010) 
T1Rit–2j 0.1742 -0.0015 -0.0012 
 (0.1159) (0.0030) (0.0017) 
DSTFit–2j -0.0094 -0.0035*** -0.0002 
 (0.0421) (0.0012) (0.0007) 
EBPTit–2j 1.6022** 0.0009 -0.0192 
 (0.7557) (0.0232) (0.0142) 
ΔGDPtj 0.1114 0.0030 -0.0035 
 (0.2523) (0.0029) (0.0027) 
ΔUNEMtj -0.2768*** 0.0033** 0.0025*** 
 (0.0690) (0.0016) (0.0008) 
Constant 0.1051 0.0218*** 0.0100*** 
 (0.1639) (0.0070) (0.0037) 
    
Observations 1,959 2,030 2,030 
Number of banks 84 84 84 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1064 0.7026 0.4767 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports banks’ individual effect of stress test participation and stress test disclosure sentiment on 
banks’ disclosure tone using alternative estimates. I measure distinct forms of disclosure tone using variation of 
disclosure tone (ΔTONEitj), aggregated ‘negative’, ‘uncertain’ and ‘modal’ tone (AGGNUMitj), and ‘litigious’ 
tone (LITIGIOUSitj). I estimate the impact of stress test disclosure sentiment using factor analysis measures from 
Table 3.12 (STS_F1 and STS_F2), which are built on the accumulated word count of my accumulated stress test, 
regulation and risk management word lists in combination with a time-dummy that estimates the individual stress 
test periods (STHC_I). I control for bank characteristics, winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentiles and lagged by 
two quarters, and country-specific fundamentals using the following variables: Bank size captured by natural 
logarithm of total assets (SIZEit–2j), traditional banking activities shown by outstanding loans (LOANit–2j), credit 
portfolio quality measured by loan loss reserves (LLRit–2j), asset quality captured by loan loss provisions         
(LLPit–2j), non-traditional banking activities measured by trading securities (TRADEit–2j), capital adequacy 
captured by regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio (T1Rit–2j), liquidity risk shown by deposits and short-term funding 
(DSTFit–2j), profitability measured by earnings before provision and taxes (EBPTit–2j); and macroeconomic 
fundamentals captured by economic growth (ΔGDPtj), and unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj). Standard errors 
(in parentheses) are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 3.1. 
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Table A.11 Effect of stress tests on bank opacity using alternative textual estimates 
Panel A: Bid-ask spreads and alternative textual measures    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables BIDASKitj BIDASKit+1j BIDASKitj BIDASKit+1j BIDASKitj BIDASKit+1j 
STHC_I 0.0002 -0.0009 0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0018 
 (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0013) 
STS_F1 -0.0008* -0.0007     
 (0.0004) (0.0005)     
STHC_I*STS_F1 0.0016*** 0.0018***     
 (0.0005) (0.0006)     
STS_F2 -0.0004 -0.0004     
 (0.0004) (0.0004)     
STHC_I*STS_F2 0.0007** 0.0008**     
 (0.0003) (0.0003)     
TONE_F1   -0.0008** -0.0008*   
   (0.0004) (0.0005)   
STHC_I*TONE_F1   0.0016*** 0.0018***   
   (0.0004) (0.0005)   
TONE_F2   -0.0005** -0.0006**   
   (0.0002) (0.0003)   
STHC_I*TONE_F2   -0.0001 -0.0001   
   (0.0002) (0.0002)   
TONE_ALT     -0.0177 -0.0375 
     (0.0542) (0.0548) 
STHC_I*TONE_ALT     -0.2056*** -0.2023*** 
     (0.0598) (0.0648) 
TOVERit–2j -0.0067 -0.0043 -0.0079 -0.0053 -0.0103 -0.0077 
 (0.0148) (0.0149) (0.0151) (0.0153) (0.0152) (0.0156) 
INVPRICEit–2j 0.0032** 0.0029** 0.0033** 0.0029** 0.0031** 0.0027** 
 (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012) 
RETVOLit–2j 0.1374** 0.1458** 0.1395** 0.1483** 0.1395** 0.1473** 
 (0.0601) (0.0644) (0.0606) (0.0651) (0.0612) (0.0657) 
MVALUEit–2j 0.0026*** 0.0026*** 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0029*** 0.0028*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
MTBVit–2j 0.0010 0.0014 0.0010 0.0014 0.0009 0.0013 
 (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0013) 
RECCONit–2j 0.0033*** 0.0030*** 0.0034*** 0.0031*** 0.0033*** 0.0030*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0010) 
ΔGDPtj 0.0089 0.0012 0.0113 0.0048 0.0117 0.0031 
 (0.0234) (0.0186) (0.0236) (0.0197) (0.0237) (0.0190) 
ΔUNEMtj -0.0051 -0.0031 -0.0062 -0.0044 -0.0061 -0.0044 
 (0.0064) (0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0070) (0.0067) (0.0070) 
IRATEtj 0.0003 0.0003* 0.0002 0.0003* 0.0003 0.0003* 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Constant -0.0344*** -0.0349*** -0.0353*** -0.0359*** -0.0354*** -0.0358*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0111) (0.0110) (0.0114) 
       
Observations 2,016 1,969 2,016 1,969 2,016 1,969 
Number of banks 55 55 55 55 55 55 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2197 0.2135 0.2221 0.2166 0.2137 0.2049 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Analyst coverage and alternative textual measures    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables RECNOitj RECNOit+1j RECNOitj RECNOit+1j RECNOitj RECNOit+1j 
STHC_I 0.3158 0.1271 0.2485 0.0772 0.8984 0.6830 
 (0.5041) (0.5159) (0.5300) (0.5402) (0.5440) (0.5520) 
STS_F1 0.2393 0.1785     
 (0.2258) (0.2368)     
STHC_I*STS_F1 -0.7293*** -0.6361***     
 (0.2043) (0.1931)     
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Table A.11 continued 
STS_F2 0.2133 0.2339     
 (0.3003) (0.2968)     
STHC_I*STS_F2 -0.5619** -0.4996**     
 (0.2284) (0.2386)     
TONE_F1   -0.0337 -0.0420   
   (0.2466) (0.2619)   
STHC_I*TONE_F1   -0.7236*** -0.6257***   
   (0.1821) (0.1725)   
TONE_F2   0.0164 0.0097   
   (0.2093) (0.2005)   
STHC_I*TONE_F2   -0.0786 -0.0393   
   (0.1678) (0.1505)   
TONE_ALT     25.9700 30.4701 
     (43.1915) (44.4616) 
STHC_I*TONE_ALT     113.8923*** 105.2607*** 
     (29.4869) (30.4278) 
TOVERit–2j 5.5376 5.8286 6.7030 6.8644 7.0279 7.1240 
 (7.2204) (6.9781) (7.3584) (7.0971) (7.1675) (6.9453) 
INVPRICEit–2j 1.4640*** 1.6290*** 1.5260*** 1.6905*** 1.5458*** 1.7125*** 
 (0.4635) (0.4216) (0.4813) (0.4367) (0.4750) (0.4297) 
RETVOLit–2j -48.1656** -34.4110** -48.2124** -34.5209** -48.0802** -34.2634** 
 (18.2825) (16.8508) (18.1725) (16.7242) (18.5079) (17.0400) 
MVALUEit–2j 2.2524*** 2.4185*** 2.2058*** 2.3730*** 2.1501*** 2.3118*** 
 (0.6090) (0.6100) (0.6066) (0.6068) (0.6140) (0.6117) 
MTBVit–2j -0.4216 -0.4859 -0.4278 -0.4891 -0.4105 -0.4742 
 (0.7458) (0.7455) (0.7446) (0.7399) (0.7399) (0.7348) 
RECCONit–2j -0.9562** -0.7032 -0.9624** -0.7087 -0.9367* -0.6869 
 (0.4705) (0.4503) (0.4732) (0.4547) (0.4701) (0.4523) 
ΔGDPtj -24.7660** -31.8731*** -24.4347** -31.5249*** -25.3737** -32.1669*** 
 (11.0348) (10.0880) (11.3422) (10.3980) (11.8316) (10.7440) 
ΔUNEMtj 6.6536* 6.1546* 7.1230** 6.6244* 7.4092** 6.9087** 
 (3.5638) (3.5289) (3.4831) (3.3997) (3.5317) (3.4449) 
IRATEtj -0.2966*** -0.4755*** -0.2965*** -0.4741*** -0.2950*** -0.4740*** 
 (0.0734) (0.0711) (0.0740) (0.0709) (0.0754) (0.0717) 
Constant 2.1354 -0.2461 2.1917 -0.1900 2.6721 0.3888 
 (6.6876) (6.5313) (6.6220) (6.4917) (6.8353) (6.6941) 
       
Observations 2,079 2,023 2,079 2,023 2,079 2,023 
Number of banks 55 55 55 55 55 55 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3102 0.3602 0.3078 0.3582 0.3065 0.3585 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports the individual effect of stress test participation and disclosure tone on information asymmetry 
and private information production using alternative textual estimates. I measure bank opacity using bid-ask-spread 
(Panel A: BIDASKitj) and analyst coverage employing the number of analyst recommendations (Panel B: RECNOitj). I 
estimate the impact of stress test disclosure sentiment and disclosure tone using factor analysis measures from 
Table 3.12 (STS_F1, STS_F2, TONE_F1, and TONE_F2) and TONE_ALT, which are built on the word count of my 
accumulated stress test, regulation and risk management word lists based on stress test disclosures, the word lists by 
Loughran and McDonald (2011a), and the formula as in Henry and Leone (2016). I combine latter measures with a 
time-dummy that estimates the individual stress test periods (STHC_I). I control for market microstructure 
characteristics, daily winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentiles, quarterly averaged and lagged by two quarters, using the 
following variables: Share turnover (TOVERit–2j), inverse share price (INVPRICEit–2j), return volatility (RETVOLit–2j), 
market value (MVALUEit–2j), market-to-book value (MTBVit–2j), analyst recommendation consensus (RECCONt–2), and 
macroeconomic fundamentals captured by economic growth (ΔGDPtj); unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj), and 
sovereign debt risk (IRATEtj). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources 
are provided in Table 3.1. 
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Table A.12 Effect of stress test disclosure sentiment on disclosure tone of stress-tested banks that 
participated more than four times 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables ΔTONEitj AGGNUMitj LITIGIOUSitj 
STHC_I -0.1725*** 0.0016* 0.0007 
 (0.0573) (0.0008) (0.0006) 
STSitj -1.0884 0.4241*** 0.0379** 
 (0.9138) (0.0307) (0.0149) 
STHC_I*STSitj 1.8503* -0.0244** -0.0113 
 (0.9438) (0.0115) (0.0104) 
SIZEit–2j -0.0466 0.0005 -0.0009 
 (0.0373) (0.0009) (0.0005) 
LOANit–2j 0.0811 -0.0029 0.0018 
 (0.1284) (0.0024) (0.0016) 
LLRit–2j 0.0336 0.0203*** 0.0082 
 (0.1904) (0.0056) (0.0064) 
LLPit–2j 1.3288 0.0299 0.0142 
 (0.8679) (0.0211) (0.0118) 
TRADEit–2j 0.0140 0.0014 -0.0006 
 (0.1751) (0.0043) (0.0021) 
T1Rit–2j 0.0561 0.0040 0.0035 
 (0.2830) (0.0082) (0.0055) 
DSTFit–2j 0.0390 -0.0018 0.0006 
 (0.0677) (0.0019) (0.0014) 
EBPTit–2j -0.3769 -0.0371 -0.0851*** 
 (1.2790) (0.0273) (0.0293) 
ΔGDPtj 0.3885 -0.0006 -0.0015 
 (0.9766) (0.0128) (0.0053) 
ΔUNEMtj -0.4961** 0.0052 0.0045** 
 (0.2220) (0.0045) (0.0019) 
Constant 0.5982 -0.0089 0.0115 
 (0.4815) (0.0109) (0.0069) 
    
Observations 766 784 784 
Number of banks 25 25 25 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1510 0.7508 0.4087 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
This table analyses the individual effect of stress test participation and stress test disclosure sentiment on 
disclosure tone of banks that participated three or more times in stress tests. I measure distinct forms of 
disclosure tone using variation of disclosure tone (ΔTONEitj), aggregated ‘negative’, ‘uncertain’ and ‘modal’ tone 
(AGGNUMitj), and ‘litigious’ tone (LITIGIOUSitj). I estimate the impact of stress test disclosure sentiment 
using the accumulated word count of my accumulated stress test, regulation and risk management word 
lists (STSitj), in combination with a time-dummy that estimates the individual stress test periods (STHC_I). 
I control for bank characteristics, winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentiles and lagged by two quarters, and 
country-specific fundamentals using the following variables: Bank size captured by natural logarithm of 
total assets (SIZEit–2j), traditional banking activities shown by outstanding loans (LOANit–2j), credit portfolio 
quality measured by loan loss reserves (LLRit–2j), asset quality captured by loan loss provisions (LLPit–2j), 
non-traditional banking activities measured by trading securities (TRADEit–2j), capital adequacy captured 
by regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio (T1Rit–2j), liquidity risk shown by deposits and short-term funding   
(DSTFit–2j), profitability measured by earnings before provision and taxes (EBPTit–2j); and macroeconomic 
fundamentals captured by economic growth (ΔGDPtj), and unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj). Standard 
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in 
Table 3.1. 
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Table A.13 Effect of stress tests on bank opacity of low-ranked stress-tested banks 
Panel A: Information asymmetry 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables BIDASKitj BIDASKit+1j BIDASKitj BIDASKit+1j 
STHC_I -0.0018 -0.0033** -0.0080*** -0.0099*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0025) (0.0030) 
STSitj   -0.0822** -0.0852** 
   (0.0362) (0.0386) 
STHC_I*STSitj   0.1360*** 0.1443** 
   (0.0486) (0.0578) 
TONEitj -0.0010 -0.0012   
 (0.0011) (0.0011)   
STHC_I*TONEitj -0.0038*** -0.0041***   
 (0.0013) (0.0015)   
TOVERit–2j -0.0110 -0.0098 -0.0072 -0.0060 
 (0.0156) (0.0168) (0.0149) (0.0161) 
INVPRICEit–2j 0.0024* 0.0020 0.0026* 0.0022 
 (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0013) 
RETVOLit–2j 0.1207 0.1299 0.1211 0.1317 
 (0.0778) (0.0837) (0.0768) (0.0827) 
MVALUEit–2j 0.0020* 0.0017** 0.0018* 0.0016* 
 (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) 
MTBVit–2j 0.0007 0.0009 0.0007 0.0008 
 (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0026) 
RECCONit–2j 0.0032** 0.0024** 0.0032** 0.0024** 
 (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0010) 
ΔGDPtj 0.0123 0.0008 0.0064 -0.0026 
 (0.0367) (0.0286) (0.0373) (0.0283) 
ΔUNEMtj -0.0191* -0.0217* -0.0166 -0.0188* 
 (0.0106) (0.0119) (0.0098) (0.0110) 
IRATEtj 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Constant -0.0280** -0.0251*** -0.0237** -0.0207** 
 (0.0105) (0.0084) (0.0102) (0.0083) 
     
Observations 1,233 1,204 1,234 1,205 
Number of banks 34 34 34 34 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2466 0.2413 0.2529 0.2473 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Analyst coverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables RECNOitj RECNOit+1j RECNOitj RECNOit+1j 
STHC_I 0.6525 0.2663 3.6247** 2.9495* 
 (0.7252) (0.7100) (1.6369) (1.6369) 
STSitj   48.0104* 45.8916* 
   (25.0956) (26.6326) 
STHC_I*STSitj   -66.9573*** -61.2051** 
   (23.0071) (23.4357) 
TONEitj 0.9785 1.0346   
 (1.0081) (0.9889)   
STHC_I*TONEitj 1.8087** 1.6847**   
 (0.7524) (0.7080)   
TOVERit–2j 4.5925 5.0995 2.6280 3.3515 
 (7.2298) (7.3685) (7.3707) (7.5414) 
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INVPRICEit–2j 1.3989** 1.6152*** 1.2913** 1.5088*** 
 (0.5123) (0.4691) (0.4941) (0.4558) 
RETVOLit–2j -47.5052** -29.9698 -46.8280** -29.3832 
 (20.6807) (19.4037) (21.1459) (19.8066) 
MVALUEit–2j 2.2022*** 2.5111*** 2.3713*** 2.6909*** 
 (0.6162) (0.6691) (0.6585) (0.7239) 
MTBVit–2j -1.6927 -1.8601 -1.6771 -1.8544 
 (1.2054) (1.2573) (1.2447) (1.3044) 
RECCONit–2j -1.6929*** -1.3909*** -1.6501*** -1.3413*** 
 (0.4265) (0.3930) (0.4363) (0.4053) 
ΔGDPtj -23.7610 -34.7506** -22.9173 -33.8215** 
 (15.5215) (14.7592) (15.0268) (14.2556) 
ΔUNEMtj 12.1584*** 9.8698** 10.5235** 8.1860* 
 (4.2529) (3.8902) (4.3419) (4.0308) 
IRATEtj -0.3357*** -0.5360*** -0.3439*** -0.5419*** 
 (0.1222) (0.1154) (0.1194) (0.1150) 
Constant 8.7183 4.6982 4.9982 0.9461 
 (7.1598) (7.2078) (7.7489) (8.0778) 
     
Observations 1,268 1,233 1,269 1,234 
Number of banks 34 34 34 34 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3422 0.3961 0.3407 0.3921 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports the individual effect of stress test participation and disclosure tone on information asymmetry 
and private information production of low-ranked stress-tested banks. I rank stress-tested banks according to 
their capital adequacy performance based on stress test disclosures and run the regression on the banks in the 
lower half of my ranking. Panel A presents information asymmetry captured by the current and future bid-ask-
spread (BIDASKitj, BIDASKit+1j), and Panel B applies analyst coverage estimated by the current and future number 
of analyst recommendations (RECNOitj, RECNOit+1j). I estimate the impact of stress test sentiment using the 
accumulated word count of my stress test, regulation and risk management word lists based on stress test 
disclosures (STSitj), disclosure tone using TONEitj, in combination with a time-dummy that estimates the 
individual stress test periods (STHC_I). I control for market microstructure characteristics, daily winsorised at 
the 1 and 99 percentiles, quarterly averaged and lagged by two quarters, using the following variables: Share 
turnover (TOVERit–2j), inverse share price (INVPRICEit–2j), return volatility (RETVOLit–2j), market value 
(MVALUEit–2j), market-to-book value (MTBVit–2j), analyst recommendation consensus (RECCONt–2); and 
macroeconomic fundamentals captured by economic growth (ΔGDPtj), unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj), and 
sovereign debt risk (IRATEtj). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant 
data sources are provided in Table 3.1. 
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Table A.14 Robustness checks using sample adjustments  
Panel A: Stress test disclosure sentiment, disclosure tone and quantitative disclosure behaviour 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Variables STSitj TONEitj TRANXitj STSitj TONEitj TRANXitj STSitj TONEitj TRANXitj 
ST1011 0.0193*** -0.2976*** 0.0619** 0.0199*** -0.3281*** 0.0419** 0.0191*** -0.2893*** 0.0667** 
 (0.0033) (0.0692) (0.0246) (0.0037) (0.0742) (0.0180) (0.0035) (0.0781) (0.0277) 
ST1011*FTST1011 0.0027* -0.0067 -0.0052 0.0034** -0.0045 0.0027 0.0027* -0.0070 -0.0073 
 (0.0016) (0.0209) (0.0095) (0.0016) (0.0238) (0.0116) (0.0016) (0.0212) (0.0096) 
ST1415 0.0292*** -0.3166*** 0.0882*** 0.0318*** -0.3230*** 0.0696*** 0.0286*** -0.3171*** 0.0978*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0727) (0.0269) (0.0034) (0.0849) (0.0242) (0.0032) (0.0820) (0.0291) 
ST1415*FTST1011 -0.0021** -0.0257 0.0096 -0.0037*** -0.0423* -0.0022 -0.0022** -0.0252 0.0095 
 (0.0010) (0.0204) (0.0074) (0.0012) (0.0247) (0.0080) (0.0010) (0.0201) (0.0073) 
ST2016 0.0312*** -0.2763*** 0.0959*** 0.0335*** -0.2979*** 0.0723*** 0.0303*** -0.2713*** 0.1031*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0743) (0.0278) (0.0036) (0.0849) (0.0261) (0.0034) (0.0833) (0.0308) 
ST2016*FTST1011 -0.0031** -0.0225 0.0307*** -0.0047*** -0.0410** 0.0286** -0.0036*** -0.0259 0.0282*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0170) (0.0096) (0.0014) (0.0193) (0.0112) (0.0012) (0.0165) (0.0095) 
SIZEit–2j -0.0050** 0.0859** 0.0357** -0.0079*** 0.1000** 0.0305 -0.0044** 0.0856** 0.0246 
 (0.0019) (0.0333) (0.0153) (0.0023) (0.0434) (0.0188) (0.0021) (0.0358) (0.0156) 
LOANit–2j 0.0032 0.1940** -0.0416 -0.0005 0.1956 -0.0469 0.0004 0.1633* -0.0360 
 (0.0053) (0.0849) (0.0360) (0.0070) (0.1177) (0.0521) (0.0059) (0.0892) (0.0357) 
LLRit–2j 0.0356* -0.6113** 0.0324 0.0386* -0.6408** 0.1480 0.0364* -0.5756* 0.0054 
 (0.0206) (0.2848) (0.1629) (0.0222) (0.3004) (0.1536) (0.0209) (0.2892) (0.1619) 
LLPit–2j 0.0064 -1.3646 -0.2224 0.0135 -1.5904 -0.6670 0.0159 -1.3626 -0.3509 
 (0.0382) (0.9909) (0.4373) (0.0421) (1.0852) (0.4950) (0.0380) (0.9989) (0.4442) 
TRADEit–2j -0.0071 -0.0868 -0.0144 0.0021 -0.0276 0.0196 -0.0078 -0.0410 -0.0476 
 (0.0070) (0.1749) (0.0649) (0.0119) (0.3195) (0.0943) (0.0068) (0.1707) (0.0624) 
T1Rit–2j 0.0073 0.5206** 0.2171*** 0.0045 0.5046** 0.0847 0.0061 0.4960** 0.2078** 
 (0.0094) (0.2101) (0.0801) (0.0132) (0.2307) (0.0792) (0.0094) (0.2094) (0.0819) 
DSTFit–2j -0.0046 0.0314 -0.0274 -0.0028 -0.0033 -0.0277 -0.0034 0.0382 -0.0330 
 (0.0037) (0.0646) (0.0275) (0.0052) (0.0970) (0.0392) (0.0038) (0.0654) (0.0276) 
EBPTit–2j -0.1577* 2.1224 0.5939 -0.2766** 2.1109 0.4778 -0.1340 2.7077** 0.3772 
 (0.0862) (1.3077) (0.5559) (0.1061) (1.5378) (0.7695) (0.0844) (1.3548) (0.5415) 
ΔGDPtj 0.0428*** -0.0594 -0.0676 0.0453*** 0.0502 -0.1633 0.0440*** -0.0688 -0.0835 
 (0.0093) (0.2278) (0.0932) (0.0120) (0.2516) (0.1115) (0.0091) (0.2259) (0.0961) 
ΔUNEMtj 0.0119** -0.2777** -0.0118 0.0112* -0.2983** -0.0045 0.0092* -0.3066*** -0.0036 
 (0.0051) (0.1131) (0.0363) (0.0056) (0.1367) (0.0443) (0.0055) (0.1147) (0.0374) 
Constant 0.0896*** -1.1702*** 0.1093 0.1244*** -1.2774** 0.1904 0.0859*** -1.1771*** 0.2388 
 (0.0220) (0.3796) (0.1799) (0.0278) (0.5125) (0.2252) (0.0253) (0.4058) (0.1847) 
          
Observations 1,957 1,956 2,037 1,422 1,421 1,501 1,970 1,969 2,037 
Number of banks 80 80 86 63 63 69 80 80 85 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3480 0.1355 0.5948 0.3791 0.1450 0.5546 0.3254 0.1285 0.5973 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel B: Effect of stress test disclosure sentiment on disclosure tone 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Variables ΔTONEitj AGGNUMitj LITIGIOUSitj ΔTONEitj AGGNUMitj LITIGIOUSitj ΔTONEitj AGGNUMitj LITIGIOUSitj 
STHC_I -0.0990** 0.0009 0.0008** -0.1140* 0.0009 0.0009** -0.1031** 0.0012** 0.0008** 
 (0.0486) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0630) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0479) (0.0006) (0.0004) 
STSitj -0.6628 0.4194*** 0.0410*** -0.2938 0.4277*** 0.0494*** -0.9159* 0.4083*** 0.0358*** 
 (0.5469) (0.0177) (0.0073) (0.7229) (0.0176) (0.0081) (0.4611) (0.0189) (0.0077) 
STHC_I*STSitj 1.4058* -0.0174* -0.0136** 1.4709 -0.0171 -0.0159** 1.4926** -0.0217** -0.0121** 
 (0.7332) (0.0104) (0.0062) (0.9753) (0.0131) (0.0076) (0.7135) (0.0107) (0.0060) 
SIZEit–2j -0.0196 0.0003 -0.0004* -0.0218 0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0127 -0.0002 -0.0007* 
 (0.0138) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0213) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0153) (0.0007) (0.0004) 
LOANit–2j 0.0817 -0.0023** 0.0007 0.0861 -0.0024 0.0012 0.0497 -0.0016 0.0008 
 (0.0599) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0848) (0.0017) (0.0009) (0.0616) (0.0013) (0.0008) 
LLRit–2j 0.1507 0.0168*** 0.0093** 0.1389 0.0176*** 0.0096** 0.1794 0.0162*** 0.0088** 
 (0.1466) (0.0043) (0.0040) (0.1513) (0.0049) (0.0045) (0.1485) (0.0042) (0.0041) 
LLPit–2j -0.0284 0.0466*** 0.0093 0.1055 0.0364** 0.0011 0.1296 0.0425*** 0.0057 
 (0.6364) (0.0141) (0.0086) (0.7371) (0.0149) (0.0093) (0.6200) (0.0140) (0.0092) 
TRADEit–2j 0.0865 -0.0010 -0.0004 0.1203 0.0032 -0.0002 0.0651 -0.0023 -0.0009 
 (0.0764) (0.0030) (0.0010) (0.1330) (0.0037) (0.0017) (0.0776) (0.0028) (0.0011) 
T1Rit–2j 0.1698 -0.0000 -0.0006 0.2369* -0.0020 -0.0011 0.1804 0.0008 -0.0009 
 (0.1159) (0.0024) (0.0017) (0.1318) (0.0034) (0.0026) (0.1171) (0.0023) (0.0018) 
DSTFit–2j -0.0204 -0.0029*** -0.0001 -0.0127 -0.0028* -0.0003 -0.0150 -0.0030*** -0.0002 
 (0.0416) (0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0536) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0426) (0.0011) (0.0007) 
EBPTit–2j 1.3953* -0.0014 -0.0129 1.7469* 0.0003 -0.0226 1.3475* -0.0169 -0.0245 
 (0.7560) (0.0209) (0.0129) (1.0174) (0.0220) (0.0173) (0.7313) (0.0242) (0.0159) 
ΔGDPtj 0.0956 -0.0048 -0.0029 0.1380 -0.0045 -0.0020 0.0303 -0.0058* -0.0035 
 (0.2541) (0.0032) (0.0026) (0.2654) (0.0042) (0.0029) (0.2452) (0.0033) (0.0027) 
ΔUNEMtj -0.2828*** 0.0004 0.0023*** -0.2801*** -0.0001 0.0028*** -0.2975*** 0.0014 0.0024*** 
 (0.0707) (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0799) (0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0726) (0.0014) (0.0008) 
Constant 0.2119 -0.0047 0.0054* 0.1994 -0.0107 0.0053 0.1694 0.0008 0.0091** 
 (0.1565) (0.0060) (0.0030) (0.2417) (0.0077) (0.0038) (0.1789) (0.0078) (0.0044) 
          
Observations 1,886 1,957 1,957 1,361 1,422 1,422 1,903 1,970 1,970 
Number of banks 80 80 80 63 63 63 80 80 80 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1054 0.7724 0.4779 0.1225 0.7659 0.4665 0.0969 0.7512 0.4523 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel C: Effect of stress test disclosure sentiment on information asymmetry 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables BIDASKitj BIDASKitj BIDASKitj BIDASKitj BIDASKitj BIDASKitj 
STHC_I -0.0005 -0.0054** -0.0012 -0.0079*** -0.0004 -0.0049** 
 (0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0011) (0.0025) (0.0012) (0.0021) 
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STSitj  -0.0506*  -0.0862**  -0.0428 
  (0.0296)  (0.0372)  (0.0270) 
STHC_I*STSitj  0.1067***  0.1481***  0.0957*** 
  (0.0347)  (0.0493)  (0.0325) 
TONEitj -0.0007  -0.0017  -0.0005  
 (0.0012)  (0.0012)  (0.0010)  
STHC_I*TONEitj -0.0029***  -0.0037***  -0.0025**  
 (0.0011)  (0.0012)  (0.0010)  
TOVERit–2j -0.0096 -0.0076 -0.0129 -0.0102 -0.0110 -0.0090 
 (0.0147) (0.0143) (0.0136) (0.0133) (0.0150) (0.0145) 
INVPRICEit–2j 0.0028** 0.0030** 0.0020** 0.0022** 0.0027** 0.0028** 
 (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
RETVOLit–2j 0.1460** 0.1459** 0.1462** 0.1467** 0.1201* 0.1200* 
 (0.0643) (0.0638) (0.0677) (0.0668) (0.0631) (0.0626) 
MVALUEit–2j 0.0026*** 0.0025*** 0.0031*** 0.0030*** 0.0022*** 0.0021*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
MTBVit–2j 0.0012 0.0013 0.0007 0.0007 0.0006 0.0007 
 (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
RECCONit–2j 0.0034*** 0.0034*** 0.0036** 0.0035** 0.0027** 0.0027*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
ΔGDPtj 0.0129 0.0101 0.0106 0.0039 0.0136 0.0105 
 (0.0249) (0.0248) (0.0348) (0.0353) (0.0244) (0.0242) 
ΔUNEMtj -0.0067 -0.0054 -0.0159* -0.0133 -0.0065 -0.0055 
 (0.0070) (0.0067) (0.0088) (0.0082) (0.0068) (0.0065) 
IRATEtj 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Constant -0.0334*** -0.0302*** -0.0396*** -0.0344*** -0.0271*** -0.0246*** 
 (0.0113) (0.0103) (0.0125) (0.0115) (0.0092) (0.0088) 
       
Observations 1,865 1,866 1,372 1,373 2,007 2,008 
Number of banks 51 51 38 38 54 54 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2143 0.2186 0.2479 0.2534 0.1956 0.2001 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel D: Effect of stress test disclosure sentiment on analyst coverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables RECNOitj RECNOitj RECNOitj RECNOitj RECNOitj RECNOitj 
STHC_I 0.7596 4.0663*** 0.7501 4.2643** 0.6690 3.7981*** 
 (0.5701) (1.1798) (0.6872) (1.6240) (0.5765) (1.1947) 
STSitj  36.9178*  40.4635  40.3494** 
  (19.5443)  (27.7460)  (17.9522) 
STHC_I*STSitj  -70.0783***  -75.8792***  -66.0121*** 
  (17.5267)  (23.3100)  (18.0800) 
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TONEitj 0.7146  0.9406  0.6103  
 (0.9143)  (1.0185)  (0.8876)  
STHC_I*TONEitj 1.3971*  1.5533**  1.3590*  
 (0.7027)  (0.7612)  (0.6985)  
TOVERit–2j 6.6221 5.3728 5.1703 4.0999 6.7085 5.0904 
 (7.0948) (7.1142) (6.8856) (7.0299) (7.0561) (7.0159) 
INVPRICEit–2j 1.5239*** 1.4364*** 1.5992*** 1.5026*** 1.5146*** 1.4234*** 
 (0.5147) (0.5015) (0.5500) (0.5385) (0.4757) (0.4619) 
RETVOLit–2j -47.7307** -47.3525** -44.4683** -44.0584** -52.5776*** -52.2005*** 
 (19.5887) (19.8771) (19.3981) (19.6333) (18.8633) (19.0815) 
MVALUEit–2j 2.1963*** 2.3184*** 1.8245*** 1.9473*** 2.0726*** 2.1958*** 
 (0.6421) (0.6504) (0.6145) (0.6394) (0.6061) (0.6088) 
MTBVit–2j -0.4982 -0.5267 -0.9259 -0.9166 -0.3948 -0.4352 
 (0.7755) (0.7802) (0.8520) (0.8662) (0.7528) (0.7545) 
RECCONit–2j -0.7881 -0.7698 -1.3099** -1.2260** -1.0162** -1.0125** 
 (0.4706) (0.4675) (0.4957) (0.5115) (0.4829) (0.4802) 
ΔGDPtj -32.3039*** -31.1604*** -28.3422* -26.3696* -26.6412** -25.5520** 
 (11.5954) (10.9726) (14.4009) (14.0006) (11.8016) (11.1062) 
ΔUNEMtj 9.1195** 8.1474** 11.8719*** 10.5098** 7.3023** 6.4096* 
 (3.4589) (3.4884) (4.1777) (4.2759) (3.5250) (3.5242) 
IRATEtj -0.3049*** -0.3138*** -0.3242*** -0.3314*** -0.2865*** -0.2919*** 
 (0.0758) (0.0732) (0.0861) (0.0838) (0.0758) (0.0731) 
Constant 1.8550 -0.7968 9.3598 6.3612 3.6228 0.8854 
 (6.9507) (7.0039) (6.9582) (7.4089) (6.9356) (6.9178) 
       
Observations 1,924 1,925 1,423 1,424 2,071 2,072 
Number of banks 51 51 38 38 54 54 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3034 0.3077 0.3264 0.3260 0.3075 0.3124 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports robustness checks using adjusted samples. Panel A presents stress test disclosure sentiment, disclosure tone and quantitative disclosure behaviour. Panel B illustrates the effect of stress test disclosure 
sentiment on (future change in) disclosure tone. Panel C shows the effect of stress tests on bank opacity. In Panels A/B and C/D, respectively, I exclude banks from the United Kingdom (Models 1 to 3 and 1 to 2), of non-
EMU countries (Models 4 to 6 and 3 to 4) and inactive banks (Models 7 to 9 and 5 to 6). I measure stress test disclosure sentiment using the word count of my accumulated stress test, regulation and risk management 
word list (STSitj). I estimate distinct forms of disclosure tone using variation of disclosure tone (ΔTONEitj), aggregated ‘negative’, ‘uncertain’ and ‘modal’ tone (AGGNUMitj), and ‘litigious’ tone (LITIGIOUSitj). I capture 
quantitative disclosure behaviour using a transparency index (TRANXitj) following Nier and Baumann (2006). I measure bank opacity using bid-ask-spread (BIDASKitj) and analyst coverage (RECNOitj). The following 
dummy variables measure first-time participation in 2010-11 (FTST1011) and the stress test periods in 2010-11 (ST1011), 2014-15 (ST1415), and 2016 (ST2016), and the individual stress test periods (STHC_I). I control 
for bank characteristics, winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentiles and lagged by two quarters, and country-specific fundamentals using the following variables: Bank size captured by natural logarithm of total assets (SIZEit–
2j), traditional banking activities shown by outstanding loans (LOANit–2j), credit portfolio quality measured by loan loss reserves (LLRit–2j), asset quality captured by and loan loss provisions (LLPit–2j), non-traditional 
banking activities measured by trading securities (TRADEit–2j), capital adequacy captured by regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio (T1Rit–2j), liquidity risk shown by deposits and short-term funding (DSTFit–2j), and profitability 
measured by earnings before provision and taxes (EBPTit–2j). I control for market microstructure characteristics, daily winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentiles, quarterly averaged and lagged by two quarters, using the 
following variables: Share turnover (TOVERit–2j), inverse share price (INVPRICEit–2j), return volatility (RETVOLit–2j), market value (MVALUEit–2j), market-to-book value (MTBVit–2j), analyst recommendation consensus 
(RECCONt–2), and macroeconomic fundamentals captured by economic growth (ΔGDPtj), unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj), and sovereign debt risk (IRATEtj). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the bank 
level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 3.1.
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Table A.15 Robustness checks on CTIME-analysis using the Fama and French (1993) three-factors model (FF3F) 
Panel A: European banks   
Equally-weighted (FF3F) 
 
MVALUE-weighted (FF3F) 
    1-12 mths. 1-24 mths. 1-36 mths.  1-12 mths. 1-24 mths. 1-36 mths. 
(1) CEBS 2010        
 Alpha -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003***  0.0006 0.0000 -0.0001 
 BETA 0.5512 0.8782*** 0.7863  0.7928*** 0.9603*** 0.9660*** 
 SMB -0.6879 -0.0497 -0.1374  -0.7084** -0.2867 -0.2019 
 HML 1.6210* 0.8961* 1.2168***  0.7086* 0.3709*** 0.3974*** 
 Observations 12 24 36  12 24 36 
 R-squared 0.9698 0.9739 0.9739  0.9964 0.9954 0.9939          
(2) EBA 2011        
 Alpha 0.0012 0.0017 0.0004  0.0004 0.0007 0.0006 
 BETA 0.9633*** 1.0444*** 0.9529***  1.0331*** 1.0840*** 1.0931*** 
 SMB 0.2225 0.4536* 0.5017  -0.6046 0.1143 0.1100 
 HML 0.9919 0.4818 1.0736**  0.3453 0.3707*** 0.3345*** 
 Observations 12 24 36  12 24 36 
 R-squared 0.9417 0.9531 0.9339  0.9886 0.991 0.9909          
(3) EBA/ECB 2014       
 Alpha -0.0033 -0.0010 -0.0002  -0.0017* -0.0017** -0.0006 
 BETA 0.9787** 0.8593*** 0.9168***  1.2732*** 1.0972*** 0.9938*** 
 SMB 0.0999 -0.1334 0.1186  0.2142 -0.1071 -0.2493 
 HML 0.1926 0.5113 0.5512**  -0.5837*** -0.4332** -0.1973 
 Observations 12 24 36  12 24 36 
 R-squared 0.9148 0.8918 0.9245  0.9833 0.9593 0.9545          
(4) EBA 2016        
 Alpha -0.0006 -0.0007   -0.0004 -0.0003  
 BETA 0.8954** 1.0939***   1.0028*** 1.0848***  
 SMB -0.5623 -0.0979   0.0811 0.2270  
 HML 0.2171 -0.2276   0.1115 -0.0378  
 Observations 12.0000 24.0000   12.0000 24.0000  
 R-squared 0.9541 0.9602   0.9822 0.9832           
(5) FTSTO       
 Alpha -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0001  -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0002  BETA 0.6549 0.9057** 0.8109***  0.7478 0.9313*** 0.8809*** 
 SMB -0.3948 0.1631 0.1793  -0.6032 -0.1198 -0.1724 
 HML 1.1839 0.7298 1.0355  0.9392 0.5420 0.6720** 
 Observations 36 72 108  36 72 108 
 R-squared 0.0486 0.2314 0.2291  0.8260 0.8647 0.7989 
         
(6) TOTALSTO        
 Alpha -0.0008 0.0000 0.0000  -0.0001 -0.0004 0.0000 
 BETA 0.9777*** 0.9975*** 0.9448***  1.1465*** 1.0878*** 1.0747*** 
 SMB 0.1400 0.2945* 0.2878*  -0.0916 -0.0270 -0.0291 
 HML 0.7306* 0.5206*** 0.8287***  0.0216 0.0368 0.1094 
 Observations 36 72 108  36 72 108 
  R-squared 0.9426 0.9502 0.9411  0.9836 0.9853 0.9839 
Panel B: U.S. banks   
Equally-weighted (FF3F) 
 
MVALUE-weighted (FF3F) 
    1-12 mths. 1-24 mths. 1-36 mths.  1-12 mths 1-24 mths 1-36 mths 
(1) SCAP 2009        
 Alpha 0.0022 0.0045* 0.0019  0.0023 0.0025* 0.0007 
 BETA 0.5672 0.5080*** 0.7656***  0.3734** 0.6066*** 0.8312*** 
 SMB 0.3357 0.3411 0.3002  0.2911 -0.0352 -0.0186 
 HML 2.1352 2.3157*** 1.1139*  2.3901*** 1.3578*** 0.3122 
 Observations 12 24 36  12 24 36 
 R-squared 0.9804 0.9664 0.9573  0.9919 0.9838 0.9714 
         
(2) CCAR 2011        
 Alpha 0.0012* 0.0008 0.0006  0.0004 0.0005 0.0003 
 BETA 0.4883*** 0.5064*** 0.5755***  0.5109*** 0.6276*** 0.6160*** 
 SMB -0.2015 0.2493 0.1347  -0.0180 0.1427 0.0596 
 HML 0.3420 0.4821 0.2866  0.3089 0.3755 0.3680 
 Observations 12 24 36  12 24 36 
 R-squared 0.876 0.7277 0.7816  0.8093 0.7538 0.7876 
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(3) CCAR 2012        
 Alpha 0.0016 0.0001 -0.0001  0.0015 0.0001 -0.0008 
 BETA 1.0069*** 1.1277*** 1.0744***  0.9149*** 1.0719*** 1.0720*** 
 SMB -0.0462 0.0820 0.0560  0.2665 0.3361 0.0072 
 HML 0.3162 -0.0866 0.0489  0.6700 0.0803 0.1476 
 Observations 12 24 36  12 24 36 
 R-squared 0.9254 0.9501 0.9391  0.914 0.9394 0.9181 
        
(4) CCAR 2013       
 Alpha -0.0021 -0.0007 0.0001  -0.0021** -0.0007 -0.0004 
 BETA 1.1891*** 1.1608*** 1.1573***  1.0487*** 1.1109*** 1.1261*** 
 SMB -0.1824 0.1490 0.1032  -0.5305** -0.1839 -0.1105 
 HML -1.5303** -0.7859 -0.2672  -0.5860 -0.1466 -0.0747 
 Observations 12 24 36  12 24 36 
 R-squared 0.8061 0.835 0.8598  0.8898 0.8147 0.8508 
         
(5) CCAR 2014       
 Alpha 0.0007 0.0000 0.0005  0.0002 0.0003 0.0004  BETA 1.1205*** 0.9297*** 0.9719***  0.9971*** 0.9682*** 0.9995*** 
 SMB -0.1005 0.0187 0.1347  -0.0334 -0.0303 -0.0459 
 HML 0.0630 -0.1434 0.0050  -0.1023 -0.1488** -0.0988* 
 Observations 12 24 36  12 24 36 
 R-squared 0.9811 0.9475 0.9335  0.9825 0.9825 0.9839 
         
(6) CCAR 2015       
 Alpha 0.0007* 0.0002 0.0004  0.0007* 0.0004 0.0004 
 BETA 1.1093*** 1.0051*** 0.9781***  1.0721*** 0.9976*** 0.9856*** 
 SMB 0.1372* 0.2141 0.1603  -0.0335 0.0132 0.0157 
 HML -0.0977 0.0560 0.0200  -0.0337 0.0593 -0.0183 
 Observations 12 24 36  12 24 36 
 R-squared 0.9908 0.9431 0.9287  0.9923 0.9623 0.9599 
         
(7) CCAR 2016       
 Alpha 0.0016 0.0011*   0.0010* 0.0005  
 BETA 1.0104*** 0.9878***   0.9141*** 0.9308***  
 SMB 0.3950* 0.5158***   0.2642** 0.3240***  
 HML 0.3215 0.2562**   0.2202 0.0775  
 Observations 12 24   12 24  
 R-squared 0.9687 0.9531   0.9927 0.9741  
         
(8) CCAR 2017       
 Alpha 0.0005    -0.0001   
 BETA 0.7393***    0.8659***   
 SMB 0.5261**    0.1404   
 HML -0.0494    -0.0601   
 Observations 12    12   
 R-squared 0.9092    0.9749   
         
(9) FTSTO        
 Alpha -0.0001 0.0008 0.0009  -0.0004 0.0003 0.0006 
 BETA 0.9126*** 0.7966*** 0.8655***  0.7632*** 0.7924*** 0.8670*** 
 SMB 0.1627 0.3697 0.2644  0.1323 0.0197 -0.0358 
 HML 0.5081 0.8170*** 0.5447**  0.5517 0.3930* 0.1115 
 Observations 36 72 108  36 72 108 
 R-squared 0.9319 0.8829 0.8362  0.9154 0.8901 0.8348 
         
(10) TOTALSTO        
 Alpha 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004  -0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 
 BETA 1.0074*** 0.9303*** 0.9422***  0.8850*** 0.8875*** 0.9073*** 
 SMB 0.0228* 0.2480** 0.1935  0.0007 0.0847 0.0391 
 HML 0.0412 0.1270 0.0922  0.0553 0.0135 -0.0051 
 Observations 72 144 216  72 144 216 
  R-squared 0.9637 0.9318 0.9333  0.9668 0.95 0.9456 
This table reports the robustness checks on the calendar-time portfolio approach (CTIME). Panel A illustrates the European 
sample. Models 1 to 4 show the results for the individual European stress tests in 2010, 2011, 2014 and 2016, whilst Models 5 
and 6 display first-time and total stress test observations (FTSTO, TOTALSTO). Panel B illustrates the U.S. sample. Models 1 
to 8 display the results for the individual U.S. stress tests in 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017, whilst 
Models 9 and 10 show first-time and total stress test observations (FTSTO, TOTALSTO). I estimate the coefficients, equally-
weighted and MVALUE-weighted (year-end quarter 4 prior to each stress test event) for 1 to 12, 24 and 36 months after the 
stress test using the Fama and French (1993) three-factors model (FF3F). Bank performance is measured by Jensen’s alpha 
(Alpha), and the three factors are asset sensitivity (BETA), capitalisation (SMB) and book-to-market (HML). *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources 
are provided in Table 4.1. 
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Table A.16 Robustness check on bank funding structure including sovereign debt risk 
Panel A: European banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables TIEitj OIEitj DEPBAitj IECDitj CUSTDitj NIMitj 
ST1011EU -0.0153*** -0.0124*** -0.0107 -0.0061*** 0.0020 -0.0077*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0027) (0.0248) (0.0013) (0.0441) (0.0011) 
ST1011EU*FTST1011EU 0.0012 0.0008 -0.0327** 0.0005 0.0172 0.0004 
 (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0160) (0.0005) (0.0155) (0.0005) 
ST1415EU -0.0177*** -0.0128*** -0.1012*** -0.0086*** 0.0396 -0.0095*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0027) (0.0261) (0.0015) (0.0438) (0.0011) 
ST1415EU*FTST1011EU 0.0002 0.0000 0.0228* 0.0001 0.0009 0.0013** 
 (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0133) (0.0005) (0.0105) (0.0006) 
ST16EU -0.0181*** -0.0131*** -0.1181*** -0.0089*** 0.0847* -0.0095*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0027) (0.0280) (0.0015) (0.0470) (0.0012) 
ST16EU*FTST1011EU -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0425** 0.0003 -0.0189 0.0015* 
 (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0170) (0.0007) (0.0199) (0.0008) 
SIZEit–2j -0.0006 0.0004 0.0403*** -0.0016** -0.1006*** -0.0012 
 (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0129) (0.0008) (0.0271) (0.0008) 
LOANit–2j 0.0103** 0.0083* -0.1114** 0.0016 -0.0154 0.0039* 
 (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0477) (0.0025) (0.0731) (0.0024) 
LLPit–2j 0.0210 0.0485 2.9362*** 0.0183 -1.7707*** -0.0779** 
 (0.0380) (0.0390) (0.6315) (0.0390) (0.6582) (0.0301) 
TRADEit–2j -0.0204*** -0.0139*** -0.1747*** -0.0117*** -0.0862 0.0018 
 (0.0049) (0.0041) (0.0613) (0.0037) (0.0792) (0.0031) 
DEPOit–2j 0.0003 -0.0018 0.1909*** 0.0027* 0.2723*** 0.0020 
 (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0558) (0.0015) (0.0384) (0.0016) 
EBPTit–2j 0.0359 0.0807 -1.3384* -0.0951** 0.1958 -0.0783 
 (0.0693) (0.0645) (0.6801) (0.0385) (0.8149) (0.0560) 
ΔGDPtj 0.0084 0.0068 0.2997 0.0006 0.0180 0.0026 
 (0.0142) (0.0150) (0.2064) (0.0107) (0.2473) (0.0100) 
ΔUNEMtj -0.0028 -0.0081** 0.0012 0.0073** -0.0835** 0.0050** 
 (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0505) (0.0032) (0.0406) (0.0025) 
IRATEtj -0.0000 0.0003*** 0.0031 -0.0002 -0.0033*** -0.0002*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0023) (0.0001) (0.0012) (0.0001) 
Constant 0.0234 0.0068 -0.3186** 0.0273*** 1.4877*** 0.0237** 
 (0.0191) (0.0176) (0.1492) (0.0085) (0.3186) (0.0094) 
       
Observations 2,067 2,047 2,280 1,297 2,311 2,312 
Number of banks 83 83 83 78 83 86 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7049 0.4890 0.2428 0.6340 0.3384 0.7438 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: U.S. banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables TIEitj OIEitj SUBDitj IECDitj CUSTDitj NIMitj 
ST0913US 0.0450*** 0.0179*** -0.0019 0.0149** 0.8166*** 0.3381*** 
 (0.0071) (0.0034) (0.0169) (0.0062) (0.1379) (0.0300) 
ST0913US*FTST09US -0.0004 0.0003 0.0009 0.0008** -0.0067 -0.0007 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0018) (0.0003) (0.0093) (0.0009) 
ST1417US 0.0207*** 0.0051** -0.0070 0.0029 0.5246*** 0.1891*** 
 (0.0039) (0.0022) (0.0103) (0.0040) (0.0909) (0.0169) 
ST1417US*FTST09US -0.0004 0.0002 -0.0005 0.0008 0.0141 0.0001 
 (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0028) (0.0005) (0.0156) (0.0008) 
SIZEit–2j 0.0024*** 0.0026** 0.0004 0.0003 -0.1066*** -0.0021* 
 (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0045) (0.0005) (0.0141) (0.0010) 
LOANit–2j -0.0009 -0.0021 0.0273 -0.0000 0.0004 0.0052 
 (0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0162) (0.0017) (0.0656) (0.0063) 
LLPit–2j 0.0222 0.0136 -0.0048 0.0109 0.7689 -0.2058*** 
 (0.0265) (0.0298) (0.1636) (0.0166) (0.5550) (0.0551) 
TRADEit–2j 0.0008 0.0014 -0.0038 -0.0047 -0.0712 -0.0021 
 (0.0051) (0.0069) (0.0159) (0.0037) (0.1311) (0.0095) 
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DEPOit–2j -0.0029 -0.0048* -0.0241** 0.0029** 0.3380*** 0.0026 
 (0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0094) (0.0014) (0.0880) (0.0038) 
EBPTit–2j -0.0468*** -0.0282** 0.0135 -0.0150 0.1108 -0.1211*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0131) (0.0618) (0.0109) (0.3260) (0.0358) 
ΔGDPtj 0.0480*** 0.0255*** 0.0062 0.0234*** 0.6371*** 0.2954*** 
 (0.0069) (0.0037) (0.0148) (0.0043) (0.0952) (0.0268) 
ΔUNEMtj 0.0832*** 0.0407*** 0.0219 0.0454*** 2.0042*** 0.5418*** 
 (0.0135) (0.0085) (0.0370) (0.0105) (0.3155) (0.0504) 
IRATEtj -0.0151*** -0.0076*** -0.0012 -0.0077*** -0.2007*** -0.0940*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0011) (0.0047) (0.0015) (0.0368) (0.0086) 
Constant -0.0221*** -0.0199* 0.0164 0.0030 1.5405*** -0.0143 
 (0.0077) (0.0097) (0.0551) (0.0046) (0.1398) (0.0131) 
       
Observations 992 992 718 869 975 993 
Number of banks 28 28 28 27 28 28 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8689 0.7125 0.3317 0.8728 0.5801 0.8532 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table robustness checks on bank funding structure including sovereign debt risk. Panel A illustrates the European 
sample and Panel B shows the U.S. sample. I estimate bank funding structure using total (TIEitj) uninsured (OIEitj) and 
insured (IECDitj) funding cost as well as uninsured (DEPBAitj, SUBDitj), insured funding (CUSTDitj) and interest margin 
(NIMitj). In Panel A, I include dummy variable to measure European first-time participation in 2010-11 (FTST1011EU) 
and the stress test periods in 2010-11 (ST1011EU), 2014-15 (ST1415EU), and 2016 (ST16EU). In Panel B, I include 
dummy variables to estimate U.S. first-time participation in 2009 (FTST09US) and the stress test periods in 2009-13 
(ST0913US) and 2014-17 (ST1417US). In both panels, I control for bank characteristics, lagged by two quarters, and 
country-specific fundamentals using the following variables: Bank size captured by natural logarithm of total assets 
(SIZEit–2j), traditional banking activities shown by outstanding loans (LOANit–2j), asset quality measured by loan loss 
provisions (LLPit–2j), non-traditional banking activities measured by trading securities (TRADEit–2j), liquidity shown by 
total deposits (DEPOit–2j), profitability measured by earnings before provision and taxes (EBPTit–2j); and 
macroeconomic fundamentals captured by economic growth (ΔGDPtj), and unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj), and 
sovereign debt risk (IRATEtj). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources 
are provided in Table 4.1. 
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Table A.17 Robustness checks on information asymmetry and analyst behaviour using sample adjustments 
Panel A: European sample without inactive banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables BIDASKitj RECNOitj EPSSUR / 
PRICEitj 
ESTSD /  
PRICEitj 
ST1011EU 0.0060* 3.0198** -0.0816** -0.0414* 
 (0.0031) (1.4417) (0.0373) (0.0233) 
ST1011EU*FTST1011EU -0.0038* 2.2591** 0.0075 0.0307** 
 (0.0021) (0.9058) (0.0185) (0.0129) 
ST1415EU -0.0039** 2.7529 0.0596 0.0298 
 (0.0018) (1.8820) (0.0357) (0.0203) 
ST1415EU*FTST1011EU 0.0032*** -1.9336 -0.0206 0.0073 
 (0.0010) (1.4690) (0.0212) (0.0159) 
ST16EU -0.0028* 2.6360 0.0415 -0.0135 
 (0.0016) (2.1708) (0.0541) (0.0251) 
ST16EU*FTST1011EU 0.0022 -3.1748* -0.0856 0.0061 
 (0.0016) (1.6119) (0.0529) (0.0240) 
TOVERit–2j -0.0154 3.3005 -0.3799 -0.1568 
 (0.0178) (6.5231) (0.4594) (0.3227) 
INVPRICEit–2j 0.0027** 0.8477 -0.0469 -0.0392** 
 (0.0012) (0.5233) (0.0411) (0.0180) 
RETVOLit–2j 0.1750* -53.1435** 1.0360 1.6057*** 
 (0.0927) (20.6367) (0.6196) (0.5616) 
MVALUEit–2j 0.0022*** 1.9501*** -0.1942*** -0.1045*** 
 (0.0006) (0.6004) (0.0457) (0.0190) 
MTBVit–2j 0.0009 -0.6334 0.0187 0.0115 
 (0.0012) (0.8672) (0.0175) (0.0103) 
RECCONit–2j 0.0027** -1.1825** -0.0208 -0.0188** 
 (0.0011) (0.5419) (0.0215) (0.0083) 
ΔGDPtj 0.0124 -23.3765* -0.5989*** -0.1626 
 (0.0127) (12.1582) (0.2082) (0.1059) 
ΔUNEMtj -0.0131 7.2586* -0.1443 -0.1550* 
 (0.0090) (3.9504) (0.1013) (0.0855) 
IRATEtj 0.0003 -0.3131*** 0.0149** 0.0129*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0753) (0.0058) (0.0031) 
Constant -0.0282*** 5.7632 1.7484*** 0.9554*** 
 (0.0086) (7.3117) (0.4473) (0.1785) 
     
Observations 2,196 2,257 2,256 2,224 
Number of banks 54 54 54 52 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2331 0.3012 0.3138 0.4284 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: U.S. sample without non-U.S. subsidiaries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables BIDASKitj RECNOitj EPSSUR / 
PRICEitj 
ESTSD /  
PRICEitj 
ST0913US 0.0002 -6.5945* 0.1024*** 0.0011 
 (0.0002) (3.3830) (0.0205) (0.0046) 
ST0913US*FTST09US -0.0003* 0.2420 -0.0220** -0.0006 
 (0.0002) (1.0534) (0.0091) (0.0018) 
ST1417US -0.0001 -1.4134 0.0425** -0.0004 
 (0.0002) (1.9340) (0.0179) (0.0044) 
ST1417US*FTST09US -0.0003* -0.0157 0.0007 0.0015 
 (0.0002) (1.4820) (0.0098) (0.0021) 
TOVERit–2j 0.0019 38.1083 -0.0256 0.0632 
 (0.0090) (35.4803) (0.7358) (0.1365) 
INVPRICEit–2j 0.0025 -9.9568 0.1405 0.0054 
 (0.0033) (7.9852) (0.1719) (0.0527) 
RETVOLit–2j 0.0086* -22.3631 1.2066* 0.3985*** 
 (0.0048) (19.8636) (0.6498) (0.1253) 
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MVALUEit–2j -0.0004 0.0940 -0.0085 -0.0031 
 (0.0002) (0.9454) (0.0166) (0.0054) 
MTBVit–2j 0.0001 0.4486 -0.0063 0.0002 
 (0.0001) (0.6159) (0.0079) (0.0021) 
RECCONit–2j 0.0001 -2.1858** 0.0013 0.0029** 
 (0.0001) (0.7889) (0.0076) (0.0011) 
ΔGDPtj -0.0014*** -4.0967* 0.0694** 0.0033 
 (0.0003) (2.3839) (0.0283) (0.0048) 
ΔUNEMtj -0.0007 -15.2514** 0.2169** 0.0166 
 (0.0005) (7.3323) (0.0854) (0.0148) 
IRATEtj 0.0000 4.6804*** -0.0345*** -0.0005 
 (0.0001) (1.1032) (0.0072) (0.0012) 
Constant 0.0038* 26.0057** 0.0766 0.0211 
 (0.0020) (10.5791) (0.1706) (0.0515) 
     
Observations 1,119 1,119 1,116 1,119 
Number of banks 25 25 25 25 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8157 0.8110 0.2432 0.6105 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports robustness checks the effect of stress tests on information asymmetry using sample adjustments. 
Panel A illustrates the European sample (without inactive banks) and Panel B shows the U.S. sample (without non-U.S. 
subsidiaries). I use the following dependent variables, daily winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentiles and quarterly 
averaged, in my analysis: Information asymmetry captured by the bid-ask spread (BIDASKitj) and analyst behaviour 
using analyst coverage (RECNOitj), earnings surprises (EPSSUR / PRICEitj) and estimate dispersion (ESTSD / PRICEitj). 
In Panel A, I include dummy variable to measure European first-time participation in 2010-11 (FTST1011EU) and the 
stress test periods in 2010-11 (ST1011EU), 2014-15 (ST1415EU), and 2016 (ST16EU). In Panel B, I include dummy 
variables to estimate U.S. first-time participation in 2009 (FTST09US) and the stress test periods in 2009-13 (ST0913US) 
and 2014-17 (ST1417US). In both panels, I control for market microstructure characteristics, lagged by two quarters, 
and country-specific fundamentals using the following variables: Share turnover (TOVERit–2j), inverse share price 
(INVPRICEit–2j), return volatility (RETVOLit–2j), market value (MVALUEit–2j), market-to-book value (MTBVit–2j), 
analyst recommendation consensus (RECCONt–2); and macroeconomic fundamentals captured by the economic growth 
(ΔGDPtj), unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj), and sovereign debt risk (IRATEtj). Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The 
description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 4.1. 
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Table A.18 Robustness checks on bank risk-taking using sample adjustments 
Panel A: European sample without inactive banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables T1Ritj LEVERAGEitj RWAitj LLRitj ZSCOREitj ROAitj 
ST1011EU 0.0350*** -0.2080** -0.0358 0.0267*** 0.4854* -0.0049*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0877) (0.0291) (0.0099) (0.2895) (0.0016) 
ST1011EU*FTST1011EU 0.0014 0.0364 0.0005 -0.0032 0.2406 -0.0019** 
 (0.0067) (0.0367) (0.0163) (0.0042) (0.1561) (0.0007) 
ST1415EU 0.0856*** -0.4186*** -0.1141*** 0.0311*** 0.9054*** -0.0056*** 
 (0.0131) (0.0754) (0.0320) (0.0109) (0.2367) (0.0018) 
ST1415EU*FTST1011EU -0.0159* -0.0404 0.0224 0.0048 -0.0702 -0.0009 
 (0.0086) (0.0407) (0.0174) (0.0041) (0.1378) (0.0009) 
ST16EU 0.0837*** -0.3717*** -0.1257*** 0.0373*** 0.7768*** -0.0071*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0728) (0.0326) (0.0135) (0.2785) (0.0018) 
ST16EU*FTST1011EU -0.0088 -0.0882* 0.0399* 0.0014 -0.1138 -0.0001 
 (0.0080) (0.0459) (0.0208) (0.0080) (0.1400) (0.0010) 
SIZEit–2j -0.0182 0.3685*** -0.1204*** -0.0167 -0.4056* -0.0024** 
 (0.0123) (0.0843) (0.0298) (0.0103) (0.2050) (0.0011) 
LOANit–2j -0.0580** -0.0304 0.3008*** -0.0318 -0.9408* 0.0064 
 (0.0284) (0.2065) (0.0763) (0.0201) (0.4805) (0.0050) 
LLPit–2j -0.9127*** 7.7302*** 0.9731* 2.0799*** -50.1736*** -0.3148*** 
 (0.2488) (1.9400) (0.5727) (0.2419) (6.3173) (0.0575) 
TRADEit–2j 0.0459 -0.8828*** -0.0560 -0.0313 0.7919 0.0091* 
 (0.0331) (0.3186) (0.0658) (0.0217) (0.5587) (0.0052) 
DEPOit–2j -0.0345*** 0.1196 -0.0534* -0.0151 0.3894 0.0009 
 (0.0103) (0.1097) (0.0292) (0.0156) (0.2836) (0.0022) 
EBPTit–2j 1.1538*** -8.4877*** -1.3262 -0.3677 28.1053*** 0.1575** 
 (0.2941) (2.3853) (0.9226) (0.3307) (8.7121) (0.0739) 
ΔGDPtj 0.0705 -0.2971 -0.2530 0.0429 1.6789** 0.0300** 
 (0.0440) (0.5981) (0.1584) (0.0516) (0.7509) (0.0135) 
ΔUNEMtj 0.0097 0.3916*** -0.1592*** -0.0480*** -0.3432 -0.0025 
 (0.0178) (0.1285) (0.0495) (0.0108) (0.3188) (0.0025) 
Constant 0.3396** -1.2006 1.8050*** 0.2240* 7.6198*** 0.0317** 
 (0.1466) (0.9386) (0.3484) (0.1147) (2.3142) (0.0129) 
       
Observations 2,265 2,364 2,150 2,154 2,421 2,408 
Number of banks 84 86 82 82 86 82 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5253 0.2938 0.4742 0.3598 0.1560 0.1802 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: U.S. sample without non-U.S. subsidiaries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables T1Ritj LEVERAGEitj RWAitj LLRitj ZSCOREitj ROAitj 
ST0913US 0.0160 0.0186 0.0991** 0.0039 0.9994** 0.0495*** 
 (0.0120) (0.1486) (0.0407) (0.0031) (0.4718) (0.0050) 
ST0913US*FTST09US 0.0022 -0.0771 -0.0126 -0.0000 0.4334 -0.0008 
 (0.0048) (0.0623) (0.0202) (0.0017) (0.2805) (0.0009) 
ST1417US 0.0129 0.0333 0.1057** 0.0021 1.1291** 0.0536*** 
 (0.0152) (0.1891) (0.0421) (0.0030) (0.4608) (0.0050) 
ST1417US*FTST09US 0.0011 -0.0775 0.0123 -0.0003 0.1134 -0.0013 
 (0.0073) (0.0820) (0.0268) (0.0007) (0.2190) (0.0012) 
SIZEit–2j 0.0000 0.0847 -0.0970*** 0.0006 0.0038 -0.0042*** 
 (0.0080) (0.1110) (0.0281) (0.0016) (0.1841) (0.0011) 
LOANit–2j -0.0358 0.1198 0.4554*** -0.0039 -0.0350 -0.0034 
 (0.0246) (0.1931) (0.0805) (0.0072) (0.9957) (0.0048) 
LLPit–2j 0.1888 2.6210 -1.5245 0.5126*** -9.4642 -0.1589** 
 (0.2651) (2.6498) (1.0106) (0.0650) (11.9784) (0.0633) 
TRADEit–2j -0.0397 0.7894 -0.1576 -0.0174 -0.9395 -0.0052 
 (0.0484) (0.7352) (0.2026) (0.0109) (1.9613) (0.0085) 
DEPOit–2j 0.0062 0.1971 -0.2582*** 0.0052 1.2287* 0.0120*** 
 (0.0203) (0.3013) (0.0612) (0.0050) (0.5970) (0.0039) 
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EBPTit–2j -0.0882 -0.1581 0.1343 -0.0804* 5.4578 -0.0880*** 
 (0.1026) (0.8662) (0.3567) (0.0438) (4.8422) (0.0266) 
ΔGDPtj -0.1142** 1.5966** 0.5811*** 0.0199* 2.8606* 0.2818*** 
 (0.0541) (0.6991) (0.1986) (0.0101) (1.4865) (0.0228) 
ΔUNEMtj -0.4061** 5.5705** 2.3353*** 0.0782* 11.1989* 0.8590*** 
 (0.1955) (2.5677) (0.7487) (0.0419) (5.7441) (0.0658) 
Constant 0.1060 1.1380 1.8712*** 0.0011 1.6738 0.0531*** 
 (0.0866) (1.2395) (0.3292) (0.0186) (2.0902) (0.0136) 
       
Observations 830 848 749 828 848 847 
Number of banks 24 24 24 23 24 24 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5528 0.3535 0.4179 0.7337 0.1319 0.5996 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports robustness checks on the effect of stress tests on bank risk-taking using sample adjustments. Panel A 
illustrates the European sample (without inactive banks) and Panel B shows the U.S. sample (without non-U.S. 
subsidiaries). I use the following dependent variables, winsorised at the 1 and 99 percentiles, in my analysis: Bank risk-
taking using capital adequacy (T1Ritj), leverage risk (LEVERAGEitj), credit risk (RWAitj), credit portfolio quality (LLRitj), 
insolvency risk (ZSCOREitj), and profitability (ROAitj). In Panel A, I include dummy variable to measure European 
first-time participation in 2010-11 (FTST1011EU) and the stress test periods in 2010-11 (ST1011EU), 2014-15 
(ST1415EU), and 2016 (ST16EU). In Panel B, I include dummy variables to estimate U.S. first-time participation in 
2009 (FTST09US) and the stress test periods in 2009-13 (ST0913US) and 2014-17 (ST1417US). In both panels, I control 
for bank characteristics, lagged by two quarters, and country-specific fundamentals using the following variables: Bank 
size captured by natural logarithm of total assets (SIZEit–2j), traditional banking activities shown by outstanding loans 
(LOANit–2j), asset quality measured by loan loss provisions (LLPit–2j), non-traditional banking activities measured by 
trading securities (TRADEit–2j), liquidity shown by total deposits (DEPOit–2j), profitability measured by earnings before 
provision and taxes (EBPTit–2j); and macroeconomic fundamentals captured by economic growth (ΔGDPtj), and 
unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data 
sources are provided in Table 4.1. 
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Table A.19 Robustness checks on bank funding structure using sample adjustments 
Panel A: European sample without inactive banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables TIEitj OIEitj DEPBAitj IECDitj CUSTDitj NIMitj 
ST1011EU -0.0155*** -0.0124*** -0.0024 -0.0065*** -0.0015 -0.0086*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0032) (0.0268) (0.0013) (0.0439) (0.0011) 
ST1011EU*FTST1011EU 0.0013 0.0007 -0.0329** 0.0005 0.0161 0.0004 
 (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0161) (0.0005) (0.0150) (0.0005) 
ST1415EU -0.0176*** -0.0135*** -0.1000*** -0.0085*** 0.0476 -0.0101*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0031) (0.0268) (0.0015) (0.0444) (0.0012) 
ST1415EU*FTST1011EU 0.0002 -0.0000 0.0247** 0.0001 -0.0064 0.0011* 
 (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0122) (0.0005) (0.0104) (0.0006) 
ST16EU -0.0179*** -0.0135*** -0.1106*** -0.0087*** 0.0783* -0.0096*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0032) (0.0288) (0.0015) (0.0454) (0.0013) 
ST16EU*FTST1011EU -0.0004 -0.0006 0.0445*** 0.0001 -0.0198 0.0013* 
 (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0156) (0.0007) (0.0180) (0.0007) 
SIZEit–2j -0.0002 0.0013 0.0320** -0.0014 -0.1230*** -0.0021** 
 (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0155) (0.0009) (0.0193) (0.0011) 
LOANit–2j 0.0111** 0.0074 -0.0849* 0.0024 -0.0685 0.0043* 
 (0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0460) (0.0025) (0.0633) (0.0025) 
LLPit–2j 0.0110 0.0537 2.9514*** -0.0109 -2.4118*** -0.0637** 
 (0.0352) (0.0349) (0.6179) (0.0363) (0.6625) (0.0310) 
TRADEit–2j -0.0208*** -0.0160*** -0.1879*** -0.0112*** -0.0528 0.0041 
 (0.0047) (0.0041) (0.0603) (0.0037) (0.0806) (0.0032) 
DEPOit–2j 0.0009 -0.0014 0.1686*** 0.0038** 0.2839*** 0.0014 
 (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0516) (0.0016) (0.0437) (0.0017) 
EBPTit–2j 0.0211 0.0558 -1.2783** -0.0963** 0.3184 -0.0570 
 (0.0700) (0.0664) (0.6264) (0.0402) (0.8994) (0.0583) 
ΔGDPtj 0.0031 -0.0027 0.0040 -0.0043 0.2249 -0.0123* 
 (0.0071) (0.0088) (0.1061) (0.0118) (0.2018) (0.0062) 
ΔUNEMtj -0.0009 -0.0036 0.0004 0.0070*** -0.0642* -0.0013 
 (0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0334) (0.0026) (0.0332) (0.0023) 
Constant 0.0167 -0.0020 -0.2293 0.0238** 1.7679*** 0.0344*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0226) (0.1796) (0.0102) (0.2243) (0.0123) 
       
Observations 2,072 2,049 2,300 1,289 2,327 2,324 
Number of banks 82 82 82 77 82 86 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7042 0.4830 0.2170 0.6245 0.3497 0.7442 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: U.S. sample without non-U.S. subsidiaries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables TIEitj OIEitj SUBDitj IECDitj CUSTDitj NIMitj 
ST0913US 0.0060** -0.0014 0.0002 -0.0035 0.3261*** 0.1045*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0066) (0.0030) (0.0429) (0.0102) 
ST0913US*FTST09US 0.0002 -0.0000 0.0008 0.0009** -0.0014 -0.0002 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0015) (0.0004) (0.0080) (0.0008) 
ST1417US 0.0056* -0.0022 -0.0044 -0.0033 0.3733*** 0.1099*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0025) (0.0074) (0.0033) (0.0547) (0.0112) 
ST1417US*FTST09US 0.0006 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0012** 0.0061 -0.0005 
 (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0031) (0.0005) (0.0137) (0.0009) 
SIZEit–2j 0.0028*** 0.0029* 0.0040 0.0006 -0.0992*** -0.0029** 
 (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0042) (0.0008) (0.0204) (0.0012) 
LOANit–2j -0.0036 -0.0034 0.0260 -0.0003 0.0788 0.0090 
 (0.0022) (0.0033) (0.0202) (0.0020) (0.0532) (0.0075) 
LLPit–2j 0.0224 0.0188 -0.0191 0.0053 0.6182 -0.2068*** 
 (0.0270) (0.0312) (0.1955) (0.0166) (0.6064) (0.0532) 
TRADEit–2j -0.0034 0.0010 -0.0060 -0.0074* 0.0056 0.0033 
 (0.0052) (0.0081) (0.0163) (0.0037) (0.1109) (0.0089) 
DEPOit–2j -0.0024 -0.0060* -0.0309*** 0.0046** 0.3342*** 0.0016 
 (0.0025) (0.0033) (0.0105) (0.0019) (0.0879) (0.0043) 
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EBPTit–2j -0.0442** -0.0277* 0.0071 -0.0163 -0.1079 -0.1368*** 
 (0.0182) (0.0157) (0.0792) (0.0116) (0.3230) (0.0391) 
ΔGDPtj 0.0945*** 0.0494*** 0.0047 0.0476*** 1.2729*** 0.5837*** 
 (0.0156) (0.0083) (0.0342) (0.0101) (0.2116) (0.0620) 
ΔUNEMtj 0.2826*** 0.1417*** 0.0100 0.1495*** 4.7305*** 1.7869*** 
 (0.0482) (0.0274) (0.1182) (0.0344) (0.8417) (0.1914) 
Constant -0.0176* -0.0177 -0.0258 0.0016 1.5137*** 0.0413*** 
 (0.0091) (0.0150) (0.0519) (0.0080) (0.2012) (0.0143) 
       
Observations 847 847 586 748 830 848 
Number of banks 24 24 24 23 24 24 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8651 0.6972 0.3457 0.8666 0.6282 0.8405 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports robustness checks on the effect of stress tests on bank funding structure using sample adjustments. 
Panel A illustrates the European sample (without inactive banks) and Panel B shows the U.S. sample (without non-U.S. 
subsidiaries). I estimate bank funding structure using total (TIEitj) uninsured (OIEitj) and insured (IECDitj) funding cost 
as well as uninsured (DEPBAitj, SUBDitj), insured funding (CUSTDitj), and interest margin (NIMitj). In Panel A, I include 
dummy variable to measure European first-time participation in 2010-11 (FTST1011EU) and the stress test periods in 
2010-11 (ST1011EU), 2014-15 (ST1415EU), and 2016 (ST16EU). In Panel B, I include dummy variables to estimate 
U.S. first-time participation in 2009 (FTST09US) and the stress test periods in 2009-13 (ST0913US) and 2014-17 
(ST1417US). In both panels, I control for bank characteristics, lagged by two quarters, and country-specific 
fundamentals using the following variables: Bank size captured by natural logarithm of total assets (SIZEit–2j), 
traditional banking activities shown by outstanding loans (LOANit–2j), asset quality measured by loan loss provisions 
(LLPit–2j), non-traditional banking activities measured by trading securities (TRADEit–2j), liquidity shown by total 
deposits (DEPOit–2j), profitability measured by earnings before provision and taxes (EBPTit–2j); and macroeconomic 
fundamentals captured by economic growth (ΔGDPtj), and unemployment growth (ΔUNEMtj). Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered at the bank level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. The description of the variables and the relevant data sources are provided in Table 4.1. 
